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At least 775 records · Page 43

Probabilistic Risk Assessment: A Bibliography

Probabilistic risk analysis is an integration of failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA), fault tree analysis and other techniques to assess the potential for failure and to find ways to reduce risk. This bibliography references 160 documents in the NASA STI Database that contain the major concepts, probabilistic risk assessment, risk and probability theory, in the basic index or major subject terms, An abstract is included with most citations, followed by the applicable subject terms.

Source record↗

Transor analysis

Reliability and failure modes of adaptive restoring circuit module Transor

LOGIC CIRCUIT↗

Lognormal Uncertainty Estimation for Failure Rates

"Uncertainty analysis itself is uncertain, therefore, you cannot evaluate it exactly," Source Uncertain. Quantitative results for aerospace engineering problems are influenced by many sources of uncertainty. Uncertainty analysis aims to make a technical contribution to decision-making through the quantification of uncertainties in the relevant variables as well as through the propagation of these uncertainties up to the result. Uncertainty can be thought of as a measure of the 'goodness' of a result and is typically represented as statistical dispersion. This presentation will explain common measures of centrality and dispersion; and-with examples-will provide guidelines for how they may be estimated to ensure effective technical contributions to decision-making.

Britton, Paul T.↗

Progressive Failure And Life Prediction of Ceramic and Textile Composites

An engineering approach to predict the fatigue life and progressive failure of multilayered composite and textile laminates is presented. Analytical models which account for matrix cracking, statistical fiber failures and nonlinear stress-strain behavior have been developed for both composites and textiles. The analysis method is based on a combined micromechanics, fracture mechanics and failure statistics analysis. Experimentally derived empirical coefficients are used to account for the interface of fiber and matrix, fiber strength, and fiber-matrix stiffness reductions. Similar approaches were applied to textiles using Repeating Unit Cells. In composite fatigue analysis, Walker's equation is applied for matrix fatigue cracking and Heywood's formulation is used for fiber strength fatigue degradation. The analysis has been compared with experiment with good agreement. Comparisons were made with Graphite-Epoxy, C/SiC and Nicalon/CAS composite materials. For textile materials, comparisons were made with triaxial braided and plain weave materials under biaxial or uniaxial tension. Fatigue predictions were compared with test data obtained from plain weave C/SiC materials tested at AS&M. Computer codes were developed to perform the analysis. Composite Progressive Failure Analysis for Laminates is contained in the code CPFail. Micromechanics Analysis for Textile Composites is contained in the code MicroTex. Both codes were adapted to run as subroutines for the finite element code ABAQUS and CPFail-ABAQUS and MicroTex-ABAQUS. Graphic user interface (GUI) was developed to connect CPFail and MicroTex with ABAQUS.

Xue, David Y.↗

Test and analysis of a stitched RFI graphite-epoxy panel with a fuel access door

A stitched RFI graphite-epoxy panel with a fuel access door was analyzed using a finite element analysis and loaded to failure in compression. The panel was initially 56-inches long and 36.75-inches wide and the oval access door was 18-inches long and 15-inches wide. The panel was impact damaged with impact energy of 100 ft-lb prior to compressive loading; however, no impact damage was detectable visually or by A-scan. The panel carried a failure load of 695,000 Ib and global failure strain of .00494 in/in. Analysis indicated the panel would fail due to collapse at a load of 688,100 Ib. The test data indicate that the maximum strain in a region near the access door was .0096 in/in and analysis indicates a local surface strain of .010 in/in at the panel's failure load. The panel did not fail through the impact damage, but instead failed through bolt holes for attachment of the access door in a region of high strain.

Jegley, Dawn C.↗

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the electrical power distribution and control subsystem, volume 1

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA first completed an analysis of the Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD and C) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline with proposed Post 51-L updates included. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter EPD and C hardware. The IOA product for the EPD and C analysis consisted of 1671 failure mode analysis worksheets that resulted in 468 potential critical items being identified. Comparison was made to the proposed NASA Post 51-L baseline which consisted of FMEAs and 158 CIL items. Volume 1 contains the EPD and C subsystem description, analysis results, ground rules and assumptions, and some of the IOA worksheets.

Schmeckpeper, K. R.↗

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the landing/deceleration (LDG/DEC) subsystem FMEA/CIL

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Landing/Deceleration (LDG/DEC) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline with proposed Post 51-L updates included. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter LDG/DEC hardware. The IOA product for the LDG/DEC analysis consisted of 259 failure mode worksheets that resulted in 124 potential critical items being identified. Comparison was made to the NASA baseline which consisted of 267 FMEA's and 120 CIL items. This comparison produced agreement on all but 75 FMEA's which caused differences in 51 CIL items.

Odonnell, R. A.↗

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the elevon actuator subsystem FMEA/CIL

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Elevon Subsystem hardware, generating draft failure modes, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline with proposed Post 51-L updates included. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter Elevon hardware. The IOA product for the Elevon analysis consisted of 25 failure mode worksheets that resulted in 17 potential critical items being identified. Comparison was made to the NASA FMEA/CIL, which consisted of 23 FMEAs and 13 CIL items. This comparison produced agreement on all CIL items. Based on the Pre 51-L baseline, all non-CIL FMEAs were also in agreement.

Wilson, R. E.↗

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the crew equipment subsystem

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Crew Equipment hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline with proposed Post 51-L updates included. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter Crew Equipment hardware. The IOA product for the Crew Equipment analysis consisted of 352 failure mode worksheets that resulted in 78 potential critical items being identified. Comparison was made to the NASA baseline which consisted of 351 FMEAs and 82 CIL items.

Saxon, H.↗

Stress Analysis of B-52B and B-52H Air-Launching Systems Failure-Critical Structural Components

The operational life analysis of any airborne failure-critical structural component requires the stress-load equation, which relates the applied load to the maximum tangential tensile stress at the critical stress point. The failure-critical structural components identified are the B-52B Pegasus pylon adapter shackles, B-52B Pegasus pylon hooks, B-52H airplane pylon hooks, B-52H airplane front fittings, B-52H airplane rear pylon fitting, and the B-52H airplane pylon lower sway brace. Finite-element stress analysis was performed on the said structural components, and the critical stress point was located and the stress-load equation was established for each failure-critical structural component. The ultimate load, yield load, and proof load needed for operational life analysis were established for each failure-critical structural component.

Ko, William L.↗

Ground test experience with large composite structures for commercial transports

The initial ground test of each component resulted in structural failure at less than ultimate design loads. While such failures represent major program delays, the investigation and analysis of each failure revealed significant lessons for effective utilization of composites in primary structure. Foremost among these are secondary loads that produce through-the-thickness forces which may lead to serious weaknesses in an otherwise sound structural design. The sources, magnitude, and effects of secondary loads need to be thoroughly understood and accounted for by the designers of composite primary aircraft structures.

Bohon, H. L.↗

Ground test experience with large composite structures for commercial transports

The initial ground test of each component resulted in structural failure at less than ultimate design loads. While such failures represent major program delays, the investigation and analysis of each failure revealed significant lessons for effective utilization of composites in primary structure. Foremost among these are secondary loads that produce through-the-thickness forces which may lead to serious weaknesses in an otherwise sound structural design. The sources, magnitude, and effects of secondary loads need to be thoroughly understood and accounted for by the designers of composite primary aircraft structures.

Bohon, H. L.↗

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the displays and controls subsystem

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents the independent analysis results corresponding to the Orbiter Displays and Controls (D and C) subsystem hardware. The function of the D and C hardware is to provide the crew with the monitor, command, and control capabilities required for management of all normal and contingency mission and flight operations. The D and C hardware for which failure modes analysis was performed consists of the following: Acceleration Indicator (G-METER); Head Up Display (HUD); Display Driver Unit (DDU); Alpha/Mach Indicator (AMI); Horizontal Situation Indicator (HSI); Attitude Director Indicator (ADI); Propellant Quantity Indicator (PQI); Surface Position Indicator (SPI); Altitude/Vertical Velocity Indicator (AVVI); Caution and Warning Assembly (CWA); Annunciator Control Assembly (ACA); Event Timer (ET); Mission Timer (MT); Interior Lighting; and Exterior Lighting. Each hardware item was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode.

Trahan, W. H.↗

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the guidance, navigation, and control subsystem

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) is presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The independent analysis results corresponding to the Orbiter Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GNC) Subsystem hardware are documented. The function of the GNC hardware is to respond to guidance, navigation, and control software commands to effect vehicle control and to provide sensor and controller data to GNC software. Some of the GNC hardware for which failure modes analysis was performed includes: hand controllers; Rudder Pedal Transducer Assembly (RPTA); Speed Brake Thrust Controller (SBTC); Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU); Star Tracker (ST); Crew Optical Alignment Site (COAS); Air Data Transducer Assembly (ADTA); Rate Gyro Assemblies; Accelerometer Assembly (AA); Aerosurface Servo Amplifier (ASA); and Ascent Thrust Vector Control (ATVC). The IOA analysis process utilized available GNC hardware drawings, workbooks, specifications, schematics, and systems briefs for defining hardware assemblies, components, and circuits. Each hardware item was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode.

Trahan, W. H.↗

Going South: Analysis of an Historic Project Engineering Failure

NASA's successful conduct of the Apollo Program greatly enhanced the prestige of the United States and remains broadly accepted as America's gift to all Mankind. NASA's accomplishments continue to amaze the world. With the Vision for Space Exploration (VSE) Americans once again tasked NASA to carry out a project that is expected to provide inspiration and economic stimulus to the United States and to the world. In preparation NASA has thoroughly examined space program precedents. There is, however, another precedent which has not been examined in this context but whose scope and environment in many ways parallel the VSE. This project was initiated by a team that had, ten years before, successfully completed an effort that, at a cost of $173 billion (in 2008 dollars), had pushed the envelope of technology, brought economic growth, established their country as the world leader in engineering, and been broadly accepted as that country's gift to all Mankind. The new project was again inspired by popular desire to enhance national prestige and make yet another major contribution to Humanity. This effort was predicted to require eight years and $156 billion (2008 dollars). However, after nine years and expenditures of 96% beyond the baseline, the project collapsed amid bankruptcy, political scandal, and criminal prosecution. This paper applies current project management metrics, such as earned value analysis, to review the strategic decisions in this historic failure and describe its ultimate collapse. Key mistakes are identified, and lessons are drawn which may prove useful in guiding the VSE.

Scott, John H.↗

Computation of spare parts requirements

Statistical analysis determines probability of failure for N-1 spares. Analysis can help reduce downtime in industrial processes by determining number of spare parts that must be stockpiled. Analysis can also be inverted to decide if number of spares on hand is sufficient for lifetime needs of system.

Mezzacappa, M. A.↗

The Dash Data Sharing System

The Data Sharing system (DASH) project was recently undertaken at NASA Johnson Space Center to introduce distributed data sharing into the Mission Control Center (MCC). Although the project focused on MCC communications, the solution is a general one. This paper describes that project. DASH allows applications to share data. It provides callable interfaces for applications wishing to export or import data. The system consists of several processes: publishers make exported data available to subscribers, which provide it to interested importing applications. A network registration service provides network location transparency, allowing the other processes to reside at arbitrary network locations. These processes act as intermediaries between external producing and consuming applications. DASH has been demonstrated in the MCC where it transmits Shuttle electrical bus data from the Bus Loss Smart System to the Configurable Realtime Analysis System. In addition, the Failure Impact and Procedure Analysis system used DASH to transmit Shuttle remote manipulator data from an expert system to a version of CRANS. DASH is currently being used to integrate a knowledge acquisition application and the CLIPS expert system shell.

Hasan, David A.↗