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NASA Lessons Learned Using High Level Architecture (HLA) in Engineering Design Analysis
No abstract available
NASA Life Sciences Data Repositories: Update on Data Access and Lessons Learned 2012
No abstract available
Reanalysis of the Stratosphere in GEOS-5: Lessons Learned from MERRA and Future Prospects
The MERRA configuration of GEOS-5 includes about 30 layers in the middle atmosphere, with an upper boundary near 80km. Stratospheric Sounding Unit (SSU) and Advanced microwave sounding unit ( AMSU) radiance data are assimilated, which yield good constraints on the analyses up to the upper stratosphere. This paper examines the performance of MERRA, with foci on: the somewhat erratic system behavior in the 1980s, as numerous SSU instruments were available for short periods; the transition from SSU to AMSU radiances; conflicts between equivalent instruments on different platforms, given in the context of bias correction and the diurnal cycle; and, the relative stability of the analyses in the 21st Century. The results from MERRA provide guidance for how to use the operational polar-orbiting datasets in future reanalyses. Additional discussion will be directed at the possible use of research data sets, from limb-sounding instruments, in future multi-decadal products.
Lessons Learned for Geologic Data Collection and Sampling: Insights from the Desert RATS 2010 Geologist Crewmembers
Since 1997, Desert Research and Technology Studies (D-RATS) has conducted hardware and operations tests in the Arizona desert that advance human and robotic planetary exploration capabilities. D-RATS 2010 (8/31-9/13) simulated geologic traverses through a terrain of cinder cones, lava flows, and underlying sedimentary units using a pair of crewed rovers and extravehicular activities (EVAs) for geologic fieldwork. There were two sets of crews, each consisting of an engineer/commander and an experienced field geologist drawn from the academic community. A major objective of D-RATS was to examine the functions of a science support team, the roles of geologist crewmembers, and protocols, tools, and technologies needed for effective data collection and sample documentation. Solutions to these problems must consider how terrestrial field geology must be adapted to geologic fieldwork during EVAs
Orion GN and C Model Based Development: Experience and Lessons Learned
The Orion Guidance Navigation and Control (GN&C) team is charged with developing GN&C algorithms for the Exploration Flight Test One (EFT-1) vehicle. The GN&C team is a joint team consisting primarily of Prime Contractor (Lockheed Martin) and NASA personnel and contractors. Early in the GN&C development cycle the team selected MATLAB/Simulink as the tool for developing GN&C algorithms and Mathworks autocode tools as the means for converting GN&C algorithms to flight software (FSW). This paper provides an assessment of the successes and problems encountered by the GN&C team from the perspective of Orion GN&C developers, integrators, FSW engineers and management. The Orion GN&C approach to graphical development, including simulation tools, standards development and autocode approaches are scored for the main activities that the team has completed through the development phases of the program.
Lessons Learned: Combining Spaceflight Training and Mission Control
No abstract available
NASA's Next Solar Sail: Lessons Learned from NanoSail - D2
NanoSail-D2 unfurled January 17th, 2011 and commenced a nine month Low Earth Orbit path to reentry to evaluate a sail's capacity to deploy in space and deorbit satellites. The orbit was strongly affected by variables including but not limited to: initial attitude, orbit lighting, solar radiation pressure, aerodynamic drag, gravity, and Center of Pressure offsets. The effects of these variables were evaluated through a 3-DOF rigid body simulation. The sail experienced stability in orbits which were continuously lit, i.e. did not orbit behind Earth. Probable drag area experienced by the sail for the mission is also estimated from orbital data and compared to the attitude simulation results. Analysis focuses on sail behavior in full lighting conditions to establish the limits of the sails stability in full lighting. Solar radiation pressure, aerodynamic drag, and gravity torque effects are described. Lastly, a reasonable upper bound on the variation of the Center of Pressure from the geometric center of the sail plane is established. Each of these results contributes to the design requirements for future solar sails.
International Space Station Common Cabin Air Assembly Condensing Heat Exchanger Hydrophilic Coating Operation, Recovery, and Lessons Learned
The ability to control the temperature and humidity of an environment or habitat is critical for human survival. These factors are important to maintaining human health and comfort, as well as maintaining mechanical and electrical equipment in good working order to support the human and to accomplish mission objectives. The temperature and humidity of the International Space Station (ISS) United States On-orbit Segment (USOS) cabin air is controlled by the Common Cabin Air Assembly (CCAA). The CCAA consists of a fan, a condensing heat exchanger (CHX), an air/water separator, temperature and liquid sensors, and electrical controlling hardware and software. The CHX is the primary component responsible for control of temperature and humidity. The CCAA CHX contains a chemical coating that was developed to be hydrophilic and thus attract water from the humid influent air. This attraction forms the basis for water removal and therefore cabin humidity control. However, there have been several instances of CHX coatings becoming hydrophobic and repelling water. When this behavior is observed in an operational CHX in the ISS segments, the unit s ability to remove moisture from the air is compromised and the result is liquid water carryover into downstream ducting and systems. This water carryover can have detrimental effects on the ISS cabin atmosphere quality and on the health of downstream hardware. If the water carryover is severe and widespread, this behavior can result in an inability to maintain humidity levels in the USOS. This paper will describe the operation of the five CCAAs within the USOS, the potential causes of the hydrophobic condition, and the impacts of the resulting water carryover to downstream systems. It will describe the history of this behavior and the actual observed impacts to the ISS USOS. Information on mitigation steps to protect the health of future CHX hydrophilic coatings as well as remediation and recovery of the full heat exchanger will be discussed.
Plant Science in Reduced Gravity: Lessons Learned
The effect of gravity on the growth and development of plants has been the subject of scientific investigation for over a century. The results obtained in space to test specific hypotheses on gravitropism, gene expression, seed formation, or growth rate are affected by both the primary effect of the microgravity and secondary effects of the spaceflight environment. The secondary effects of the spaceflight environment include physical effects arising from physical changes, such as the absence of buoyancy driven convective mixing, altered behavior of liquids and gases, and the environmental conditions in the spacecraft atmosphere. Thus, the design of biological experiments (e.g. cells, plants, animals, etc.) conducted in microgravity must account for changes in the physical forces, as well as the environmental conditions, imposed by the specific spaceflight vehicle and experimental hardware. In addition, researchers must become familiar with other aspects of spaceflight experiments: payload integration with hardware developers, safety documentation and crew procedures, and the logistics of conducting flight and ground controls. This report reviews the physical and environmental factors that directly and indirectly affect the results of plant science experiments in microgravity and is intended to serve as a guide in the design and implementation plant experiments in space.
Lessons Learned in the Selection and Development of Test Cases for the Aeroelastic Prediction Workshop: Rectangular Supercritical Wing
The Aeroelastic Prediction Workshop brought together an international community of computational fluid dynamicists as a step in defining the state of the art in computational aeroelasticity. The Rectangular Supercritical Wing (RSW) was chosen as the first configuration to study due to its geometric simplicity, perceived simple flow field at transonic conditions and availability of an experimental data set containing forced oscillation response data. Six teams performed analyses of the RSW; they used Reynolds-Averaged Navier-Stokes flow solvers exercised assuming that the wing had a rigid structure. Both steady-state and forced oscillation computations were performed by each team. The results of these calculations were compared with each other and with the experimental data. The steady-state results from the computations capture many of the flow features of a classical supercritical airfoil pressure distribution. The most dominant feature of the oscillatory results is the upper surface shock dynamics. Substantial variations were observed among the computational solutions as well as differences relative to the experimental data. Contributing issues to these differences include substantial wind tunnel wall effects and diverse choices in the analysis parameters.
A First Person Shooter/Real Time Strategy Hybrid: Lessons Learned
Today's military training bears little resemblance to the methods of previous generations. The Cold War is over and the enemy has changed. Doctrine that was once useful is now woefully out of date. No longer are we confronting a predictable nation but instead a diverse collection of independent fighters spread out over several countries. The enemy has changed, his tactics have changed amI cin.:urnsLance dictates that we must change as well. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have tested virtually all aspects of the military's support infrastructure. After fighting continuously for over a decade, many weaknesses have been revealed by the steady grind of war. Chief among them is the inability of the military to rapidly and adequately train its soldiers in the latest doctrines. In response to the enemy developing new strategies on a near monthly basis, the Joint Training Counter-IED Operations Integration Center (JTCOIC) was first created. Designed to supplement the current training system, it would attempt to address the current training shortfalls. As a result, new methods were devised to streamline training.
Lessons Learned in the Decommissioning of the Stardust Spacecraft
The Stardust spacecraft completed its prime mission in 2006, returning samples from the coma of comet Wild 2 to earth in the sample return capsule. Still healthy, and in a heliocentric orbit, the Stardust spacecraft was repurposed for a new mission - Stardust NExT. This new mission would take the veteran spacecraft to a 2011 encounter with comet Tempel 1, providing a new look at the comet visited in 2005 by the Deep Impact mission. This extended mission for Stardust would push it to the limits of its fuel reserves, prompting several studies aimed at determining the actual remaining fuel on board. The results were used to plan mission events within the constraints of this dwindling resource. The team tracked fuel consumption and adjusted the mission plans to stay within the fuel budget. This effort intensified toward the end of the mission, when a final assessment showed even less remaining fuel than previously predicted, triggering a delay in the start of comet imaging during the approach phase. The flyby of comet Tempel 1 produced spectacular up close views of this comet, imaging previously seen areas as well as new territory, and providing clear views of the location of the 2005 impact. The spacecraft was decommissioned about a month after the flyby, revealing that the fuel tank was now empty after having flown successfully for 12 years, returned comet dust samples to earth, and flown by an asteroid and two comets.
Lessons Learned in the Decommissioning of the Stardust Spacecraft
No abstract available
Thermal Infrared Sensor (TIRS) Instrument Thermal Subsystem Design and Lessons Learned
The Thermal Infrared Sensor (TIRS) is one of two instruments on the Landsat Data Continuity Mission (LDCM), which is scheduled to launch in February of 2013. The TIRS instrument was officially added to the mission later in the flow, which led to a highly aggressive schedule that became one of the main drivers during instrument development. The thermal subsystem design of the TIRS Sensor Unit is comprised of five thermal zones which range in temperature from less than 43 Kelvin to 330 Kelvin. Most zones are proportional heater controlled, and all are within a volume of 35 cu.ft. A two-stage cryocooler is used to cool the "cold stage" including three QWIP detectors to less than 43 Kelvin, and cool the "warm stage" to 105 Kelvin. The excess power dissipation from the cryocooler is rejected via ammonia transport heat pipes to a dedicated Cryocooler Radiator with embedded ammonia heat pipes. The cryogenic subsystem includes a series of shells used to radiatively and conductively isolate the cold stage from the warmer surroundings. The Optical System (telescope) is passively cooled to 180-190 Kelvin using a "thermal link" (comprised of a Flexible Conductive Thermal Strap and an APG Bar) which couples the telescope stage to a dedicated radiator with embedded ethane heat pipes. The Scene Select Mechanism, which is responsible for moving the Scene Select Mirror to three distinct positions (including Nadir, Space, and On-board Black Body Calibrator pointing), runs nominally at 278 Kelvin and is thermally isolated from the cryogenic thermal zones. The On-board Black Body Calibrator requires a dedicated radiator which allows for a temperature range of 260-330 Kelvin at the Source. The detectors are powered by the FPE Box, which is mounted to the nadir external surface of the composite honeycomb structure. There are two additional electronics boxes which are wet-mounted directly to the spacecraft shear panel, the Main Electronics Box and Cryocooler Electronics Box; thermal control of these boxes is the responsibility of Orbital Sciences Corporation, the spacecraft developer. The TIRS thermal subsystem design was successfully verified during months of testing campaign, from component & subsystem level to two instrument-level thermal vacuum tests. The Instrument, despite an aggressive schedule, was delivered to the spacecraft vendor in February of 2012 and is currently undergoing the final stages of spacecraft environmental testing in preparation for launch.
Rocket Exhaust Cratering: Lessons Learned from Viking and Apollo
During the Apollo and Viking programs NASA expended considerable effort to study the cratering of the regolith when a rocket launches or lands on it. That research ensured the success of those programs but also demonstrated that cratering will be a serious challenge for other mission scenarios. Unfortunately, because three decades have elapsed since NASA last performed a successful retro-rocket landing on a large planetary body - and ironically because Apollo and Viking were successful at minimizing the cratering effects - the space agency has a minimized sense of the seriousness of the issue. The most violent phase of a cratering event is when the static overpressure of the rocket exhaust exceeds the bearing capacity of the soil. This bearing capacity failure (BCF) punches a small and highly concave cup into the surface. The shape of the cup then redirects the supersonic jet - along with a large flux of high-velocity debris - directly toward the spacecraft. This has been observed in terrestrial experiments but never quantified analytically. The blast from such an event will be more than just quantitatively greater than the cratering that occurred in the Apollo and Viking programs. It will be qualitatively different, because BCF had been successfully avoided in all those missions. In fact, the Viking program undertook a significant research and development effort and redesigned the spacecraft specifically for the purpose of avoiding BCF [1]. (See Figure 1.) Because the Apollo and Viking spacecraft were successful at avoiding those cratering effects, it was unnecessary to understand them. As a result, the physics of a BCF-driven cratering event have never been well understood. This is a critical gap in our knowledge because BCF is unavoidable in the Martian environment with the large landers necessary for human exploration, and in Lunar landings it must also be addressed because it may occur depending upon the design specifics of the spacecraft and the weakening of the regolity by gas diffusion.