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At least 775 records · Page 43
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2019

Human Performance Contributions to Safety in Commercial Aviation

Every day in aviation, pilots, air traffic controllers, and other front-line personnel perform countless correct judgments and actions in a variety of operational environments. These judgments and actions are often the difference between an accident and a non-event. Ironically, data on these behaviors are rarely collected or analyzed. Data-driven decisions about safety management and design of safety-critical systems are limited by the available data, which influence how decision makers characterize problems and identify solutions. Large volumes of data are collected on the failures and errors that result in infrequent incidents and accidents, but in the absence of data on behaviors that result in routine successful outcomes, safety management and system design decisions are based on a small sample of nonrepresentative safety data. This assessment aimed to find and document “safety successes” made possible by human operators. With many Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate (ARMD) Programs and Projects focusing on increased automation and autonomy and decreased human involvement, failure to fully consider the human contributions to successful system performance in civil aviation represents a significant risk — a risk that has not been recognized to date. Without understanding how humans contribute to safety, any estimate of predicted safety of autonomous capabilities is incomplete and inherently suspect. Furthermore, understanding the ways in which humans contribute to safety can promote strategic interactions among safety technologies, functions, procedures and the people using them. Without this understanding, the full benefits of an integrated, optimized human/technology or autonomous system will not be realized. Historically, safety has been consistently defined in terms of the occurrence of accidents or recognized risks (i.e., in terms of things that go wrong). These adverse outcomes are explained by identifying their causes, and safety is restored by eliminating or mitigating these causes. An alternative to this approach is to focus on what goes right and identify how to replicate that process. Focusing on the rare cases of failures attributed to “human error” provides little information about why human performance routinely prevents adverse events. Hollnagel has proposed that things go right because people continuously adjust their work to match their operating conditions. These adjustments become increasingly important as systems continue to grow in complexity. Thus, the definition of safety should reflect not only “avoiding things that go wrong” but “ensuring that things go right.” The basis for safety management requires developing an understanding of everyday activities. However, few mechanisms to monitor everyday work exist in the aviation domain, which limits opportunities to learn how designs function in reality. This concept of safety thinking and safety management is reflected in the emerging field of resilience engineering. According to Hollnagel, a system is resilient if it can sustain required operations under expected and unexpected conditions by adjusting its functioning prior to, during, or following changes, disturbances, and opportunities. To explore “positive” behaviors that contribute to resilient performance in commercial aviation, the assessment team examined a range of existing sources of data about pilot and air traffic control (ATC) tower controller performance, including subjective interviews with domain experts and objective aircraft flight data records. These data were used to identify strategies that support resilient performance, methods for exploring and refining those strategies in existing data, and proposed methods for capturing and analyzing new data.

Null, Cynthia H.↗
NASA NTRS2019

In-Time Non-Participant Casualty Risk Assessment to Support Onboard Decision Making for Autonomous Unmanned Aircraft

Numerous operational paradigms, technologies, and missions are emerging as newcomers to the National Airspace System (NAS) develop small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (sUAS), personal air vehicles and other Urban Air Mobility (UAM) concepts. As the list of applications expands, maintaining the safety of the current airspace system remains one of the core concerns preventing widespread commercial implementation of these concepts. Further, the risks associated with unmanned aircraft operations themselves have to be recognized and mitigated in a timely manner. Safety-critical risks include, but are not limited to, flight outside of approved airspace, unsafe proximity to people or property, critical system failures, loss-of control, and cyber-security related risks. Instead of reacting to accidents, a set of predictive and data-driven risk monitoring, assessment, and mitigation capabilities are envisioned to help capture and eliminate hazards as these systems become operational. NASA’s System-wide Safety project is performing R&D on such a safety assurance concept. As part of this concept, this paper describes an architecture that continuously monitors a diverse set of onboard and ground-based sources to estimate and predict non-participant casualty risk during flight. Timely identification of the changing nature of this risk can inform decision making processes to mitigate current and impending situations.

Ancel, Ersin↗
DOE OSTI2025

Constraining the impact of chlorine as a neutron absorber in next-gen fast reactor designs

The role of chlorine as a neutron poison and as a seed for producing radioactive waste in nuclear systems has driven a renewed interest to improve its nuclear data uncertainties. Additionally, basic and applied science programs that use CLYC (Cs 2 LiYCl 6 :Ce) detectors for neutron spectroscopy and monitoring are also very sensitive to any change in chlorine nuclear data for simulations of the detector response. In this work, sensitivities relevant for these different applications are addressed through simulations of the efficiency of CLYC detectors in a fast fission spectrum when applying new chlorine nuclear data as input. These simulations are validated by an experimental measurement using CLYC detectors coupled to an ionization chamber loaded with a 252 Cf spontaneous fission source. The results are then used to obtain the first reliable direct measurement of the 35 Cl(n,p 0 ) and summed Cl(n,p+n,α) fission spectrum average cross sections, found to be 54.7(32) and 105.0(98) mb, respectively. The results are within uncertainty of calculated fission spectrum averaged cross sections based on recently re-evaluated chlorine nuclear data, which confirm recent impact studies performed for the Molten Chloride Reactor Experiment. Meanwhile, there currently exists only one published criticality benchmark experiment that is sufficiently sensitive to chlorine nuclear data. Discrepancies are found with this set of criticality safety benchmarks, which are more sensitive to thermal and epithermal neutron energies than the energies, above 100 keV, tested in this current work. Hence, there is still a need to re-evaluate the chlorine nuclear data at lower energies to assess these discrepancies. Interpretation of the data from future “faster” criticality benchmarks, which are needed for next-gen fast reactor designs, benefit from the improved constraints on the chlorine nuclear data validated in this work.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2022

The B737 MAX 8 Accidents as Operational Experiences With Automation Transparency

Automation transparency has come into prominence in the human-machine systems literature, with researchers offering definitions, models, design frameworks, and empirical findings. However, missing from the literature are reflections on the actual operational experiences of human crews interacting with intelligent automation conceived from multiple transparency perspectives. The Boeing 737 MAX 8 accidents present a tragic case of a catastrophic failure of automation transparency. We explore this case with an emphasis on extracting design and regulatory insights for the nuclear power and other safety-critical domains.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
NASA NTRS2011

Towards Measurement of Confidence in Safety Cases

Arguments in safety cases are predominantly qualitative. This is partly attributed to the lack of sufficient design and operational data necessary to measure the achievement of high-dependability targets, particularly for safety-critical functions implemented in software. The subjective nature of many forms of evidence, such as expert judgment and process maturity, also contributes to the overwhelming dependence on qualitative arguments. However, where data for quantitative measurements is systematically collected, quantitative arguments provide far more benefits over qualitative arguments, in assessing confidence in the safety case. In this paper, we propose a basis for developing and evaluating integrated qualitative and quantitative safety arguments based on the Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) and Bayesian Networks (BN). The approach we propose identifies structures within GSN-based arguments where uncertainties can be quantified. BN are then used to provide a means to reason about confidence in a probabilistic way. We illustrate our approach using a fragment of a safety case for an unmanned aerial system and conclude with some preliminary observations

Denney, Ewen↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Standards for AI/ML and Emerging Technologies

Standards development activities require a keen and deep understanding of the problem being solved by the standard as well as the technologies being deployed in any reference implementation of the solution. It is important to understand the mechanisms and limits of the fundamental, underlying science of implementation and verification technologies used to realize and assure systems. We need to understand the limits of what current process and metrics can provide with respect to new technologies. US leadership is important in this endeavor, and it is vital that we have a measured approach that yields sound results. We wish to start with simple, well-defined, non-safety critical applications and then progress to functions which have (1) clearly defined requirements, (2) means of checking the answer/output, and (3) means of intervention and mitigation of incorrect answers/outputs.

Standards Development↗
NASA NTRS2022

NASA System-Wide Safety Wildland Firefighting Operations Workshop Report

On March 9-11, 2022, NASA’s System-Wide Safety Wildland Firefighting Operations Workshop engaged the broader wildland firefighting management ecosystem in a safety-oriented discussion via a virtual platform. This enabled a better understanding of how NASA and community expertise can be leveraged in the safe development of current and future firefighting systems and operations. The goals of the workshop were to: (1) identify and prioritize the top safety-oriented risks, gaps in capabilities, and emerging technologies to enhance wildland firefighting for both near-term and far-term concepts, with a specific focus on aviation operations and (2) engage the stakeholder community in defining emergent safety-oriented scope, roles, responsibilities, and procedures for agents undergoing increasingly complex wildland firefighting operations in information-rich, but uncertain environments. Workshop participants were solicited from wildland firefighting stakeholders across government, industry, and academia. All levels of government were engaged, as NASA sought attendees from federal, state, local, and tribal government agencies. Industry participants from traditional wildland firefighting domains such as data visualization and equipment manufacturers were invited, and corporate attendees from novel application domains such as aerial robotics and autonomous systems were present as well. The top three findings were as follows: (1) Enhancing situation awareness is a safety priority, especially in the use of aerial assets; (2) Timely access to information along with data fusion and integrated displays will enhance safety-critical decision-making both inside and outside aviation contexts; and (3) Tailorable standards and common operating pictures in the field will enhance inter-agency cooperation in the wildland firefighting lifecycle and enable the optimal use of limited resources such as aerial assets. The workshop helped inform NASA of the relevant safety-related wildland firefighting concerns and aided the broader ecosystem in understanding the potential safety-oriented role NASA might play in this community. Increased engagement with crucial governmental stakeholders (e.g., U.S. Forest Service, CAL FIRE, etc.) along with industry partners in cutting- edge information -centric domains is a fundamental next step. Additionally, the workshop findings will help define the first of a series of operationally challenging demonstrations, held in concert with strategic ecosystem partners, known as the Safety Demonstrator Series for NASA’s System-Wide Safety project. The first demonstration is set in the wildland firefighting application domain and will: (1) examine high risk operational scenarios to reduce their overall risk via services, functions or capabilities that act as risk mitigators (or transfer that risk to automated systems better able to tolerate it) and (2) explore novel tools and technologies that will enhance safety margins by enabling non-traditional or neoteric operational paradigms.

wildland firefighting↗
NASA NTRS2017

Real-Time Risk Assessment Framework for Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Traffic Management (UTM)

The new Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Small Unmanned Aircraft rule (Part 107) marks the first national regulations for commercial operation of small unmanned aircraft systems (sUAS) under 55 pounds within the National Airspace System (NAS). Although sUAS flights may not be performed beyond visual line-of-sight or over non- participant structures and people, safety of sUAS operations must still be maintained and tracked at all times. Moreover, future safety-critical operation of sUAS (e.g., for package delivery) are already being conceived and tested. NASA's Unmanned Aircraft System Trac Management (UTM) concept aims to facilitate the safe use of low-altitude airspace for sUAS operations. This paper introduces the UTM Risk Assessment Framework (URAF) which was developed to provide real-time safety evaluation and tracking capability within the UTM concept. The URAF uses Bayesian Belief Networks (BBNs) to propagate off -nominal condition probabilities based on real-time component failure indicators. This information is then used to assess the risk to people on the ground by calculating the potential impact area and the effects of the impact. The visual representation of the expected area of impact and the nominal risk level can assist operators and controllers with dynamic trajectory planning and execution. The URAF was applied to a case study to illustrate the concept.

Ancel, Ersin↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

A Data-Driven Approach to Recognizing and Understanding Human Contributions to Aviation Safety

Data-driven decisions about safety management and design of safety-critical systems are limited by the available data, which influence, and are influenced by, how decision makers characterize problems and identify solutions. In the commercial aviation domain, large volumes of data are collected and analyzed on the failures and errors that result in infrequent incidents and accidents, but in the absence of data on safety-producing behaviors, safety management and system design decisions are based on a small sample of non-representative safety data. Analysis of aviation accident data suggests that human error is implicated in up to 80% of accidents, which has been used to justify future visions for aviation in which the roles of human operators are greatly diminished or eliminated in the interest of creating a safer aviation system. However, failure to fully consider the human contributions to aviation safety represents a significant and largely unrecognized risk when making policy decisions about safety management and system design. Opportunities exist to leverage the vast amount of data that have already been collected, or could be easily obtained, to increase our understanding of human contributions to safety in commercial aviation. This presentation will focus on those opportunities as well as the challenges associated with collecting and analyzing data on operators’ safety-producing behaviors.

Safety↗
DOE OSTI2023

Efficient learning of power grid voltage control strategies via model-based deep reinforcement learning

Here this article proposes a model-based deep reinforcement learning (DRL) method to design emergency control strategies for short-term voltage stability problems in power systems. Recent advances show promising results for model-free DRL-based methods in power systems control problems. But in power systems applications, these model-free methods have certain issues related to training time (clock time) and sample efficiency; both are critical for making state-of-the-art DRL algorithms practically applicable. DRL-agent learns an optimal policy via a trial-and-error method while interacting with the real-world environment. It is also desirable to minimize the direct interaction of the DRL agent with the real-world power grid due to its safety-critical nature. Additionally, the state-of-the-art DRL-based policies are mostly trained using a physics-based grid simulator where dynamic simulation is computationally intensive, lowering the training efficiency. We propose a novel model-based DRL framework where a deep neural network (DNN)-based dynamic surrogate model (SM), instead of a real-world power grid or physics-based simulation, is utilized within the policy learning framework, making the process faster and more sample efficient. However, having stable training in model-based DRL is challenging because of the complex system dynamics of large-scale power systems. We addressed these issues by incorporating imitation learning to have a warm start in policy learning, reward-shaping, and multi-step loss in surrogate model training. Finally, we achieved 97.5% reduction in samples and 87.7% reduction in training time for an application to the IEEE 300-bus test system.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
NASA NTRS2018

From Formal Requirements to Highly Assured Software for Unmanned Aircraft Systems

Operational requirements of safety-critical systems are often written in restricted specification logics. These restricted logics are amenable to automated analysis techniques such as model-checking, but are not rich enough to express complex requirements of unmanned systems. This short paper advocates for the use of expressive logics, such as higher-order logic, to specify the complex operational requirements and safety properties of unmanned systems. These rich logics are less amenable to automation and, hence, require the use of interactive theorem proving techniques. However, these logics support the formal verification of complex requirements such as those involving the physical environment. Moreover, these logics enable validation techniques that increase con dence in the correctness of numerically intensive software. These features result in highly-assured software that may be easier to certify. The feasibility of this approach is illustrated with examples drawn for NASA's unmanned aircraft systems.

Munoz, Cesar↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Verifying PLC Programs via Monitors: Extending the Integration of FRET and PLCverif

Verification of Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) programs requires reasoning about propositions qualified in terms of time. CERN’s PLCverif, an open-source tool for the analysis of safety-critical PLC systems, uses Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) for the specification of properties. Until now, PLCverif depended on third-party tools that accept LTL specifications to perform verification. However, our experience with industrial PLC programs shows that, to overcome analysis limitations, a wide range of techniques are needed to successfully verify complex properties. In this paper, we extend PLCverif to enable PLC program verification of pure-past LTL (PLTL) safety properties with assertion-based verification tools. To this end, we take an algorithm from the runtime-monitoring domain, apply it to bounded model checking of PLC programs, and implement it in PLCverif. We extend the integration of NASA’s Formal Requirements Elicitation Tool (FRET) into PLCverif to use PLTL properties generated with FRET. In addition, we leverage the program structure induced by the PLC scan-cycle for a state-space reduction. Finally, we expose the algorithm to a real-world case study of critical systems at CERN.

Formal verification↗
DOE OSTI2024

TEX-Hf Assemblies: Highly Enriched Uranium Plates with Hafnium Using Polyethylene Moderator and Polyethylene Reflector

This report documents the integral experiment evaluation and publication for IER-532 (TEX-Hf), Thermal/Epithermal eXperiments (TEX) with highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel and hafnium (Hf), moderated and reflected by polyethylene. The design of TEX-Hf is a variation of IER-297 (TEX-HEU), with the inclusion of hafnium as a diluent material. The experiment and evaluation include seven configurations, all of which were acceptable as benchmark cases. These benchmark cases provide validation for hafnium in the thermal, intermediate, and fast neutron energy regimes by maximizing the sensitivity in k eff to the hafnium cross sections. The evaluation was reviewed and accepted by the International Criticality Safety Benchmark Evaluation Project (ICSBEP) Technical Review Group on April 17, 2024, and was submitted to the ICSBEP in August 2024 following subgroup approval.

42 ENGINEERING↗
NASA NTRS2006

Model-Based Safety Analysis

System safety analysis techniques are well established and are used extensively during the design of safety-critical systems. Despite this, most of the techniques are highly subjective and dependent on the skill of the practitioner. Since these analyses are usually based on an informal system model, it is unlikely that they will be complete, consistent, and error free. In fact, the lack of precise models of the system architecture and its failure modes often forces the safety analysts to devote much of their effort to gathering architectural details about the system behavior from several sources and embedding this information in the safety artifacts such as the fault trees. This report describes Model-Based Safety Analysis, an approach in which the system and safety engineers share a common system model created using a model-based development process. By extending the system model with a fault model as well as relevant portions of the physical system to be controlled, automated support can be provided for much of the safety analysis. We believe that by using a common model for both system and safety engineering and automating parts of the safety analysis, we can both reduce the cost and improve the quality of the safety analysis. Here we present our vision of model-based safety analysis and discuss the advantages and challenges in making this approach practical.

Joshi, Anjali↗
NASA NTRS2018

Health Monitoring and Prognostics for More Electric Aircrafts

As more and more electric vehicles emerge in our daily operation progressively, a very critical challenge lies in the prediction of remaining flying time/distance (for aircraft). This information is important, particularly in the case of unmanned vehicles, because such vehicles can become self-aware, autonomously compute its own capabilities, and identify how to best plan and successfully complete vehicular missions safely. In case of electric aircrafts, computing remaining flying time is also safety-critical, since an aircraft that runs out of battery charge while in the air will eventually lose control leading to catastrophe. In order to tackle and solve the prediction problem, it is essential to have awareness of the current state and health of the system, especially since it is necessary to perform condition-based predictions. To be able to predict the future state of the system, it is also required to possess knowledge of the current and future operations of the vehicle. Given models of the current and future system behavior, the general approach of model-based prognostics can be employed as a solution to the prior stated prediction problem.For electric aircraft, propulsion is based on power generated from batteries. Thus, it is critical to monitor battery state charge and to estimate the ability of the battery to support mission activities as it is being discharged during flight operation. The ability of the vehicle to complete its given mission very much depends on the charge left in the batteries based on its operational route, maneuvering, weather conditions along with aging health of the batteries. Hence, for the purpose this discussion, consider the scenario of an unmanned electric aircraft that has some planned sequence of waypoints to reach throughout its mission. In such a scenario, for this particular aircraft, and within the region it is flown, at most two minutes are required to safely land the aircraft. Thus, it is desired to predict at which point in time the aircraft must begin to head to the runway and land.

Goebel, Kai↗
DOE OSTI2020

Solubility Testing to Support the Addition of Sodium Reactor Experiment Material to Sludge Batch 10

The Savannah River Site H-Canyon Facility is planning to discard dissolved Sodium Reactor Experiment (SRE) material into Tank 51 prior to Sludge Batch 10 (SB10). SB10 with the SRE material will be processed in the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) using the Nitric-Glycolic Acid (NGA) flowsheet. The DWPF Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluation (NCSE) protects a 14:1 mass ratio of manganese to equivalent uranium-235 in both the solid and liquid phases during processing by requiring a 70:1 mass ratio in the feed. A concern was raised that freshly precipitated manganese in the SRE material will behave differently from the manganese in sludge during DWPF processing and potentially invalidate the criticality control. To mitigate risks to the DWPF criticality controls, the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) performed a metals solubility test applicable to recently precipitated manganese and uranium, as would be expected with SRE transfers to SB10. The objective of this analysis is the tracking of partitioning of the primary fissile component (uranium-235) with the credited poison (manganese) between the aqueous and insoluble phases.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2022

Review of Experimental Data for Validating Computer Codes Used in Shielding Calculations for Spent Fuel Storage and Transportation Systems

This report presents a review of available radiochemical assay data and shielding benchmarks applicable to spent nuclear fuel (SNF) shielding calculations. The relevant information reviewed herein includes the Spent Fuel Composition (SFCOMPO) database, the Shielding Integral Benchmark Archive and Database (SINBAD), the International Handbook of Evaluated Criticality Safety Benchmark Experiments, and published measurements of external dose rates of casks loaded with SNF. The relevant experimental data identified in this report may be used to support verification and validation of computer codes used in SNF cask/transport shielding applications, as well as development of calculation uncertainties. It should be noted that a relatively small subset of the identified experimental data (e.g., criticality alarm experiments) is available in a standard format established by the international community participating in experimental isotopic and shielding data evaluations. An effort of the SFCOMPO Technical Review Group (TRG) is underway to publish first isotopic evaluations of individual assay data using a standard data evaluation format. The SINBAD TRG has recently initiated benchmark evaluations and modernization of the database. Therefore, more relevant information is expected in the future that will enable users to select quality experimental data in depletion code and shielding code validations for SNF applications.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2021

Critical and Californium Source-Driven Noise Analysis Subcritical Measurements with an Unreflected Cylindrical Tank of Mixed Uranium-Plutonium Nitrate Solution

The reported experiments were performed by Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) at the Battelle Northwest Laboratory’s (now Pacific Northwest National Laboratory) critical experiments facility at Hanford, Washington in 1981 and used 16 days of critical facility time, not including 10 days for setup and removal of ORNL equipment. These measurements were to assess the capability of the Cf source-driven noise analysis (CSDNA) method to measure the subcriticality (keff) of mixed U-Pu nitrate solutions. In addition to the CSNDA measurements, measurements were also performed near delayed criticality where CSDNA measurements cannot be performed. This report documents the experiments that were not reported at that time by presenting the ORNL experimental results and any online analysis performed during and shortly after the measurements. The mixed nitrate solution had a U concentration at 188 grams per liter (g/L), a Pu concentration of 280 g/L, free acid normality of 2.80, H ion molarity of 5.9 and a specific gravity of 1.754 g/cm 3 , a 240 Pu isotopic content of 7.981 wt. %, and a 235 U isotopic content of 0.724 wt. %. The stainless-steel tank for the solution had an inside diameter of 35.38 cm, an outside diameter of 35.53 cm, a height of 56.72 cm, and bottom thickness of 0.9525 cm. A Zircaloy pipe with a 3.1496 cm outside diameter, a 2.7788 cm inside diameter, and bottom thickness of 0.635 cm was available for insertion of the Cf source in the center of the fissile solution. The Cf source was also located at the outside surface of the tank (solution height varied from 10 to 53 cm) and in the center of the solution (solution height varied from 10 to 60.7 cm). The CSDNA measurements were not analyzed online to determine the subcritical neutron multiplication factors. At all subcritical states, the break frequency noise analysis data was fitted to obtain the prompt neutron decay constant. The neutron multiplication factors were determined for the two configurations of the measurements near delayed criticality. The subcritical neutron multiplication factors from the CNSDA measurements can be obtained with further analysis. However, the near delayed critical configuration, the prompt neutron decay constants, the count rates, and the measured cross and auto power spectral densities can be calculated directly for benchmarking. Much of data presented in this report are from ORNL notes—not in the ORNL logbooks. For the final benchmark analysis, the data from the Battelle Northwest Laboratory (which operated the critical facility in 1981) critical facility logbook should be consulted and be incorporated where appropriate. The purpose of this report is to document the experimental information for the measurements performed so that at a later date researchers could perform the required uncertainty and calculational analyses and documentation to use these data for an International Criticality Safety Benchmark Program (ICSBEP) or Nuclear Energy Agency benchmark. The data from these measurements are available from the ORNL Records Management Services Department, and the logbook is available from ICSBEP at Idaho National Laboratory. Preparation of the present report is part of a larger cooperative effort between Idaho National Laboratory (INL) and Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) to document more than 15 undocumented critical and subcritical experiments enumerated in ORNL/TM-2019/18 and performed by ORNL at ORCEF and other USDOE critical experiments facilities using more than 500 operational days of critical facility time.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗