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U.S. and Allied Cyber Security Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific (Workshop Summary)

On March 30, 31, and April 1, 2021, the Center for Global Security Research (CGSR) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) hosted a workshop titled "U.S. and allied Cyber Security Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific". This session brought together participants drawn across the policy, military, and private sector in the United States and among allied countries in Europe and the Indo-Pacific. The workshop evaluated threat perceptions, assessed cyber power in a regional context, and explored opportunities for building capacity and trust with allies, partners, and the private sector. The region's cyber threat landscape is marked by increasing malicious activity, with threats persistent and ever-growing. Grounded by this strategic reality, the workshop advocated for 1) a concerted push into the arena of norm setting from the bottom up, 2) an agreed metric by which to assess progress, and 3) the creation of future lines of collaborative effort for the United States and its allies to ensure an open, interoperable, and secure internet.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Geothermal Heat Recovery Complex: Large-Scale, Deep Direct-Use System in a Low-Temperature Sedimentary Basin (Final Report)

A feasibility study of using deep direct-use (DDU) geothermal energy to heat agricultural research facilities (ARFs) was conducted at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (U of IL) and its similar application to military facilities in the Illinois Basin (ILB). The geothermal energy system (GES) investigated utilizes low-temperature (30–90°C; 90–190°F) geothermal fluid (i.e., brine) from an extraction well that is part of a deep, two-well (doublet) system that extends to the bottom of the ILB. The geothermal reservoir modeled, the Mt. Simon Sandstone (MSS), is about 1,280 m (4,200 feet) deep and 457 m thick (1,500 feet) beneath the U of IL. The DDU GES surface infrastructure includes heat exchangers connected in-parallel to pipelines carrying the geothermal fluid and fresh cold and hot water. Analysis of the GES indicated that the MSS can provide a baseload of 2 MMBtu/hr to heat the ARFs by extracting 954 m³/d (6,000 barrels/day [bbl/d]) of geothermal fluid that has a temperature of 44–46 °C (111–115 °F). In addition to analyzing the levelized cost of heat (LCOH) and life cycle costs, the environmental effects of the DDU GES were evaluated, including reduced greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and water consumption. Multiple system designs were evaluated and then ranked based on their maximum heating performance, energy efficiency, and cost recovery. This feasibility study identified the key components of the fully-integrated DDU technology that can be implemented, both technically and economically. The results and information from this study provides end-users and policy makers with guidance for additional research on the specific components of DDU technology such that its widespread use can provide an uninterruptible energy source, increase resilience from extreme weather conditions, reduce U.S. dependency on fossil fuels, and reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. The site-specific part of this study gives U of IL administrators a realistic and pragmatic assessment of the financial resources necessary to add a DDU GES in the MSS to the campus’ energy portfolio.

15 GEOTHERMAL ENERGY↗

Operation Tumbler-Snapper

Operation Tumbler-Snapper began on April 1, 1952, when Able, a low-yield nuclear device, detonated 793 feet over the Frenchman Flat area of the Nevada Proving Ground. Able, the first of four airdrops conducted as the Tumbler phase of the Operation, provided the Department of Defense with reliable data on the relationship between height of burst and blast overpressure. Such information was vital to establishing the battlefield use of nuclear weapons. A final set of four tower detonations, the Snapper phase, provided the AEC and Los Alamos with diagnostic data on new weapon designs. Although the test series was nominally divided between the AEC and the DOD, this distinction held little meaning because two of the Tumbler effects tests, Charlie and Dog, employed experimental devices and all four of the Snapper tests involved effects experiments, including military troop maneuvers.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Operation Upshot-Knothole

A thundering boom and sheet of fire announced a dramatic, once in a lifetime event – the firing of a nuclear projectile from a 280 mm cannon. Travelling seven miles downrange, the projectile detonated 500 feet over the Nevada Test Site’s Frenchman Flat with a force of fifteen kilotons. Although the test was successful, the massive cannon, designed for tactical battlefield use, had a critical flaw. It was too large and cumbersome for mobile combat. The cannon test, codenamed Grable, was part of Operation Upshot-Knothole, the fourth test series conducted in Nevada. Beginning with the Annie test on March 17, 1953, and concluding with the Climax test on June 4th, the Operation consisted of three airdrops, seven tower detonations, and the one artillery shot. As with previous Nevada tests, the demarcation between the weapon development series, Upshot, and the DOD effects tests, Knothole, was blurred. All eleven tests generated data in support of weapon development as well as tactical battlefield applications. During Upshot-Knothole, the University of California Radiation Laboratory (UCRL), conducted its first ever tests, Ruth and Ray. Although neither test was successful, these failures, along with another a year later at Operation Castle, provided the new laboratory with design data leading to future successful tests. The Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA) participated in a test series with the general goal of preparing for societal recovery from a nuclear attack. Known as Operation Doorstep, the FCDA’s experiments evaluated the effects of a nuclear attack on food supplies, housing and urban structures, and even a copse of trees transplanted from nearby Mt. Charleston. A contingent of the press witnessed test Annie from an outcropping of rocks, subsequently named News Nob. The presence of the news media, along with the FCDA’s participation, marked a fundamental change in the Nevada test program - a change that that now included the general populace, whose survival was, of course, the rationale for testing. The Department of Defense continued and expanded its Desert Rock exercises of troop exercises, helicopter operations, and evaluation of blast damage to military aircraft, tanks, and guns. Annie, Nancy, Badger, Simon, Encore, and Grable involved larger numbers of personnel than the other five shots. Below is an edited and condensed account of Desert Rock activities compiled by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Assurance Theory: A Strategic Imperative

A commonly stated goal of many US Military activities, especially in the strategic realm of nuclear weapons, is to “deter potential adversaries and assure allies.” However, sometimes the phrase “assure allies” seems to be an appendage to a larger deterrence objective. Yet, assurance is fundamentally different than deterrence, even extended deterrence, which aims to shape the decisions of potential adversaries. Assurance, on the other hand, seeks to influence the decisions of allies. As such, assurance must not be treated as an appendage to deterrence, but rather as the strategic imperative that it is. A proper understanding of assurance is critical in an age of renewed great power competition where alliances provide an asymmetric strategic advantage over potential adversaries. This paper provides a primer on assurance theory, to include its definition, variables, challenges, and measures of success.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Off-Road Vehicle Decarbonization and Energy Systems Integration: R&D Gaps and Opportunities

This report summarizes findings from the Off-Road Decarbonization and Energy Systems Integration workshop, hosted by the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) from March 22-24, 2022. The workshop focused on the importance of collaboration among the off-road vehicle industry and government to address barriers and opportunities for decarbonization. The workshop aligns with priorities of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Vehicle Technologies Office and Hydrogen and Fuel Cell Technologies Office to decarbonize transportation in the agriculture, mining, construction, and military industries. This decarbonization effort is also intended to support original equipment manufacturers, industry associations, technology developers, utilities, and consultants. The sections within this report correspond to the three topic areas covered in the 3-day workshop: a high-level perspective of needs and challenges, vehicle and equipment decarbonization strategies, and energy systems integration opportunities.

33 ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗

Tommy Morris’ Comments on Nuclear Explosive Safety

Nuclear explosives and weapon systems require special consideration because of their political and military importance, their destructive power, and the potential consequences of an accident. The special consideration translates into specific requirements promulgated by Department of Energy (DOE) O 452.1E “Nuclear Explosive and Weapon Surety,” and Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 3150.02 “DoD Nuclear Weapon System Safety Program.” The Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) W-Division Nuclear Explosive Safety Office mission is to coordinate LANL participation in Nuclear Explosive Safety Studies (NESS) and Nuclear Weapon System Safety Studies (NWSS); to provide qualified members and advisors to the studies; to liaise with the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), the DoD, other national laboratories, the Nevada Test Site, and Pantex Plant with regards to nuclear explosive and weapon system safety. These orders and directives define nuclear detonation as an energy release through a nuclear process, during a period of time on the order of 1 microsecond, in an amount equivalent to the energy released by detonating 4 or more pounds of trinitrotoluene (TNT).

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Nuclear Weapons and the Atmospheric Test Era

The era of atmospheric testing defies a simple description. Beginning with the goal of proving fission, the United States’ test program grew in complexity as scientists explored thermonuclear reactions, met the military demand for a variety of weapons for an increasing number of delivery platforms, and reacted to the ever-growing public fear of fallout. And, of course, political considerations were always present, first in the prosecution of World War II and later in the Cold War. To understand the atmospheric test program, then, is to understand how science, politics, and the public shaped our society in ways that are still difficult to fully understand.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

The Effects of the War in Ukraine on National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Missions

While the challenge from a risen and revisionist China may prove greater and more enduring, Russia’s war on Ukraine profoundly changes the strategic context, importance, and requirements of the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) missions. The world changed as much in February of 2022 as it did in November of 1989 or December of 1991 , when the Berlin Wall fell and the Soviet Union fell apart. These changes will not likely be ephemeral. Russia is preparing for a long war and a prolonged period of isolation from and hostility toward the West. Although Russia has many political, economic, and military weaknesses, it retains the world’s largest arsenal of nuclear weapons. Russia is therefore central to deterrence, arms control, nonproliferation, and nuclear security issues. Furthermore, Moscow’s permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council affords it a veto potentially affecting all these issues.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Strategic Analyses and Assessments Office Annual Report 2023

The past year has seen a significant increase in focus on strategic issues with the continued aggression by Russia, the rapid expansion of China’s military—particularly their nuclear capabilities, North Korea’s rapid improvements in intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) technology, and the increase in Iranian fuel enrichment. The U.S. continues to modernize Nuclear Command Control and Communication and all three legs of its nuclear Triad—Columbia-class submarines, Sentinel ICBMs, and B-21 bombers—for the Department of Defense (DOD). At the same time, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is updating its stockpile, producing the B61-12, the new B61-13, the W88 Alteration, the W87-1—with new pits, and the W80-4. This rework of the nuclear enterprise represents the most aggressive expansion of our capabilities and infrastructure in the modern era. At the same time, the Strategic Posture Commission completed its report to Congress and reported that the current modernization program, although clearly necessary, is insufficient to meet the threats that are emerging.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Mil-Std-464C and Mil-Std-464D Electromagnetic Radiation Environment Evaluation

Many systems derive their electromagnetic radiation (EMR) environments from Mil-Std-464C or Mil-Std-464D, Electromagnetic Environmental Effects Requirements for Systems. This standard defines several EMR environments based on the type of system and expected application. Many nuclear weapon (NW) systems reference the ordnance environments as the starting point for their functional EMR requirements, since any item intended to go into Department of Defense (DOD) custody is expected to be certified hazards of electromagnetic radiation to ordnance (HERO) safe when exposed to the environments listed in Mil-Std-464 Table 9. This environment is defined as the envelope of all sources any system in DOD custody may ever encounter, however, and may include sources that are not relevant for a particular system. This document is intended to provide additional clarity on the Mil-Std-464C and Mil-Std-464D EMR environments, specifically the driving sources for the maximum ordnance levels. This supplementary information may be used to guide tailoring of relevant environments or application to different systems with the additional consideration of any shielding that may reduce the external environments defined in the military standard.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Project Plan 7930 Cell G PaR Remote Handling System Replacement

For over 40 years the US Department of Energy (DOE) and its predecessors have made Californium-252 ({sup 252}Cf) available for a wide range of industries including medical, nuclear fuels, mining, military and national security. The Radiochemical Engineering Development Center (REDC) located within the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) processes irradiated production targets from the High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR). Operations in Building 7930, Cell G provide over 70% of the world's demand for {sup 252}Cf. Building 7930 was constructed and equipped in the mid-1960s. Current operations for {sup 252}Cf processing in Building 7930, Cell G require use of through-the-wall manipulators and the PaR Remote Handling System. Maintenance and repairs for the manipulators is readily accomplished by removal of the manipulator and relocation to a repair shop where hands-on work can be performed in glove boxes. Contamination inside cell G does not currently allow manned entry and no provisions were created for a maintenance area inside the cell. There has been no maintenance of the PaR system or upgrades, leaving operations vulnerable should the system have a catastrophic failure. The Cell G PaR system is currently being operated in a run to failure mode. As the manipulator is now 40+ years old there is significant risk in this method of operation. In 2006 an assessment was completed that resulted in recommendations for replacing the manipulator operator control and power centers which are used to control and power the PaR manipulator in Cell G. In mid-2008 the chain for the bridge drive failed and subsequent examinations indicated several damaged links (see Figure 1). To continue operations the PaR manipulator arm is being used to push and pull the bridge as a workaround. A retrieval tool was fabricated, tested and staged inside Cell G that will allow positioning of the bridge and manipulator arm for removal from the cell should the PaR system completely fail. A fully functioning and reliable Par manipulator arm is necessary for uninterrupted {sup 252}Cf operations; a fully-functioning bridge is needed for the system to function as intended.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Information Technology and Community Restoration Studies/Task 1: Information Technology

Executive Summary The Interagency Biological Restoration Demonstration—a program jointly funded by the Department of Defense's Defense Threat Reduction Agency and the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS's) Science and Technology Directorate—is developing policies, methods, plans, and applied technologies to restore large urban areas, critical infrastructures, and Department of Defense installations following the intentional release of a biological agent (anthrax) by terrorists. There is a perception that there should be a common system that can share information both vertically and horizontally amongst participating organizations as well as support analyses. A key question is: "How far away from this are we?" As part of this program, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory conducted research to identify the current information technology tools that would be used by organizations in the greater Seattle urban area in such a scenario, to define criteria for use in evaluating information technology tools, and to identify current gaps. Researchers interviewed 28 individuals representing 25 agencies in civilian and military organizations to identify the tools they currently use to capture data needed to support operations and decision making. The organizations can be grouped into five broad categories: defense (Department of Defense), environmental/ecological (Environmental Protection Agency/Ecology), public health and medical services, emergency management, and critical infrastructure. The types of information that would be communicated in a biological terrorism incident include critical infrastructure and resource status, safety and protection information, laboratory test results, and general emergency information. The most commonly used tools are WebEOC (web-enabled crisis information management systems with real-time information sharing), mass notification software, resource tracking software, and NW WARN (web-based information to protect critical infrastructure systems). It appears that the current information management tools are used primarily for information gathering and sharing—not decision making. Respondents identified the following criteria for a future software system. It is easy to learn, updates information in real time, works with all agencies, is secure, uses a visualization or geographic information system feature, enables varying permission levels, flows information from one stage to another, works with other databases, feeds decision support tools, is compliant with appropriate standards, and is reasonably priced. Current tools have security issues, lack visual/mapping functions and critical infrastructure status, and do not integrate with other tools. It is clear that there is a need for an integrated, common operating system. The system would need to be accessible by all the organizations that would have a role in managing an anthrax incident to enable regional decision making. The most useful tool would feature a GIS visualization that would allow for a common operating picture that is updated in real time. To capitalize on information gained from the interviews, the following activities are recommended: • Rate emergency management decision tools against the criteria specified by the interviewees. • Identify and analyze other current activities focused on information sharing in the greater Seattle urban area. • Identify and analyze information sharing systems/tools used in other regions.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

INFORMATION: Inspection Report on "Removal of Categories I and II Special Nuclear Material from Sandia National Laboratories-New Mexico"

The Department of Energy's (DOE's) Sandia National Laboratories-New Mexico (Sandia) develops science-based technologies in support of national security in areas such as nuclear weapons, nonproliferation, military technologies, and homeland security. Sandia's primary mission is ensuring that the U.S. nuclear arsenal is safe, secure, and reliable and can fully support the Nation's deterrence policy. Part of this mission includes systems engineering of nuclear weapons; research, design, and development of non-nuclear components; manufacturing of non-nuclear weapons components; the provision of safety, security, and reliability assessments of stockpile weapons; and the conduct of high-explosives research and development and environmental testing. Sandia Corporation, a subsidiary of Lockheed Martin Corporation, operates Sandia for the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). On May 7, 2004, the Secretary announced that the Department would evaluate missions at DOE sites to consolidate Special Nuclear Material (SNM) in the most secure environments possible. The Administrator of the NNSA said that this effort was a key part of an overall plan to transform the nuclear weapons complex into a smaller, safer, more secure, and more efficient national security enterprise. In February 2008, Sandia was the first site to report it had reduced its on-site inventory of nuclear material below 'Categories I and II' levels, which require the highest level of security to protect material such as plutonium and highly enriched uranium. The Office of Inspector General initiated an inspection to determine if Sandia made appropriate adjustments to its security posture in response to the removal of the Categories I and II SNM. We found that Sandia adjusted its security posture in response to the removal of Categories I and II SNM. For example, security posts were closed; unneeded protective force weapons and equipment were excessed from the site; and, Sandia's Site Safeguards and Security Plan was modified. We also found that some highly enriched uranium in a complex material configuration was not removed from Sandia. This material was designated as Category III material using a methodology for assessing the attractiveness of complex materials that was not specifically addressed in any current DOE directive. Although DOE and NNSA officials believed that this designation was appropriate, the methodology used to support this designation had not, as of the time of our review, been incorporated into the DOE directives system. Historically, the Department has considered the categorization of SNM to be an important national security and public policy issue. Consequently, we believe that expedited action should be taken to formalize this methodology in the DOE directives system and that it be disseminated throughout the Department of Energy complex.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Particle Swarm Social Adaptive Model for Multi-Agent Based Insurgency Warfare Simulation

To better understand insurgent activities and asymmetric warfare, a social adaptive model for modeling multiple insurgent groups attacking multiple military and civilian targets is proposed and investigated. This report presents a pilot study using the particle swarm modeling, a widely used non-linear optimal tool to model the emergence of insurgency campaign. The objective of this research is to apply the particle swarm metaphor as a model of insurgent social adaptation for the dynamically changing environment and to provide insight and understanding of insurgency warfare. Our results show that unified leadership, strategic planning, and effective communication between insurgent groups are not the necessary requirements for insurgents to efficiently attain their objective.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Elevations in Tumor Necrosis Factor Alpha and Interleukin 6 From Neuronal-Derived Extracellular Vesicles in Repeated Low-Level Blast Exposed Personnel

The purpose of this pilot study was to determine if military service members with histories of hundreds to thousands of low-level blast exposures (i. e., experienced breachers) had different levels of serum and neuronal-derived extracellular vesicle (EV) concentrations of interleukin (IL)-6, IL-10, and tumor necrosis factor alpha (TNFα), compared to matched controls, and if these biomarkers related to neurobehavioral symptoms. Participants were experienced breachers (n = 20) and matched controls without blast exposures (n = 14). Neuronal-derived EVs were isolated from serum and identified with mouse anti-human CD171. Serum and neuronal-derived EVs were analyzed for IL-6, IL-10, and TNFα using an ultra-sensitive assay. Serum TNFα concentrations were decreased in breachers when compared to control concentrations (p < 0.01). There were no differences in serum concentrations of IL-6, IL-10, or the IL-6/IL-10 ratio between breachers and controls (p's > 0.01). In neuronal-derived EVs, TNFα and IL-6 levels were increased in breachers compared to controls (p's < 0.01), and IL-10 levels were decreased in the breacher group compared to controls (p < 0.01). In breachers the IL-6/IL-10 ratio in neuronal-derived EVs was higher compared to controls, which correlated with higher total Rivermead Post-concussion Questionnaire (RPQ) scores (p's < 0.05). These findings suggest that exposure of personnel to high numbers of low-level blast over a career may result in enduring central inflammation that is associated with chronic neurological symptoms. The data also suggest that peripheral markers of inflammation are not necessarily adequate surrogates for central neuroinflammation.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

End-User Perspectives on Using Quantitative Real-Time PCR and Genomic Sequencing in the Field

Quantitative real-time PCR and genomic sequencing have become mainstays for performing molecular detection of biological threat agents in the field. There are notional assessments of the benefits, disadvantages, and challenges that each of these technologies offers according to findings in the literature. However, direct comparison between these two technologies in the context of field-forward operations is lacking. Most market surveys, whether published in print form or provided online, are directed to product manufacturers who can address their respective specifications and operations. One method for comparing these technologies is surveying end-users who are best suited for discussing operational capabilities, as they have hands-on experience with state-of-the-art molecular detection platforms and protocols. These end-users include operators in military defense and first response, as well as various research scientists in the public sector such as government and service laboratories, private sector, and civil society such as academia and nonprofit organizations performing method development and executing these protocols in the field. Our objective was to initiate a survey specific to end-users and their feedback. We developed a questionnaire that asked respondents to (1) determine what technologies they currently use, (2) identify the settings where the technologies are used, whether lab-based or field-forward, and (3) rate the technologies according to a set list of criteria. Of particular interest are assessments of sensitivity, specificity, reproducibility, scalability, portability, and discovery power. This article summarizes the findings from the end-user perspective, highlighting technical and operational challenges.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

Energy Storage Technologies and U.S. Department of War Requirements

This report offers an overarching primer the energy storage market and assessment of each technology’s suitability for U.S. Department of War applications. We find that battery energy storage is the most promising technology for energy storage applications in terms of energy density and cost. While commercial and advanced Li-ion can satisfy certain electric mobility (e.g., cars, midsized vehicles) and electric flight application (e.g. drones) needs of DoW, next generation technologies like Li metal solid-state batteries, and conversion chemistries (Li-air, Li-CFx) are needed for heavy duty applications like armored vehicles, tanks, airplanes, jets. Batteries should also be supplemented with technologies such as supercapacitors and next-generation flywheels to provide short bursts of high energy for high power needs. Thermal energy storage solutions (sensible and latent heat) and fuel cells (PEMFC and SOFC) are good alternatives for supporting energy storage applications in terms of energy density and cost. Gravity-based energy storage promises the least energy density with high cost and should only be used for niche DoW applications. Of the different gravity energy storage technologies reviewed, pumped-hydro, flywheel, and compressed air energy storage are promising, while solid gravity energy storage appears the least attractive. Military facilities requiring 14 days of energy storage can benefit from flow batteries, especially commercial VFRBs and next generation iron-air systems. While VFRBs are expensive, iron-air batteries have the coupled benefits of low cost and good energy density promising 100+ hours of storage.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗