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At least 775 records · Page 43

Recent development of the Multi-Grid detector for large area neutron scattering instruments

Most of the Neutron Scattering facilities are committed in a continuous program of modernization of their instruments, requiring large area and high performance thermal neutron detectors. Beside scintillators detectors, {sup 3}He detectors, like linear PSDs (Position Sensitive Detectors) and MWPCs (Multi-Wires Proportional Chambers), are the most current techniques nowadays. Time Of Flight instruments are using {sup 3}He PSDs mounted side by side to cover tens of m{sup 2}. As a result of the so-called '{sup 3}He shortage crisis{sup ,} the volume of 3He which is needed to build one of these instruments is not accessible anymore. The development of alternative techniques requiring no 3He, has been given high priority to secure the future of neutron scattering instrumentation. This is particularly important in the context where the future ESS (European Spallation Source) will start its operation in 2019-2020. Improved scintillators represent one of the alternative techniques. Another one is the Multi-Grid introduced at the ILL in 2009. A Multi-Grid detector is composed of several independent modules of typically 0.8 m x 3 m sensitive area, mounted side by side in air or in a vacuum TOF chamber. One module is composed of segmented boron-lined proportional counters mounted in a gas vessel; the counters, of square section, are assembled with Aluminium grids electrically insulated and stacked together. This design provides two advantages: First, magnetron sputtering techniques can be used to coat B{sub 4}C films on planar substrates, and second, the neutron position along the anode wires can be measured by reading out individually the grid signals with fast shaping amplifiers followed by comparators. Unlike charge division localisation in linear PSDs, the individual readout of the grids allows operating the Multi-Grid at a low amplification gain, hence this detector is tolerant to mechanical defects and its production accessible to laboratories equipped with standard equipment. Prototypes of different configurations and sizes have been developed and tested. A demonstrator, with a sensitive area of 0.8 m x 3 m, has been studied during the CRISP European project; it contains 1024 grids, and a surface of isotopically enriched B{sub 4}C film close to 80 m{sup 2}. Its size represented a challenge in terms of fabrication and mounting of the detection elements. Another challenge was to make the gas chamber mechanically compatible with operation in a vacuum TOF chamber. Optimal working condition of this detector was achieved by flushing Ar-CO{sub 2} at a pressure of 50 mbar, and by applying 400 Volts on the anodes. This unusual gas pressure allows to greatly simplifying the mechanics of the gas vessel in vacuum. The detection efficiency has been measured with high precision for different film thicknesses. 52% has been measured at 2.5 Angstrom, in good agreement with the MC simulation. A high position resolution has been achieved by centre of gravity measurement of the TOT (Time-Over-Threshold) signals between neighbouring grids. These results, as well as other detection parameters, including gamma sensitivity and spatial uniformity, will be presented. (author)

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Development of new Polysiloxane Based Liquid Scintillators

In the last decade, attention toward neutron detection has been growing in the scientific community, driven by new requirements in different fields of application ranging from homeland security to medical and material analysis, from research physics, to nuclear energy production. So far neutron detection, with particular attention to fast neutrons, has been mainly based on organic liquid scintillators, owing to their good efficiency and pulse shape discrimination (PSD) capability. Most of these liquids have however some main drawbacks given by toxicity, flammability, volatility and sensitivity to dissolved oxygen that limits the duration and the quality of their performances with worse handiness and increased costs. Phenyl-substituted polysiloxanes could address most of these issues, being characterized by low toxicity, low volatility and low flammability. Their optical properties can be tailored by changing the phenyl distribution and concentration thus allowing to increase the solubility of organic dyes, to modify the fluorescence spectra and to vary the refractive index of the medium. Furthermore, polysiloxanes have been recently exploited for the production of plastic scintillators with very good chemical and thermal stability and very good radiation hardness and the development of polysiloxane liquid scintillators could allow to combine these interesting properties with the supremacy of liquid scintillators as regarding PSD over plastics. For these reasons, the properties of several phenyl-substituted polysiloxane with different phenyl amounts and different viscosities have been investigated, with particular attention to the scintillation response and the pulse shape discrimination capability, and the results of the investigation are reported in this work. More in details, the scintillation light yield towards gamma rays ({sup 60}Co and {sup 137}Cs) of several polysiloxane liquids has been analyzed and compared with the light yield of a commercial non-toxic liquid scintillator (EJ309). The results have been related to the optical characterization of these materials, especially as regarding the fluorescence response, and the best performing material (1,1,5,5-Tetraphenyl 1,3,3,5-Tetramethyl Trisiloxane) showed a scintillation light-yield only slightly lower than EJ309, proving to be a promising candidate for the production of an efficient polysiloxane based liquid scintillator. The results as regarding the neutron-gamma pulse shape discrimination capability of the best performing materials are also reported in this work and the scintillation decay time of these materials are compared to the results of fluorescence lifetime analysis. PSD tests have been performed at CN accelerator in Legnaro National Laboratories with a 2.2 MeV pulsed neutron beam using TOF procedure and the pulses have been analyzed in order to evidence the PSD capability of every sample. The reported results pave the way to the development of a new promising class of non-toxic liquid scintillating materials for neutron detection, with good light output and interesting PSD characteristics. (authors)

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

ROS-DOE: Leveraging Open-Source Robotics Software for the DOE-EM Mission? - 17181

In order to establish a common software framework for its robotic systems, the United States Department of Energy - Environmental Management (DOE-EM) is considering the possibility of extending the Robot Operating System (ROS) open source robotics software to address the varied, complex challenges facing DOE-EM. The effort, preliminarily called ROS-DOE, would enhance the reliability, robustness, security, and user friendliness of ROS to meet the requirements of the nuclear waste remediation mission, and those of DOE as a whole. As envisioned, the ROS DOE program would also support rapid progress to mature cross-cutting capabilities including supervised autonomy, inter-operability with off-the-shelf industrial equipment, and physics-based robot simulation (i.e., Gazebo). This paper provides background context about the current state of ROS software and its supporting community, surveys DOE-EM needs and requirements for robotic solutions, and analyzes the gaps between the current state of ROS and those needed for DOE-EM robotics. It then identifies new capabilities that are recommended for ROS-DOE and outlines software development practices that could be leveraged to blend the best of the open-source world with high-reliability software development practices. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Reconstruction of Irradiation History of Am-241/Be Startup Sources for Disposal at WIPP - 18644

The National Nuclear Security Administration, Global Material Security (GMS)/ Off-site Source Recovery Program (OSRP) requires an approved final disposition pathway for sealed neutron startup sources with undocumented or questionable irradiation histories. To obtain approval for WIPP disposal, a reliable method is required to determine yields of transmutation, as well as fission and activation products contained within the source at the time of disposal. This paper presents a method to reconstruct the irradiation history of americium beryllium (Am/Be) reactor startup sources using gamma spectroscopy, ORIGEN modeling and the initial composition of the source. Using this method, measured isotopes in the Am/Be startup sources are related to the WIPP disposal requirements. Maximum allowable measurement uncertainties have been quantified and related to uncertainties in the WIPP required isotopes. Characterization calculations and experimental measurements of irradiated Am/Be sources are discussed. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Review of Enabling Technologies to Facilitate Secure Compute Customization

High performance computing environments are often used for a wide variety of workloads ranging from simulation, data transformation and analysis, and complex workflows to name just a few. These systems may process data for a variety of users, often requiring strong separation between job allocations. There are many challenges to establishing these secure enclaves within the shared infrastructure of high-performance computing (HPC) environments. The isolation mechanisms in the system software are the basic building blocks for enabling secure compute enclaves. There are a variety of approaches and the focus of this report is to review the different virtualization technologies that facilitate the creation of secure compute enclaves. The report reviews current operating system (OS) protection mechanisms and modern virtualization technologies to better understand the performance/isolation properties. We also examine the feasibility of running ``virtualized'' computing resources as non-privileged users, and providing controlled administrative permissions for standard users running within a virtualized context. Our examination includes technologies such as Linux containers (LXC [32], Docker [15]) and full virtualization (KVM [26], Xen [5]). We categorize these different approaches to virtualization into two broad groups: OS-level virtualization and system-level virtualization. The OS-level virtualization uses containers to allow a single OS kernel to be partitioned to create Virtual Environments (VE), e.g., LXC. The resources within the host's kernel are only virtualized in the sense of separate namespaces. In contrast, system-level virtualization uses hypervisors to manage multiple OS kernels and virtualize the physical resources (hardware) to create Virtual Machines (VM), e.g., Xen, KVM. This terminology of VE and VM, detailed in Section 2, is used throughout the report to distinguish between the two different approaches to providing virtualized execution environments. As part of our technology review we analyzed several current virtualization solutions to assess their vulnerabilities. This included a review of common vulnerabilities and exposures (CVEs) for Xen, KVM, LXC and Docker to gauge their susceptibility to different attacks. The complete details are provided in Section 5 on page 33. Based on this review we concluded that system-level virtualization solutions have many more vulnerabilities than OS level virtualization solutions. As such, security mechanisms like sVirt (Section 3.3) should be considered when using system-level virtualization solutions in order to protect the host against exploits. The majority of vulnerabilities related to KVM, LXC, and Docker are in specific regions of the system. Therefore, future "zero day attacks" are likely to be in the same regions, which suggests that protecting these areas can simplify the protection of the host and maintain the isolation between users. The evaluations of virtualization technologies done thus far are discussed in Section 4. This includes experiments with 'user' namespaces in VEs, which provides the ability to isolate user privileges and allow a user to run with different UIDs within the container while mapping them to non-privileged UIDs in the host. We have identified Linux namespaces as a promising mechanism to isolate shared resources, while maintaining good performance. In Section 4.1 we describe our tests with LXC as a non-root user and leveraging namespaces to control UID/GID mappings and support controlled sharing of parallel file-systems. We highlight several of these namespace capabilities in Section 6.2.3. The other evaluations that were performed during this initial phase of work provide baseline performance data for comparing VEs and VMs to purely native execution. In Section 4.2 we performed tests using the High-Performance Computing Conjugate Gradient (HPCCG) benchmark to establish baseline performance for a scientific application when run on the Native (host) machine in contrast with execution under Docker and KVM. Our tests verified prior studies showing roughly 2-4% overheads in application execution time & MFlops when running in hypervisor-base environments (VMs) as compared to near native performance with VEs. For more details, see Figures 4.5 (page 28), 4.6 (page 28), and 4.7 (page 29). Additionally, in Section 4.3 we include network measurements for TCP bandwidth performance over the 10GigE interface in our testbed. The Native and Docker based tests achieved >= ~9Gbits/sec, while the KVM configuration only achieved 2.5Gbits/sec (Table 4.6 on page 32). This may be a configuration issue with our KVM installation, and is a point for further testing as we refine the network settings in the testbed. The initial network tests were done using a bridged networking configuration. The report outline is as follows: - Section 1 introduces the report and clarifies the scope of the proj...

Aderholdt, Ferrol↗

NASA guidelines for assuring the adequacy and appropriateness of security safeguards in sensitive applications

The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-71, transmittal Memorandum No. 1, requires that each agency establish a management control process to assure that appropriate administrative, physical and technical safeguards are incorporated into all new computer applications. In addition to security specifications, the management control process should assure that the safeguards are adequate for the application. The security activities that should be integral to the system development process are examined. The software quality assurance process to assure that adequate and appropriate controls are incorporated into sensitive applications is also examined. Security for software packages is also discussed.

Tompkins, F. G.↗

Space Station needs, attributes, and architectural option study

Potential user interest and requirements for a manned space station are examined for space and applications missions, commercial missions, technology demonstration missions, space operations missions, and national security missions. Approaches to architectural options, candidate payloads, and technology drivers are considered. Mission imposed requirements for the space operations center are also considered.

Source record↗

Creating a Training Dataset for Semantic Segmentation of Canal Networks for Irrigation Modernization

Canal infrastructure has provided critical irrigation water to the western United States for over a century. To continue providing vital water resources to the semi-arid West, irrigation systems must undergo maintenance and modernization. Many canal companies are resource-constrained, and because funding opportunities often require detailed knowledge of existing infrastructure, they can struggle to secure financial capital. We address this problem by creating training data for a semantic segmentation deep learning model to map canal networks throughout the western United States. To create a diverse and robust training dataset, we labelled 1-m NAIP imagery with the locations of no canals, wet canals, and dry/vegetated canals. Since creating these datasets is time consuming, we first developed a preprocessing methodology to identify canals within our four study areas. We used NAIP imagery and provided canal centerline data to buffer, standardize, and cluster the imagery, automating the labeling process as much as possible. However, this still required manual cleaning and manual classification of canal type. Challenges arose when canals were interrupted (e.g., road culverts or piped sections) or when nearby features shared similar characteristics (e.g., irrigated fields, trees, and shadows). Combining automated preprocessing with manual refinement produced four detailed canal masks to be used in the semantic segmentation model developed by Richard Tapia.

13 - HYDRO ENERGY↗

Rapid Design and Engineering of Smart and Secure Microbiological Systems (Final Report)

The design and application of successfully engineered biosystems requires an understanding of how engineered microbes will interact with other organisms – either as one-on-one competitors or in the context of microbial consortia. Engineering microorganisms from first principles for non-laboratory, environmental applications is inherently challenging because: (1) engineered systems tend to quickly revert back to their wild-type behaviors; and (2) these systems typically pay a price in reduced fitness, making them uncompetitive against invasive contaminating species (i.e., metabolic burden). For this project, we used a synthetic biology-based strategy to investigate the organization, control, stabilization, and destabilization of natural and engineered microbes. This approach enabled development of (1) single-strain systems capable of detecting and responding to target organisms in the environment; (2) a pipeline for refining and engineering biological constructs in new, non-model host organisms; and (3) improved systems for rapidly designing, engineering, and assaying new biological modules. This coupled approach to safeguard system design is predictable and portable across bacterial species and is focused on microbes that are part of the beneficial plant microbiome. A long-term goal beyond the proposed research is to enable the rational engineering of microbial communities based on first principles of biological design that mimic the smart performance of microorganisms observed in natural systems.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

Securing Sensitive Flight and Engine Simulation Data Using Smart Card Technology

NASA Glenn Research Center has developed a smart card prototype capable of encrypting and decrypting disk files required to run a distributed aerospace propulsion simulation. Triple Data Encryption Standard (3DES) encryption is used to secure the sensitive intellectual property on disk pre, during, and post simulation execution. The prototype operates as a secure system and maintains its authorized state by safely storing and permanently retaining the encryption keys only on the smart card. The prototype is capable of authenticating a single smart card user and includes pre simulation and post simulation tools for analysis and training purposes. The prototype's design is highly generic and can be used to protect any sensitive disk files with growth capability to urn multiple simulations. The NASA computer engineer developed the prototype on an interoperable programming environment to enable porting to other Numerical Propulsion System Simulation (NPSS) capable operating system environments.

Blaser, Tammy M.↗

Development of an Energy Services Interface for the EGoT

The Energy Services Interface (ESI) is a set of rules that ensure private, secure, and trustworthy information exchange between Grid Service Providers (GSPs) and utility customers. Large-scale adoption of Distributed Energy Resources (DERs) will be necessary for GSPs to dispatch effective grid services, and to stimulate technological innovations in DER and DERMS (DER Management Systems) technologies, as well as novel grid service programs. The ESI promotes these objectives by advancing a set of rules and interoperability requirements that define bi-directional, service-oriented, logical interfaces between GSPs and customers’ DERs, with expectations for privacy, security, and trust. The ESI rules and interoperability requirements establish boundaries between customers and GSPs that delineate the functions and responsibilities that must be implemented by the developers of Energy Grid of Things (EGoT) ecosystem products. These rules impose constraints on the implementation of a DERMS. The ESI interoperability requirements are based on the Interoperability Maturity Model (IMM), developed by the Grid Modernization Laboratory Consortium. By emphasizing private, secure, and trustworthy information exchange, and by mandating a service-oriented and interoperable architecture, the ESI promotes the development of an EGoT ecosystem that motivates customer participation and technological innovation. Interoperability will encourage innovation by reducing barriers to entry and increasing confidence of stakeholders. Customers will be willing to participate in DER service programs that establish trust and emphasize customer choice. Large-scale customer participation ensures GSPs have ample DER resources to provide grid services that have significant impact on grid reliability and reduce electricity cost for consumers. This in turn signals economic opportunities that encourage innovation, resulting in the development of a robust EGoT ecosystem.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Gamma Equipment System Requirements by Application

This document outlines a set of requirements for gamma sensitive systems applied to three different applications: (1) homeland security (search and identification); (2) in-situ quantification; and (3) quantification in a material characterization laboratory. These three applications represent a range of activities that a country might use for locating, identifying, and quantifying radioactive material. These applications require increasing accuracy and system advancements, and skill levels. This document considers systems with various detector types and are characterized by their energy resolution: (1) low resolution (e.g., NaI(Tl) scintillation) and (2) higher resolution (e.g., high-purity germanium [HPGe] solid state) systems. The higher resolution systems also include cadmium zinc telluride (CZT) and only mechanically cooled HPGe systems are considered. These detectors and their associated acquisition hardware and analysis software afford a broad range of capabilities with corresponding ranges of complexity, maintainability, and cost. Ultimately, the equipment must meet the measurement goals of the application, and compliance with a given list of hardware specifications does not in itself guarantee meeting those goals. Examples of typical performance objectives for international safeguards applications are documented in International Target Values 2010 for Measurement Uncertainties in Safeguarding Nuclear Materials (IAEA, STR-368, November 2010). Selection of the detector type best suited to a specific application is often a compromise between “state of the art” or best available option and what is practical.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

SPSP Phase III Recruiting, Selecting, and Developing Secure Power Systems Professionals: Individual and Team Performance Guidelines

The pending retirement of significant numbers of power system experts and a continuing trend of increasing complexity in modern power systems prompted the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) to establish the three-phase Secure Power Systems Professional (SPSP) project. The project developed resources for job definition and competency analysis along with tools to guide assessment and curriculum design and to help identify and develop required knowledge, skills, and abilities in technical and operational aspects of power systems cybersecurity. The Secure Power Systems Professional Phase III final report was released last year which an appendix of Individual and Team Performance Guidelines. This new report is that appendix broken out as a standalone document to assist utilities in recruiting and developing Secure Power Systems Professionals at their site. Individual/Team Performance Guidelines were developed for each of the four job roles: the secure power systems engineer, incident responder, intrusion analyst, and security operator. They enable an “at-a-glance” view of the multidisciplinary and collaborative nature of SPSP job roles, for which skill sets were studied and then mapped to stories of critical incidents or vignettes. This afforded an enumeration of tasks required of each job role to effectively perform responsibilities and to meet bestpractice goals for that operation. Assignment of these tasks among the job roles, either as an individual responsibility or a collaborative responsibility, was validated during a job performance model analysis. The analysis identified 13 master vignettes from the collection of critical incident stories, many of which shared a common set of job responsibilities and tasks that were grouped into four vignette categories according to the task requirement for effective response to each event.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Secure Data Transfer Guidance for Industrial Control and SCADA Systems

This document was developed to provide guidance for the implementation of secure data transfer in a complex computational infrastructure representative of the electric power and oil and natural gas enterprises and the control systems they implement. For the past 20 years the cyber security community has focused on preventative measures intended to keep systems secure by providing a hard outer shell that is difficult to penetrate. Over time, the hard exterior, soft interior focus changed to focus on defense-in-depth adding multiple layers of protection, introducing intrusion detection systems, more effective incident response and cleanup, and many other security measures. Despite much larger expenditures and more layers of defense, successful attacks have only increased in number and severity. Consequently, it is time to re-focus the conventional approach to cyber security. While it is still important to implement measures to keep intruders out, a new protection paradigm is warranted that is aimed at discovering attempted or real compromises as early as possible. Put simply, organizations should take as fact that they have been, are now, or will be compromised. These compromises may be intended to steal information for financial gain as in the theft of intellectual property or credentials that lead to the theft of financial resources, or to lie silent until instructed to cause physical or electronic damage and/or denial of services. This change in outlook has been recently confirmed by the National Security Agency [19]. The discovery of attempted and actual compromises requires an increased focus on monitoring events by manual and/or automated log monitoring, detecting unauthorized changes to a system's hardware and/or software, detecting intrusions, and/or discovering the exfiltration of sensitive information and/or attempts to send inappropriate commands to ICS/SCADA (Industrial Control System/Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition) systems.

03 NATURAL GAS↗

Mock Nuclear Processing Facility-Safeguards Training Requirements

This document outlines specific training requirements in the topical areas of Material Control and Accounting (MC&A) and Physical Protection(PP) which are to be used as technical input for designing a mock Integrated Security Facility (ISF) at Sandia National Laboratories (SNL). The overall project objective for these requirements is to enhance the ability to deliver training on Material Protection Control and Accounting (MC&A) concepts regarding hazardous material such as irradiated materials with respect to bulk processing facilities.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Economic Incentives for Cybersecurity: Using Economics to Design Technologies Ready for Deployment

Cybersecurity practice lags behind cyber technology achievements. Solutions designed to address many problems may and do exist but frequently cannot be broadly deployed due to economic constraints. Whereas security economics focuses on the cost/benefit analysis and supply/demand, we believe that more sophisticated theoretical approaches, such as economic modeling, rarely utilized, would derive greater societal benefits. Unfortunately, today technologists pursuing interesting and elegant solutions have little knowledge of the feasibility for broad deployment of their results and cannot anticipate the influences of other technologies, existing infrastructure, and technology evolution, nor bring the solutions lifecycle into the equation. Additionally, potentially viable solutions are not adopted because the risk perceptions by potential providers and users far outweighs the economic incentives to support introduction/adoption of new best practices and technologies that are not well enough defined. In some cases, there is no alignment with redominant and future business models as well as regulatory and policy requirements. This paper provides an overview of the economics of security, reviewing work that helped to define economic models for the Internet economy from the 1990s. We bring forward examples of potential use of theoretical economics in defining metrics for emerging technology areas, positioning infrastructure investment, and building real-time response capability as part of software development. These diverse examples help us understand the gaps in current research. Filling these gaps will be instrumental for defining viable economic incentives, economic policies, regulations as well as early-stage technology development approaches, that can speed up commercialization and deployment of new technologies in cybersecurity.

Cyber Security↗