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At least 757 records · Page 42

Genesis failure investigation report : JPL Failure Review Board, Avionics Sub-Team

On January 7, 2001, the Genesis spacecraft lifted off from Cape Canaveral. Its mission was to collect solar wind samples and return those samples to Earth for detailed analysis by scientists. The mission proceeded successfully for three-and-a-half years. On September 8, 2004, the spacecraft approached Earth, pointed the Sample Return Capsule (SRC) at its entry target, and then fired pyros that jettisoned the SRC. The SRC carried the valuable samples collected over the prior 29 months. The SRC also contained the requisite hardware (mechanisms, parachutes, and electronics) to manage the process of entry, descent, and landing (EDL). After entering Earthas atmosphere, the SRC was expected to open a drogue parachute. This should have been followed by a pyro event to release the drogue chute, and then by a pyro event to deploy the main parachute at an approximate elevation of 6.7 kilometers. As the SRC descended to the Utah landing site, helicopters were in position to capture the SRC before the capsule touched down. On September 8, 2004, observers of the SRCas triumphant return became concerned as the NASA announcer fell silent, and then became even more alarmed as they watched the spacecraft tumble as it streaked across the sky. Long-distance cameras clearly showed that the drogue parachute had not deployed properly. On September 9, 2004, General Eugene Tattini, Deputy Director of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory formed a Failure Review Board (FRB). This board was charged with investigating the cause of the Genesis mishap in close concert with the NASA Mishap Investigation Board (MIB). The JPL-FRB was populated with experts from within and external to the Jet Propulsion Laboratory. The JPL-FRB participated with the NASA-MIB through all phases of the investigation, working jointly and concurrently as one team to discover the facts of the mishap.

solar wind↗

The HEAO experience - design through operations

The design process and performance of the NASA High Energy Astronomy Observatories (HEAO-1, 2, and 3) are surveyed from the initiation of the program in 1968 through the end of HEAO-3 operation in May, 1981, with a focus on the attitude control and determination subsystem (ACDS). The science objectives, original and revised overall design concepts, final design for each spacecraft, and details of the ACDS designs are discussed, and the stages of the ACDS design process, including redefinition to achieve 50 percent cost reduction, detailed design of common and mission-unique hardware and software, unit qualification, subsystem integration, and observatory-level testing, are described. Overall and ACDS performance is evaluated for each mission and found to meet or exceed design requirements despite some difficulties arising from errors in startracker-ACDS-interface coordination and from gyroscope failures. These difficulties were resolved by using the flexibility of the software design. The implicationns of the HEAO experience for the design process of future spacecraft are suggested.

Hoffman, D. P.↗

Advanced detection, isolation, and accommodation of sensor failures in turbofan engines: Real-time microcomputer implementation

The objective of the Advanced Detection, Isolation, and Accommodation Program is to improve the overall demonstrated reliability of digital electronic control systems for turbine engines. For this purpose, an algorithm was developed which detects, isolates, and accommodates sensor failures by using analytical redundancy. The performance of this algorithm was evaluated on a real time engine simulation and was demonstrated on a full scale F100 turbofan engine. The real time implementation of the algorithm is described. The implementation used state-of-the-art microprocessor hardware and software, including parallel processing and high order language programming.

Delaat, John C.↗

The International Space Station (ISS) Solar Alpha Rotary Joint (SARJ): Materials & Processes (M&P) Lessons Learned for a Large, Spacecraft Rotating Mechanism

The ISS utilizes two large rotating mechanisms, the SARJ, as part of the solar arrays alignment system for more efficient power generation. The SARJ is a 10.3m circumference, nitrided 15-5PH steel race ring of triangular cross-section, with 12 sets of trundle bearing assemblies transferring load across the rolling joint. The SARJ mechanism rotates continuously and slowly - once every orbit, or every 90 minutes. In 2008, the starboard SARJ suffered a lubrication failure, resulting in severe damage (spalling) of one of the race ring surfaces. Extensive effort was conducted to prevent the port SARJ from suffering the same failure, and fortunately was ultimately successful in recovering the functionality of the starboard SARJ. The M&P function was key in determining the cause of failure and the means for mechanism recovery. From a M&P lessons-learned perspective, observations are made concerning the original SARJ design parameters (boundary conditions), the perceived need for nitriding the race ring, the test conditions employed during qualification, the environmental controls used for the hardware preflight, and the lubrication robustness necessary for complex kinematic mechanisms expecting high-reliability and long-life.

Golden, Johnny L.↗

The International Space Station (ISS) Solar Alpha Rotary Joint (SARJ): Materials & Processes (M&P) Lessons Learned for a Large, Rotating Spacecraft Mechanism

The International Space Station (ISS) utilizes two large rotating mechanisms, the solar alpha rotary joints (SARJs), as part of the solar arrays' alignment system for more efficient power generation. Each SARJ is a 10.3m circumference, nitrided 15-5PH steel race ring of triangular cross-section, with 12 sets of trundle bearing assemblies transferring load across the rolling joint. The SARJ mechanism rotates continuously and slowly - once every orbit, or every 90 minutes. In 2007, the starboard SARJ suffered a lubrication failure, resulting in severe damage (spalling) to one of the race ring surfaces. Extensive effort was conducted to prevent the port SARJ from suffering the same failure, and fortunately that effort was ultimately successful in also recovering the functionality of the starboard SARJ. The M&P engineering function was key in determining the cause of failure and the means for mechanism recovery. From a M&P lessons-learned perspective, observations are made concerning the original SARJ design parameters (boundary conditions), the perceived need for nitriding the race ring, the test conditions employed during qualification, the environmental controls used for the hardware preflight, and the lubrication robustness necessary for complex kinematic mechanisms expecting high-reliability and long-life.

Golden, Johnny L.↗

Safe and Optimal Techniques Enabling Recovery, Integrity, and Assurance

There is a trend in the aviation industry to go from federated to integrated computing systems. Combining a number of traditional stand-alone federated systems into an integrated common platform (called Integrated Modular Avionics, IMA) has the benefit of increased power efficiency, reduced support hardware, and reduced cabling. However, changing from federated to integrated has a significant impact on the system architecture and hence the process of how avionic systems are to be analyzed. Traditional approaches to safety analysis become inefficient when functional boundaries can no longer be assumed for failure independence and fault isolation. In this report, we describe a tool that we developed to accelerate the safety engineer's ability to perform safety analysis of IMA systems through modeling, as well as optimize the system engineer's ability to develop a system through architecture synthesis. This work was the result of a three-year research effort called SOTERIA (Safe and Optimal Techniques Enabling Recovery, Integrity, and Assurance). We developed a compositional modeling language that supports rapid development, modification, and evaluation of architectures. The modeling language is structured such that the end-user defines a library of components with information on component reliability, connectivity, and fault propagation logic. The system model is built by instantiating the components from the library, connecting the components, and identifying the top-level faults of interest. Our tool is compositional in that the end-user only needs to define safety aspects at the component level. The tool takes the model and automatically synthesizes both the qualitative and quantitative safety analyses. We go further by allowing users to describe system information such as components to use in an architecture and their connection compatibility and automatically synthesize an architecture that meets the top-level probability target adhering to end-user specified constraints. This capability allows users to rapidly explore a design space..

Siu, Kit Y.↗

Care 3, Phase 1, volume 1

A computer program to aid in accessing the reliability of fault tolerant avionics systems was developed. A simple mathematical expression was used to evaluate the reliability of any redundant configuration over any interval during which the failure rates and coverage parameters remained unaffected by configuration changes. Provision was made for convolving such expressions in order to evaluate the reliability of a dual mode system. A coverage model was also developed to determine the various relevant coverage coefficients as a function of the available hardware and software fault detector characteristics, and subsequent isolation and recovery delay statistics.

Stiffler, J. J.↗

Design for dependability: A simulation-based approach

This research addresses issues in simulation-based system level dependability analysis of fault-tolerant computer systems. The issues and difficulties of providing a general simulation-based approach for system level analysis are discussed and a methodology that address and tackle these issues is presented. The proposed methodology is designed to permit the study of a wide variety of architectures under various fault conditions. It permits detailed functional modeling of architectural features such as sparing policies, repair schemes, routing algorithms as well as other fault-tolerant mechanisms, and it allows the execution of actual application software. One key benefit of this approach is that the behavior of a system under faults does not have to be pre-defined as it is normally done. Instead, a system can be simulated in detail and injected with faults to determine its failure modes. The thesis describes how object-oriented design is used to incorporate this methodology into a general purpose design and fault injection package called DEPEND. A software model is presented that uses abstractions of application programs to study the behavior and effect of software on hardware faults in the early design stage when actual code is not available. Finally, an acceleration technique that combines hierarchical simulation, time acceleration algorithms and hybrid simulation to reduce simulation time is introduced.

Goswami, Kumar K.↗

Source Data Impacts on Epistemic Uncertainty for Launch Vehicle Fault Tree Models

Launch vehicle systems are designed and developed using both heritage and new hardware. Design modifications to the heritage hardware to fit new functional system requirements can impact the applicability of heritage reliability data. Risk estimates for newly designed systems must be developed from generic data sources such as commercially available reliability databases using reliability prediction methodologies, such as those addressed in MIL-HDBK-217F. Failure estimates must be converted from the generic environment to the specific operating environment of the system in which it is used. In addition, some qualification of applicability for the data source to the current system should be made. Characterizing data applicability under these circumstances is crucial to developing model estimations that support confident decisions on design changes and trade studies. This paper will demonstrate a data-source applicability classification method for suggesting epistemic component uncertainty to a target vehicle based on the source and operating environment of the originating data. The source applicability is determined using heuristic guidelines while translation of operating environments is accomplished by applying statistical methods to MIL-HDK-217F tables. The paper will provide one example for assigning environmental factors uncertainty when translating between operating environments for the microelectronic part-type components. The heuristic guidelines will be followed by uncertainty-importance routines to assess the need for more applicable data to reduce model uncertainty.

Al Hassan, Mohammad↗

Source Data Applicability Impacts on Epistemic Uncertainty for Launch Vehicle Fault Tree Models

Launch vehicle systems are designed and developed using both heritage and new hardware. Design modifications to the heritage hardware to fit new functional system requirements can impact the applicability of heritage reliability data. Risk estimates for newly designed systems must be developed from generic data sources such as commercially available reliability databases using reliability prediction methodologies, such as those addressed in MIL-HDBK-217F. Failure estimates must be converted from the generic environment to the specific operating environment of the system where it is used. In addition, some qualification of applicability for the data source to the current system should be made. Characterizing data applicability under these circumstances is crucial to developing model estimations that support confident decisions on design changes and trade studies. This paper will demonstrate a data-source applicability classification method for assigning uncertainty to a target vehicle based on the source and operating environment of the originating data. The source applicability is determined using heuristic guidelines while translation of operating environments is accomplished by applying statistical methods to MIL-HDK-217F tables. The paper will provide a case study example by translating Ground Benign (GB) and Ground Mobile (GM) to the Airborne Uninhabited Fighter (AUF) environment for three electronic components often found in space launch vehicle control systems. The classification method will be followed by uncertainty-importance routines to assess the need to for more applicable data to reduce uncertainty.

Al Hassan, Mohammad↗

Analysis of Launch Vehicle Liftoff Debris: Historical Perspective from Space Shuttle and Application to Artemis I

Human exploration-class launch vehicles are inherently prone to debris due to the extreme environments generated during pre-launch operations, liftoff, and flight. The use of cryogenic propellants often requires thermal protection system (TPS) coatings, typically foam, to maintain the propellant conditions in the tank and prevent an accumulation ice on the external surface of the vehicle. Some ice growth is to be expected at umbilical interfaces, vents, flanges, or brackets where it is difficult to apply TPS. This ice may come loose at any time due to wind on the launch pad, structural vibration and acoustics after rocket ignition, or aerodynamic forces during flight. This phenomena is especially apparent on vehicles with no TPS, such as the Saturn V rockets used in the Apollo Program, see Figure 1. During propellant tanking, the thermal contraction of the underlying substrate may generate cracks in the TPS (Figure 1). Chunks of TPS can release due to the expansion of ingested gas from cryopumping or from aerodynamic forces if the crack creates an offset surface. Most foams will also have a certain amount of “popcorning” where small pieces of foam will pop off during flight because of the differential between the static surface pressure and the pressure of the gas trapped in the foam cell structure. There are a number of other coating or closeout materials that may be shed from the vehicle and become debris. During pre-launch operations and liftoff, the vehicle may also be exposed to debris originating from the launch pad or ground support equipment. This debris is separate from foreign object debris, or FOD, which is not intended to be present and is strictly controlled through operations and maintenance procedures. In this case, debris is generated from hardware and materials that are necessary for launch and are subject to the intense vibration, acoustics, and direct plume impingement of the launch environment. Examples include ice from umbilicals, tape and tie wraps that protect cables, and rust or corrosion from the launch platform. While NASA has historically been aware of debris as a potential issue that could cause a failure resulting in loss of mission, loss of vehicle, or loss of crew, the likelihood and severity of that risk was not always well understood or given sufficient weight in program and flight decisions. After the Space Shuttle Columbia accident (STS-107), the investigation found that foam TPS debris shed from the external tank was the proximate cause of the damage to the orbiter wing. Six previous observations of debris released from the foam ramp that covered the bipod connecting the forward end of the orbiter to the external tank resulted in minor changes or were determined to be accepted flight risks. Two occurrences of bipod ramp foam loss were not identified until the STS-107 investigation. Despite the damage inflicted by these debris strikes, the Shuttle Program Requirements Control Board deemed the vehicle safe to fly. During the Return to Flight effort following the Columbia disaster, NASA Engineering developed a process for the assessment of debris transport, impact, and damage tolerance to support independent assessments of risk by NASA Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA). Under this system, each element (vehicle or ground system) defines a catalog of all expected debris based on launch history, component testing, or analysis. Debris transport analysis (DTA) is conducted using the debris catalog characteristics and potential flow transport mechanisms (e.g., vehicle aerodynamics, gravity, wind, plume-driven). The predicted debris impact locations and velocities are provided to the hardware owners, who use available test data and analysis to determine whether each component can withstand the impacts. In cases where the element hardware may be severely damaged or fail, the options are to mitigate the debris source through some change in design or operation, or to work with S&MA to try to characterize the probability of the impact and damage for program risk acceptance. Because of the differences in debris characteristics and transport, the DTA has been divided between the Liftoff and Ascent regimes. The development and application of Liftoff DTA methodology from the Shuttle Program to the current Artemis Program is the subject of this paper. Liftoff DTA covers the time from the start of pre-launch operations at the launch pad, up until the vehicle clears the launch tower and there is no longer any interaction with ground systems. Debris transport during this period is broadly classified as either gravity, wind, and plume-entrained (GWPE) or plume driven (PD). GWPE debris is generally lower speed, travelling in a forward-to-aft direction. PD transport includes flow features from the rocket ignition transient, as well as plume impingement and recirculation that occur as the vehicle lifts off the launch platform. In these cases, the debris typically moves in an aft-to-forward direction at higher speeds. The applicable transport mechanisms must be considered for each piece of debris depending on the material, and release location and time. For example, rust or metallic debris from the tower could fall (GWPE) and impact the vehicle before landing on the launch platform deck where it could be also be transported by plume impingement (PD). However, falling ice (GWPE) from an umbilical is unlikely to survive impact with the vehicle or launch platform and be available for PD transport. Modeling of debris transport is accomplished using a set of DTA tools which simulate debris trajectories subject to a reference frame acceleration (i.e., gravity) and aerodynamic drag. Where the trajectory encounters a solid surface, the debris is allowed to rebound with a specified coefficient of restitution. The drag is calculated by interpolating the fluid state at each point in the debris trajectory from high-fidelity computational fluid dynamics (CFD) simulations of the launch vehicle and pad. The CFD data may either be static (steady state or time averaged), typically for GWPE transport, or dynamic (time-accurate) for PD flow features like the ignition transient. Examples of the CFD flow field solutions for the Space Launch System (SLS) rocket and launch pad are shown in Figure 2. Typical SLS debris trajectory predictions from DTA are illustrated in Figure 3. The final version of this paper will include a more detailed examination of the Liftoff DTA process developed during the Shuttle Program, and how it has been augmented and applied to the SLS rocket under the Artemis Program. Comparisons with debris observations from the Artemis I launch will demonstrate validation of the tools and methodology.

Debris↗

Modification to area navigation equipment for instrument two-segment approaches

A two-segment aircraft landing approach concept utilizing an area random navigation (RNAV) system to execute the two-segment approach and eliminate the requirements for co-located distance measuring equipment (DME) was investigated. This concept permits non-precision approaches to be made to runways not equipped with ILS systems, down to appropriate minima. A hardware and software retrofit kit for the concept was designed, built, and tested on a DC-8-61 aircraft for flight evaluation. A two-segment approach profile and piloting procedure for that aircraft that will provide adequate safety margin under adverse weather, in the presence of system failures, and with the occurrence of an abused approach, was also developed. The two-segment approach procedure and equipment was demonstrated to line pilots under conditions which are representative of those encountered in air carrier service.

Source record↗

Fallible humans and vulnerable systems - Lessons learned from aviation

It is suggested that the problems being experienced in complex automatic systems are essentially due to the failure of information management and communication. The failure covers the entire spectrum: display devices and techniques, coding information so as to reduce human error, and information economy, i.e., resisting the temptation to bombard the operator with unlimited information simply because the system possesses the capability to do so. Since there has been great progress in hardware engineering, it is suggested that further attention is needed in the 'soft' side of systems. The approach should focus on (1) preventing human cognitive slips and (2) making the systems less vulnerable to such slips when they do occur. Most of the examples are taken from studies of cockpit automation.

Wiener, Earl L.↗

Minimum Control Requirements for Advanced Life Support Systems

Advanced control technologies are not necessary for the safe, reliable and continuous operation of Advanced Life Support (ALS) systems. ALS systems can and are adequately controlled by simple, reliable, low-level methodologies and algorithms. The automation provided by advanced control technologies is claimed to decrease system mass and necessary crew time by reducing buffer size and minimizing crew involvement. In truth, these approaches increase control system complexity without clearly demonstrating an increase in reliability across the ALS system. Unless these systems are as reliable as the hardware they control, there is no savings to be had. A baseline ALS system is presented with the minimal control system required for its continuous safe reliable operation. This baseline control system uses simple algorithms and scheduling methodologies and relies on human intervention only in the event of failure of the redundant backup equipment. This ALS system architecture is designed for reliable operation, with minimal components and minimal control system complexity. The fundamental design precept followed is "If it isn't there, it can't fail".

Boulange, Richard↗

Human Factors Research for Space Exploration: Measurement, Modeling, and Mitigation

As part of NASA's Human Research Program, the Space Human Factors Engineering Project serves as the bridge between Human Factors research and Human Spaceflight applications. Our goal is to be responsive to the operational community while addressing issues at a sufficient level of abstraction to ensure that our tools and solutions generalize beyond the point design. In this panel, representatives from four of our research domains will discuss the challenges they face in solving current problems while also enabling future capabilities. Historically, engineering-dominated organizations have tended to view good Human Factors (HF) as a desire rather than a requirement in system design and development. Our field has made significant gains in the past decade, however; the Department of Defense, for example, now recognizes Human-System Integration (HSI), of which HF is a component, as an integral part of their divisions hardware acquisition processes. And our own agency was far more accepting of HF/HSI requirements during the most recent vehicle systems definition than in any prior cycle. Nonetheless, HF subject matter experts at NASA often find themselves in catch up mode... coping with legacy systems (hardware and software) and procedures that were designed with little regard for the human element, and too often with an attitude of we can deal with any operator issues during training. Our challenge, then, is to segregate the true knowledge gaps in Space Human Factors from the prior failures to incorporate best (or even good) HF design principles. Further, we strive to extract the overarching core HF issues from the point-design-specific concerns that capture the operators (and managers) attention. Generally, our approach embraces a 3M approach to Human Factors: Measurement, Modeling, and Mitigation. Our first step is to measure human performance, to move from subjective anecdotes to objective, quantified data. Next we model the phenomenon, using appropriate methods in our field, modifying them to suit the unique aspects of the space environment. Finally, we develop technologies, tools, and procedures to mitigate the decrements in human performance and capabilities that occur in space environments. When successful, we decrease risks to crew safety and to mission success. When extremely successful (or lucky), we devise generalizable solutions that advance the state of our practice. Our panel is composed of researchers from diverse domains of our project... from different boxes, if you will, of the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS).

Kaiser, Mary K.↗

Phase VI Glove Durability Testing

The current state-of-the-art space suit gloves, the Phase VI gloves, have an operational life of 25 - 8 hour Extravehicular Activities (EVAs) in a clean, controlled ISS environment. Future planetary outpost missions create the need for space suit gloves which can endure up to 90 - 8 hour traditional EVAs or 576 - 45 minute suit port-based EVAs in a dirty, uncontrolled planetary environment. Prior to developing improved space suit gloves for use in planetary environments, it is necessary to understand how the current state-of-the-art performs in these environments. The Phase VI glove operational life has traditionally been certified through cycle testing consisting of ISS-based tasks in a clean environment, and glove durability while performing planetary EVA tasks in a dirty environment has not previously been characterized. Testing was performed in the spring of 2010 by the NASA Johnson Space Center Crew and Thermal Systems Division to characterize the durability of the Phase VI Glove and identify areas of the glove design which need improvement to meet the requirements of future NASA missions. Lunar simulant was used in this test to help replicate the dirty lunar environment, and generic planetary surface EVA tasks were performed during testing. A total of 50 manned, pressurized test sessions were completed in the Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) using one pair of Phase VI gloves as the test article. The 50 test sessions were designed to mimic the total amount of pressurized cycling the gloves would experience over a 6 month planetary outpost mission. The gloves were inspected at periodic intervals throughout testing, to assess their condition at various stages in the test and to monitor the gloves for failures. Additionally, motion capture and force data were collected during 18 of the 50 test sessions to assess the accuracy of the cycle model predictions used in testing and to feed into the development of improved cycle model tables. This paper provides a detailed description of the test hardware and methodology, shares the results of the testing, and provides recommendations for future work.

Mitchell, Kathryn C.↗

Phase VI Glove Durability Testing

The current state-of-the-art space suit gloves, the Phase VI gloves, have an operational life of 25 -- 8 hour Extravehicular Activities (EVAs) in a dust free, manufactured microgravity EVA environment. Future planetary outpost missions create the need for space suit gloves which can endure up to 90 -- 8 hour traditional EVAs or 576 -- 45 minute suit port-based EVAs in a dirty, uncontrolled planetary environment. Prior to developing improved space suit gloves for use in planetary environments, it is necessary to understand how the current state-of-the-art performs in these environments. The Phase VI glove operational life has traditionally been certified through cycle testing consisting of International Space Station (ISS)-based EVA tasks in a clean environment, and glove durability while performing planetary EVA tasks in a dirty environment has not previously been characterized. Testing was performed in the spring of 2010 by the NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) Crew and Thermal Systems Division (CTSD) to characterize the durability of the Phase VI Glove and identify areas of the glove design which need improvement to meet the requirements of future NASA missions. Lunar simulant was used in this test to help replicate the dirty lunar environment, and generic planetary surface EVA tasks were performed during testing. A total of 50 manned, pressurized test sessions were completed in the Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) using one pair of Phase VI gloves as the test article. The 50 test sessions were designed to mimic the total amount of pressurized cycling the gloves would experience over a 6 month planetary outpost mission. The gloves were inspected periodically throughout testing, to assess their condition at various stages in the test and to monitor the gloves for failures. Additionally, motion capture and force data were collected during 18 of the 50 test sessions to assess the accuracy of the cycle model predictions used in testing and to feed into the development of improved cycle model tables. This paper provides a detailed description of the test hardware and methodology, shares the results of the testing, and provides recommendations for future work.

Mitchell, Kathryn↗

Topic Modeling of NASA Space System Problem Reports: Research in Practice

Problem reports at NASA are similar to bug reports: they capture defects found during test, post-launch operational anomalies, and document the investigation and corrective action of the issue. These artifacts are a rich source of lessons learned for NASA, but are expensive to analyze since problem reports are comprised primarily of natural language text. We apply topic modeling to a corpus of NASA problem reports to extract trends in testing and operational failures. We collected 16,669 problem reports from six NASA space flight missions and applied Latent Dirichlet Allocation topic modeling to the document corpus. We analyze the most popular topics within and across missions, and how popular topics changed over the lifetime of a mission. We find that hardware material and flight software issues are common during the integration and testing phase, while ground station software and equipment issues are more common during the operations phase. We identify a number of challenges in topic modeling for trend analysis: 1) that the process of selecting the topic modeling parameters lacks definitive guidance, 2) defining semantically-meaningful topic labels requires nontrivial effort and domain expertise, 3) topic models derived from the combined corpus of the six missions were biased toward the larger missions, and 4) topics must be semantically distinct as well as cohesive to be useful. Nonetheless,topic modeling can identify problem themes within missions and across mission lifetimes, providing useful feedback to engineers and project managers.

Data Mining↗