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At least 793 records · Page 44
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2020

Geologic Framework Model for the Dry Alluvium Geology (DAG) Experiment Testbed Yucca Flat, Nevada National Security Site

Geologic framework models (GFMs) provide a methodology for integrating geology into, and thus geologically informing, other modeling and simulation activities. GFMs provide a threedimensional (3-D), geology-based digital framework for developing and parametrizing meshes and evaluating model and simulation results. This report describes a 3-D GFM constructed for the Source Physics Experiment Phase II Dry Alluvium Geology test series located in Yucca Flat at the Nevada National Security Site. The geology in the Yucca Flat region is complex and diverse, which creates challenges to modeling seismic wave propagation from SPE tests. The Yucca Flat GFM helps address these challenges by providing the 3-D distribution of relevant geologic features and physical properties necessary to more effectively model seismic wave propagation. The GFM includes 7 model layers and 48 faults that cut and offset the layers. An appendix is included that provides quantitative data on physical properties for each model layer.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2020

Securing machine learning models

We discuss the challenges and approaches to securing numeric computation against adversaries who may want to discover hidden parameters or values used by the algorithm. We discuss techniques that are both cryptographic and non-cryptographic in nature. Cryptographic solutions are either not yet algorithmically feasible or currently require more computational resources than are reasonable to have in a deployed setting. Non-cryptographic solutions may be computationally faster, but these cannot stop a determined adversary. For one such non-cryptographic solution, mixed Boolean arithmetic, we suggest a number of improvements that may protect the obfuscated calculation against current automated deobfuscation methods.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2020

Radionuclide Screening Analysis and Transport Parameters for Pahute Mesa Detonations, Nevada National Security Site

A “screening analysis” is implemented at Pahute Mesa (PM), Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), to determine subsets of the 43 radionuclides listed in the radionuclide inventory of Finnegan et al. (2016) that are of relevance or potential relevance to the hydrologic source term (HST) for assessment of radionuclide transport in groundwater. Consideration is added to how levels of contamination are defined and whether any other radionuclides not in the inventory are relevant to the HST. A model is developed to estimate a range of possible source concentrations in groundwater that account for uncertainty in partitioning into melt glass and sorption into surrounding rock of the exchange zone for the 82 PM underground nuclear tests detonated in vertical shafts. The model also accounts for the varied hydrogeochemical settings. Transport parameters needed for the screening model calculations are developed from databases for hydrogeologic units, chemistry, mineralogy, fracture spacing, fracture aperture, fracture openness, matrix porosity, bulk density, saturation, and alteration. Of key importance is consideration of diagenetic zonation of the mineralogy related to hydrothermal alteration. The screening analysis compares model results with available groundwater radiochemistry data. Consistency between screening model results and available data helps validate the model for application to all 43 radionuclides, most of which have no measurements or only non-detect measurements of concentration in groundwater. The screening analysis determines that ten radionuclides – tritium, Sr-90, I-129, Cs-137, U-232, U-233, U-234, U-238, and the total of Pu-239 and Pu-240 are relevant to the HST. Determination of relevance is primarily based on data and/or model results indicating source concentration exceeding a maximum contaminant level (MCL) out to 100 years since the time of detonation. U-238 is relevant to assessment of contamination relative to MCLs for uranium and gross alpha particle activity. Five other radionuclides – C-14, Cl-36, Tc-99, Np-237, and Pu-238 – are determined potentially relevant to the HST based on a 0.1 MCL threshold. The screening analysis recommends additional attention to the natural daughter radionuclides of the uranium series (U-238) and thorium series (Th-232) decay chains, particularly Ra-226 and Ra-228, that were not included the inventory.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗
DOE OSTI2020

Geologic framework model for the Dry Alluvium Geology (DAG) experiment testbed, Yucca Flat, Nevada National Security Site

Geologic framework models (GFMs) provide a methodology for integrating geology into, and thus geologically informing, other modeling and simulation activities. GFMs provide a three-dimensional (3-D), geology-based digital framework for developing and parametrizing meshes and evaluating model and simulation results. This report describes a 3-D GFM constructed for the Source Physics Experiment Phase II Dry Alluvium Geology test series located in Yucca Flat at the Nevada National Security Site. The geology in the Yucca Flat region is complex and diverse, which creates challenges to modeling seismic wave propagation from SPE tests. The Yucca Flat GFM helps address these challenges by providing the 3-D distribution of relevant geologic features and physical properties necessary to more effectively model seismic wave propagation. The GFM includes 7 model layers and 48 faults that cut and offset the layers. An appendix is included that provides quantitative data on physical properties for each model layer.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2020

Nevada National Security Site 2019 Waste Management Monitoring Report Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites

Environmental monitoring data are collected at and around the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites (RWMSs) within the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). This report summarizes the 2019 environmental data to provide an overall evaluation of RWMS performance and to support environmental compliance and performance assessment (PA) activities. Some of these data (e.g., radiation exposure, air, and groundwater) are presented in other reports (Mission Support and Test Services, LLC 2019, 2020a, 2020b). Direct radiation monitoring data indicate exposure levels at the Area 3 and Area 5 RWMSs are within the range of background levels measured at the NNSS. Slightly elevated exposure levels outside the Area 3 RWMS are attributed to nearby historical aboveground nuclear weapons tests. Air monitoring data at the Area 3 and Area 5 RWMSs show that tritium concentrations in water vapor and americium and plutonium concentrations in air particles are below Derived Concentration Standards for these radionuclides. Groundwater monitoring data indicate the groundwater in the uppermost aquifer beneath the Area 5 RWMS is not impacted by RWMS operations. Results of groundwater analysis from wells around the Area 5 RWMS are below established investigation levels. Leachate samples collected from the leachate collection systems at the Area 5 mixed low-level waste disposal unit are below established contaminant regulatory limits. During 2019, precipitation at the Area 3 RWMS was 77 percent above average, and precipitation at the Area 5 RWMS was 69 percent above average. Water balance measurements indicate that evapotranspiration from the vegetated weighing lysimeter at the Area 5 RWMS dries the soil and prevents downward percolation of precipitation more effectively than evaporation as measured from the bare-soil weighing lysimeter. Vadose zone monitoring in the Area 3 and Area 5 RWMS soil covers shows no evidence of precipitation percolating through the covers to the waste. Moisture from precipitation did not percolate below 120 centimeters (3.9 feet [ft]) in the vegetated final cover on the U-3ax/bl disposal unit at the Area 3 RWMS during 2019. There was no drainage through 2.4 meters (8 ft) of soil as indicated from the Area 3 drainage lysimeters that received only natural precipitation. At the Area 3 RWMS, which received three times the natural precipitation, 57 percent of the applied precipitation and irrigation drained from the bare-soil drainage lysimeter. All 2019 monitoring data indicate that the Area 3 and Area 5 RWMSs are performing within expectations of the model and parameter assumptions for the facilities’ PAs.

2019↗
DOE OSTI2020

Applicability of Public Dose Limits to Individuals on the Nevada National Security Site

Historically all persons working on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) were considered subject to worker dose limits when calculations of potential dose from the air pathway were conducted to demonstrate compliance with Title 42 United States Code (USC) Chapter 85, “The Clean Air Act,” and Title 40 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 61, Subpart H, “National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP).” Calculations were also conducted for the all-pathways potential dose to demonstrate compliance with U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Order DOE O 458.1 Chg. 3, “Radiation Protection of the Public and the Environment.” The need to evaluate environmental air sampling locations and past regulator questions about the existence of persons potentially subject to public dose limits being on the NNSS drove this assessment (letter from EPA [U.S. Environmental Protection Agency] Region 9 to DOE/Nevada Operations Office, dated September 3, 1999). This assessment also supports determining those persons subject to public dose limits from the all pathways perspective. A person that is a member of the public is subject to public dose limits.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗
DOE OSTI2020

Mosquito Distribution and West Nile Virus Surveillance Results on the Nevada National Security Site in South Central Nevada

A 10-year study (2004-2013) was conducted to determine mosquito distribution and the prevalence of West Nile Virus (WNV) on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) in south central Nevada. Mosquito traps baited with dry ice were set overnight at sites where standing water provided potential breeding sites for mosquitoes. Captured mosquitoes were identified to species and tested for WNV. A total of 556 mosquitoes representing 6 species were captured and identified at 20 sites around the NNSS during 124 surveys. A vast majority (89%) of mosquitoes were Culex tarsalis. None of the mosquitoes tested were positive for WNV although 2 samples, both Culiseta inornata, were suspect for WNV in 2005 and 2006, both from Well 3 Pond. Additionally, 24 birds representing 5 species were opportunistically collected and tested for WNV with no positive results. Results from this study reveal patterns of mosquito distribution across the NNSS and suggest that NNSS workers have a very low risk of being exposed to WNV.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2021

National Security & International Studies (Q1 FY2021 Newsletter)

Happy New Year to everyone. Activity in the office continues to be at a high pace with the addition of the Strategic Analyses and Assessments (SAA) Office from ALDX, and the Mission Integration (MI) Office (formerly known as Nuclear and Military [NMA] Office) from DDW. We are working closely to optimize the impact of our combined offices. In this issue of our newsletter, we will highlight programs from the SAA Office portfolio, delve into our interactions with the Project on Nuclear Issues (PONI) program from CSIS, introduce you to new staff in NSIS and review a new joint postdoc program with the UC Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation and the Center for Global Security Research at LLNL. I also encourage you to take a look at the new NSIS website for more information on the office. Finally, the NSIS office will soon be kicking off a webinar series on starting with topics of interest to the Director’s Strategic Resilience Initiative and will grow beyond that. Stay tuned for more information. --John Scott, Acting Office Director, NSIS

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2021

Learning Management System User Requirements for the National Nuclear Security Administration's International Nuclear Safeguards Engagement Program

The National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) International Nuclear Safeguards Engagement Program (INSEP) is considering investing in new tools that would allow the program to support its partner states from a distance. At the same time, the program is considering approaches that would allow several organizations, including NNSA, IAEA, national laboratories and contractor staff, to collaborate in the development and maintenance of instructional content. Software systems known as Learning Management Systems (LMSs) might represent a mechanism through which INSEP could accomplish these goals (collaborative development and remote support). To assess the usefulness of an LMS, INSEP has specified its needs for delivering online training and compared those needs to the capability of a range of LMSs. This comparison will allow INSEP to determine whether an LMS would be a useful tool and may set the stage for a "make-buy" decision in the future. The study team concluded that INSEP's content development and delivery needs align well with the capabilities of the leading LMSs on the market today and that that INSEP performance requirements allow for a customized approach using existing training portals that are already available to NNSA. Additional work would be required to specify the desired processes for developing online training and outreach materials, structuring the databases, specifying the data that should be collected, and detailing the desired system reports and documentation.

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗
DOE OSTI2021

FEST: Facility Energy Saving and Securing Technology Using Multi-Source Data: (Milestone 2 Report)

This project aims to demonstrate three technologies developed in-house at LLNL and University of Michigan-Dearborn (UMD), at a military site, including i) Grid Data Crossing (called GriD-Xing) for increasing smart meter data usability, ii) Facility Energy Optimization (called Facility E-GO) for improving facility energy efficiency in both operation and planning perspectives, and iii) Co-simulation tool (called Co-Sim) for enhancing smart meter and energy facility networks resilience and security. In this report, Millstone 2 - Integration A: Integrate GriD-Xing and facility optimization tools is documented.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗
DOE OSTI2021

Classified library critical in Lab’s Annual Assessment of weapons to U.S. President. National Security Resource Center’s collections are the foundation to stockpile confidence

One of the most important accomplishments every year at LANL is a letter sent by the Laboratory Director that ultimately reaches the President of the United States. The subject is the current state of the weapons for which the Lab is responsible. Known as the Annual Assessment letter, it is a culmination of nearly 14 months’ worth of work and the contributions of more than 1,000 Lab staff members. Its classified contents come from the Lab’s Annual Assessment, which is an approximately 100-page document evaluating the safety, security and effectiveness of the stockpile.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗
DOE OSTI2021

Automated Cyber Security Testing Platform for Industrial Control Systems

Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) are a complex system of coupled physics controlled by a network of Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs). These PLCs communicate process data across the network to coordinate control actions with each other and inform the operators of process variables and control decisions. Networking the PLCs allows more effective process control and provides the operator more information which results in more efficient plant operation. This interconnectivity creates new security issues, as operators have more access to the plant controls, so will bad actors. As plant networks become more digitized and encompass more sophisticated controllers, the network surface exposed to cyber interference grows. Understanding the dynamics of these coupled systems of physics, control logic, and network communications is critical to their protection. The research into the cybersecurity of the Operational Technologies of NPPs is developing and requires a platform that can allow high fidelity physics simulations to interact with digital networks of controllers. This will require three main components: a network simulation environment, a physics simulator, and virtual PLCs (vPLC) that represent typical industry hardware. A platform that incorporates these three components to provide the most accurate representation of actual NPP networks and controllers is developed in this paper.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2021

Nevada National Security Site Demonstration Reactor Siting and Capabilities Study

The NNSS Demonstration Reactor Siting and Capabilities study identifies siting opportunities supporting the demonstration of advanced and emerging reactor designs and operations in a manner that optimizes these activities within the NNSS physical, operational, and regulatory footprint considering relevant evaluation factors to ensure the designated site locations provide the necessary defense-in-depth for safe and secure sustained operations.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Underground Test Area (UGTA) Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 99: Rainier Mesa/Shoshone Mountain, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada

This closure report (CR) has been prepared for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 99, Rainier Mesa/Shoshone Mountain (RM/SM), Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), Nevada. Rainier Mesa (RM) was the site of 61 underground nuclear tests, and Shoshone Mountain (SM) was the site of 6 underground nuclear tests. The corrective action for the RM/SM CAU is closure in place with long-term monitoring and institutional controls; and involves a balance of modeling, monitoring, and institutional controls.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2020

Groundwater Monitoring Report, U.S. Department of Energy Y-12 National Security Complex, Oak Ridge, Tennessee

This report contains the groundwater and surface water monitoring data obtained during calendar year (CY) 2019 at the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) on the DOE Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR) in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. The monitoring data were obtained from wells, springs, and surface water sampling locations in three hydrogeologic regimes at Y-12. The Bear Creek Hydrogeologic Regime (Bear Creek Regime) encompasses a section of Bear Creek Valley (BCV) between the west end of Y-12 and the west end of the Bear Creek Watershed (directions are in reference to the Y-12 grid system, shown as Plant North. The Upper East Fork Poplar Creek Hydrogeologic Regime (East Fork Regime) encompasses the Y-12 industrial facilities and support structures in BCV. The Chestnut Ridge Hydrogeologic Regime (Chestnut Ridge Regime) encompasses a section of Chestnut Ridge directly south of Y-12. Background information in Section 2 of this report outlines the hydrogeologic framework for groundwater and surface water quality monitoring at Y-12 and includes an overview of the groundwater contamination in each hydrogeologic regime. Section 3 provides details regarding the groundwater and surface water sampling and analysis activities implemented under the Y-12 GWPP, including sampling locations and frequency, sample collection and handling, field measurements and laboratory analytes, quality assurance (QA)/quality control (QC) sampling, data management, and data quality assessment (DQA). However, the equivalent QA/QC or DQA information for the groundwater and surface water data associated with the monitoring programs implemented by UCOR are not included in this report and instead are deferred to referenced programmatic plans and reports issued by OREM and UCOR. Section 4 of this report presents a summary evaluation of the CY 2019 monitoring data with regard to the respective objectives of surveillance monitoring and exit pathway/perimeter monitoring. The evaluation is based primarily on the analytical results for the following principal groundwater contaminants at Y-12: nitrate, uranium, gross alpha activity, gross beta activity, and volatile organic compounds (VOCs). Section 5 summarizes the most significant findings with respect to the principal contaminants along with recommendations for any proposed changes to the ongoing groundwater and surface water quality monitoring performed under the Y-12 GWPP. Technical reports and plans cited in the narrative sections of the report are listed in Section 6. Narrative sections of this report reference several appendices. Figures (maps and diagrams) and data tables (excluding data summary tables incorporated in the narrative sections) are in Appendix A and Appendix B, respectively. Appendix C contains construction details for each well sampled during CY 2019 by either the Y-12 GWPP or UCOR, along with schematic diagrams for wells equipped with Westbay™ multiport sampling equipment or Barcad® pump systems. Appendix D supports the background summary discussion in Section 2 and provides more detailed information about the hydrogeologic framework for groundwater and surface water monitoring at Y-12, including the primary sources of groundwater contamination in each hydrogeologic regime. Results for all field measurements and laboratory analyses obtained by the Y-12 GWPP and UCOR are presented in Appendix E, which also includes the sample numbers for the QA/QC samples associated with groundwater and surface water monitoring performed by the Y-12 GWPP.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2021

Advanced Detection of Wellbore Failure for Safe and Secure Utilization of Subsurface Infrastructure

The main goal of this project was to create a state-of-the-art predictive capability that screens and identifies wellbores that are at the highest risk of catastrophic failure. This capability is critical to a host of subsurface applications, including gas storage, hydrocarbon extraction and storage, geothermal energy development, and waste disposal, which depend on seal integrity to meet U.S. energy demands in a safe and secure manner. In addition to the screening tool, this project also developed several other supporting capabilities to help understand fundamental processes involved in wellbore failure. This included novel experimental methods to characterize permeability and porosity evolution during compressive failure of cement, as well as methods and capabilities for understanding two-phase flow in damaged wellbore systems, and novel fracture-resistant cements made from recycled fibers.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗