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At least 793 records · Page 44

On/Off State Classification of a Reactor Facility Using Gas Effluence Measurements

Inferring on/off operational state of a reactor facility using measurements from an independent monitoring system is critical to the assessment of its compliance to agreements. In this paper, we consider the problem of inferring on/off state of a reactor facility using measurements of Ar-41, Cs-138, and Xe-138 gas effluence types collected at the facility’s off-gas stack. We present classifiers based on thresholding measurements of individual effluence types, and then present fusers that combine their outputs or measurements. We present five fusers based on simple majority rule, Chow’s pattern recognition function, Fisher’s combined p-value statistic, physics-based Poisson radiation counts model, and correlation coefficient method. In addition, we also test five machine learning methods based on non-linear classifiers, which are available as R packages. Finally, our results show that: (i) these gas effluence measurements are effective in inferring on/off state of a reactor facility; for example, best fusers achieve ~97% detection at ~1% false alarm rate, and (ii) fusers that combine all effluence types based on physics-based models, correlation coefficient and Fisher’s method outperform simple majority rule, Chow’s fusers and machine learning methods, as well as when they are applied to individual and pairs of effluence types.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

A structural description of the evolution of stakeholders and risk communication in the Department of Energy's defense nuclear facilities: Historical perspective, major stakeholders, and external events

Regulators and policymakers are routinely challenged with explaining complex concepts concerning risk. Part of the challenge is helping external and internal stakeholders to understand the context behind risk-related information and decisions. Here, this paper will describe the historical evolution of the safety and regulatory framework for an important category in the nuclear industry—defense nuclear facilities owned and operated by the US Department of Energy. In parallel with describing this evolution, three major events which occurred external to the complex of defense nuclear facilities will be summarized, and their impact on the maturation of the Department's safety and regulatory framework will be discussed. Finally, integrated with these two threads of discussion will be a chronicle of the changing set of involved organizations and the expanding set of external stakeholders involved in risk decisions—and therefore, the risk communications ecosystem surrounding defense nuclear facilities. It will be noted that this system was once describable as a classic “iron triangle,” but now has progressed to a complex network of federal and state organizations, numerous congressional committees, and expanding sets of external stakeholders. It is hoped that a comprehensive discussion of the context of risk assessment in the defense nuclear facilities complex—addressing historical insights, organizational evolution, and the maturing structure of regulation—will provide enhanced opportunities for building trust and understanding in this complex environment.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Integrated Disposal Facility FY2011 Glass Testing Summary Report [Erratum]

Pacific Northwest National Laboratory was contracted by Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC to provide the technical basis for estimating radionuclide release from the engineered portion of the disposal facility (e.g., source term). Vitrifying the low-activity waste at Hanford is expected to generate over 1.6 x 10 5 m 3 of glass (Certa and Wells 2010). The volume of immobilized low-activity waste (ILAW) at Hanford is the largest in the DOE complex and is one of the largest inventories (approximately 8.9 x 10 14 Bq total activity) of long-lived radionuclides, principally 99 Tc (t 1/2 = 2.1 x 10 5 ), planned for disposal in a low-level waste (LLW) facility. Before the ILAW can be disposed, DOE must conduct a performance assessment (PA) for the Integrated Disposal Facility (IDF) that describes the long-term impacts of the disposal facility on public health and environmental resources. As part of the ILAW glass testing program PNNL is implementing a strategy, consisting of experimentation and modeling, in order to provide the technical basis for estimating radionuclide release from the glass waste form in support of future IDF PAs. The purpose of this report is to summarize the progress made in fiscal year (FY) 2011 toward implementing the strategy with the goal of developing an understanding of the long-term corrosion behavior of low-activity waste glasses.

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2014 Annual Wastewater Reuse Report for the Idaho National Laboratory Site’s Central Facilities Area Sewage Treatment Plant

This report describes conditions, as required by the state of Idaho Wastewater Reuse Permit (#LA-000141-03), for the wastewater land application site at the Idaho National Laboratory Site’s Central Facilities Area Sewage Treatment Plant from November 1, 2013, through October 31, 2014. The report contains, as applicable, the following information; Site description; Facility and system description; Permit required monitoring data and loading rates; Status of compliance conditions and activities; and Discussion of the facility’s environmental impacts. The current permit expires on March 16, 2015. A permit renewal application was submitted to Idaho Department of Environmental Quality on September 15, 2014. During the 2014 permit year, no wastewater was land-applied to the irrigation area of the Central Facilities Area Sewage Treatment Plant and therefore, no effluent flow volumes or samples were collected from wastewater sampling point WW-014102. Seepage testing of the three lagoons was performed between August 26, 2014 and September 22, 2014. Seepage rates from Lagoons 1 and 2 were below the 0.25 inches/day requirement; however, Lagoon 3 was above the 0.25 inches/day. Lagoon 3 has been isolated and is being evaluated for future use or permanent removal from service.

2014 Annual Wastewater Reuse Report Central Facili↗

Measuring and monitoring KIPT Neutron Source Facility Reactivity

Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) of USA and Kharkov Institute of Physics and Technology (KIPT) of Ukraine have been collaborating on developing and constructing a neutron source facility at Kharkov, Ukraine. The facility consists of an accelerator-driven subcritical system. The accelerator has a 100 kW electron beam using 100 MeV electrons. The subcritical assembly has k eff less than 0.98. To ensure the safe operation of this neutron source facility, the reactivity of the subcritical core has to be accurately determined and continuously monitored. A technique which combines the area-ratio method and the flux-to-current ratio method is purposed to determine the reactivity of the KIPT subcritical assembly at various conditions. In particular, the area-ratio method can determine the absolute reactivity of the subcritical assembly in units of dollars by performing pulsed-neutron experiments. It provides reference reactivities for the flux-to-current ratio method to track and monitor the reactivity deviations from the reference state while the facility is at other operation modes. Monte Carlo simulations are performed to simulate both methods using the numerical model of the KIPT subcritical assembly. It is found that the reactivities obtained from both the area-ratio method and the flux-to-current ratio method are spatially dependent on the neutron detector locations and types. Numerical simulations also suggest optimal neutron detector locations to minimize the spatial effects in the flux-to-current ratio method. The spatial correction factors are calculated using Monte Carlo methods for both measuring methods at the selected neutron detector locations. Monte Carlo simulations are also performed to verify the accuracy of the flux-to-current ratio method in monitoring the reactivity swing during a fuel burnup cycle.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

How to implement security controls for an information security program at CBRN facilities

This document was prepared by PNNL within the framework of Project 19 of the European Union Chemical Biological Radiological and Nuclear Risk Mitigation Centres of Excellence Initiative entitled, ''Development of procedures and guidelines to create and improve secure information management systems and data exchange mechanisms for CBRN materials under regulatory control.'' It provides management and workers at CBRN facilities, parent organization managers responsible for those facilities, and regulatory agencies (governmental and nongovernmental) with guidance on the best practices for protecting information security. The security mitigation approaches presented in this document were chosen because they present generally accepted guidance in an easy-to-understand manner, making it easier for facility personnel to grasp key concepts and envision how security controls could be implemented by the facility. This guidance is presented from a risk management perspective.

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗

Facility Modeling Capability Demonstration Summary Report

A joint effort has been initiated by Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), Savanah River National Laboratory (SRNL), Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), sponsored by the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA’s) office of Proliferation Detection, to develop and validate a flexible framework for simulating effluents and emissions from spent fuel reprocessing facilities. These effluents and emissions can be measured by various on-site and/or off-site means, and then the inverse problem can ideally be solved through modeling and simulation to estimate characteristics of facility operation such as the nuclear material production rate. The flexible framework called Facility Modeling Toolkit focused on the forward modeling of PUREX reprocessing facility operating conditions from fuel storage and chopping to effluent and emission measurements.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Preparation and evaporation of Hanford Waste treatment plant direct feed low activity waste effluent management facility simulant

The Hanford Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) Low Activity Waste (LAW) vitrification facility will generate an aqueous condensate recycle stream (LAW Melter Off-Gas Condensate, LMOGC) from the off-gas system. The baseline plan for disposition of this stream during full WTP operations is to send it to the WTP Pretreatment Facility, where it will be blended with LAW, concentrated by evaporation, and recycled to the LAW vitrification facility. However, during the Direct Feed LAW (DFLAW) scenario, planned disposition of this stream involves concentrating the condensate in a new evaporator at the Effluent Management Facility (EMF) and returning it to the LAW melter. The LMOGC stream will contain components, e.g. halides and sulfates, that are volatile at melter temperatures, have limited solubility in glass waste forms, and present a material corrosion concern. Because this stream will recycle within WTP, these components are expected to accumulate in the LMOGC stream, exacerbating their impact on the number of LAW glass containers that must be produced. Diverting the stream reduces the halides and sulfates in the glass and is a key objective of this program. In order to determine the disposition path, it is key to experimentally determine the fate of contaminants. To do this, testing is needed to account for the buffering chemistry of the components, determine the achievable evaporation end point, identify insoluble solids that form, determine the formation and distribution of key regulatoryimpacting constituents, and generate an aqueous stream that can be used in testing of the subsequent immobilization step. This overall program examines the potential treatment and immobilization of the LMOGC stream to enable alternative disposal. The objective of this task was to (1) prepare a simulant of the LAW Melter Off-gas Condensate expected during DFLAW operations, (2) demonstrate evaporation in order to predict the final composition of the effluents from the EMF evaporator to aid in planning for their disposition, and (3) generate concentrated evaporator bottoms for use in immobilization testing.

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Final Report for the Contractor Readiness Assessment of the Transient Reactor Test Facility Resumption of Transient Testing Activity at the Idaho National Laboratory

The purpose of this review was to verify readiness for the TREAT restart of transient testing activity at the INL and inform the startup authorization authority decision-making for startup authorization by providing a deliberate and managed determination of the state of readiness preparation and determination of whether operations can be performed safely. Verification of readiness included assuring that equipment operability, procedure viability, and personnel knowledge, skills, and performance are adequate for operations. Because the TREAT (including restart of transient testing activity) is a hazard category-2 nuclear facility and because reactor operation and transient testing activities were suspended for programmatic and funding reasons in excess of a year, DOE O 425.1D required that both a contractor and DOE RA be satisfactorily completed prior to startup of the TREAT and restart of transient testing activity. To this end, DOE directed that a CRA and federal RA be conducted. The CRA IP defined the depth of the CRA through the objectives and CRADs, delineated in Appendix A of the IP; established roles and responsibilities for CRA team activities; and established processes, practices, and protocols for preparation, conduct, documentation, and reporting of the CRA. The approaches and methodologies identified in the IP were used to verify that the BEA management team has established SSCs, developed personnel capabilities and competencies, and implemented safety features, programs, and procedures in a manner that provides reasonable assurance for adequate protection of workers, the public, and the environment in preparation for and execution of the TREAT restart of transient testing activity. This CRA was intended to confirm that (1) the facility is in a state of readiness to safely conduct operations in accordance with the safety basis; and (2) the management control programs are in place to ensure safe operations can be sustained. This equated to mature implementation of the integrated safety management (ISM) in conjunction with implementation of the individual facility authorization basis. This CRA was structured to verify the readiness to conduct restart of transient testing activity safely, and that facility programs were in place to support the restart of transient testing activity.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Partner Facilities Working Group (PFWG) Meeting

The Nuclear Science User Facilities (NSUF) program convened the PFWG meeting to provide a formal venue to capture valued input from the NSUF partner facilities. The general topics of discussion included: • Memorandums of understanding (MOU) • User agreements • Proposal rules and guidelines • Facility reviews • Establishment of standing working committees for the PFWG. In addition, each partner facility provided a short presentation on its capabilities and contributions to the NSUF. This document is a synopsis of the meeting.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Closure Report for the Central Facilities Area Sewage Treatment Plant Lagoon 3 and Land Application Area

Because of significantly reduced wastewater discharges to the Central Facilities Area Sewage Treatment Plant, wastewater has not been land applied since 2011. The future need to land apply wastewater was evaluated. Based on the current wastewater flows into the Central Facilities Area Sewage Treatment Plant, expected future missions at Central Facilities Area, and the discovery in 2014 that Lagoon 3 was leaking at an unacceptable rate, it was determined that the Central Facilities Area Sewage Treatment Plant is significantly oversized and that Lagoons 1 and 2 could be converted to total evaporation lagoons. Therefore, the decision was made to remove the existing sludge in Lagoon 3 and transfer it to Lagoon 2 for additional treatment, decommission Lagoon 3 and the land application area, and terminate the wastewater reuse permit. A closure plan was submitted and approved by the Idaho Department of Environmental Quality in 2016. This report describes the closure activities that were performed. Closure activities included: • Characterizing the soil/liner in Lagoon 3 to determine whether further characterization and/or remediation will be required under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act. • Based on the results from the soil/liner sampling, determining whether additional sampling will be required for the land application area. • Removing the sludge in Lagoon 3 and placing it in Lagoon 2. • Puncturing the Lagoon 3 soil/liner to prevent ponding of storm water and becoming a source for vectors. • Installing a permanent cap on the inlet piping to Lagoon 3. Samples were collected on November 10, 2016, and were submitted for analysis to an off-site laboratory. Data validation and evaluation were performed by Portage, INC. Sample results confirmed that there is no hazard to human health and the environment and that Lagoon 3 and the land application area could be closed. In August 2017, sludge was removed from Lagoon 3 and placed in Lagoon 2, the soil/liner was punctured in 4 places, and caps were installed on the primary and bypass inlet lines.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Remote Handled Hot Cell Facility and Other Research Transuranic Waste (Debris)

This acceptable knowledge (AK) Summary Report has been prepared for the Central Characterization Program (CCP) for remote-handled (RH) transuranic (TRU) waste generated and managed by Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico (SNL/NM) in Albuquerque, New Mexico. The waste described in this report was predominately generated in the SNL/NM Hot Cell Facility (HCF) during the removal and packaging of experimental material and decontamination operations in Building 6580 at Technical Area (TA)-V. The waste stream also includes a very small amount of waste (estimated at less than 1 gram of fuel similar to that used for research at the HCF) originating from classified research at TA-I. In addition, the waste also includes secondary waste termed by SNL/NM as process generated waste (PGW), created during repackaging operations for this waste at the Auxiliary Hot Cell Facility (AHCF). The waste has been stored at the Sandia Pulsed Reactor (SPR) Dense Pack Storage Facility within TA-V or the Manzano Bunkers located at Manzano Base within Kirtland Air Force Base. All of the waste is being repackaged at the AHCF. This report was prepared in accordance with CCP-TP-005, CCP Acceptable Knowledge Documentation (Reference 1), to implement the AK requirements of DOE/WIPP-02-3214, Remote-Handled TRU Waste Characterization Program Implementation Plan (WCPIP) (Reference 2); Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Hazardous Waste Facility Permit, Waste Analysis Plan (WIPP-WAP) (Reference 3); and DOE/WIPP-02-3122, Transuranic Waste Acceptance Criteria for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP-WAC) (Reference 4).

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E- Area Low-Level Waste Facility Multitiered Groundwater and Intruder Radionuclide Screening

Solid Waste Management (SWM) operates the E- Area Low-Level Waste Facility (ELLWF) where low level on-site and off-site solid waste streams are buried. The facility has been in operation since late 1994 and is currently projected to remain in operation until 2065. This facility can accommodate a broad range of waste forms resulting from the six different types of disposal unit (DU) options (i.e., varying degrees of engineered barriers → trenches to concrete vaults). This facility is currently operating under a Performance Assessment (PA)issued back in 2008, along with several subsequent supporting Special Analyses (SA).

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FY2020 performance assessment annual review for the E-area low-level waste facility

The Savannah River Site (SRS) E-Area Low-Level Waste Facility (ELLWF) consists of six types of disposal units described in the Performance Assessment (PA) (WSRC, 2008): Low Activity Waste Vault (LAWV), Intermediate Level Vault (ILV), Trenches [Slit Trenches (STs), Engineered Trenches (ETs), and Component-in-Grout (CIG) Trenches], and Naval Reactor Component Disposal Areas (NRCDAs). The ELLWF is a part of the Solid Waste Management Facility (SWMF). SWMF is managed and operated by the SRS Management and Operations prime contractor, Savannah River Nuclear Solutions (SRNS). Within SRNS, the Solid Waste Management (SWM) organization is responsible for operating the SWMF, and the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) is the technical agency responsible for preparing and maintaining the PA. SWMF operations have been performed at SRS since 1952. The mission of the SWMF is to provide storage, processing, disposal, and shipment of radioactive, hazardous, and mixed waste. The SWMF is committed to treat, store, and dispose of these waste products in a manner that protects the environment and the health and safety of the facility worker, the co-located worker, and the offsite general public. Wastes handled in the SWMF include low level waste, transuranic waste, hazardous waste, Toxic Substances Control Act waste, and mixed waste (containing both hazardous and radioactive constituents). The FY2020 PA Annual Review for the ELLWF affirms that the disposal facility continued to operate within the bounds of the current PA and Composite Analysis (CA) baseline and the subsequent SA’s and satisfied all the requirements, conditions, and limitations identified in the 2008 DAS (DOE 2008a), RWMB SRNL_STI-2020-00588 Revision 0 vi (McGill, 2020), and ELLWF Low-Level Waste Acceptance Criteria (SRS-1S, 2014). This annual review affirms that the supporting studies performed in FY2020 do not alter the conclusions of the ELLWF PA (WSRC, 2008) and that there is a reasonable expectation that the ELLWF will meet the performance objectives delineated in DOE Manual 435.1-1 (DOE 2011)

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An Evaluation of the Impact of Glycolate and Glycolate Mitigation on the Defense Waste Processing Facility Recycle Diversion Project Flowsheet

The Savannah River Site (SRS) Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) processes radioactive High Level Waste (HLW) sludge solids from the Concentration, Storage, and Transfer Facilities (CSTF); which includes the SRS Tank Farm and Evaporator facilities, and a concentrated Cs-137 laden stream and a Monosodium Titanate (MST) and sludge solids stream from the SRS Salt Waste Processing Facility (SWPF). The waste is chemically adjusted with acids and reductant (currently with 50 wt.% nitric acid and ~90 wt.% formic acid, but eventually formic acid will be substituted with ~70 wt.% glycolic acid), and frit is added so that a durable, borosilicate glass waste form can be produced when the material is vitrified in the melter. As a result of the evaporation of water during both the melter feed preparation and the melter feed vitrification steps in DWPF, a recycle waste stream is generated, neutralized, and sent back to the CSTF. The recycle waste is a dilute aqueous stream originating from the collection of condensate liquids containing some minor sludge, MST, and frit solids and other waste components resulting from melter feed entrainment during foamover events and transfer of volatile species into the condensate. The recycle stream volume is significant and is expected to approach 3 million gallons per year once SWPF reaches full operation, requiring the use of multiple large CSTF tanks for storage. The recycle waste is currently collected in the SRS Tank Farm and periodically evaporated in the 242-16H (2H) Evaporator to conserve storage space.

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Annual Summary Report for the Remote-Handled Low-Level Waste Disposal Facility—FY2021

This Fiscal Year (FY) 2021 annual summary report (ASR) documents the continued adequacy of the performance assessment (PA), the composite analysis (CA) and associated operating disposal-authorization statement (ODAS) technical basis documents for the Remote Handled (RH) Low-Level Waste (LLW) Disposal Facility at Idaho National Laboratory. Annual review of the adequacy of the PA and CA for the RHLLW Disposal Facility ensures that conclusions of the analyses remain valid in accordance with requirements of Department of Energy (DOE) Order 435.1, “Radioactive Waste Management.” In FY 2021, no significant operational changes or other activities occurred that would cause deviation from the assumptions in the PA and CA pertaining to disposal geometry, verification of waste characteristics, tracking disposal inventories against total limits, facility closure design, or institutional controls. Sixteen total waste-canister shipments were received at the RHLLW Disposal Facility, and 16 total waste canisters were emplaced.

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Annual Summary Report for the Remote-Handled Low-Level Waste Disposal Facility—FY 2022

This Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 annual summary report (ASR) documents the continued adequacy of the performance assessment (PA), the composite analysis (CA) and associated operating disposal-authorization statement (ODAS) technical-basis documents for the Remote-Handled (RH) Low-Level Waste (LLW) Disposal Facility at Idaho National Laboratory. Annual review of the adequacy of the PA and CA for the RHLLW Disposal Facility ensures that conclusions of the analyses remain valid in accordance with requirements of Department of Energy (DOE) Order 435.1, “Radioactive Waste Management.” In FY 2022, no significant operational changes or other activities occurred that would cause deviation from the assumptions in the PA and CA pertaining to disposal geometry, verification of waste characteristics, tracking disposal inventories against total limits, facility-closure design, or institutional controls. Fifteen waste canister shipments were received at the RHLLW Disposal Facility, and 15 waste canisters were emplaced in disposal vaults.

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Annual Summary Report for the Remote-Handled Low-Level Waste Disposal Facility—FY 2023

This Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 annual summary report (ASR) documents the continued adequacy of the performance assessment (PA), the composite analysis (CA) and associated operating disposal-authorization statement (ODAS) technical-basis documents for the Remote-Handled (RH) Low-Level Waste (LLW) Disposal Facility at Idaho National Laboratory. Annual review of the adequacy of the PA and CA for the RHLLW Disposal Facility ensures that conclusions of the analyses remain valid in accordance with requirements of Department of Energy (DOE) Order 435.1, “Radioactive Waste Management.” In FY 2023, no significant operational changes or other activities occurred that would cause deviation from the assumptions in the PA and CA pertaining to disposal geometry, verification of waste characteristics, tracking disposal inventories against total limits, facility-closure design, or institutional controls. Eleven waste canister shipments were received at the RHLLW Disposal Facility, and ten waste canisters were emplaced in disposal vaults.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗