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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2022

Deception-Based Cyber Attacks on Hierarchical Control Systems using Domain-Aware Koopman Learning

Industrial control systems are subject to cyber attacks that produce physical consequences. These attacks can be both hard to detect and protracted. Here, we focus on deception-based sensor bias attacks made against a hierarchical control system where the attacker attempts to be stealthy. We develop a a data-driven, optimization-based attacker model and use the Koopman operator to represent the system dynamics in a domain-aware and computationally efficient manner. Using this model, we compute several different attacks against a high-fidelity commercial building emulator and compare the impacts of those attacks to each other. Finally, we discuss some computational considerations and identify avenues for future research.

koopman operator, Cyber-Physical Security, machine↗
DOE OSTI2023

Sensor and Actuator Attacks on Hierarchical Control Systems with Domain-Aware Operator Theory

Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) provide opportunities for cyber attacks to have physical impacts. Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) are a subclass of cyber threats that act stealthily to avoid detection and enable long-term attacks. Here, we build on our past work in APT modelling to combine deception-based sensor bias attacks and direct actuator manipulations in attacks against a hierarchical control system. That past work used the Koopman operator to develop a data-driven, domain-aware, optimization-based attacker model. Using an expansion of this model, we compute several different attacks, including multiple simultaneous attacks, against a high-fidelity commercial building emulator and compare the impacts of those attacks to each other. One next step of interest is to construct a defender system, built on the same modelling approach, designed to detect and mitigate such attacks.

koopman operator, Cyber-Physical Security, machine↗
DOE OSTI2020

Perturbation-Based Diagnosis of False Data Injection Attack Using Distributed Energy Resources

Modern smart grid relies on various sensor measurements for its operational control. In a successful false data injection attack, the attacker manipulates the measurements from the grid sensors such that undetected errors are introduced into the estimates of the system parameters leading to catastrophic situations. This paper proposes a novel perturbation based false data injection attack detection mechanism that utilizes inverter based distributed energy resources (DERs) to create low magnitude perturbation signal in the distribution system voltage that is inconsequential to the normal grid operation. Two voltage sensitivity analysis based algorithms are designed to identify the optimal set of DERs that can create the voltage perturbation signal of desired magnitude. An analytical method of voltage sensitivity analysis is used to compute the magnitude of voltage perturbation signal at each node in a computationally efficient manner. Then, a detection mechanism is developed that checks for the presence of the perturbation sequence in each sensor measurement. A sensor measurement is deemed authentic if the voltage perturbation signal is present in the data. In case of sensor malfunction or cyber-attack, the perturbation signal will not be present in the measurement data. Performance of the proposed attack detection mechanism is validated via simulation of the IEEE 69 bus test system.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2021

Source Authentication of Distribution Synchrophasors for Cybersecurity of Microgrids

This letter proposes a hybrid approach combining Self-Adaptive Mathematical Morphology (SAMM) and Time-Frequency (TF) techniques to authenticate the source information of Distribution Synchrophasors (DS) within near-range locations. The SAMM can adaptively regulate the synchrophasors variations which are representatives of local environmental characteristics. Subsequently, TF mapping is employed to extract informative signatures from the regulated synchrophasors variation. Finally, Random Forest Classification (RFC) is used to correlate the extracted signatures with the source information based on the derived TF mapping. Experiment results using DS collected at multiple small geographical scales validated the proposed methodology.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2021

Data-Driven Cyber-Attack Detection for PV Farms via Time-Frequency Domain Features

The internetworking of grid-connected power electronics converters (PECs) in photovoltaic (PV) farms has inevitably expanded the cyber-attack surfaces. Here this paper presents a comprehensive study on cyber-attack detection and diagnosis for PEC-enabled PV farms via single waveform sensor to distinguish between normal conditions, open-circuit faults, short-circuit faults, and cyber-attacks. To our knowledge, this has not been attempted before. Firstly, we propose frequency-domain magnitude-based residuals to identify short-circuit faults and a time-domain mean current vector-based feature to distinguish open-circuit faults from other threats. These features can fully reflect the specific physical characteristics of PV farms during threat duration. Secondly, unlike micro phasor measurement units (µPMU) and raw electric waveform-based methods, the proposed innovative features can address novel cyber-attacks that are excluded from the training process. Thirdly, an online hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) testbed using the OPAL-RT real-time digital simulator has verified the effectiveness. The monitoring system runs in real-time while using HIL as an operational solar farm and a National Instruments (NI) data acquisition card as the electric waveform sensor at the point of coupling.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2025

Resilient State Recovery Using Prior Measurement Support Information

Resilient state recovery of cyber-physical systems has attracted much research attention due to the unique challenges posed by the tight coupling between communication, computation, and the underlying physics of such systems. By modeling attacks as additive adversary signals to a sparse subset of measurements, this resilient recovery problem can be formulated as an error correction problem. To achieve exact state recovery, most existing results require less than 50% of the measurement nodes to be compromised, which limits the resiliency of the estimators. In this paper, we show that observer resiliency can be further improved by incorporating data-driven prior information. Here, we provide an analytical bridge between the precision of prior information and the resiliency of the estimator. By quantifying the relationship between the estimation error of the weighted ℓ 1 observer and the precision of the support prior, this quantified relationship provides guidance for the estimator’s weight design to achieve optimal resiliency. Several numerical simulations and an application case study are presented to validate the theoretical claims.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2024

Use Case-Informed Framework for Utility Cloud Migration

This white paper presents a comprehensive methodology for assessing utilities’ cloud postures and frameworks. It aims to produce a roadmap and strategy for a cloud-enabled grid future, providing guidance for integrators, asset owners, and operators. Instead of offering a yes or no answer for cloud implementation, this framework offers strategic guidance on responsibly preparing for and deploying cloud solutions. This paper delves into cloud-service models pertinent to the electric sector, dissecting the shared responsibility model and elucidating what on-premise infrastructure as a service (IaaS), platform as a service (PaaS), and software as a service (SaaS) entail. A pivotal consideration within the context of the shared responsibility model is the allocation of responsibility for foundational security aspects—a decision that will be informed by a comprehensive risk assessment. The ensuing discussion will present a checklist of certifications necessary for a secure cloud transition, equipping utilities with the knowledge to navigate this digital transformation with confidence and with a strategic roadmap. Furthermore, the paper outlines gaps in understanding the U.S. government’s role in shaping technology development and responsible use. Its purpose is to aid decision-making by offering support for risk-informed solutions that benefit those managing assets and operating in the cloud environment. The primary objective is to enhance the resilience and future readiness of a decarbonized electric grid, with cloud solutions as one viable option. The paper synthesizes information on current and future grid architectures and applications, considering both conservative and progressive energy transitions, along with scalable and distributed computing considerations.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2021

Attack-Resilient Weighted $\ell_{1}$ Observer with Prior Pruning

Security related questions for Cyber Physical Systems (CPS) have attracted much research attention in searching for novel methods for attack-resilient control and/or estimation. Specifically, false data injection attacks (FDIAs) have been shown to be capable of bypassing bad data detection (BDD), while arbitrarily compromising the integrity of state estimators and robust controller even with very sparse measurements corruption. Moreover, based on the inherent sparsity of pragmatic attack signals, ℓ1 -minimization scheme has been used extensively to improve the design of attack-resilient estimators. For this, the theoretical maximum for the percentage of compromised nodes that can be accommodated has been shown to be 50%. In order to guarantee correct state recoveries for larger percentage of attacked nodes, researchers have begun to incorporate prior information into the underlying resilient observer design framework. For the most pragmatic cases, this prior information is often obtained through some data-driven machine learning process. Existing results have shown strong positive correlation between the tolerated attack percentages and the precision of the prior information. In this paper, we present a pruning method to improve the precision of the prior information, given corresponding stochastic uncertainty characteristics of the underlying machine learning model. Then a weighted ℓ1 -minimization is proposed based on the pruned prior. The theoretical and simulation results show that the pruning method significantly improves the observer performance for much larger attack percentages, even when moderately accurate machine learning model used.

Resilient observer, Cyber-physical systems, prunin↗
DOE OSTI2022

2021 Annual Report Laboratory Directed Research & Development

The Department of Energy’s (DOE) Laboratory Directed Research and Development (LDRD) program is an essential pathway for innovation, capability growth, and research staff development at Idaho National Laboratory (INL). This program enables timely and agile response to national security, energy, and environmental challenges that motivate INL’s mission to discover and demonstrate innovative nuclear energy solutions and other clean energy options as well as securing our critical infrastructure. This report highlights INL’s LDRD projects concluding in fiscal year (FY) 2021 which included innovative research and development (R&D) across INL’s five science and technology initiatives: nuclear reactor sustainment and expanded deployment, integrated fuel cycle solutions, integrated energy systems, advanced design and manufacturing for extreme environments, and secure and resilient cyber-physical systems.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Achieving American Leadership in Cybersecurity and Digital Components Factsheet

The Biden Administration’s efforts to meet 100% clean electricity by 2035 and net-zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 has created opportunities to rebuild American supply chains create new jobs, strengthen community engagement, and spur U.S. economic growth. DOE’s strategy for success in the transition to a clean energy economy hinges on building and maintaining technology supply chains that are advanced, secure, and resilient to cyber threats. As the energy sector grows increasingly globalized, complex, and digitized, the supply chain for digital components of energy systems – including software, virtual platforms and services, and data – is facing greater threats. Nearly all digital components of U.S. energy sector systems are vulnerable to cyber supply chain instability, stemming from a variety of causes and shared among a broad set of interdependent stakeholders. Overall, supply chain risks for digital components in energy sector systems will continue to evolve and likely increase as these systems are increasingly interconnected, digitized, and remotely operated.

CCE↗
DOE OSTI2022

Cybersecurity for Distributed Wind: MIRACL Advisory Board Meeting 2022

This presentation for the MIRACL Industry Advisory Board summarizes the cybersecurity research for distributed wind that was performed during the project. Highlights include an overview of the distributed wind reference architecture, descriptions of the unique needs and challenges for securing distributed wind, the cyber risk management framework that was developed for this project, and key takeaways for various stakeholders.

17 WIND ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2023

Pillars of Innovation Across Southeast Idaho & the Interstate-15 Corridor

Since 1949, Idaho National Laboratory (INL) has been home to developing civilian and defense nuclear reactor technologies and managing spent nuclear fuel. Today, INL is the nation’s nuclear energy research laboratory, sustaining the safe and efficient operation of existing reactors, powering science in space, and breaking ground on the future fleet of advanced nuclear reactors. INL is only one of many rising technology resources in the region, however. Along the Interstate 15 (I-15) corridor, technology and cybersecurity industries and intellectual assets are rapidly expanding. Creating an innovation hub in this region would unite capabilities to solve current and future challenges in nuclear reactor sustainment and expanded deployment, integrated fuel cycle solutions, integrated energy systems, advanced materials and manufacturing for extreme environments, and secure and resilient cyber-physical systems.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗
DOE OSTI2023

2022 Annual Report Laboratory Directed Research & Development

Idaho National Laboratory’s (INL’s) mission is “to discover, demonstrate and secure innovative nuclear energy solutions, other clean energy options and critical infrastructure.” INL executes this mission through research and development across the continuum from basic science to applied science to engineering demonstration and then deployment. The Department of Energy (DOE) Laboratory Directed Research and Development (LDRD) program enables INL to conduct high-risk, impactful research that enriches the laboratory capabilities in order to further its missions. INL’s LDRD portfolio specifically advances the core capabilities of the laboratory aligned with its five science and technology initiatives: 1) nuclear reactor sustainment and expanded deployment, 2) integrated fuel cycle solutions, 3) integrated energy systems, 4) advanced design and manufacturing for extreme environments, and 5) secure and resilient cyber-physical systems. The 45 projects that ended in fiscal year 2022 and highlighted in this report are just a small sample of the impressive breadth and depth of cutting-edge science, technology, and engineering ongoing at INL.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2017

Computer Security for I and C Systems at Nuclear Facilities - 116

Cyber-attacks on Instrumentation and Control (I and C) systems may jeopardize the safety and security of nuclear facilities by contributing to sabotage or aiding in the unauthorized removal of nuclear material. The effects of cyber-attacks on I and C systems important to safety to safety may result in a wide range of consequences, such as a temporary loss of process control or unacceptable radiological consequences. Public awareness of cyber-attacks that affect I and C systems may also undermine confidence in the safety and security of nuclear facilities. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) recognizes the need for the guidance on the protection of I and C systems that provide safety, security, or auxiliary functions at nuclear facilities from cyber-attacks. To meet this need, The IAEA has developed a new Nuclear Security Series publication with the provisional title Computer Security of Instrumentation and Control Systems at Nuclear Facilities which builds upon and expands the guidance published in Nuclear Security Series No. 17 Computer Security at Nuclear Facilities (2011) . This publication will be formally released in 2017 as Technical Guidance and will be the second international consensus publication dedicated to Computer Security at Nuclear Facilities. It was developed in parallel with the new IAEA Nuclear Safety publications providing recommendations on I and C systems at research reactors (RR) and nuclear power plants (NPP) . The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of this publication and its application. The paper will also discuss its relation to other IAEA Nuclear Security Series (NSS) publications on computer security. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2020

IMPLEMENTING CYBERSECURITY INTO AN EXISTING NATIONAL NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION PROGRAMME – A CASE STUDY

Cyber threat profiling and risk mitigation is critical to any nuclear state organization and should be considered as part of any comprehensive nuclear security programme. Defining and evaluating the impact of the cyber threat to mission can be challenging. An existing national nuclear non-proliferation organization undertook an effort to incorporate computer security activities into its programme to address cyber risk. One of the primary goals of this endeavour was to develop a set of prioritised recommendations for organizational follow-through. The organization dedicated subject matter expert resources in the form of a cyber task force to support this goal. Opportunities were identified where computer security could be built into each programme including office-level strategies and tools. Of course, no new identified threat vector is easily considered and incorporated into existing programmes without impact. There are many obstacles to be overcome. Technically literate subject matter experts are difficult to find, management has comparatively less experience applying computer security into its programmes, and trying to change the culture to consider computer security risk at policy and programmatic levels takes time and management attention. As an outcome of this process, a roadmap for program integration was developed, including the establishment of a cyber support team. This paper will discuss the challenges and successes associated with establishing such a team.

Cyber Security, Nuclear, Non-proliferation↗
DOE OSTI2025

Cyber-Physical Tabletop Exercise for Small Modular Reactor Facilities

U.S. nuclear power facilities face increasing challenges in meeting dynamic security requirements caused by evolving and expanding threats while keeping costs reasonable to make nuclear energy competitive. This evolving threat landscape includes adversaries having offensive cyber capabilities to attack information technology (IT) systems and operation technology (OT) systems. These adversaries may have the ability to attack the physical protection system (PPS) networks with potential consequential impacts that could degrade the effectiveness of the PPS. These cyber attacks may also be used to attack the safety and operational systems used to operate and ensure the safety of the reactor. Additionally, adversaries may gain access to unmanned aerial systems (UAS) that may be used to provide reconnaissance and surveillance of the facility, provide information to the adversaries, and be equipped with kinetic capabilities such as explosives or weapons that can be used to directly attack the facility. The Department of Energy’s Office of Nuclear Energy’s Advanced Reactor Safeguards and Security (ARSS) program funded Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) and Idaho National Laboratory (INL) to develop a cyber-physical tabletop exercise (TTX). This exercise was conducted on a hypothetical small modular reactor (SMR) facility, and only considered a potential adversary cyber attack on the PPS to a physical attack on the hypothetical facility to achieve a radiological release. This cyber-physical TTX is meant to provide lessons learned to integrate the cyber security system design and the physical protection system (PPS) design to decrease design, operation, and maintenance costs as well as increase effectiveness for defending against design basis threat attacks at the facility. This TTX will also provide a framework and method for SMR and microreactor vendors to conduct their own cyber-physical TTX and gain impactful insights to improving the cyber and physical protection system design for their SMR or microreactor facility design.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2017

TASQC Quantum Key Transfer Program

Securely transferring timing information in the electrical grid is a critical component of securing the nation's infrastructure from cyber attacks. One solution to this problem is to use quantum information to securely transfer the timing information across sites. This software provides such an infrastructure using a standard Java webserver that pulls the quantum information from associated hardware.

Billings, JayJ.↗