Engineering Papers⌕ Search

SEARCH · Engineering Papers

Results for “Physical Security”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 793 records · Page 44

EMS and DMS Integration of the Coordinative Real-time Sub-Transmission Volt-Var Control Tool under High DER Penetration

This paper proposes an applicable approach to deploy the Coordinative Real-time Sub-Transmission Volt-Var Control Tool (CReST-VCT), and a holistic system integration framework considering both the energy management system (EMS) and distribution system management system (DMS). This provides an architectural basis and can serve as the implementation guideline of CReST-VCT and other advanced grid support tools, to co-optimize the operation benefits of DERs and assets in both transmission and distribution networks. Potential communication protocols for different physical domains of a real application is included. Performance and security issues are also discussed, along with specific considerations for field deployment. Finally, the paper presents a viable pathway for CReST-VCT and other advanced grid support tools, which could be integrated in an open-source standardized-based platform that supports distribution utilities.

Nguyen, Quan H.↗

Data Centers and Digital Assurance Workshop 3 – Mitigations for Digital Assurance Risks

The third session of the TADA (Technical Assistance for Digital Assurance) Data Centers Cohort, held on November 18, 2025, focused on developing mitigation strategies for digital assurance risks identified in previous workshops. Hosted by Idaho National Laboratory (INL) and ScottMadden, the session emphasized the application of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) to data center infrastructure, particularly at the utility–data center interface. Participants revisited and ranked key digital assurance risks, including architecture and interface weaknesses, governance gaps, and AI-enabled threats. The workshop introduced the 12 principles of CIE, advocating for consequence-focused design, engineered controls, and secure information architecture to proactively reduce cyber-physical vulnerabilities. These principles were applied to critical data center systems such as power distribution, UPS, cooling, SCADA/BMS, and grid-forming batteries. The session also addressed governance challenges at the interconnection boundary, highlighting the need for clear roles in telemetry sharing, firmware management, and trip settings. Special attention was given to emerging risks from behind-the-meter (BTM) generation, including reverse-power flow and the integration of small modular reactors (SMRs), which shift data centers from large loads to complex generation nodes. Participants explored how interconnection agreements can serve as enforceable instruments for digital assurance, and reviewed gaps in current standards such as NERC CIP, IEC 62443, and IEEE 1547. The workshop concluded with pathways to standardization, including model agreement language, state-level programs, and expanded NERC guidance. INL also presented tools and frameworks for secure procurement and supplier risk management, reinforcing the need for integrated engineering and policy solutions to secure the evolving data center–grid ecosystem. Session 3 of 3.

24 - POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Semiconductor detectors with proximity signal readout

Semiconductor-based radiation detectors are routinely used for the detection, imaging, and spectroscopy of x-rays, gamma rays, and charged particles for applications in the areas of nuclear and medical physics, astrophysics, environmental remediation, nuclear nonproliferation, and homeland security. Detectors used for imaging and particle tracking are more complex in that they typically must also measure the location of the radiation interaction in addition to the deposited energy. In such detectors, the position measurement is often achieved by dividing or segmenting the electrodes into many strips or pixels and then reading out the signals from all of the electrode segments. Fine electrode segmentation is problematic for many of the standard semiconductor detector technologies. Clearly there is a need for a semiconductor-based radiation detector technology that can achieve fine position resolution while maintaining the excellent energy resolution intrinsic to semiconductor detectors, can be fabricated through simple processes, does not require complex electrical interconnections to the detector, and can reduce the number of required channels of readout electronics. Proximity electrode signal readout (PESR), in which the electrodes are not in physical contact with the detector surface, satisfies this need.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

NEUTRON AND GAMMA RAY DETECTION FOR BORDER SECURITY APPLICATIONS

Countries around the world are deploying radiation detection instrumentation to interdict the illegal shipment of radioactive material crossing international borders. These efforts include deployments in the U.S. and in a number of other countries by governments and international organizations. Most deployed radiation portal monitor systems are based on plastic scintillator for gamma-ray detection and 3He tubes for neutron detection. The approach to this homeland security application, and lessons learned, are discussed.

72 PHYSICS OF ELEMENTARY PARTICLES AND FIELDS↗

Nuclear Security Objectives of an NMAC System

After completing this module, you should be able to: Describe the role of Nuclear Material Accounting and Control (NMAC) in comprehensive nuclear security at a facility; Describe purpose of NMAC; Identify differences between the use of NMAC for IAEA safeguards and for facility nuclear security; List NMAC elements and measures; and Describe process for resolution of irregularities

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Probabilistic Risk Assessment of Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System Failure Considering Safety and Security Initiating Events

In order to quantify the probable risk associated with a safety system, nuclear safety risk evaluation process is applied which is generally performed in three steps. The first step is to calculate the damage frequency of a critical system. This step is followed by the radioactive source term estimation due to the potential system damage. The final step is the assessment of off-site consequences. The safety risk formula is shown by Eq. (1). P{sub F} is the probability of safety system failure (the probability used describes a random, independent event), and C is the consequence value. R{sub SAF} = P{sub F} * C (1) The security risk associated with an attack on critical infrastructure and/or special nuclear materials theft is usually evaluated using three- term risk equation (probability of attack, probability of adversary success, and consequence). A security threat and the related initiating events are not considered in a pure safety risk analysis. The vulnerability of the physical protection system is performed independently even though the consequence resulting from a security initiating event can be similar to a safety related initiating event and thus gets double counted. The security risk can be calculated using Eq. (2) R{sub SEC} = P{sub A} * P{sub S} * C (2) PA is the probability of attack, P{sub S} is the probability of adversary success (P{sub S} = 1 - P{sub I} P{sub N}). P{sub I} being the probability of interruption which accounts for the probabilities of detection of all timely detection elements along an adversary path. PN being the probability of neutralization: the result of engagement of the response force with the adversaries after the interruption has occurred. C is the consequence magnitude from a successful attack. The two security probabilities do not describe random, independent events. As a result, because of the differences in the randomness and independence of the respective safety and security probabilities, the safety and the security risks are currently calculated separately. The consequence term in nuclear safety and security risk evaluation have the same definition. An effort is made here to study the effect on the overall risk by considering security initiating events along with the subsequent failure of the intermediate safety element. The target selected is a spent fuel storage pool for analyzing the public risk arising from the interplay between nuclear security and safety initiating events. EASI (Estimate of Adversary Sequence Interruption) model is used to calculate the probability of interruption related to a security system that leads to the calculation of the security initiating event frequency. Further progression of this initiating security event to a top event is analyzed using a Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) tool, SAPHIRE (version 8) to obtain a joint pool damage frequency. For the progression of events leading to a top event, the failure of the intermediate safety elements is assumed to be external random events such as heavy load drop and fire events. The objectives of this study is to (1) determine the double accounting of frequency of failure, risk and allocated resources in the scenario of a non-random security initiating event leading to a safety random event chain (2) compare the damage frequency from pure security with the frequency of combined security-safety failure event and pure safety failure events. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Forewarning of Failure in Complex Systems

As the critical infrastructures of the United States have become more and more dependent on public and private networks, the potential for widespread national impact resulting from disruption or failure of these networks has also increased. Securing the nation s critical infrastructures requires protecting not only their physical systems but, just as important, the cyber portions of the systems on which they rely. A failure is inclusive of random events, design flaws, and instabilities caused by cyber (and/or physical) attack. One such domain is failure in critical equipment. A second is aging bridges. We discuss the workings of such a system in the context of the necessary sensors, command and control and data collection as well as the cyber security efforts that would support this system. Their application and the implications of this computing architecture are also discussed, with respect to our nation s aging infrastructure.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

The Need for a Strong Science and Technology Program in the Nuclear Weapons Complex for the 21st Century

In this paper I argue for the need for a strong Science and Technology program in the Nuclear Weapons Complex as the basis for maintaining a credible deterrence capability. The current Nuclear Posture Review establishes a New Triad as the basis for the United States deterrence strategy in a changing security environment. A predictive science capability is at the core of a credible National Nuclear Weapons program in the 21st Century. In absence of nuclear testing, the certification of our current Nuclear Weapons relies on predictive simulations and quantification of the associated simulation uncertainties. In addition, a robust nuclear infrastructure needs an active research and development program that considers all the required nuclear scenarios, including new configurations for which there is no nuclear test data. This paper also considers alternative positions to the need for a Science and Technology program in the Nuclear Weapons complex.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

ModuleOT

ModuleOT is an open hardware security platform which provides all features necessary for securing remote energy resources. The platform consists of a physical bump in-the wire device which runs a custom-built application built with Go and Python and leverages AES-NI Instruction set available on modern hardware for cryptographic acceleration. By combining these features, ModuleOT acts as an all-in-one low-cost solution to enable cryptographically secured communications to any critical remote servers or devices. Because the software application has been built using Golang, this source can be easily compiled for different hardware platforms. The module is designed to provide the following core features: (1) encrypted communications across an untrusted network, (2) certificate-based authentication with secure storage, (3) hardware cryptographic acceleration, (4) IP-based whitelisting, (5) local firewall management, and (6) legacy (RS485) device support.

Hasandka, Adarsh↗

Small Modular Reactor and Microreactor Security-by-Design Lessons Learned: Integrated PPS Designs

U.S. nuclear power facilities face increasing challenges in meeting dynamic security requirements caused by evolving and expanding threats while keeping costs reasonable to make nuclear energy competitive. The past approach has often included implementing security features after a facility has been designed and without attention to optimization, which can lead to cost overruns. Incorporating security into the design process can provide robust, cost-effective, and sufficient physical protection systems. The purpose of this report is to capture lessons learned by the Advanced Reactor Safeguards and Security (ARSS) program that may be beneficial for other advanced and small modular reactor (SMR) vendors to use when developing security systems and postures. This report will capture relevant information that can be used in the security-by-design (SeBD) process for SMR and microreactor vendors.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

R&D for Better Nuclear Security: Radiation Detector Materials

I am going to talk about the need for better materials for radiation detectors. I believe that government investment in this area can enable transformational technology change that could impact domestic nuclear security and also national nuclear security in some very positive and powerful ways. I'm not going to give you a lecture on how radiation detectors work, but I am going to tell you a bit about today's off-the-shelf technology and why it is not sufficient, what we need, and what security benefit you could get from improvements. I think we're at a critical point in time for some very impactful investments. In particular I'm going to focus on the use of gamma-ray radiation detectors at ports of entry. Not long before DHS was formed, Congress decreed that counter measures against the delivery of radiological and nuclear threats would be put in place at US ports of entry, under the authority of US Customs (later Customs and Border Protection in DHS). This included the screening of all cars and trucks passing through a port of entry. Existing off-the-shelf radiation detectors had to be selected for this purpose. Plans were made to make the most of the available technologies, but there are some inherent limitations of these detectors, plus the operational setting can bring out other limitations.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Addressing Consequence within Operational Risk (O.T. Gagnon III) 9-18-2024

Addressing Consequence within Operational Risk: Why threats and security are just not that important! When dealing with cyber or physical risk within any critical infrastructure (CI) environment, don’t concern yourself with vulnerabilities and threats, at least not at first! Also, don’t be overly fixated on “securing the systems” within the organization. The endeavor of tackling operational risk focused on consequences in any critical infrastructure environment to include the complex Aviation ecosystem is challenging even for the most resourced entity but can be advanced though a simplified approach: identifying, binning, and prioritizing the infrastructure environment. While no two entities within a single element of the 16 critical infrastructure sectors are exactly alike when it comes to risk, there is a basic process to move toward a greater understanding of operational risk through becoming more informed about the infrastructure environment in which the entity exists. The process starts with bringing internal and external stakeholders and subject matter experts together to analyze key areas such as Information Technology (IT) and Operational Technology (OT) components and points of convergence, analyzing internal and external cyber and physical dependencies, accounting for explosive growth in devices and wireless technology, and leveraging the contributions of people inside and outside the operational environment. Attaining a common understanding of the infrastructure environment as part of addressing consequences within operational risk is not easy to do or resource light, but the process outlined provides the framework to further any entity’s efforts in this space. When it comes to cyber risks, before an organization can consider vulnerabilities within and threats to its operations, it must first have a solid understanding of the consequences existing inside its infrastructure environment. Idaho National Lab’s Consequence-Driven, Cyber-Informed Engineering is offered as an example of this approach to effective and efficient cyber risk mitigation.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Advanced Reactor Designs Security Analysis, Risk, and Recommendations: Risks, Consequences, and Possible by-Design Mitigation Approaches Associated with Select Advanced Reactors

Next-generation advanced reactors (ARs) incorporate enhanced safety systems, have smaller source terms, and feature compact modular designs, which should lessen their collective risk profiles. However, to fully evaluate risk, security needs to be a part of the equation. Without taking security into consideration, safety systems and components in the new ARs may be vulnerable to sabotage. These base attributes, coupled with enhanced security features specific to AR design through sound engineering and security-by-design (SeBD), should provide developers and operators with lower inherent security risk profiles. Building security early into the AR design may remove or passively secure potential critical targets from an adversary’s reach , thereby increasing overall safety and security. An integrated approach and diverse design team that includes engineering, operations, and security experts are fundamental to building security into the design without sacrificing fundamental operational efficiencies and principles. The objective of this project was to evaluate the security and safety interfaces for five classes of reactors, identify potential security vulnerabilities of structures, systems, and components (SSC), and underscore the need to consider security alongside safety in the design o f these concepts. The five reactor classes evaluated in this project and presented in this report are molten-salt reactors (MSR), high temperature gas reactors (HTGR), sodium-fast reactors (SFR), advanced light-water reactors (ALWR), and microreactors. These designs were selected because they reflect the concepts that are closest to market deployment and have received significant resource investments from the public and private sector. This project assesses the inherent security risks posed by common classes of ARs, provides a methodology and framework to assess security along with safety, and offers an analysis of potential mitigation strategies that could be incorporated. For each AR technology, the SSCs that relate to radionuclide source safety functions are discussed to understand the SSC contribution to safety and relative importance in the protective strategy for the design. The assumptions that went into evaluating each reactor concept originated from generic publicly available nonproprietary information and should not directly be used to qualify an absolute risk profile nor to rank specific AR designs. Instead, the purpose of the analysis is to understand and compare the generic inherent security risks of different AR technologies.

98 - NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL↗

3D orthorhombic earth model effects on seismic source characterization

Most earth materials are anisotropic with regard to seismic wave-speeds, especially materials such as shales, or where oriented fractures are present. However, the base assumption for many numerical simulations is to treat earth materials as isotropic media. This is done for simplicity, the apparent weakness of anisotropy in the far field, and the lack of well-characterized anisotropic material properties for input into numerical simulations. One approach for addressing the higher complexity of actual geologic regions is to model the material as an orthorhombic medium. We have developed an explicit time-domain, finite-difference (FD) algorithm for simulating three-dimensional (3D) elastic wave propagation in a heterogeneous orthorhombic medium. The objective of this research is to investigate the errors and biases that result from modeling a non-isotropic medium as an isotropic medium. This is done by computing “observed data” by using synthetic, anisotropic simulations with the assumption of an orthorhombic, anisotropic earth model. Green’s functions for an assumed isotropic earth model are computed and then used an inversion designed to estimate moment tensors with the “observed” data. One specific area of interest is how shear waves, which are introduced in an anisotropic model even for an isotropic explosion, affect the characterization of seismic sources when isotropic earth assumptions are made. This work is done in support of the modeling component of the Source Physics Experiment (SPE), a series of underground chemical explosions at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS).

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

Security barriers, systems and methods

Systems, arrangements, barriers and methods for detecting illicit attempts to compromise or penetrate a physical barrier are disclosed. The systems, arrangements, barriers and methods detect illicit attempts to pry, remove or compromise a security barrier from the surface or location it protects, by insider/outsider adversaries, when any type of cabled continuity sensor (optical, electrical) is woven, embedded, or interlaced through the security barrier.

Brooks, Scott H.↗

Global Security & Strategic Partnership Programs

Long, proud history of expertise in uranium, lithium, high explosives, assembly/disassembly, and nuclear security and a vital part of today’s nuclear security enterprise Integral role in sustaining U.S. nuclear deterrent and reducing global nuclear threats with unique security and nonproliferation research capabilities NN and GSP Missions Bring Fresh Ideas and Solves Important National Security Problems NN and GSP Missions Keep Our Technology and People Sharp and Ready for New Challenges

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗