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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Urban Air Mobility Airspace Dynamic Density Safety Metric

NASA’s Advanced Air Mobility (AAM) project focuses on enabling emerging aviation markets by accelerating development of safe, high-volume flight operations.[1] It involves development and validation of vehicles, airspace, and automation changes required to support concepts such as Urban Air Mobility, a vision for electric or hybrid electric, vertical or short take-off and landing vehicles that can transport passengers and cargo over an urban environment.[2] NASA’s System Wide Safety (SWS) project is coordinating with AAM by understanding how safety could be affected by these emerging operations. We approach the assessment of airspace safety by identifying threats to operations and then monitoring and predicting the evolution of those threats encoded in a set of safety metrics.[3] Toward this end, we have been developing a dynamic density metric to predict the likelihood of vehicle conflicts in the airspace.

Dynamic Density↗
NASA NTRS2021

NASA Engineering and Safety Center Technical Bulletin No. 19-01-1: Mitigating Risks of Single-Event Effects in Space Applications

Since most Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical (EEE) parts are intended for terrestrial applications, they are susceptible to a range of radiation threats in the space environment if the resulting effects are not properly characterized and mitigated. Even specially designed radiation-hardened parts may not be tolerant to all types of radiation effects. Radiation hardness is a multi-dimensional property of any part that describes intrinsic abilities to tolerate various radiation environments [1,2]. Effects to be concerned with include total ionizing dose, total non-ionizing dose, and single-event effects (SEE) – all of which depend on the mission, environment, application, and lifetime. Radiation effects concerns may be the same whether a EEE part is Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS), MIL-SPEC, or some other variant, all of which are susceptible to the same radiation threats [3]. SEE consequences range from recoverable faults to catastrophic failure. Like other random faults, SEE can be mitigated with informed circuit design practices at the device, card, and/or system level.

Single-event effects↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Merging Analytic Collaborative Frameworks with New Observing Strategies Toward a Digital Twin: Earth – Episodic Pulse Event Impacts on Ocean Carbon Cycle as an Example

Virtual representations of the Earth will allow us to address some of the most critical environmental issues of our time. Here, we show the first steps toward representation of riverine, estuarine, and coastal carbon processes to enable scenario driven “what-if” analyses of the carbon system and human footprint. Excess sediment and nutrient runoff from land-based human activities impact water quality and can pose serious threats to coastal and marine ecosystems. Episodic pulse events, such as extreme precipitation events, can increase the amount of nutrients entering estuaries and coastal regions, potentially leading to large phytoplankton blooms followed by anoxic conditions. Consequences of coastal runoff are predicted to increase with the higher intensity and frequency of extreme events. Beyond the threat to coastal ecosystems, recent findings suggest these episodic pulses might play a significant role for biological production influencing regional and global carbon fluxes and budgets. An improved understanding of these events through optimal, dynamic observing strategies will increase our knowledge of the land-ocean continuum and how regional events and nutrient fluxes affect the carbon cycle and ocean ecosystem. This conceptual framework enables focused science investigations by pairing data analytics and artificial intelligence tools (otherwise termed an Analytic Center Framework, ACF) with targeted measurement acquisition through distributed sensing and intelligent asset tasking (or New Observing Strategies, NOS). This NOS and ACF iterative approach acquires and integrates complementary and coincident satellite, in-situ and model data to build a more complete and in-depth picture of science phenomena. Specifically, Apache Science Data Analytic Platform (SDAP) is extended to incorporate relevant datasets for data access, harmonized analysis, and anomaly detection. When conditions are met for a likely pulse event, NASA’s D-SHIELD (Distributed Spacecraft with Heuristic Intelligence to Enable Logistical Decisions) tool is triggered to optimize asset overpass frequency and schedule observations for persistent monitoring. Targeted data is ingested by SDAP for enhanced investigation via iterative analysis until the trigger criteria is no longer met - steps toward a digital twin.

Laura Rogers↗
NASA NTRS2022

Predicting the Penetration of a Shielded TPS Tile

All spacecraft are subject to the possibility of high-speed particle impacts during their mission life. In low earth orbit, those impacts could be the result of collisions with pieces of orbital debris or with meteorites. Beyond LEO, and especially beyond GEO, those impacts will likely be caused by meteorites. Such high-speed impacts on spacecraft surfaces create debris clouds that travel towards and eventually impact other downstream spacecraft components. In addition to the impulsive load that such debris clouds would impart to the spacecraft elements with which they subsequently collide, the largest fragment in these debris clouds poses a significant threat on its own to those spacecraft elements. In order to be able to assess the severity of the threat posed by such a fragment, it is important to be able to predict the extent of damage sustained by the impacted spacecraft element. In this paper, we present a new process for determining the penetration depth in a shielded TPS tile system. The requirements for the process were that it be applicable across a full spectrum of impact low velocities (i.e. from ~ 7 km/s to above 50 km/s), that it be applicable over a wide range of projectile materials densities (i.e. ranging from water to steel, for example), and that it be applicable over a wide range of trajectory obliquities (i.e. not just normal impacts). Furthermore, the process developed should be sufficiently flexible so that it can be used for shield design parameter and / or system configuration trade studies (i.e. be written in terms of as many shield and TPS tile system parameters as possible). Following the initial impact of the projectile on the outer wall of the dual-wall shield, a debris cloud (i.e. the primary debris cloud) is created that travels towards and impacts the inner wall of the shield. Within this debris cloud is a combination of solid, liquid, and vaporized material, depending on the impact velocity and the impedance mismatch of the projectile and outer wall materials. The impact of this debris cloud on the inner wall creates another debris cloud (i.e. the secondary debris cloud) that then travels towards and impacts the TPS tile. Within the particulate distribution of the material in each of these debris clouds is a so-called largest fragment. The process used to calculate the penetration depth in a shielded TPS tile system developed herein consists of the following three steps: 1. Does the initial projectile perforate the outer wall of the shield? If NO, the TPS tile remains undamaged. If YES, calculate the size and speed of the largest fragment exiting the outer wall of the shield and traveling towards the shield’s inner wall. 2. Does the largest fragment in the debris cloud exiting the outer wall of the shield perforate the inner wall of the shield? If NO, the TPS tile again remains undamaged. If YES, calculate the size and speed of the largest fragment exiting the rear of the shield inner wall. 3. Calculate the penetration depth of the largest fragment in the debris cloud exiting the inner wall into the TPS. Perforation of the inner and outer shield walls is predicted using the Cour-Palais penetration depth equation and an associated failure criterion [1]. The largest debris cloud fragment diameters and associated velocities are calculated using regression equations developed from a mix of hydrocode and experimental diameter and velocity information [2]. Finally, TPS penetration depths are calculated using an empirical penetration depth predictor equation based on high-speed impact test data and are calibrated using a limited number of hydrocode penetration depth predictions for water, nylon, aluminum, Dunite, and steel projectiles The predictions of the penetration depth calculation process are compared against the predictions of more than 60 SPHC hydrocode runs. These comparisons show that the process used to calculate TPS tile penetration depths usually yields values that are within 1 mm of the predictions of hydrocode simulations. If a maximum allowable TPS penetration depth is known, the process developed herein can now be used to develop a failure limit equation that would predict whether or not an impacting particle would penetrate deeply enough into the TPS to result in a “failed” or “not failed” end state. References [1] E.L. Christiansen, “Design and performance equations for advanced meteoroid and debris shields”, International Journal of Impact Engineering, Vol. 14, 1993, pp. 145-156. [2] W.P. Schonberg, “Predicting the size of the largest particle fragment in a debris cloud created by an orbital debris impact and its associated velocity”, 2021 Applied Space Environments Conference, NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory, Pasadena, California, November, 2021.

Meteroid↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

A Blockchain Case Study for Urban Air Mobility Operational Intent

The next generation of aerial passenger and cargo transportation may leverage the concept of Urban Air Mobility (UAM). UAM is a concept that proposes to develop short-range, point-to-point transportation systems in metropolitan areas using vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) or short takeoff and landing (STOL) aircraft to overcome increasing surface congestion [1]. The UAM concept leverages a decentralized service-based architecture for airspace solutions. Within the environment, UAM operators work collaboratively to manage aerial vehicles in the urban environment. Providers of Services for UAM (PSU), UAM operators, and Supplemental Data Service Providers (SDSP) provide services to support flight operations within the UAM environment. Also, various views of UAM flight information are provided to the public and public safety entities [2]. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) can coordinate flight information between the FAA controlled National Airspace System (NAS) and the UAM environments through the FAA-Industry Data Exchange Protocol (FIDXP). To realize the potential of UAM, an assurance of cybersecurity is critical for public acceptance. Cybersecurity has come to the forefront highlighting the need to protect these networks and systems from cyberattacks. The growth in the development of UAM systems, and the associated data exchange and service interactions will be at risk due to numerous types of cybersecurity attacks. As these threats evolve, the UAM cybersecurity capabilities must adapt to these changes as well [3]. This research focuses on the secure data exchange and storage of this decentralized UAM environment to address these challenges. This research intends to leverage a permissioned blockchain approach to address cybersecurity threats that may impact a UAM environment. Blockchain technologies can be used for tracking transactions and verifying negotiated agreements between stakeholders in the NAS environment. For example, the record of the submitted flight plan and the approved flight plan could be verified using the Blockchain-based immutable ledger.

UAM↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Advances in Entry Modeling for Impact Risk Assessment

A summary of recent advancements in the detailed modeling of asteroid atmospheric entry processes made through NASA’s Asteroid Threat Assessment Project (ATAP) is presented. Understanding, and accurately modeling these processes and their associated uncertainties is critical to predicting all downstream impact effects, such as blast wave and thermal damage footprints. Furthermore, there is (perhaps thankfully) a dearth of empirical data for large impactors of the kind that would pose a threat to human populations, on which to anchor and/or validate models used in risk assessments. Therefore, we must rely heavily on detailed theoretical and numerical modeling to develop robust assessments for decision makers. To that end, ATAP has made some significant progress in advancing the capabilities in this area. Two areas in particular are highlighted in the present work: meteoroid ablation mechanisms, and bolide luminosity. The first research area – meteoroid ablation mechanisms – has focused on performing novel high-enthalpy wind tunnel experiments on meteorites and meteorite analogs, and utilizing the resulting data to develop high-fidelity models for impactor mass loss at scale. These efforts have resulted in several insights. Of note, these data suggest a differential vaporization process where volatiles are liberated preferentially when the asteroidal material is subject to high heat, while refractory components remain in the molten layer on the surface. A numerical model has been developed which considers this phenomena, and its effect on the bulk impactors effective heat of ablation is examined. The second research thrust that is discussed is focused on accurate modeling of impactor radiation phenomena. While another submission to the conference will discuss the application of our approach to thermal ground damage modeling, here, we present an overview of our extensive efforts to utilize available ground- and space-based observations of large bolides (~1m diameter, and above) to inform and validate our detailed modeling approaches. These methods have been shown to accurately reconstruct the detailed spectra for the Benesov bolide, as well as approximate the burn footprint for the Tunguska event. Recent effort has focused on reconciling light curve data from multiple sources (all-sky camera networks, GLM, US government sensors), using our validated model, and providing a calibrated model for luminous efficiency which can then be utilized to infer impactor properties such as shape, mass, and composition. This work will be demonstrated through an exemplar case study focusing on a large bolide event with observational data (e.g. Chelyabinsk, Flensburg, etc.). Finally, our team’s assessment on the current maturity of atmospheric entry models, and priorities for future research will be provided.

ATAP↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Advances in Entry Modeling for Impact Risk Assessment

A summary of recent advancements in the detailed modeling of asteroid atmospheric entry processes made through NASA’s Asteroid Threat Assessment Project (ATAP) is presented. Understanding, and accurately modeling these processes and their associated uncertainties is critical to predicting all downstream impact effects, such as blast wave and thermal damage footprints. Furthermore, there is (perhaps thankfully) a dearth of empirical data for large impactors of the kind that would pose a threat to human populations, on which to anchor and/or validate models used in risk assessments. Therefore, we must rely heavily on detailed theoretical and numerical modeling to develop robust assessments for decision makers. To that end, ATAP has made some significant progress in advancing the capabilities in this area. Two areas in particular are highlighted in the present work: meteoroid ablation mechanisms, and bolide luminosity.

ATAP↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

An Approach to Identifying Aspects of Positive Pilot Behavior within the Aviation Safety Reporting System

The National Airspace System (NAS) is constantly evolving as air traffic continues to ramp up to pre-pandemic numbers and projected to grow to unprecedented levels in the coming years. As well as increasing demand to the current system, emerging operations such as Unmanned Autonomous Systems are also expected to add to complexity in the airspace. To address these issues, the industry and government agencies supporting the NAS will need to rely upon additional automation and new technologies to address future operational requirements, while continuing to be a world-leading safe transportation system. As these new technologies are implemented, the system continues to rely on human pilots and controllers in the loop to monitor the system and intervene in situations the automation cannot handle. The goal of proactively addressing safety is of foremost concern to ensure passenger confidence. The industry has implemented various Safety Monitoring Systems to identify safety risks and proactively address them before they result in a serious incident or accident. One such program is the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS). ASRS is a long-established system where pilots and controllers voluntarily and anonymously report safety incidents they experienced and observed during line operations by providing rich text narratives describing the events, the environment, and conditions leading to the safety event of concern. These narratives provide insight and context around events of interest and can be used to identify emerging problems. They can trigger investigations within Flight Operational Quality Assurance or Flight Data Monitoring programs. However, this process typically focuses on the adverse events and the unsafe aspects of the operations surrounding the reported or detected events. This perspective of investigating factors that went wrong around an adverse event is commonly referred to as Safety I. Alternatively, characterizing successful actions that operators perform every day under varying conditions that keep the system within safe operating bounds is a concept referred to as Safety II. The benefit of the Safety II view is that the scope is much larger than that of Safety I since a vast majority of the operations result in successful flights. Many of the successful techniques used to manage operational threats are not documented in standard operating procedures or taught during training. They are typically acquired over time by working with experienced pilots during line operations or in many cases after experiencing a problem for the first time and reacting to it in situ, drawing from years of experience to manage the threat. In an attempt to quantify these positive actions, we are proposing an approach to extracting key behaviors within ASRS reports that can support the Safety II concept. Our analysis assumes that ASRS reports contain some descriptions of corrective actions that operators performed to prevent a situation from leading to an accident. Leveraging recent advances in Natural Language Process modeling, we have developed an approach to extract positive sentiment from reports, embed these positive statements in a vector space where they can be numerically analyzed, and clustering these statements into similar contextual categories. From these contextualized categories we can attempt to summarized and distilled aspects of the positive behavior. The goal is to identify categories of behavior that describe consistent operator techniques that supports the Safety II concept. With this information, airlines may enable learning from these positive actions, or address procedures that need to be changed to avoid having pilots implement a workaround. These insights can provide a lens into what is “going right” in the operations that may otherwise not be known widely within the community. It is envisioned that this approach can be extended to other narrative programs such as Line Operation Safety Audit or Learning Improvement Team reports where similar observed behavior can be analyzed to extract positive actions and inform the overall operations.

NLP↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

What Can We Learn From Resilient Pilot Behaviors? The Case of Energy Management While Flying a Star

Recently, there has been increased interest in documenting flightcrew behaviors that contribute to safe operations. Instead of only capturing errors, new efforts are attempting to understand how pilots manage complexity and variability in the operational environment to ensure a safe mission. This approach highlights pilot responses to events and conditions that fall outside typical TEM threats; e.g., revised ATC clearances. This approach presents a two-sided coin: characterize flightcrew resilience /or/ generate insights regarding complexity in the operational environment that is not adequately managed by current flight deck interface designs, procedures, and training. To capture operational complexity, we have been analyzing flight path management tied to flying an RNAV STAR. Because ATC often requests revisions—e.g., descend late—and because RNAV STARs may not align with airplane performance limits, flightcrews need to monitor, anticipate threats to RNAV STAR compliance, and devise ways to accommodate unexpected challenges. In this paper, we identify general strategies that can support response adaptation and explore methods to facilitate training these strategies.

flight operations↗
NASA NTRS2022

Space Induced Discharge Model to Be Used on Interface Circuit Vulnerability Assessment

Charging can occur in space due to plasma and high energy particles. Charging is especially severe in certain earth orbits such as geostationary orbit, medium earth orbit and highly inclined orbit. A spacecraft that travels to other planets such as Jupiter also encounters high level of charging due to Jupiter’s radiation belt. The major concern for spacecraft operation due to charging is the survival of sensitive electrical circuits. Dielectrics and floating metal can charge up and discharge onto interface circuits. The electrical circuits need to be evaluated for survival from the electrostatic-discharge (ESD) threat. Both ESD induced upset and damage need to be assessed. The interface circuits are often located inside a shielded unit in the spacecraft structure or a shielded vault with sufficient radiation shielding to avoid surface and internal charging. The materials external to the highly shielded area can charge up and discharge onto wires that can directly dissipate the ESD onto the interface circuits. Figure 1 shows a possible discharge mechanism onto the interfacing circuits. If the wire has an external shield or a coaxial line, some or most of the discharge can flow on the shield to chassis ground. There is always coupling from external discharge. If the wire has no shield, the discharge flows onto the interface circuit. Fig. 1 Possible discharge paths onto the interface circuits. The purpose of this article is to address how to model the ESD threat to be used as the discharge source onto the interface circuit based on the electron beam test data. Different models are needed for different impedances associated with the interface circuits. Once those models are derived, one needs to analyze the interface circuit with the corresponding model using an electrical simulation tool. Then, the circuit’s front-end components can be assessed for damage and upset. Upset is highly dependent on the circuit operation and system requirements, and thus it is not addressed any further. Damage of electrical parts is often rated under Human-Body-Model (HBM) ESD. One can utilize this industry-wide available information to assess the damage vulnerability due to space discharges. However, the HBM waveform does not always match the discharge waveform. To estimate the damage vulnerability of the circuit and set margin, one needs to compare the equivalent energy delivered to the victim between a HBM discharge and the results from an ESD source model based on actual discharges. This paper presents such a comparison for a few select cases.

Xie, Julie↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

An Approach to Identifying Aspects of Positive Pilot Behavior within the Aviation Safety Reporting System

The National Airspace System (NAS) is constantly evolving as air traffic continues to ramp up to pre-pandemic numbers and projected to grow to unprecedented levels in the coming years. As well as increasing demand to the current system, emerging operations such as Unmanned Autonomous Systems are also expected to add to complexity in the airspace. To address these issues, the industry and government agencies supporting the NAS will need to rely upon additional automation and new technologies to address future operational requirements, while continuing to be a world-leading safe transportation system. As these new technologies are implemented, the system continues to rely on human pilots and controllers in the loop to monitor the system and intervene in situations the automation cannot handle. The goal of proactively addressing safety is of foremost concern to ensure passenger confidence. The industry has implemented various Safety Monitoring Systems to identify safety risks and proactively address them before they result in a serious incident or accident. One such program is the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS). ASRS is a long-established system where pilots and controllers voluntarily and anonymously report safety incidents they experienced and observed during line operations by providing rich text narratives describing the events, the environment, and conditions leading to the safety event of concern. These narratives provide insight and context around events of interest and can be used to identify emerging problems. They can trigger investigations within Flight Operational Quality Assurance or Flight Data Monitoring programs. However, this process typically focuses on the adverse events and the unsafe aspects of the operations surrounding the reported or detected events. This perspective of investigating factors that went wrong around an adverse event is commonly referred to as Safety I. Alternatively, characterizing successful actions that operators perform every day under varying conditions that keep the system within safe operating bounds is a concept referred to as Safety II. The benefit of the Safety II view is that the scope is much larger than that of Safety I since a vast majority of the operations result in successful flights. Many of the successful techniques used to manage operational threats are not documented in standard operating procedures or taught during training. They are typically acquired over time by working with experienced pilots during line operations or in many cases after experiencing a problem for the first time and reacting to it in situ, drawing from years of experience to manage the threat. In an attempt to quantify these positive actions, we are proposing an approach to extracting key behaviors within ASRS reports that can support the Safety II concept. Our analysis assumes that ASRS reports contain some descriptions of corrective actions that operators performed to prevent a situation from leading to an accident. Leveraging recent advances in Natural Language Process modeling, we have developed an approach to extract positive sentiment from reports, embed these positive statements in a vector space where they can be numerically analyzed, and clustering these statements into similar contextual categories. From these contextualized categories we can attempt to summarized and distilled aspects of the positive behavior. The goal is to identify categories of behavior that describe consistent operator techniques that supports the Safety II concept. With this information, airlines may enable learning from these positive actions, or address procedures that need to be changed to avoid having pilots implement a workaround. These insights can provide a lens into what is “going right” in the operations that may otherwise not be known widely within the community. It is envisioned that this approach can be extended to other narrative programs such as Line Operation Safety Audit or Learning Improvement Team reports where similar observed behavior can be analyzed to extract positive actions and inform the overall operations.

NLP↗
NASA NTRS2023

Cleaning up the Coasts: A System for the Removal of Marine Microplastics Using Semi-Autonomous Vehicles

In recent years, microplastic pollution has become an increasingly threatening problem for ocean ecosystems. With only 9% of plastics being successfully recycled, many end up in oceans where they break down into small particles less than 5 millimeters in length known as microplastics. These microplastics pose a threat to ocean wildlife, as many sea creatures are harmed by accidentally consuming them. Microplastics also end up contaminating human water and food supply. This report presents a system with the goal of identifying and collecting microplastics near coastlines in order to reduce the number of microplastics in the ocean that pose a threat to wildlife. The system consists of a combination of air and sea drones to locate and collect the microplastics, as well as charging stations to allow the drones to operate for extended periods of time. If implemented, this system will help combat microplastic pollution in oceans by preventing plastics from leaving the coastlines and going deeper where they could harm wildlife.

ocean cleanup↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

An Approach to Identifying Aspects of Positive Pilot Behavior within the Aviation Safety Reporting System

The National Airspace System (NAS) is constantly evolving as air traffic continues to ramp up to pre-pandemic numbers and projected to grow to unprecedented levels in the coming years. As well as increasing demand to the current system, emerging operations such as Unmanned Autonomous Systems are also expected to add to complexity in the airspace. To address these issues, the industry and government agencies supporting the NAS will need to rely upon additional automation and new technologies to address future operational requirements, while continuing to be a world-leading safe transportation system. As these new technologies are implemented, the system continues to rely on human pilots and controllers in the loop to monitor the system and intervene in situations the automation cannot handle. The goal of proactively addressing safety is of foremost concern to ensure passenger confidence. The industry has implemented various Safety Monitoring Systems to identify safety risks and proactively address them before they result in a serious incident or accident. One such program is the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS). ASRS is a long-established system where pilots and controllers voluntarily and anonymously report safety incidents they experienced and observed during line operations by providing rich text narratives describing the events, the environment, and conditions leading to the safety event of concern. These narratives provide insight and context around events of interest and can be used to identify emerging problems. They can trigger investigations within Flight Operational Quality Assurance or Flight Data Monitoring programs. However, this process typically focuses on the adverse events and the unsafe aspects of the operations surrounding the reported or detected events. This perspective of investigating factors that went wrong around an adverse event is commonly referred to as Safety I. Alternatively, characterizing successful actions that operators perform every day under varying conditions that keep the system within safe operating bounds is a concept referred to as Safety II. The benefit of the Safety II view is that the scope is much larger than that of Safety I since a vast majority of the operations result in successful flights. Many of the successful techniques used to manage operational threats are not documented in standard operating procedures or taught during training. They are typically acquired over time by working with experienced pilots during line operations or in many cases after experiencing a problem for the first time and reacting to it in situ, drawing from years of experience to manage the threat. In an attempt to quantify these positive actions, we are proposing an approach to extracting key behaviors within ASRS reports that can support the Safety II concept. Our analysis assumes that ASRS reports contain some descriptions of corrective actions that operators performed to prevent a situation from leading to an accident. Leveraging recent advances in Natural Language Process modeling, we have developed an approach to extract positive sentiment from reports, embed these positive statements in a vector space where they can be numerically analyzed, and clustering these statements into similar contextual categories. From these contextualized categories we can attempt to summarized and distilled aspects of the positive behavior. The goal is to identify categories of behavior that describe consistent operator techniques that supports the Safety II concept. With this information, airlines may enable learning from these positive actions, or address procedures that need to be changed to avoid having pilots implement a workaround. These insights can provide a lens into what is “going right” in the operations that may otherwise not be known widely within the community. It is envisioned that this approach can be extended to other narrative programs such as Line Operation Safety Audit or Learning Improvement Team reports where similar observed behavior can be analyzed to extract positive actions and inform the overall operations.

NLP↗
NASA NTRS2023

Global Ozone Loss Following Extreme Solar Proton Storms Based on the July 2012 Coronal Mass Ejection

Large solar coronal mass ejections pose a threat in the near-Earth space. As a cause of extreme periods of space weather, they can damage satellite-based communications and create geomagnetically induced currents in power and energy grids. Further, the solar wind energetic particles can reduce the protecting layer of atmospheric ozone and pose a threat to life on Earth. The large coronal mass ejection (CME) of July 2012, although directed away from the Earth, is often highlighted as a prime example of a potentially devastating super storm. Here we show, based on proton fluxes recorded by the instruments aboard the STEREO-A satellite, that the atmospheric response to the July 2012 event would have been comparable to those of the largest solar proton events of the satellite era. Significant impact on total ozone outside polar regions would require a much larger event, similar to those recorded in historical proxy data sets. Such an extreme event would cause long-term ozone reduction all the way to the equator and increase the size, duration, and depth of the Antarctic ozone hole. The impact would be comparable to predicted drastic and sudden ozone reduction from major volcanic eruptions, regional nuclear conflicts, or long-term stratospheric geoengineering.

ozone depletion↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

On the Alleviation of the Impact of Spaceborne RFI on Geodetic VLBI Results

Radio astronomy observations are under a growing threat from the rapidly growing number of communication satellites. Especially those in low earth orbit. These satellite not only emit at frequencies crucial to radio astronomny, including VLBI, but they also do it at a much stronger signal than the astronomical sources (quasars and pulsars) we are interested in. We therefore present a dynamic mask that will scan the sky and avoid pointing in directions that may be under threat of radio frequency interruption (RFI) from these satellites at a given time. We also present our database of all the potentially threatening satellites, that is updated daily and used to map out the satellites in the sky. Finally, we present results from actual tracking of a radio emitting satellites, and show how these affected our VLBI analysis.

VLBI↗
DOE OSTI2020

A Mathematical Framework for Representing Cyber-Physical System Interdependencies and Resilience

U.S. critical infrastructure is increasingly composed of integrated cyber-physical systems (CPS) whose components are operationally interdependent. These interdependencies can create additional vulnerabilities beyond those that are typically evaluated through independent physical and cyber risk assessments. These additional vulnerabilities, previously undetected at the sub-system and/or component level, could cause cascading effects across both the physical and cyber domains that could lead to infrastructure disruption or failure. This paper will review an initial mathematical framework developed to help understand the dynamics of these interfacing physical and cyber components at a holistic system level. The resulting framework also provides a method for modeling and assessing the resilience of CPS in complex and adaptive systems. It frames the system in terms of mission performance and the potential effects to performance caused by attacks that are cyber, physical, or blended in nature. The framework utilizes a systems-based, state-space modeling approach to reason about risk, resilience, and interdependencies in CPS. Probabilities are applied to each CPS component regarding a threat (both man-made and natural) and the likelihood of that particular component being impacted, along with indirect impact to other interdependent components. These component-level impacts from threats then translate into mission-level impact and systemic state change.

Brigantic, Robert T.↗
DOE OSTI2020

Thermal protection barrier for delaying access

A thermal protection barrier including a base layer having a plurality of baffles with perforated walls and a high melting temperature granular media disposed within the plurality of baffles. When the base layer is breached by a thermal threat, the granular media is operable to flow through the perforated walls of the plurality of baffles to provide a controlled flow of granular media to an area proximate the breach for thwarting the thermal threat.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
DOE OSTI2020

Innovation in Radiological Security, Part 1 of 2 – Using a Cloud Solution to Compress the Timely Detection Model

The design and implementation of new security technologies must account for numerous and complex operational challenges. For example, traditionally isolated systems must now survive amid the proliferation of network connectivity and endure the dynamic environments created by organizations tolerating bring-your-own-device policies. When evaluating the cyber, physical, or cyber-physical security of an asset, a common practice in the security industry is to apply the Timely Detection Model (TDM)—a versatile concept that relates the security functions of detection, delay, and response to the progression of an oppositional force’s attack timeline. If implemented correctly, security enhancements can compress the TDM to offer efficiencies to the stakeholders responsible for adjudicating threat scenarios. The efficiencies gained by the response force allow for more effective protection strategies to be realized. One such enhancement, deployed within the radiological security domain—the Sentry-Remote Monitoring System (Sentry-RMS)—is a stand-alone security system that detects, assesses, and communicates priority alarms as a means of thwarting internal and external threats. The SEntry-RMS CommUnications and REsponse (Sentry-SECURE) platform—an optional feature of the Sentry-RMS—is being developed to facilitate more efficient alarm adjudication by site stakeholders and, if necessary, a faster response by law enforcement. This Cloud-hosted platform receives protected information from deployed Sentry-RMS units and relays it to stakeholders that have vested interests in maintaining an elevated level of situational awareness. Operationally, this enables real-time delivery of high-priority alarm and video imagery directly to an identified response stakeholder, such as local law enforcement or site management, via natively developed mobile applications or full platform integration. The Sentry-SECURE platform, as implemented by the U.S. Department of Energy’s Office of Radiological Security, is an example of an innovative security technology that compresses the TDM by (1) enabling a more efficient time to target and (2) better informing a response force’s predetermined tactics, techniques, and procedures. This paper explores the platform’s operational roles, highlights its principal functions, and presents a use case that demonstrates how the platform provides enhanced situational awareness when adjudicating priority alarms.

Sentry-RMS, Timely Detection Model, Sentry-SECURE↗