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Nuclear waste reduction: Exploring new pathways one step at a time

In my home country of Venezuela, nuclear energy is not a topic that attracts much attention. The government briefly oversaw some nuclear energy programs during the 1950s, but currently there are no active nuclear power facilities in the country. In fact, the Venezuelan government signed and ratified the treaty of the prohibition of nuclear weapons in 2021, which states that Venezuela has never owned, possessed or controlled nuclear weapons or programs of any kind. When I moved to the United States, however, nuclear energy became an extremely relevant topic. In the 1940s, the U.S. government established and oversaw the Manhattan Project to build atomic bombs for use in World War II. After the war, the government encouraged scientists to use this information on nuclear reactions to develop nuclear energy for peaceful civilian purposes instead.1 During these early days of nuclear research, there were no formal regulatory standards for nuclear waste management. Policies usually were self-regulated and often created based on existing policies of disposal for non-nuclear waste.2 As a result, there were instances of nuclear waste leaching into the environment and affecting local communities. So, much research has been conducted since then to characterize and store nuclear waste safely and securely.3 I first became interested in nuclear energy during my undergraduate studies when I worked on a project involving ligand synthesis to help extract actinides from nuclear waste. I then studied electrochemistry in molten salt systems for nuclear energy applications during my Ph.D. As I approached graduation, I started looking into national laboratories that have programs involving nuclear energy and waste management. At Idaho National Laboratory (INL), the focus is more on applied processes and how nuclear energy can be innovated to realize next-generation reactor design and technologies. This focus led me to apply for a Seaborg distinguished postdoctoral position at INL, for which I was chosen based on my proposal of a way to improve nuclear waste recycling. To understand my proposal, we must familiarize ourselves with the makeup of nuclear waste. After uranium dioxide is used as nuclear fuel in a reactor, the fuel matrix is then characterized by various fission products, including rare earth elements, alkali and alkaline earths, and actinides. Some of these fission products can potentially be recovered through pyroprocessing, 4 which involves the electrochemical dissolution of the used nuclear fuel in a molten chloride salt mixture at high temperatures. Though some of the fission products can be easily recovered—for example, uranium is reduced onto an inert cathode by applied potentials—numerous other fission products such as rare earth elements are difficult to recover due to their multivalent oxidation states and side reactions.5 To improve the recovery efficiency of rare earth elements specifically, I proposed investigating the fundamental interactions between rare earth elements in the molten chloride salt and their metallic form (Figure 1). The kinetic pathways and the chemical reactions of these elements, which will be elucidated through spectro-electrochemistry at high temperatures, will give insights on how the recovery efficiency can be improved. Although my research focuses on fundamental science, it will benefit the applied process by generating new scientific knowledge and closing the gap for efficient recycling of the waste: one step at a time.

11 - NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Nuclear Security Education Program at the Pennsylvania State University

The availability of trained and qualified nuclear and radiation security experts worldwide has decreased as those with hands-on experience have retired while the demand for these experts and skills have increased. The U.S. Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) has responded to the continued loss of technical and policy expertise amongst personnel and students in the security field by initiating the establishment of a Nuclear Security Education Initiative, in partnership with Pennsylvania State University (PSU), Texas A and M (TAMU), and Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). This collaborative, multi-year initiative forms the basis of specific education programs designed to educate the next generation of personnel who plan on careers in the nonproliferation and security fields with both domestic and international focus. The three universities worked collaboratively to develop five core courses consistent with the GTRI mission, policies, and practices. These courses are the following: Global Nuclear Security Policies, Detectors and Source Technologies, Applications of Detectors/Sensors/Sources for Radiation Detection and Measurements Nuclear Security Laboratory, Threat Analysis and Assessment, and Design and Analysis of Security Systems for Nuclear and Radiological Facilities. The Pennsylvania State University (PSU) Nuclear Engineering Program is a leader in undergraduate and graduate-level nuclear engineering education in the USA. The PSU offers undergraduate and graduate programs in nuclear engineering. The PSU undergraduate program in nuclear engineering is the largest nuclear engineering programs in the USA. The PSU Radiation Science and Engineering Center (RSEC) facilities are being used for most of the nuclear security education program activities. Laboratory space and equipment was made available for this purpose. The RSEC facilities include the Penn State Breazeale Reactor (PSBR), gamma irradiation facilities (in-pool irradiator, dry irradiator, and hot cells), neutron beam laboratory, radiochemistry laboratories, and various radiation detection and measurement laboratories. A new nuclear security education laboratory was created with DOE NNSA- GTRI funds at RSEC. The nuclear security graduate level curriculum enables the PSU to educate and train future nuclear security experts, both within the United States as well as worldwide. The nuclear security education program at Penn State will grant a Master's degree in nuclear security starting fall 2015. The PSU developed two courses: Nuclear Security- Detector And Source Technologies and Nuclear Security- Applications of Detectors/Sensors/Sources for Radiation Detection and Measurements (Laboratory). Course descriptions and course topics of these courses are described briefly: - Nuclear Security - Detector and Source Technologies; - Nuclear Security - Applications of Detectors/Sensors/Sources for Radiation Detection and Measurements Laboratory.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

August 5, 1963-President Kennedy's Nuclear Test Ban Treaty signed in Moscow, Russia

On August 5, 1963, after more than eight years of negotiations, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union signed the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. The destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by atomic bombs marked the end of World War II and the beginning of the nuclear age. As tensions between East and West settled into a Cold War, scientists in the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union conducted tests and developed more powerful nuclear weapons. In 1959, radioactive deposits were found in wheat and milk in the northern United States. As scientists and the public gradually became aware of the dangers of radioactive fallout, they began to raise their voices against nuclear testing. Leaders and diplomats of several countries sought to address the issue. In May 1955, the United Nations Disarmament Commission brought together the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, France, and the Soviet Union to begin negotiations on ending nuclear weapons testing. Conflict soon arose over inspections to verify underground testing. The Soviet Union feared that on-site inspections could lead to spying that might expose the Soviets' vastly exaggerated claims of the number of deliverable nuclear weapons. As negotiators struggled over differences, the Soviet Union and the United States suspended nuclear tests—a moratorium that lasted from November 1958 to September 1961. John F. Kennedy had supported ban on nuclear weapons testing since 1956. He believed a ban would prevent other countries from obtaining nuclear weapons, and took a strong stand on the issue in the 1960 presidential campaign. Once elected, President Kennedy pledged not to resume testing in the air and promised to pursue all diplomatic efforts for a test ban treaty before resuming underground testing. He envisioned the test ban as a first step to nuclear disarmament. President Kennedy met with Soviet Premier Khrushchev in Vienna in June 1961, just five weeks after the humiliating defeat of the US-sponsored invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs. Khrushchev took a hard line at the summit. He announced his intention to cut off Western access to Berlin and threatened war if the United States or its allies tried to stop him. Many US diplomats felt that Kennedy had not stood up to the Soviet premier at the summit and left Khrushchev with the impression that he was a weak leader. President Kennedy's political and military advisers feared that the Soviet Union had continued secret underground testing and made gains in nuclear technology. They pressured Kennedy to resume testing. And, according to a Gallup poll in July 1961, the public approved of testing by a margin of two-to-one. In August 1961, the Soviet Union announced its intention to resume atmospheric testing, and over the next three months it conducted 31 nuclear tests. It exploded the largest nuclear bomb in history—58 megatons—4,000 times more powerful than the bomb dropped on Hiroshima. In his commencement address at American University on June 10, 1963, Kennedy announced a new round of high-level arms negotiations with the Russians. He boldly called for an end to the Cold War. "If we cannot end our differences," he said, "at least we can help make the world a safe place for diversity." The Soviet government broadcast a translation of the entire speech, and allowed it to be reprinted in the controlled Soviet press. The Limited Nuclear Test Ban treaty was signed in Moscow on August 5, 1963, by US Secretary Dean Rusk, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, and British Foreign Secretary Lord Home—one day short of the 18th anniversary of the dropping of an atomic bomb on Hiroshima. Over the next two months, President Kennedy convinced a fearful public and a divided Senate to support the treaty. The Senate approved the treaty on September 23, 1963, by an 80-19 margin. Kennedy signed the ratified treaty on October 7, 1963. The treaty: prohibited nuclear weapons tests or other nuclear explosions under water, in the atmosphere, or in outer space allowed underground nuclear tests as long as no radioactive debris falls outside the boundaries of the nation conducting the test pledged signatories to work towards complete disarmament, an end to the armaments race, and an end to the contamination of the environment by radioactive substances. Thirty-three years later, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Signed by 71 nations, including those possessing nuclear weapons, the treaty prohibited all nuclear test explosions including those conducted underground. Though it was signed by President Bill Clinton, the Senate rejected the treaty by a vote of 51 to 48.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Introduction on Recently Revised Regulatory Framework Related to Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities in Korea - 16488

There are 24 units of nuclear power reactors in operation and 4 units of nuclear power reactors under construction in Korea as of November 2015. However, there is no permanently shutdown nuclear power reactor and decommissioned or under decommissioning nuclear power reactor. There are only 2 research reactors being decommissioned since 1997. It is realized that improvement of the regulatory framework for decommissioning of nuclear facilities has been emphasized constantly from the point of view of IAEA's safety standards. IAEA published the safety requirement on decommissioning of facilities on July 2014; its title is the Safe Decommissioning of Facilities, General Safety Requirement Part 6. According to follow up action on the result of IAEA's Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) mission to Korea in 2011, regulatory framework for decommissioning of nuclear facilities in Korea was revised through comparing to IAEA safety standards. It was identified that items should be revised to improve the regulatory framework for decommissioning. Those are as follows: absence of legal definition of decommissioning, incomplete procedure for safety regulation after permanent shutdown, un-detailed acceptance criteria for decommissioning plan, incomplete requirements for early preparing and periodic update of decommissioning plan, un-detailed requirements on standard format and contents for decommissioning plan, and incomplete radiological criteria on site and building reuse after completion of decommissioning. Nuclear Safety Act related to decommissioning of nuclear facilities was revised and promulgated on 21 July 2015. As the lower statute of Nuclear Safety Act, Enforcement Decree of the Nuclear Safety Act and Enforcement Regulation of the Nuclear Safety Act were also revised and promulgated on 21 July 2015. In this paper, related to decommissioning of nuclear facilities such as nuclear power reactor, research or training reactor, and nuclear fuel cycle facility, it was introduced the main changes of the amended and promulgated Nuclear Safety Act on July 2015. It was also mentioned about the current issue in accordance with its implementation. Main contents of revised Nuclear Safety Act are that decommissioning plan should be submitted for nuclear installations to be constructed and operated, and this plan should be updated periodically. In addition, 3 years of grace period was set to submit preliminary decommissioning plan for the facility which has already been approved prior to July 2018. Preliminary decommissioning plan should be updated every 10 years, and regulatory body should review this document. According to the revised Nuclear Safety Act, in the case of a nuclear power reactor after the approval of the change on operating license for permanent shutdown, should submit final decommissioning plan within 5 years, and be approved by the regulatory body. On July 2015, Kori Unit 1 was determined not to apply its 2nd continued operation, and will expire in 2017. Kori Unit 1 will be the first case for the submission of final decommissioning plan. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Progress of teaching and learning of nuclear engineering courses at College of Engineering, Universiti Tenaga Nasional (UNITEN)

Developing human capital in nuclear with required nuclear background and professional qualifications is necessary to support the implementation of nuclear power projects in the near future. Sufficient educational and training skills are required to ensure that the human resources needed by the nuclear power industry meets its high standard. The Government of Malaysia has made the decision to include nuclear as one of the electricity generation option for the country, post 2020 in order to cater for the increasing energy demands of the country as well as to reduce CO{sub 2} emission. The commitment by the government has been made clearer with the inclusion of the development of first NPP by 2021 in the Economic Transformation Program (ETP) which was launched by the government in October 2010. The In tandem with the government initiative to promote nuclear energy, Center for Nuclear Energy, College of Engineering, Universiti Tenaga Nasional (UNITEN) is taking the responsibility in developing human capital in the area of nuclear power and technology. In the beginning, the College of Engineering has offered the Introduction to Nuclear Technology course as a technical elective course for all undergraduate engineering students. Gradually, other nuclear technical elective courses are offered such as Nuclear Policy, Security and Safeguards, Introduction to Nuclear Engineering, Radiation Detection and Nuclear Instrumentation, Introduction to Reactor Physics, Radiation Safety and Waste Management, and Nuclear Thermal-hydraulics. In addition, another course Advancement in Nuclear Energy is offered as one of the postgraduate elective courses. To enhance the capability of teaching staffs in nuclear areas at UNITEN, several junior lecturers are sent to pursue their postgraduate studies in the Republic of Korea, United States and the United Kingdom, while the others are participating in short courses and workshops in nuclear that are conducted locally and abroad. This paper describes the progress of teaching and learning in nuclear engineering and technology at UNITEN that include curriculum development, students’ enrolment and performance, and teaching staff’s human resource development.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Nuclear Thermal Rocket (NTR) Development Risk Communication

There are clear advantages of development of a Nuclear Thermal Rocket (NTR) for a crewed mission to Mars. NTR for in-space propulsion enables more ambitious space missions by providing high thrust at high specific impulse (approximately 900 sec) that is 2 times the best theoretical performance possible for chemical rockets. Missions can be optimized for maximum payload capability to take more payload with reduced total mass to orbit; saving cost on reduction of the number of launch vehicles needed. Or missions can be optimized to minimize trip time significantly to reduce the deep space radiation exposure to the crew. NTR propulsion technology is a game changer for space exploration. However, "NUCLEAR" is a word that is feared and vilified by some groups and the hostility towards development of any nuclear systems can meet great opposition by the public as well as from national leaders and people in authority. Communication of nuclear safety will be critical to the success of the development of the NTR. Why is there a fear of nuclear? A bomb that can level a city is a scary weapon. The first and only times the Nuclear Bomb was used in a war was on Hiroshima and Nagasaki during World War 2. The "Little Boy" atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima on August 6, 1945 and the "Fat Man" on Nagasaki 3 days later on August 9th. Within the first 4 months of bombings, 90- 166 thousand people died in Hiroshima and 60-80 thousand died in Nagasaki. It is important to note for comparison that over 500 thousand people died and 5 million made homeless due to strategic bombing (approximately 150 thousand tons) of Japanese cities and war assets with conventional non-nuclear weapons between 1942- 1945. A major bombing campaign of "firebombing" of Tokyo called "Operation Meetinghouse" on March 9 and 10 consisting of 334 B-29's dropped approximately1,700 tons of bombs around 16 square mile area and over 100 thousand people have been estimated to have died. The declaration of death is very clear for conventional weapons and then the declaration of death due to radiation becomes vague and unclear. This may have been due to people mis-understanding the dangers and effects of radiation when assessing the damage and harm to people initially, but it is also become insidious when expressing opposition to nuclear energy. A nuclear radiation accident can be scary due to the power involved and the fear of radiation release. The International Atomic Energy Agency defines a nuclear and radiation accident a "an event that has led to significant consequences to people, the environment or the facility." There have been 3 commercial nuclear reactor accidents (Chernobyl, Three Mile Island, and Fukushima) that stand out to the public and much of the information about the result and impact to workers, environment, and public can be misleading. Often information is presented without clear correlation with radiation and other pertinent information is left out presenting a very scary situation to affect the emotions of the reader. A very boring but "critically acclaimed" movie was made in 1979 called "The China Syndrome" starring Jane Fonda and Jack Lemmon. The film was released on March 16, 1979, 12 days before the 3-Mile Island nuclear accident in Pennsylvania. The basis from the movie was from a few nuclear plant incidents and in particular, the Brown's Ferry Alabama Power Plant fire. In one scene from the movie, a physicist Dr. Elliott Lowell played by Donald Hotton states that a China Syndrome event would make "an area the size of Pennsylvania" permanently uninhabitable. Real serious nuclear incidents like Chernobyl and Fukushima are often sited to make people fear the consequences of using nuclear power. However, the consequences are at best poorly communicated and at worst fictitiously inflated to instigate social unrest against nuclear power. There is an article being circulated on Facebook with a title "28 Signs that the (US) West Coast is being absolutely fried with nuclear radiation from Fukushima" which focus on mis-information and fear mongering. Nuclear power and NTR are powerful resources that can open many doors for future prosperity and capability. With great power comes great responsibility. Radiation and its effects need to be better understood, quantified, and communicated. A human mission to mars has its own risks of deep space radiation and is considered a considerable risk at 400 milli-Sieverts per year in deep space and 245 milli-Sieverts per year on the surface of Mars as measured by the Mars Curiosity mission. Although these quantities of ionizing radiation are within the astronaut career limit, it exceeds the yearly average amounts of ionizing radiation. Astronaut crews have experienced these levels of radiation before, but for durations shorter than a year, and a mission to Mars could possibly be 3 years in length. There is also evidence that people can comfortably handle higher levels of ionizing radiation where the radiation occurs naturally like Ramsar, Iran when people can experience 270 milli-Sieverts per year. A risk posture that the development, test, and flight of an NTR will meet opposition from groups who oppose nuclear energy must be likely and the impact can be sever to the effort. Active risk mitigation must be taken for an NTR full-scale development project. The NTR design must take into account safety for transport and off nominal conditions. Nuclear fuel element must consider containment of fission products and Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) that may meet less opposition should be considered for safety and security reasons. Even though testing was conducted on Rover/NERVA safely and successfully in the 60's with exhaust sent heavenward in to open air, modern testing of NTR must consider full containment and no release of ionizing radiation to the public and must meet the current requirement of no more than 0.1 milli-Sieverts per year to the public. 0.1 milli-Sieverts is equivalent to eating one banana or a 20 hour plane flight. Good communication with the public and regulatory agencies will be essential to show that all effort is applied toward protection to the public and astronauts. The inspiring endeavor to put humans on Mars to study the planet, search for life, and learn more about this Solar System will be full of risks but it will be worth it. NTR will be worth the development effort if it allows humans to explore our Solar System.

Kim, Tony↗

Optimising National WM Strategies through early consideration of Nuclear Safeguards - 18607

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards stand alongside safety and security as one of the three pillars for prudent management of all nuclear material, including nuclear waste. Although safety considerations, including public and environmental radiation protection, are the traditional drivers of waste management strategies, there is a requirement for nuclear safeguards in shaping and quantifying long-term solutions for special classes of radioactive waste. This is especially important when considering the disposal of nuclear material in a repository that could be released from regulatory oversight for radiation protection after a period of institutional control, as some safeguards oversight would still be required. Failure to consider nuclear safeguards at the early stages of planning may alternatively lead to excessive volumes for disposal or the need to recondition already treated wastes. At the very least, safeguards measures should be considered before countries seek to dispose of legacy nuclear materials, decommissioning wastes and other materials containing uranium, thorium or plutonium in an operating repository. Nuclear safeguards are the set of tools and techniques used by the IAEA to verify that countries comply with their international obligations not to divert nuclear materials to nuclear explosive devices. Under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), nuclear safeguards apply to all uranium, thorium and plutonium held in non-weapons NPT states, with limited exceptions. In nuclear-weapon states, much of their material is likewise subject to IAEA safeguards through conditions in agreements with respective suppliers of the uranium. Under IAEA safeguards, such nuclear material must remain accounted for and accessible for periodic verification-analogous to the safety concepts of reversibility and retrievability. Nevertheless, safeguards requirements can be terminated - provided that the State and the [IAEA] agree that such nuclear material is practicably irrecoverable - through dilution or immobilisation in solid form (such as cement, glass or ceramic). This means candidate material can be disposed of as non- nuclear material, with no further safeguards requirements, provided this criterion is met. Unlike radiological wastes where repository design strongly influences pathways for radionuclide migration and overall safety performance, repository design is not a factor in considering the termination of safeguards on nuclear material. This paper looks at similarities and differences in the safety, security and safeguards regulatory requirements for the management of radioactive waste and nuclear material in Australia. In particular, it outlines recent experience gained from participation in Australia's waste acceptance criteria working group for a national low-level waste repository and intermediate-level waste store, as well as from Australia's overall waste management strategy. These items of work have coincided with the IAEA update of its internal policy on termination of safeguards on nuclear material. Australia's experience shows how inclusion of safeguards criteria in the planning process is leading to optimisations in choice of facility concepts, project sequencing and equitable distribution of economic risk. By considering the three pillars-safety, security and safeguards-early on in the planning process, Australia's waste management strategy will provide a benchmark for other states in establishing and updating their own waste acceptance criteria for the disposal of nuclear material. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

A Systems Thinking Approach to Nuclear Pedagogy and Workforce Development

Nuclear technology's controversial status has been shaped by its early use in military applications, fear driven by high-profile accidents, and unresolved waste management challenges. There have, on the other hand, been periodic claims that a “nuclear renaissance” is imminent, driven by different dynamics at different times, most recently related to growing energy demands and increasing concern over carbon emissions. In this article, we respond to urgent calls for more nuclear engineers, resulting from the latest rallying cry around nuclear energy, by reframing the problem using a systems thinking approach that illuminates new pathways for nuclear workforce development via interdisciplinary pedagogies. By building nuclear education into a wide variety of disciplines, we argue, the nuclear workforce could become more resilient to ebbs and flows in energy markets and public opinion. Widening nuclear education beyond nuclear engineers could also reduce the isolation and compartmentalization that has limited the possibilities of nuclear technology. We show how growing and diversifying the overall nuclear workforce could create a wide variety of career opportunities outside STEM and enable greater specialization within STEM, since nuclear engineers and other specialists could be freed up to focus on technological and infrastructural innovations. We argue that interventions into nuclear education should establish new connections and applications of the nuclear sciences in diverse areas of expertise to develop a broad range of professionals who can contribute to a more stable nuclear workforce, bringing what we call “critical and creative nuclear energy literacies” to long-standing and systemic challenges around nuclear energy.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Nuclear Safety [Vol. 33, No. 4, October-December 1992]

Nuclear Safety is a review journal that covers significant developments in the field of nuclear safety. Its scope includes the analysis and control of hazards associated with nuclear energy, operations involving fissionable materials, and the products of nuclear fission and their effects on the environment. Primary emphasis is on safety in reactor design, construction, and operation; however, the safety aspects of the entire fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing, nuclear waste disposal, handling of radioisotopes, and environmental effects of these operations, are also treated. Table of Contents for this issue follows. GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: 499 Technical Note: Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s Examination Question Bank System, C. L Jensen and N. L. Skinner; 506 Report on the Specialists’ Meeting on Passive and Active Safety Features of Liquid-Metal Fast Breeder Reactors Organized by the International Atomic Energy Agency at Oarai Engineering Centre of Power Reactor and Nuclear Development Corporation, Japan, November 5-7,1991, S. R. Paranjpe; ACCIDENT ANALYSIS: 514 A Review of Hydrogen Production During Melt/Water Interaction in LWRs, D. F. Fletcher, B. D. Turland, and S. P. A. Lawrence; 535 A Review of the U 3 0 8 -Al Reaction as a Potential Heat Source in Research and Test Reactor Accidents, J. L. Snelgrove; CONTROL AND INSTRUMENTATION: 543 Multilevel Interfaces for Power Plant Control Rooms II: A Preliminary Design Space, K. J. Vicente; DESIGN FEATURES: 549 Twenty-Second DOE/NRC Nuclear Air Cleaning and Treatment Conference, R. R. Bellamy, D. W. Moeller, and M. W. First; 562 Book Review: Safety Assessment of Unit 5 (WWER-440/W-213) of the Greifswald Nuclear Power Station, M. H. Fontana; WASTE AND SPENT FUEL MANAGEMENT: 576 Activities Related to Waste and Spent Fuel Management, M. D. Muhlheim and E. G. Silver; OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 586 Analysis of Corrective Actions Applied to Nuclear Power Plant Operations, A. E. Cross; 593 Reactor Shutdown Experience, Compiled by J. W. Cletcher; 596 Operating U.S. Power Reactors, Compiled by M. D. Muhlheim and E. G. Silver; 609 Non-Commercial Power Operating Experience; 614 World Nuclear Performance, Compiled by M. D. Muhlheim; RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: 623 General Administrative Activities, Compiled by M. D. Muhlheim and E. G. Silver; 635 Reports, Standards, and Safety Guides, D. S. Queener; 639 Proposed Rule Changes as of June 30, 1992; ANNOUNCEMENTS: 513 Fourth International Conference on Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing and Waste Management RECOD '94; 585 International Topical Meeting on Advanced Reactors Safety; 622 International Workshop on Implementation of ALARA at Nuclear Power Plants; 648 Short Course on Nuclear Criticality Safety; 648 8th Topical Meeting on Problems in Reactor Physics MEPhi-VOLGA-93; 643 The Authors; 646 Reviewers of Nuclear Safety, Vol. 33

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Web-Based Computational Model Builder For Nuclear Energy Advanced Modeling and Simulation (Final Report)

According to the World Nuclear Association, the U.S. is the largest producer of nuclear power worldwide. In fact, the U.S. provides over 30 percent of the world's nuclear generation of electricity. Although few new reactors have been built in the past 30 years, the association anticipates that four to six reactors may be built by 2020. The first of the reactors will be built in response to 16 license applications, which have been completed since 2007, to build 24 additional nuclear reactors. Currently, both government and industry are working to accelerate approval for the construction and design of new nuclear energy plants. The U.S. nuclear industry has already achieved significant developments in the implementation of nuclear power plants due to advancements in refueling, maintenance, and safety systems at current power plants. Meanwhile, changes in government policy, which have occurred since the late 1990s, have provided for noteworthy expansion in nuclear capacity. For example, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 evoked investment in electricity infrastructure such as nuclear power. To design future systems and continue operational improvements at existing U.S. plants, advanced modeling and simulation of nuclear reactors are crucial. We developed a Cloud/Web-based tool, HPCCloud, that enables nuclear energy firms, or other manufacturing and engineering companies, to innovate using advanced modeling and simulation. Through the Web-Based Computational Model Builder for Nuclear Energy Advanced Modeling and Simulation grant, we develop HPCCloud to simplify and democratize advanced modeling and simulation in the nuclear energy industry on a range of nuclear engineering applications. It leverages millions of investment dollars from the Department of Energy's Consortium for Advanced Simulation of Light Water Reactors (CASL) and the Office of Nuclear Energy's research and development in Nuclear Energy Advanced Modeling and Simulation (NEAMS). Our approach simplifies the workflow, alleviates the need for in-house computational science and engineering experts, and lowers the capital investments required for advanced modeling and simulation. The Cloud/Web-based simulation environment guides end-users and developers through the advanced modeling and simulation lifecycle. In addition to providing significantly improved, intuitive software, the environment offers reproducible workflows where one can save, share, and even publish the full path of data from input to final analyzed results. HPCCloud addresses identified challenges to the nuclear energy industry's use of advanced modeling and simulation. With this unique Cloud/Web-based environment, we enable an ecosystem of synergistic activities, fueling new research and development for nuclear energy. HPCCloud lays the groundwork for commercialization, through customization, technology integration, and advanced research and development services.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Progress in Constraining Nuclear Symmetry Energy Using Neutron Star Observables Since GW170817

The density dependence of nuclear symmetry energy is among the most uncertain parts of the Equation of State (EOS) of dense neutron-rich nuclear matter. It is currently poorly known especially at suprasaturation densities partially because of our poor knowledge about isovector nuclear interactions at short distances. Because of its broad impacts on many interesting issues, pinning down the density dependence of nuclear symmetry energy has been a longstanding and shared goal of both astrophysics and nuclear physics. New observational data of neutron stars including their masses, radii, and tidal deformations since GW170817 have helped improve our knowledge about nuclear symmetry energy, especially at high densities. Based on various model analyses of these new data by many people in the nuclear astrophysics community, while our brief review might be incomplete and biased unintentionally, we learned in particular the following: (1) The slope parameter L of nuclear symmetry energy at saturation density ρ0 of nuclear matter from 24 new analyses of neutron star observables was about L≈57.7±19 MeV at a 68% confidence level, consistent with its fiducial value from surveys of over 50 earlier analyses of both terrestrial and astrophysical data within error bars. (2) The curvature Ksym of nuclear symmetry energy at ρ0 from 16 new analyses of neutron star observables was about Ksym≈−107±88 MeV at a 68% confidence level, in very good agreement with the systematics of earlier analyses. (3) The magnitude of nuclear symmetry energy at 2ρ0, i.e., Esym(2ρ0)≈51±13 MeV at a 68% confidence level, was extracted from nine new analyses of neutron star observables, consistent with the results from earlier analyses of heavy-ion reactions and the latest predictions of the state-of-the-art nuclear many-body theories. (4) While the available data from canonical neutron stars did not provide tight constraints on nuclear symmetry energy at densities above about 2ρ0, the lower radius boundary R2.01=12.2 km from NICER’s very recent observation of PSR J0740+6620 of mass 2.08±0.07M⊙ and radius R=12.2–16.3 km at a 68% confidence level set a tight lower limit for nuclear symmetry energy at densities above 2ρ0. (5) Bayesian inferences of nuclear symmetry energy using models encapsulating a first-order hadron–quark phase transition from observables of canonical neutron stars indicated that the phase transition shifted appreciably both L and Ksym to higher values, but with larger uncertainties compared to analyses assuming no such phase transition. (6) The high-density behavior of nuclear symmetry energy significantly affected the minimum frequency necessary to rotationally support GW190814’s secondary component of mass (2.50–2.67) M⊙ as the fastest and most massive pulsar discovered so far. Overall, thanks to the hard work of many people in the astrophysics and nuclear physics community, new data of neutron star observations since the discovery of GW170817 have significantly enriched our knowledge about the symmetry energy of dense neutron-rich nuclear matter.

79 ASTRONOMY AND ASTROPHYSICS↗

Nuclear Safety [Vol. 36, No. 1, January-June 1995]

Nuclear Safety is a journal that covers significant issues in the field of nuclear safety. Its primary scope is safety in the design, construction, operation, and decommissioning of nuclear power reactors worldwide and the research and analysis activities that promote this goal, but it also encompasses the safety aspects of the entire nuclear fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing and handling, and nuclear waste disposal, the handling of fissionable materials and radioisotopes, and the environmental effects of all these activities. Table of Contents for this issue follows. THE CHORNOBYL ACCIDENT: 1 The Chornobyl Accident Revisited, Part II: The State of the Nuclear Fuel Located Within the Chornobyl Sarcophagus, A A. Borovoi and A. R. Sich; GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: 33 Nuclear Power Safety in Central and Eastern Europe, R. Wilson; 46 Safety of Nuclear Power Reactors in the Former Eastern European Countries, S. Chakraborty; 53 Technical Note: On the Definition of Common-Cause Failures, H. Paula; ACCIDENT ANALYSIS: 58 Modeling and Analysis of Core-Debris Recriticality During Hypothetical Severe Accidents in the Advanced Neutron Source Reactor, S.-H. Kim, V. Georgevich, D. B. Simpson, C. O. Slater, and R. P. Taleyarkhan; 68 Ignitability of Hydrogen/Oxygen/Diluent Mixtures in the Presence of Hot Surfaces, R. K. Kumar and G. W. Koroll; 94 Coupled RELAP5 and CONTAIN Accident Analysis Using PVM, K. A. Smith, A. J. Baratta, and G. E. Robinson; CONTROL AND INSTRUMENTATION: 109 Application of Fuzzy Logic in Nuclear Reactor Control Part I: An Assessment of State-of-the-Art, A. S. Heger, N. K. Alang-Rashid, and M. Jamshidi; DESIGN FEATURES: 122 Twenty-Third DOE/NRC Nuclear Air-Cleaning and Treatment Conference, R. R. Bellamy, J. J. Hayes, and M. W. First; ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS: 135 Atmospheric Dispersion and the Radiological Consequences of Normal Airborne Effluents from a Nuclear Power Plant, D. Fang, C. Z. Sun, and L. Yang; 142 Calculation of Distribution Coefficients for Radionuclides in Soils and Sediments, I. Puigdomenech and U. Bergstrom: OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 155 Reactor Shutdown Experience, Compiled by J. W. Cletcher; U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION INFORMATION AND ANALYSES: 158 Operating Experience Feedback Report—Reliability of Safety-Related Steam Turbine-Driven Standby Pumps Used in U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants, J. R. Boardman; 166 Turbine Building Hazards, H. L Ornstein; RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: 169 Reports, Standards, and Safety Guides, D. S. Queener; 175 Proposed Rule Changes as of Dec. 31,1994; ANNOUNCEMENTS: 32 Harvard School of Public Health In-Place Filter Testing Workshop; 134 International Conference on Advances in the Operational Safety of Nuclear Power Plants; 193 30th Tennessee Industries Week; 193 DOE Technical Standards Program 1995 Workshop; 194 Multiphase Flow Experiments and Instrumentation; 180 The Authors; 185 Indexes to Nuclear Safety, Volumes 34 and 35.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Nuclear Safety [Vol. 16, No. 2, March-April 1975]

Nuclear Safety covers significant developments in the field of nuclear safety. The scope is limited to topics relevant to the analysis and control of hazards associated with nuclear energy, operations involving fissionable materials, and the products of nuclear fission and their effects on the environment. Primary emphasis is on safety in reactor design, construction, and operation; however, safety considerations in regard to the entire fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing, nuclear waste disposal, handling of radioisotopes, and environmental effects of these operations, are also treated. Table of Contents for this issue follows. Table of Contents for this issue follows. GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: 127 Quality Assurance in the Construction of Nuclear Power Plants by Sidney A. Bernsen, 141 1974 ANS Topical Meeting on Fast Reactor Safety by M. H. Fontana; CONTROL AND INSTRUMENTATION: 150 GBR-4 Protection Systems: Failures and Their Consequences by Peter Burgsmüller, J. J. Dekais, Albert Krähe, Raffaello Pignatelli, and Gottfried Vieider, 162 Standby Emergency Power Systems. Part 2—The Later Plants by E. W. Hagen; PLANT SAFETY FEATURES: 180 Radiotoxic Hazard Measure for Buried Solid Radioactive Waste by J. Hamstra, 190 The Thirteenth AEC Air-Cleaning Conference by D. W. Moeller, D. W. Underhill, and M. W. First, 203 Book Review: Nuclear Criticality Safety; CONSEQUENCES OF EFFLUENT RELEASE: 204 Environmental Radiation Effects of Nuclear Facilities in New York State by M. S. Terpilak and B. L. Jorgensen, 222 Book Review: Thermal Ecology; OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 223 Set-Point Drift in Nuclear Power-Plant Safety-Related Instrumentation Adapted by the Nuclear Safety Staff, 224 Diesel-Generator Operating Experience at Nuclear Power Plants, 227 Summary of Operating U. S. Power Reactors as of Jan. 1, 1975, 232 Selected Safety-Related Occurrences Reported in November and December 1974 Compiled by William R. Casto, 235 Recent Occurrences at Nuclear Reactors and Their Causes Compiled by William R. Casto; CURRENT EVENTS: 243 General Administrative Activities Compiled by Wm. B. Cottrell, 251 Action on Power-Reactor Projects Undergoing Regulatory Review or Consideration Compiled by Wm. B. Cottrell, 266 Action on Nonreactor Projects Undergoing Regulatory Review or Consideration Compiled by Wm. B Cottrell, 268 Proposed Rule Changes as of Jan. 1, 1975; MISCELLANY: 149 Course in Italy on High-Energy Radiation Dosimetry and Protection (Announcement), 250 Course at Northwestern on Safety of Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants (Announcement), 266 Symposium of the Combined Effects on the Environment of Radioactive, Chemical, and Thermal Releases from the Nuclear Industry (Announcement), 271 Short Course on Engineering for Extreme Winds and Tornadoes (Announcement), 272 Three 1-Week Courses at MIT on Nuclear Power-Reactor Safety (Announcement), 272 Harvard University Short Courses (Announcement).

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Monte-Carlo Simulations of the Nuclear Energy Deposition Inside the CARMEN-1P Differential Calorimeter Irradiated into OSIRIS Reactor

The nuclear heating measurements in Material Testing Reactors (MTRs) are crucial for the study of nuclear materials and fuels under irradiation. The reference measurements of this nuclear heating are especially performed by a differential calorimeter including a graphite sample material. These measurements are then used for other experimental conditions in order to predict the nuclear heating and thermal conditions induced in the irradiation devices. Nuclear heating is a great deal of interest at the moment as the measurement of such heating is an important issue for MTRs reactors. This need is especially generated by the new Jules Horowitz Reactor (JHR), under construction at CEA/Cadarache 'French Alternative Energies and Atomic Energy Commission'. This new reactor, that will be operational in late 2019, is a new facility for the nuclear research on materials and fuels. Indeed the expected nuclear heating rate is about 20 W/g for nominal capacity of 100 MW. The present Monte Carlo calculation works belong to the IN-CORE (Instrumentation for Nuclear radiation and Calorimetry On line in Reactor): a joint research program between the CEA and Aix- Marseille University in 2009. One scientific aim of this program is to design and develop a multi-sensors device, called CARMEN, dedicated to the measurements of main physical parameters simultaneously encountered inside JHR's experimental channels (core and reflector) such as neutron fluxes, photon fluxes, temperature, and nuclear heating. A first prototype was already developed. This prototype includes two mock-ups dedicated respectively to neutronic measurements (CARMEN-1N) and to photonic measurements (CARMEN-1P) with in particular a specific differential calorimeter. Two irradiation campaigns were performed successfully in the periphery of OSIRIS reactor (a MTR located at Saclay, France) in 2012 for nuclear heating levels up to 2 W/g. First Monte Carlo calculations reduced to the graphite sample of the calorimeter were carried out. A preliminary analysis shows that the numerical results overestimate the measurements by about 20 %. A new approach has been developed in order to estimate the nuclear heating by two methods (energy deposition or KERMA) by considering the whole complete geometry of the sensor. This new approach will contribute to the interpretation of the irradiation campaign and will be useful to improve the out-of-pile calibration procedure of the sensor and its thermal response during irradiations. The aim of this paper is to present simulations made by using MCNP5 Monte-Carlo transport code (using ENDF/B-VI nuclear data library) for the nuclear heating inside the different parts of the calorimeter (head, rod and base). Calculations into two steps will be realized. We will use as an input source in the model new spectra (neutrons, prompt-photons and delayed-photons) calculated with the Monte Carlo code TRIPOLI-4{sup R} inside different experimental channels (water) located into the OSIRIS periphery and used during the CARMEN-1P irradiation campaign. We will consider Neutrons- Photons-Electrons and Photons-Electrons modes. We will begin by a brief description of the differential-calorimeter device geometry. Then the MCNP5 model used for the calculations of nuclear heating inside the calorimeter elements will be introduced. The energy deposition due to the prompt-gamma, delayed-gamma and neutrons, the neutron-activation of the device will be considered. The different components of the nuclear heating inside the different parts of the calorimeter will be detailed. Moreover, a comparison between KERMA and nuclear energy deposition estimations will be given. Finally, a comparison between this total nuclear heating Calculation and Experiment in graphite sample will be determined. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Global Trends of ASME "N-Stamp" Certifications for Nuclear Component Vendors

Historically, nuclear component manufacturing vendors, from small businesses through large conglomerates, have felt compelled to obtain an American Society for Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Nuclear Certification, known colloquially as an "N-stamp", to assure supply chain quality standards that will be acceptable to regulators and safety concerns. Since the N-stamp quality standard is a U.S.-origin code, combined with the apparent decline in the U.S. nuclear industry alongside the growth of the Asian nuclear industry, there is the question of whether the rest of the world, including new entrants to the nuclear industry, also regard N-stamp as a needed certification. This study addresses this question through analysis of the entire N-stamp database of holders, and former holders, of N-stamp certificates of all types and for all regions worldwide from 1989-2020 (the dates available in the database). From this 30 years of data, we find that actually U.S.-based vendors still consistently obtain the largest number of N-stamps worldwide over all time periods, but also find that the countries participating in the N-stamp certification process has broadly expanded beyond just North America, Japan, S. Korea and Western Europe (the primary N-stamp recipients before the mid-2000's). We produced global heats maps and bar charts to illustrate our findings, as well as further investigation into why the data shows changes over time and region. We note that nuclear entities involved with Soviet-type reactors do not participate in the N-stamp process, but instead pursue the Russian version PNAE, which is substantially similar to the ASME code. We conclude that at least from the N-stamp database, the United States nuclear component manufacturing industry is alive and well, although there have been some consolidations, and that the ASME N-stamp appears to still be a valued certificate worldwide, including in China which now ranks second only to the United States in obtaining N-stamp certificates in recent years. We further note that the vendors of new reactor types, in particular High Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactors (HTGRs) and Small Modular Reactors (SMRs), are actively engaged with ASME (and other U.S.-based nuclear standards bodies such as the American Nuclear Society and Nuclear Energy Institute) to coordinate updates to the ASME N-Stamp criteria to ensure applicability of the code for these new designs. Implications of these findings include the following: The global use of the U.S.-origin N-stamp certification supports the view that, despite the decline of the U.S. nuclear industry, the United States remains an esteemed global leader in the area of nuclear safety. As the U.S. Government works to revitalize the U.S. nuclear industry, especially in the area of exports, it may be beneficial to leverage the global standing of the N-stamp certification. The findings indicate that the N-stamp database would be a useful tool for the U.S. Government to use to track the growth of the civil nuclear industry in foreign countries, under certain circumstances. The Excel-format N-stamp database produced as part of this study may be a useful tool for this purpose. N-stamp data may be a useful tool for foreign governments to use to identify nuclear manufacturers within their own country, especially to identify "targets" for outreach on nuclear export control compliance. The U.S. Government could carry this message to foreign partners during bilateral engagements or as part of Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) discussions on industry outreach.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Verification of Upcoming MCNP Features For Estimating Nuclear Data Sensitivities in Fixed Source Simulations [Abstract]

Predictive simulation codes, like the Monte Carlo N-Particle (MCNP) transport code, are used throughout the nuclear community. These simulations are based on nuclear data. Maximizing the accuracy and precision of nuclear data maximizes the accuracy and precision of the overall simulation. This is imperative to applications that rely on simulations. For example, improving nuclear data for special nuclear material improves simulation accuracy in stockpile stewardship applications, which results in larger safety margins and decreased operational costs. The improvement and validation of nuclear data is completed through integral benchmark experiments. Past benchmarks have primarily been limited to focus on the effective multiplication factor ($\kappa$ eff ); broadening the purview of benchmarks beyond $\kappa$ eff -dependent nuclear data addresses nuclear data deficiencies. Different response types depend on different areas of nuclear data. This dependence is quantified as nuclear data sensitivity: the change in response due to perturbation of a contributing parameter. The larger the nuclear data sensitivity of a response, the more the experiment is influenced by the uncertainties of the nuclear data. The optimization of nuclear data sensitivities in future benchmarks would result in more detailed validation of lesser studied areas of nuclear data. Currently, direct sensitivity capabilities are not easily found for all experiment types and parameters. An MCNP tool to directly estimate the cross section sensitivities of tallied values is under development. Additionally, updates have been made to the perturbation feature of MCNP, which can be used in a less direct approach to estimating sensitivities. This work verifies these features to estimate nuclear data sensitivities in fixed source simulations of a 4.5-kg sphere of alpha- phase weapons-grade plutonium surrounded by differing amounts of copper and polyethylene. Integrated estimates made using MCNP’s tools were found to statistically agree with integrated estimates made from manual perturbation of nuclear data proving the validity of the MCNP tools.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

National technical nuclear forensics: U.S. approach to capability sustainment

In the event of a nuclear detonation in the United States (U.S.), the interdiction of a nuclear device, or the seizure of nuclear materials, there will be tremendous pressure to attribute the source of the material, establish responsibility, and ensure the prevention of another incident. Along with intelligence and law enforcement investigations, nuclear forensics is one of the three pillars supporting attribution. The field of nuclear forensics includes the collection, analysis, and evaluation of radiological or nuclear materials, devices, and debris after an event or interdiction. The nuclear forensics scientific workforce is situated primarily in national and defense laboratories, but in recent decades has experienced a decline in numbers. The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office has implemented an expertise development program in order to off-set these declines and sustain a workforce of educated and trained scientists skilled in areas needed for nuclear forensics. Since its inception in 2008, the National Nuclear Forensics Expertise Development Program (NNFEDP) addresses this challenge holistically, through support to undergraduate and graduate students, university faculty and programs, as well as post-doctoral researchers at national laboratories in fields which are directly relevant to nuclear forensics. In that time, the program has placed 44 Ph.D.'s directly into national laboratories and U.S. federal agencies, maintaining the technical expertise required to execute the Nation's nuclear forensics mission. In 2017, the NNFEDP will institute the new Nuclear Forensics Research Award that will foster collaborations between university students and faculty with national laboratory researchers to further support and reinforce the advancement of nuclear forensic science through joint efforts. This opportunity will increase participation in this exciting and critically important national security mission space and contribute to the sustained development of the nuclear forensics workforce. (authors)

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

A Systematic Evidence Based Performance Approach to Regulation of Nuclear Sites in England and Wales - 20058

The Environment Agency for England has developed a systematic evidence-based approach to pursue our strategic environmental objectives for the regulation of nuclear sites. We use an annual evidence review process to ensure effective and efficient targeting of limited resources to achieve those objectives. Over the last 8 years, we have been developing and refining this approach to ensure risk-based and value driven regulation. The approach comprises nuclear site and nuclear sector review processes known as Site Environment Review (SER) and Nuclear Environment Review (NER). This approach complements our regulation of nuclear site permit holders under the Environmental Permitting Regulations (EPR). We deliver our regulation of nuclear sites in England and Wales alongside the Office for Nuclear Regulation. The SER process involves the lead regulator for each nuclear site assessing the permit holder's environmental performance across 14 themes, set within the context of the site's main activities and associated waste disposals. Our themes include environmental leadership, resources and climate change, radioactive waste management, facility management and decommissioning, groundwater, and environmental radiological protection. We use evidence from site inspections and working within our subject matter groups to grade current and predicted future environmental performance. We are particularly interested in sustainability and the application of Best Available Techniques (BAT) to prevent the creation, and minimise the disposal, of radioactive wastes. We use risk analysis (strengths, weaknesses, threats and opportunities) to examine performance against our strategic environmental objectives, which are set out, in our 5-year Nuclear Delivery Plan (NDP). The output supports the targeting of our resources at each nuclear site. We consult the relevant permit holders on the SER priorities and use their feedback to refine our plans. We expect all permit holders to take account of our priorities when considering their own programmes of work, objectives and plans. The NER process brings together what we learn and achieve through regulation across the sector. It provides input to planning priorities, supported by qualitative and semi-quantitative evidence. It covers the 28 nuclear sites in England and Wales and spans the same 14 environmental themes. During the process we collate, compile and summarise evidence from the SERs and other sources such as inspection reports and evidence from our other nuclear work programmes. The output is the NER annual report. This provides a snapshot of the status of the nuclear sector and gives insights to enable us to regulate more efficiently and effectively. It also takes account of cross-cutting issues and risks such as changes in international standards, domestic policy, regulatory framework, domestic standards and guidance, learning from experience such as incidents, events and good practice, and innovation, research and development. It provides graphics that illustrate the grading of environmental performance for the nuclear sector across the fourteen environmental themes. This analysis allows benchmarking of nuclear site's environmental performance and the visualisation provides a convenient comparison of performance across themes, sites, and over time. We use this intelligence to inform our investment in training and development of our staff, and our cross-cutting engagement on strategic issues with government, the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA) and other corporate organisations. Adopting this approach can provide benefits with organisational reputation, stakeholder participation and ensuring value from the public investment. This paper describes the history of the SER/NER process, a selection of outputs from the process and ideas for improvement. The paper will be of interest to other regulators and organisations across the world that are interested in supporting continuous improvement. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗