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At least 757 records · Page 42

Direct Adaptive Control of Systems with Actuator Failures: State of the Art and Continuing Challenges

In this paper, the problem of controlling systems with failures and faults is introduced, and an overview of recent work on direct adaptive control for compensation of uncertain actuator failures is presented. Actuator failures may be characterized by some unknown system inputs being stuck at some unknown (fixed or varying) values at unknown time instants, that cannot be influenced by the control signals. The key task of adaptive compensation is to design the control signals in such a manner that the remaining actuators can automatically and seamlessly take over for the failed ones, and achieve desired stability and asymptotic tracking. A certain degree of redundancy is necessary to accomplish failure compensation. The objective of adaptive control design is to effectively use the available actuation redundancy to handle failures without the knowledge of the failure patterns, parameters, and time of occurrence. This is a challenging problem because failures introduce large uncertainties in the dynamic structure of the system, in addition to parametric uncertainties and unknown disturbances. The paper addresses some theoretical issues in adaptive actuator failure compensation: actuator failure modeling, redundant actuation requirements, plant-model matching, error system dynamics, adaptation laws, and stability, tracking, and performance analysis. Adaptive control designs can be shown to effectively handle uncertain actuator failures without explicit failure detection. Some open technical challenges and research problems in this important research area are discussed.

Tao, Gang↗

Re-Engineering the Tropical Rainfall Measuring Mission (TRMM) Satellite Utilizing Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) Mission Services Center (GMSEC) Middleware Based Technology to Enable Lights Out Operations and Autonomous Re-Dump of Lost Telemetry Data

The Tropical Rainfall Measuring Mission (TRMM) spacecraft was launched in November of 1996 in order to obtain unique three dimensional radar cross sectional observations of cloud structures with particular interest in hurricanes. The TRMM mission life was recently extended with current estimates that operations will continue through the 2012-2013 timeframe. Faced with this extended mission profile, the project has embarked on a technology refresh and re-engineering effort. TRMM has recently implemented a re-engineering effort to expand a middleware based messaging architecture to enable fully redundant lights-out of flight operations activities. The middleware approach is based on the Goddard Mission Services Evolution Center (GMSEC) architecture, tools and associated open-source Applications Programming Interface (API). Middleware based messaging systems are useful in spacecraft operations and automation systems because private node based knowledge (such as that within a telemetry and command system) can be broadcast on the middleware messaging bus and hence enable collaborative decisions to be made by multiple subsystems. In this fashion, private data is made public and distributed within the local area network and multiple nodes can remain synchronized with other nodes. This concept is useful in a fully redundant architecture whereby one node is monitoring the processing of the 'prime' node so that in the event of a failure the backup node can assume operations of the prime, without loss of state knowledge. This paper will review and present the experiences, architecture, approach and lessons learned of the TRMM re-engineering effort centered on the GMSEC middleware architecture and tool suite. Relevant information will be presented that relates to the dual redundant parallel nature of the Telemetry and Command (T and C) and Front-End systems and how these systems can interact over a middleware bus to achieve autonomous operations including autonomous commanding to recover missing science data during the same spacecraft contact.

Marius, Julio L.↗

Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter In-flight Anomalies and Lessons Learned: An Update

The Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter mission has as its primary objectives: advance our understanding of the current Mars climate, the processes that have formed and modified the surface of the planet and the extent to which water has played a role in surface processes; identify sites of possible aqueous activity indicating environments that may have been or are conducive to biological activity; and thus identify and characterize sites for future landed missions; and provide forward and return relay services for current and future Mars landed assets. MRO's crucial role in the long term strategy for Mars exploration requires a high level of reliability during its 5.4 year mission. This requires an architecture which incorporates extensive redundancy and cross-strapping. Because of the distances and hence light-times involved, the spacecraft itself must be able to utilize this redundancy in responding to time-critical failures. For cases where fault protection is unable to recognize a potentially threatening condition, either due to known limitations or software flaws, intervention by ground operations is required. These aspects of MRO's design were discussed in a previous paper [Ref. 1]. This paper provides an update to the original paper, describing MRO's significant in-flight anomalies over the past year, with lessons learned for redundancy and fault protection architectures and for ground operations.

Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter↗

Distributed and recoverable digital control system

A real-time multi-tasking digital control system with rapid recovery capability is disclosed. The control system includes a plurality of computing units comprising a plurality of redundant processing units, with each of the processing units configured to generate one or more redundant control commands. One or more internal monitors are employed for detecting data errors in the control commands. One or more recovery triggers are provided for initiating rapid recovery of a processing unit if data errors are detected. The control system also includes a plurality of actuator control units each in operative communication with the computing units. The actuator control units are configured to initiate a rapid recovery if data errors are detected in one or more of the processing units. A plurality of smart actuators communicates with the actuator control units, and a plurality of redundant sensors communicates with the computing units.

Stange, Kent↗

Quadratic Programming for Allocating Control Effort

A computer program calculates an optimal allocation of control effort in a system that includes redundant control actuators. The program implements an iterative (but otherwise single-stage) algorithm of the quadratic-programming type. In general, in the quadratic-programming problem, one seeks the values of a set of variables that minimize a quadratic cost function, subject to a set of linear equality and inequality constraints. In this program, the cost function combines control effort (typically quantified in terms of energy or fuel consumed) and control residuals (differences between commanded and sensed values of variables to be controlled). In comparison with prior control-allocation software, this program offers approximately equal accuracy but much greater computational efficiency. In addition, this program offers flexibility, robustness to actuation failures, and a capability for selective enforcement of control requirements. The computational efficiency of this program makes it suitable for such complex, real-time applications as controlling redundant aircraft actuators or redundant spacecraft thrusters. The program is written in the C language for execution in a UNIX operating system.

Singh, Gurkirpal↗

Common Cause Failure Modes

High technology industries with high failure costs commonly use redundancy as a means to reduce risk. Redundant systems, whether similar or dissimilar, are susceptible to Common Cause Failures (CCF). CCF is not always considered in the design effort and, therefore, can be a major threat to success. There are several aspects to CCF which must be understood to perform an analysis which will find hidden issues that may negate redundancy. This paper will provide definition, types, a list of possible causes and some examples of CCF. Requirements and designs from NASA projects will be used in the paper as examples.

Wetherholt, Jon↗

Advanced Signal Conditioners for Data-Acquisition Systems

Signal conditioners embodying advanced concepts in analog and digital electronic circuitry and software have been developed for use in data-acquisition systems that are required to be compact and lightweight, to utilize electric energy efficiently, and to operate with high reliability, high accuracy, and high power efficiency, without intervention by human technicians. These signal conditioners were originally intended for use aboard spacecraft. There are also numerous potential terrestrial uses - especially in the fields of aeronautics and medicine, wherein it is necessary to monitor critical functions. Going beyond the usual analog and digital signal-processing functions of prior signal conditioners, the new signal conditioner performs the following additional functions: It continuously diagnoses its own electronic circuitry, so that it can detect failures and repair itself (as described below) within seconds. It continuously calibrates itself on the basis of a highly accurate and stable voltage reference, so that it can continue to generate accurate measurement data, even under extreme environmental conditions. It repairs itself in the sense that it contains a micro-controller that reroutes signals among redundant components as needed to maintain the ability to perform accurate and stable measurements. It detects deterioration of components, predicts future failures, and/or detects imminent failures by means of a real-time analysis in which, among other things, data on its present state are continuously compared with locally stored historical data. It minimizes unnecessary consumption of electric energy. The design architecture divides the signal conditioner into three main sections: an analog signal section, a digital module, and a power-management section. The design of the analog signal section does not follow the traditional approach of ensuring reliability through total redundancy of hardware: Instead, following an approach called spare parts tool box, the reliability of each component is assessed in terms of such considerations as risks of damage, mean times between failures, and the effects of certain failures on the performance of the signal conditioner as a whole system. Then, fewer or more spares are assigned for each affected component, pursuant to the results of this analysis, in order to obtain the required degree of reliability of the signal conditioner as a whole system. The digital module comprises one or more processors and field-programmable gate arrays, the number of each depending on the results of the aforementioned analysis. The digital module provides redundant control, monitoring, and processing of several analog signals. It is designed to minimize unnecessary consumption of electric energy, including, when possible, going into a low-power "sleep" mode that is implemented in firmware. The digital module communicates with external equipment via a personal-computer serial port. The digital module monitors the "health" of the rest of the signal conditioner by processing defined measurements and/or trends. It automatically makes adjustments to respond to channel failures, compensate for effects of temperature, and maintain calibration.

Lucena, Angel↗

Fault-Tolerant, Radiation-Hard DSP

Commercial digital signal processors (DSPs) for use in high-speed satellite computers are challenged by the damaging effects of space radiation, mainly single event upsets (SEUs) and single event functional interrupts (SEFIs). Innovations have been developed for mitigating the effects of SEUs and SEFIs, enabling the use of very-highspeed commercial DSPs with improved SEU tolerances. Time-triple modular redundancy (TTMR) is a method of applying traditional triple modular redundancy on a single processor, exploiting the VLIW (very long instruction word) class of parallel processors. TTMR improves SEU rates substantially. SEFIs are solved by a SEFI-hardened core circuit, external to the microprocessor. It monitors the health of the processor, and if a SEFI occurs, forces the processor to return to performance through a series of escalating events. TTMR and hardened-core solutions were developed for both DSPs and reconfigurable field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs). This includes advancement of TTMR algorithms for DSPs and reconfigurable FPGAs, plus a rad-hard, hardened-core integrated circuit that services both the DSP and FPGA. Additionally, a combined DSP and FPGA board architecture was fully developed into a rad-hard engineering product. This technology enables use of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) DSPs in computers for satellite and other space applications, allowing rapid deployment at a much lower cost. Traditional rad-hard space computers are very expensive and typically have long lead times. These computers are either based on traditional rad-hard processors, which have extremely low computational performance, or triple modular redundant (TMR) FPGA arrays, which suffer from power and complexity issues. Even more frustrating is that the TMR arrays of FPGAs require a fixed, external rad-hard voting element, thereby causing them to lose much of their reconfiguration capability and in some cases significant speed reduction. The benefits of COTS high-performance signal processing include significant increase in onboard science data processing, enabling orders of magnitude reduction in required communication bandwidth for science data return, orders of magnitude improvement in onboard mission planning and critical decision making, and the ability to rapidly respond to changing mission environments, thus enabling opportunistic science and orders of magnitude reduction in the cost of mission operations through reduction of required staff. Additional benefits of COTS-based, high-performance signal processing include the ability to leverage considerable commercial and academic investments in advanced computing tools, techniques, and infra structure, and the familiarity of the science and IT community with these computing environments.

Czajkowski, David↗

Process Sensitivity, Performance, and Direct Verification Testing of Adhesive Locking Features

Phase I: The use of adhesive locking features or liquid locking compounds (LLCs) (e.g., Loctite) as a means of providing a secondary locking feature has been used on NASA programs since the Apollo program. In many cases Loctite was used as a last resort when (a) self-locking fasteners were no longer functioning per their respective drawing specification, (b) access was limited for removal & replacement, or (c) replacement could not be accomplished without severe impact to schedule. Long-term use of Loctite became inevitable in cases where removal and replacement of worn hardware was not cost effective and Loctite was assumed to be fully cured and working. The NASA Engineering & Safety Center (NESC) and United Space Alliance (USA) recognized the need for more extensive testing of Loctite grades to better understand their capabilities and limitations as a secondary locking feature. These tests, identified as Phase I, were designed to identify processing sensitivities, to determine proper cure time, the correct primer to use on aerospace nutplate, insert and bolt materials such as A286 and MP35N, and the minimum amount of Loctite that is required to achieve optimum breakaway torque values. The .1900-32 was the fastener size tested, due to wide usage in the aerospace industry. Three different grades of Loctite were tested. Results indicate that, with proper controls, adhesive locking features can be successfully used in the repair of locking features and should be considered for design. Phase II: Threaded fastening systems used in aerospace programs typically have a requirement for a redundant locking feature. The primary locking method is the fastener preload and the traditional redundant locking feature is a self-locking mechanical device that may include deformed threads, non-metallic inserts, split beam features, or other methods that impede movement between threaded members. The self-locking resistance of traditional locking features can be directly verified during assembly by measuring the dynamic prevailing torque. Adhesive locking features or LLCs are another method of providing redundant locking, but a direct verification method has not been used in aerospace applications to verify proper installation when using LLCs because of concern for damage to the adhesive bond. The reliability of LLCs has also been questioned due to failures observed during testing with coupons for process verification, although the coupon failures have often been attributed to a lack of proper procedures. It is highly desirable to have a direct method of verifying the LLC cure or bond integrity. The purpose of the Phase II test program was to determine if the torque applied during direct verification of an adhesive locking feature degrades that locking feature. This report documents the test program used to investigate the viability of such a direct verification method. Results of the Phase II testing were positive, and additional investigation of direct verification of adhesive locking features is merited.

Golden, Johnny L.↗

Common Cause Failure Modeling

Common Cause Failures (CCFs) are a known and documented phenomenon that defeats system redundancy. CCFS are a set of dependent type of failures that can be caused by: system environments; manufacturing; transportation; storage; maintenance; and assembly, as examples. Since there are many factors that contribute to CCFs, the effects can be reduced, but they are difficult to eliminate entirely. Furthermore, failure databases sometimes fail to differentiate between independent and CCF (dependent) failure and data is limited, especially for launch vehicles. The Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) of NASA's Safety and Mission Assurance Directorate at Marshall Space Flight Center (MFSC) is using generic data from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's database of common cause failures at nuclear power plants to estimate CCF due to the lack of a more appropriate data source. There remains uncertainty in the actual magnitude of the common cause risk estimates for different systems at this stage of the design. Given the limited data about launch vehicle CCF and that launch vehicles are a highly redundant system by design, it is important to make design decisions to account for a range of values for independent and CCFs. When investigating the design of the one-out-of-two component redundant system for launch vehicles, a response surface was constructed to represent the impact of the independent failure rate versus a common cause beta factor effect on a system's failure probability. This presentation will define a CCF and review estimation calculations. It gives a summary of reduction methodologies and a review of examples of historical CCFs. Finally, it presents the response surface and discusses the results of the different CCFs on the reliability of a one-out-of-two system.

Hark, Frank↗

Robot Serviced Space Facility

A robot serviced space facility includes multiple modules which are identical in physical structure, but selectively differing in function. and purpose. Each module includes multiple like attachment points which are identically placed on each module so as to permit interconnection with immediately adjacent modules. Connection is made through like outwardly extending flange assemblies having identical male and female configurations for interconnecting to and locking to a complementary side of another flange. Multiple rows of interconnected modules permit force, fluid, data and power transfer to be accomplished by redundant circuit paths. Redundant modules of critical subsystems are included. Redundancy of modules and of interconnections results in a space complex with any module being removable upon demand, either for module replacement or facility reconfiguration. without eliminating any vital functions of the complex. Module replacement and facility assembly or reconfiguration are accomplished by a computer controlled articulated walker type robotic manipulator arm assembly having two identical end-effectors in the form of male configurations which are identical to those on module flanges and which interconnect to female configurations on other flanges. The robotic arm assembly moves along a connected set or modules by successively disconnecting, moving and reconnecting alternate ends of itself to a succession of flanges in a walking type maneuver. To transport a module, the robot keeps the transported module attached to one of its end-effectors and uses another flange male configuration of the attached module as a substitute end-effector during walking.

Purves, Lloyd R.↗

Common Cause Failure Modeling

Common Cause Failures (CCFs) are a known and documented phenomenon that defeats system redundancy. CCFS are a set of dependent type of failures that can be caused by: system environments; manufacturing; transportation; storage; maintenance; and assembly, as examples. Since there are many factors that contribute to CCFs, the effects can be reduced, but they are difficult to eliminate entirely. Furthermore, failure databases sometimes fail to differentiate between independent and CCF (dependent) failure and data is limited, especially for launch vehicles. The Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) of NASA's Safety and Mission Assurance Directorate at Marshal Space Flight Center (MFSC) is using generic data from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's database of common cause failures at nuclear power plants to estimate CCF due to the lack of a more appropriate data source. There remains uncertainty in the actual magnitude of the common cause risk estimates for different systems at this stage of the design. Given the limited data about launch vehicle CCF and that launch vehicles are a highly redundant system by design, it is important to make design decisions to account for a range of values for independent and CCFs. When investigating the design of the one-out-of-two component redundant system for launch vehicles, a response surface was constructed to represent the impact of the independent failure rate versus a common cause beta factor effect on a system's failure probability. This presentation will define a CCF and review estimation calculations. It gives a summary of reduction methodologies and a review of examples of historical CCFs. Finally, it presents the response surface and discusses the results of the different CCFs on the reliability of a one-out-of-two system.

Hark, Frank↗

Catastrophic fault recovery with self-reconfigurable chips

Mission critical systems typically employ multi-string redundancy to cope with possible hardware failure. Such systems are only as fault tolerant as there are many redundant strings. Once a particular critical component exhausts its redundant spares, the multi-string architecture cannot tolerate any further hardware failure. This paper aims at addressing such catastrophic faults through the use of "Self-Reconfigurable Chips" as a last resort effort to "repair" a faulty critical component.

Chau, Savio N.↗

Design for Reliability (DfR) in Space Life Support

The engineering process of Design for Reliability (DfR) is well established in the automotive and aerospace industries. DfR should be useful in the future development of space life support systems. DfR is a sequence of tasks that develop system requirements and plan reliability analysis and testing. First and fundamentally, the reliability requirement is defined. Next the system reliability model is developed, often using a reliability block diagram. The overall system reliability requirement is allocated to the subsystems and an estimate of the attainable reliability is made. This expected reliability can be improved by simplifying the design by removing components or by replacing less reliable components. Improving reliability can require difficult compromises, such as reducing performance requirements, increasing budget, or extending testing. The actual system reliability can be determined only by testing, which should continue long enough to provide the required confidence in the measured value. New systems often have unexpected design errors that cause failures in early testing. The usual reliability improvement process of testing, finding the failure modes, and redesigning to remove them reduces the failure rate and is referred to as “reliability growth.” After redesign has been completed, the system should be further tested to determine the actual achieved reliability more accurately. If the final system failure rate is too high, redundant systems can be used to improve overall operational reliability. Adding redundancy simply to increase the one- or two-fault tolerance metric may sometimes reduce reliability. Reliability can be improved in three ways: redesigning the system to include more reliable subsystems and components, reliability growth testing and failure mode removal, and by using parallel redundant systems. DfR should combine these approaches to achieve the required reliability while managing performance, cost, and schedule.

Reliability↗

Design for Reliability (DfR) in Space Life Support

The engineering process of Design for Reliability (DfR) is well established in the automotive and aerospace industries. DfR should be useful in the future development of space life support systems. DfR is a sequence of tasks that develop system requirements and plan reliability analysis and testing. First and fundamentally, the reliability requirement is defined. Next the system reliability model is developed, often using a reliability block diagram. The overall system reliability requirement is allocated to the subsystems and an estimate of the attainable reliability is made. This expected reliability can be improved by simplifying the design by removing components or by replacing less reliable components. Improving reliability can require difficult compromises, such as reducing performance requirements, increasing budget, or extending testing. The actual system reliability can be determined only by testing, which should continue long enough to provide the required confidence in the measured value. New systems often have unexpected design errors that cause failures in early testing. The usual reliability improvement process of testing, finding the failure modes, and redesigning to remove them reduces the failure rate and is referred to as “reliability growth.” After redesign has been completed, the system should be further tested to determine the actual achieved reliability more accurately. If the final system failure rate is too high, redundant systems can be used to improve overall operational reliability. Adding redundancy simply to increase the one- or two-fault tolerance metric may sometimes reduce reliability. Reliability can be improved in three ways: redesigning the system to include more reliable subsystems and components, reliability growth testing and failure mode removal, and by using parallel redundant systems. DfR should combine these approaches to achieve the required reliability while managing performance, cost, and schedule.

Reliability↗

Risk Analysis of Various Design Architectures for High Safety-significant Safety-related Digital Instrumentation and Control Systems of Nuclear Power Plants during Accident Scenarios

This report documents the plus-up activities performed by Idaho National Laboratory (INL) during Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Program, Risk Informed Systems Analysis (RISA) Pathway, digital instrumentation and control (DI&C) risk assessment project. In FY 2019, the RISA Pathway initiated a project to develop a risk assessment strategy for delivering a strong technical basis to support effective, licensable, and secure DI&C technologies for digital upgrades/designs. An integrated risk assessment technology for the DI&C systems was proposed for this strategy, which aims to (1) provide a best-estimate, risk-informed capability to quantitatively and accurately estimate the safety margin obtained from plant modernization, especially for the high safety-significant safety-related (HSSSR) DI&C systems, (2) support and supplement existing advanced risk-informed DI&C design guides by providing quantitative risk information and evidence, (3) offer a capability of design architecture evaluation of various DI&C systems to support system design decisions and diversity and redundancy applications, (4) assure the long-term safety and reliability of HSSSR DI&C systems, and (5) reduce uncertainty in costs and support integration of DI&C systems in the plant. To achieve these technical goals and deal with the expensive licensing justifications from regulatory insights, the LWRS-developed framework instructs nuclear vendors and utilities on how to effectively lower the costs associated with digital compliance and speed industry advances by: (1) defining an integrated risk-informed analysis process for DI&C upgrade, including hazard analysis, reliability analysis, and consequence analysis, (2) applying systematic and risk-informed tools to address common cause failures (CCFs) and quantify corresponding failure probabilities for DI&C technologies, particularly software CCFs, (3) evaluating the impact of digital failures at the component level, system level, and plant level, and (4) providing insights and suggestions on designs to manage the risks, thus to support the development, licensing, and deployment of advanced DI&C technologies on nuclear power plant (NPPs). Adding diversity within system or components is the main means to eliminate and mitigate CCFs, but diversity also increases plant complexity and errors and may not address all sources of systematic failures. How to optimize the diversity and redundancy applications for the safety-critical DI&C systems remains a challenge. To deal with the technical issues in addressing potential software CCFs in HSSSR DI&C systems of NPPs and supporting relevant design optimization, the framework provides: ? An integrated best-estimate, risk-informed capability to address new technical digital issues quantitatively, accurately, and efficiently in plan modernization progress, such as software CCFs in HSSSR DI&C systems of NPPs ? A common and a modularized platform for DI&C designers, software developers, cybersecurity analysts, and plant engineers to efficiently predict and prevent risk in the early design stage of DI&C systems ? Technical bases and risk-informed insights to assist U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and industry to address and fulfill the risk-informed alternatives for evaluation of CCFs in HSSSR DI&C systems of NPPs ? An integrated risk-informed tool that offers a capability of design architecture evaluation of various DI&C systems to support system design decisions in diversity and redundancy applications. The plus-up research and development efforts of this project in FY 2022 are focused on methodology improvement of software CCF modeling and estimation, prevention analysis, importance analysis and risk analysis of various design architectures of HSSSR DI&C systems. This work greatly enhances the capability of the LWRS-developed framework for the risk assessment and design optimization of safety-critical DI&C systems. It should be noted that all the analyses are performed for the demonstration of the LWRS-developed framework, not for the evaluation of relevant systems. Results are obtained based on very limited design information and testing data.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Major Achievements of the Springfields Decommissioning Program - 16512

Since the 1940's, Springfields has manufactured fuel products for the UK's nuclear power stations and for international customers. The early operations were in support of the atomic weapons program, closely followed by fuel manufacture for electricity generation via the Magnox power stations commencing in the late 1950's. In 2005, responsibility for the assets and liabilities of Springfields was transferred to the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA). A new company, Springfields Fuels Limited, was created to run the site, which was managed and operated by Westinghouse Electric UK Ltd on the NDA's behalf. On April 1, 2010, Westinghouse entered into an agreement with the NDA for a long-term lease of the Springfields site, which transferred responsibility for the commercial fuel manufacturing business and Springfields Fuels Limited to Westinghouse. Today, the main Springfields activities include: - Oxide fuels for Advanced Gas-cooled and Light Water Reactors, as well as intermediate fuel products, such as powders, granules and pellets, - Manufacture of Uranium Hexafluoride (now in Care and Maintenance), - Processing and recovery of Uranium residues, - Decommissioning and demolition of redundant plants and buildings. Some 120 plant buildings and support facilities have been successfully decommissioned and demolished in the period 1996 to date. These range from 1940's buildings, subsequently converted for nuclear fuel manufacture, together with some of the formerly sealed chemical agent manufacture and storage facilities. Decommissioning of the now redundant Magnox manufacturing facilities is ongoing at Springfields without compromising the other site operations. Westinghouse is managing all activities related to the whole lifecycle, planning, design, safety case, radiation protection, Post Operational Clean Out (POCO), service diversions, characterization, decommissioning all phases through to ground remediation, waste disposal and agreed end states. Decommissioning of process plants starts with the removal of the majority of radiological activity or hazard contained within the plant. This is known as Post Operational Clean Out. Once this is complete, the plant may be dismantled. Work is scoped and defined within packages (at plant or cell level) to aid control and commercial monitoring as the decommissioning is progressed. This package approach also enables clean or lightly contaminated items to be removed separately to aid potential re-cycling and minimize decontamination and waste disposal costs. Westinghouse is further optimising work package delivery by planning parallel POCO and Decommissioning work phases within plant at a cell level to systematically remove redundant plant and reduce hazard earlier, whilst optimising use of both internal and external resources to reduce total project cost. Waste and Residues from all phases are disposed of via authorized disposal routes and in accordance with our environmental authorizations. On completion of decommissioning and removal of plant and equipment the building is re-assessed radiologically, categorized and appropriate remediation work progressed to render it safe for conventional demolition. The major elements of the success achieved to date can be attributed to the following elements: - Overall programme management with extensive experience of planning, cost, and risk management. Integration of the programme within a major commercial site without compromising safety or operations. - Complete site EHS management working within a complex regulatory framework including the Nuclear Site Licenses, Environmental Authorisations and Security requirements. - Avoiding safety complacency by use of rigorous and systematic process to emphasise safety over competing goals. Including structured use of Human Performance and Corrective Action and Learning processes. - Unique safety experiences attained through complex hazard reduction across a broad range of uranium manufacturing and chemical hazard/agent facilities. - Project leadership and excellence utilizing a core site team to deploy repeatable processes and safe practices to deliver complex scope within budget and schedule. - Optimised use of internal and external resources, with extensive use of Operating Experience to drive continuous improvement and problem resolution. - Management of Contractors from initial selection, pre-qualification, tender assessment and Performance using varied contract forms across delivery phases. - Use of Westinghouse expertise for safety case, waste management, uranium recovery, health physics and design. - Implementation of a work package to ensure gated discreet manageable packages. Underpinned by package specific method statements, with appropriate hold points to maintain management and control of the works. - Continuous local safety focus via safety planning, induction, plant specific training, proactive risk assessment, and a defined approach to decoupling operating plant safety cases enabling focussed and usable documentation. This paper will provide an overview of the latest decommissioning activities achieved on the Springfields site and will focus on best practices that allowed Westinghouse to maintain the program on time and on budget. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

GSplit: Scaling Graph Neural Network Training on Large Graphs via Split-Parallelism

Graph neural networks (GNNs), an emerging class of machine learning models for graphs, have gained popularity for their superior performance in various graph analytical tasks. Mini-batch training is commonly used to train GNNs on large graphs, and data parallelism is the standard approach to scale mini-batch training across multiple GPUs. Data parallel approaches contain redundant work as subgraphs sampled by different GPUs contain significant overlap. To address this issue, we introduce a hybrid parallel mini-batch training paradigm called Split parallelism. Split parallelism avoids redundant work by splitting the sampling, loading, and training of each mini-batch across multiple GPUs. Split parallelism, however, introduces communication overheads that can be more than the savings from removing redundant work. We further present a lightweight partitioning algorithm that probabilistically minimizes these overheads. We implement spllit parllelism in GSplit and show that it outperforms state-of-the-art mini-batch training systems like DGL, Quiver, and P3.

Lim, Seung-Hwan [ORNL] (ORCID:0000000194616866)↗