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At least 757 records · Page 42
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2020

Characteristics of Uranium-Plutonium Mixed Oxide Nondestructive Assay Standards

A set of six well-characterized, homogeneous, mixed HEU-WGPu oxide standards has been manufactured for and are proposed for qualification as NDA working reference standards with SAFE-NMCA. These standards, if approved, will provide the basis for qualifying the FRAM isotopic systems for use in accountability measurements of 235U in the presence of Pu for unknown mixed U-Pu items by nondestructive assay. The U to Pu elemental mass ratios of the six analytical standards are nominally in the proportions 0.1, 0.25, 1.0, 2.5, 10, and 20; these values were chosen to span the U/Pu mass ratios of inventory items that ultimately will be measured by nondestructive assay and which currently reside in long term storage. The measured characteristics, including plutonium and uranium elemental masses and isotopic distribution, of each standard and relevant source documentation are reported here.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2021

Cold Testing for Characterization of Oxide Feed Impurities in Support of the ARIES Program

The Advanced Recovery and Integrated Extraction System (ARIES) Program converts surplus plutonium metal components into an oxide powder form and packages the material for final disposition. In support of the ARIES program, over a metric ton (MT) of plutonium has been removed from surplus nuclear weapons since 1998 and packaged for long-term storage in 3013 cans. The oxide production rate is anticipated to increase substantially over the next decade in support of dilute and dispose goals. Analytical chemistry data from destructive analysis of the resulting 70+ blend lots to date has been reported for contaminants in the product oxide. Changes in the Pu product specification for Pu oxide product, induced by a different pit mix, the LANL swap program and processing Alternate (non-Pit Pu) Feed Stock (AFS) metals, will affect the level and the mix of these contaminants in the upcoming years. With these changes in feed material, it will be important to provide fast and efficient measurement of elemental impurities in the oxide to be certain that the process is under control and to monitor the anticipated changes from the historical blend lot data. Non-destructive methods need to be evaluated for the characterization of the plutonium oxide product and the quantification of the impurities at the current and anticipated levels. A feasibility study has begun to investigate the applicability of new spectroscopic methods for oxide impurity characterization. To this end, here we describe the preparation of surrogate materials to support these investigations, and the results of a feasibility study investigating the use of LIBS (Laser Induced Breakdown Spectroscopy) to characterize the surrogate materials as calibration standards.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Requirements and Conceptual Design of Off-gas Systems for the Reprocessing of Metallic Fuels

An assessment has been conducted to determine how key regulations regarding volatile radionuclide emissions to the atmosphere may apply to the off-gas streams associated with electrochemical reprocessing. The scope of this assessment was based upon a generic electrochemical reprocessing scheme with a throughput rate of 200 MTIHM/y applied to metallic fuel discharged from a sodium fast reactor (SFR), but the findings are able to be translated to other advanced nuclear scenarios as merited. Air dispersion modeling was performed using the EPA CAP-88 model and evaluated the uncontrolled decontamination factors (DFs) that would be required to achieve regulatory compliance with the dose-based limits set forth by EPA regulation 40 CFR 190.10(a). These DFs were compared to those required by fuel cycle–based limits set forth by EPA regulation 40 CFR 190.10(b). Two theoretical sites with disparate climatological conditions were selected for air dispersion modeling (Idaho and Tennessee). The radionuclides modeled included 3 H, 85 Kr, 129 I, and selected alpha-emitting transuranic isotopes (referred to here as 239 Pu-TRU <1y ). It was found that the fuel cycle-based limits in 40 CFR 190.10(b) are most restrictive for 85 Kr and 239 Pu-TRU <1y , with DFs of 3 and 6.1E+09, respectively. The dose-based limit as derived from 40 CFR 190.10(a) could require mitigation of tritium in some scenarios, with an estimated DF of about 3 for the reference scenarios. The fuel cycle-based limit for 129 I resulted in a DF of about 240 for the reference scenario. The need for iodine mitigation based on dose to the public depended upon the physical form of iodine as either particulate or vapor-phase species. Emission of iodine from the facility as a vapor necessitated DFs of about 2 but emission as a particulate would require DFs >6,000 to meet thyroid dose-based limits. Effects of physical form on needed iodine mitigation are significant, but the understanding of speciation of iodine both during electrochemical reprocessing and after release to the atmosphere is limited. The electrochemical processing unit operations were evaluated to identify potential release points for the volatile radionuclides and to assess the potential for retention of the radionuclides within the process (thus decreasing the need for mitigation). Mitigation strategies for 3 H, 85 Kr, 129 I, and 239 Pu-TRU <1y were identified. In all cases, there are reasonably achievable pathways to regulatory compliance, although in some cases additional R&D is merited to verify the chemical speciation of these isotopes and to develop and demonstrate potential treatment technologies for this application. Whether or not additional off-gas controls (beyond common operations such as HEPA filtration and oxygen and moisture control) are needed for any of these regulated or volatile radionuclides depends on the (a) type of facility (NRC-regulated or DOE), (b) used fuel process rate, (c) used fuel burnup and composition, (d) speciation and retention of volatile radionuclides in the process and in the cell gas cleanup system, (e) site-specific parameters such as location, meteorology, stack height, and site boundaries, and (f) levels of conservatism and safety factors used in assessing compliance to air emissions regulations. Performance of this assessment revealed several areas where information is lacking or additional research is required in order to better determine if or what kinds of off-gas control might be needed. First, and most significantly, the understanding of the chemical speciation and physical form and partitioning of iodine during electrochemical processing operations is lacking and prevents the ability to accurately assess the potential iodine mitigation requirements. Future research in this area should be multifaceted and include thermodynamic modeling of iodine speciation in different process steps, experiments to quantify the kinetics of vapor-phase and melt-phase transitions, bench-scale experiments to determine the potential chemical and physical form of iodine emissions from the electrorefining process, and verification of iodine behavior with experiments utilizing operational facilities. Similarly, an improved understanding of iodine behavior in the environment after release from the facility stack will be required to refine dose estimations, as particulate and vapor-phase emissions result in significantly different doses to the MEI.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Total Measurement Uncertainty in Neutron Coincidence Multiplicity Analysis

Neutron multiplicity counting is the most commonly used nondestructive assay technique for determining the plutonium mass within containers of scrap PuO 2 or mixed oxide (MOX). In multiplicity analysis, the 240 Pu eff mass, leakage multiplication, and alpha ratio (the ratio of [α, n]-to-spontaneous fission neutron production) are the three primary unknown sample properties. They must be determined simultaneously. To solve for these three unknowns in a multiplicity assay, three measured values are needed: the singles, doubles, and triples neutron count rates. While the analysis is limited to solving for three unknowns, there are many additional factors that impact the observed count rates and contribute to the measurement uncertainty. In this study we investigate the various uncertainty contributors for the multiplicity analysis through a combination of traditional uncertainty propagation techniques supplemented by Monte Carlo simulations to address the dependences not explicitly expressed by the point source model. Uncertainties arising from counting statistics, calibration parameters, calibration method, nuclear data, and various material characteristics (isotopic abundances, chemical form, density, and impurities) are considered. A Total Measurement Uncertainty (TMU) estimate is then developed from these uncertainty contributors. This study is confined to multiplicity analysis of items commonly encountered in international safeguards applications. That is, the study focused on Pu oxides and MOX materials for the masses ranging up to 4000 grams total Pu. Multiplicity measurements were simulated using MCNP V6 based on the Plutonium Scrap Multiplicity Counter (PSMC), Epithermal Multiplicity Counter (ENMC), Pyrochemical Multiplicity Counter, and Large Epithermal Multiplicity Counter (LEMC) for this study; however, this report focuses on the parameterization of the uncertainties for the PSMC. The performance differences between the PSMC and the other multiplicity counting systems are relatively small, primarily manifesting in the impact on measurement precision so that the evaluation developed for the PSMC can be applied to the other multiplicity counting systems. Finally an analysis tool, the Multiplicity TMU Estimator, was developed from this study to serve as an aid for evaluation of the total measurement uncertainty of multiplicity assay results obtained from the commonly used INCC acquisition and analysis software.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Nuclear Criticality Safety Assessment of Criticality Control Containers without Moderation Control at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) provides for safe, permanent disposal of government-owned transuranic (TRU) and TRU mixed wastes. Receipt and disposal of waste at the WIPP site began in March 1999. The Sandia report, Consideration of Nuclear Criticality When Disposing of Transuranic Waste at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, addressed potential nuclear criticality safety issues based on the projected inventory characteristics known at the time [1]. As designs for inventory, waste forms, and disposal packages have changed, new analyses have been performed, and updates have been made to address any potential effects to the WIPP safety basis. New analyses performed include Saylor 2017 [2] and Brickner 2019 [3], which address certain waste containers with specified loadings under post-closure conditions. Both examined several hypothetical scenarios and included analyses to bound (from a criticality potential standpoint) credible configurations that could occur at WIPP during the repository regulatory post-closure disposal time period for feature, event, and process (FEP) considerations—10,000 years. During this post-closure period at WIPP, the screening of FEPs is governed by the risk-based standards and implementing regulations of the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) (i.e., 40 CFR 191 and 40 CFR 194, respectively) [4,5]. An FEP screening can be based on either a low-consequence or low-probability rationale. A low-probability rationale includes either (a) a qualitative rationale that the FEP is not credible or (b) a quantitative demonstration that the probability is less than 10-4 in 104 years. In this evaluation, a qualitative lowprobability rationale of not credible is used by demonstrating that bounding configurations of the waste are not critical. The demonstration of subcriticality is through quantitative calculations, but a probability of criticality is not evaluated. Rather, the rationale for this evaluation is that bounding configurations with an effective neutron multiplication factor (keff) well below the upper subcriticality limit (USL) make criticality incredible. Reference [2] documented a nuclear criticality assessment of the WIPP repository for disposal of dilute surplus plutonium materials using the Dilute and Dispose Approach and packaging in criticality control overpacks (CCOs). The CCO is the waste disposal container recently designed to allow for up to 380 fissile gram equivalent (FGE) 239 Pu per drum, which is a higher fissile loading than typical waste containers. The CCO consists of a criticality control container (CCC) positioned by upper and lower plywood spacers within a standard 55 gal drum. The CCC is used to establish a geometry control for fissile materials during transportation and WIPP emplacement operations. The current WIPP waste acceptance criteria for CCO payloads limit beryllium to less than or equal to 1% by weight of the waste contents and require the waste form to be non-machine compacted. Reference [2] considered two scenario progressions—room closure from salt creep, hereafter referred to as the reconfigured dry scenario, and flooding with brine, hereafter referred to as the reconfigured wet scenario. The subsequent drying out of the reconfigured wet scenarios was also considered. For all scenarios, subcriticality was maintained when 50 g of B 4 C (acting as a neutron absorber) per CCC was intermixed within the plutonium disposition waste form. The analysis used a waste form description that limits the amount of moderation that could be present within the waste form (i.e., it limits the amount of water and polyethylene that could be present based on planned processing conditions). This analysis to evaluate increased limits on the amount of moderation that could be present was performed as a companion to Reference [2] to address concerns associated with verifying moisture and/or plastic contents of waste materials following packaging of dilute surplus plutonium in the CCO. To that end, this analysis used the models and methods from Reference [2] to evaluate a more generic base waste form consisting of water and polyethylene that is more similar (and nearly identical) to the generic waste forms utilized in other models/analyses supporting the TRU Package Transporter Model II (TRUPACTII) safety analysis [6] (all are without moderation controls). The waste form in this analysis uses a base mixture of 75% water and 25% polyethylene, the total amount of which is varied to determine the optimum moderation to fissile material (H/Pu) ratio. The fissile loading is maintained at up to 380 FGE 239 Pu (modeled as PuO 2 ) per CCO with an additional 545 g of beryllium (to bound the 1% by weight contents restriction) and 50 g of B 4 C intermixed per CCO. The beryllium content (1% by weight) is based on the total allowed waste weight (this does not include packaging and container weights). Figures ES-1 and ES-2 display summary results, showing that with this model including 50 g of B 4 C per CCO, the system keff remains under 0.85 for all moderator amounts and provides a significant margin against post-closure criticality under postulated bounding conditions for compaction. Figure ES-1 compares an infinite model with a room model at the initial emplacement spacing and under full radial compaction. Full radial compaction places each CCC in direct contact and does not credit any anticipated spacing associated with current post-closure geomechanical modeling of the repository [7]. The effects of variations in the H/Pu ratio were evaluated by varying the amount of the water/polyethylene component of the waste model, with fissile loading maintained at 380 239 Pu FGE. Similarly, Figure ES-2 illustrates how various amounts of B 4 C per CCO influence k eff at different radial compactions, all at the H/Pu ratio of 200 (in the room array model). Therefore, while the results from Saylor 2017 [2] modeled more realistic process limits associated with packaging of dilute surplus plutonium, this analysis demonstrates that limits on moderation (plastic and water content) are not necessary to ensure subcriticality in the WIPP repository, provided the requisite B 4 C absorber is present.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2022

ALDWP Operational Highlights 2021

The Weapons Pit production manufacturing team completed pit build 21-1 assembly operations on December 23, 2020. This build utilized all essential flow sheet steps and included the second -01 long tube cut off extension and welding activity. This is the best build produced in the MC4597-01 pit program to date. Final out-of-line operations, non-destructive evaluation, and radiography was completed during the week of January 4. Depending on the results from high energy radiography, this pit will be considered to be a candidate for CERT-02 and shipment to Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in support of pit certification. It is notable that this build was completed while concurrently making Plutonium (Pu) metal, producing additional castings, machining Pu parts for Build 22, completing disassembly of two pits, supporting Nightshade B Pu target characterization, and precision machining of Jasper certification base plates.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2021

Critical and Californium Source-Driven Noise Analysis Subcritical Measurements with an Unreflected Cylindrical Tank of Mixed Uranium-Plutonium Nitrate Solution

The reported experiments were performed by Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) at the Battelle Northwest Laboratory’s (now Pacific Northwest National Laboratory) critical experiments facility at Hanford, Washington in 1981 and used 16 days of critical facility time, not including 10 days for setup and removal of ORNL equipment. These measurements were to assess the capability of the Cf source-driven noise analysis (CSDNA) method to measure the subcriticality (keff) of mixed U-Pu nitrate solutions. In addition to the CSNDA measurements, measurements were also performed near delayed criticality where CSDNA measurements cannot be performed. This report documents the experiments that were not reported at that time by presenting the ORNL experimental results and any online analysis performed during and shortly after the measurements. The mixed nitrate solution had a U concentration at 188 grams per liter (g/L), a Pu concentration of 280 g/L, free acid normality of 2.80, H ion molarity of 5.9 and a specific gravity of 1.754 g/cm 3 , a 240 Pu isotopic content of 7.981 wt. %, and a 235 U isotopic content of 0.724 wt. %. The stainless-steel tank for the solution had an inside diameter of 35.38 cm, an outside diameter of 35.53 cm, a height of 56.72 cm, and bottom thickness of 0.9525 cm. A Zircaloy pipe with a 3.1496 cm outside diameter, a 2.7788 cm inside diameter, and bottom thickness of 0.635 cm was available for insertion of the Cf source in the center of the fissile solution. The Cf source was also located at the outside surface of the tank (solution height varied from 10 to 53 cm) and in the center of the solution (solution height varied from 10 to 60.7 cm). The CSDNA measurements were not analyzed online to determine the subcritical neutron multiplication factors. At all subcritical states, the break frequency noise analysis data was fitted to obtain the prompt neutron decay constant. The neutron multiplication factors were determined for the two configurations of the measurements near delayed criticality. The subcritical neutron multiplication factors from the CNSDA measurements can be obtained with further analysis. However, the near delayed critical configuration, the prompt neutron decay constants, the count rates, and the measured cross and auto power spectral densities can be calculated directly for benchmarking. Much of data presented in this report are from ORNL notes—not in the ORNL logbooks. For the final benchmark analysis, the data from the Battelle Northwest Laboratory (which operated the critical facility in 1981) critical facility logbook should be consulted and be incorporated where appropriate. The purpose of this report is to document the experimental information for the measurements performed so that at a later date researchers could perform the required uncertainty and calculational analyses and documentation to use these data for an International Criticality Safety Benchmark Program (ICSBEP) or Nuclear Energy Agency benchmark. The data from these measurements are available from the ORNL Records Management Services Department, and the logbook is available from ICSBEP at Idaho National Laboratory. Preparation of the present report is part of a larger cooperative effort between Idaho National Laboratory (INL) and Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) to document more than 15 undocumented critical and subcritical experiments enumerated in ORNL/TM-2019/18 and performed by ORNL at ORCEF and other USDOE critical experiments facilities using more than 500 operational days of critical facility time.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Data Assimilation using Non-invasive Monte Carlo Sensitivity Analysis of Reactor Kinetics Parameters [Slides]

Sensitivity coefficients of prompt neutron decay constant (α) and effective delayed neutron fraction (β eff ) to Pu-239 nuclear data were calculated using a newly available tool (ACEtk). Uncertainty calculations showed the following trends: (1) The prompt neutron decay constant can be used to reduce nuclear data-induced uncertainty in Pu-239(n,f) and (2) the effective delayed neutron fraction can be used to effectively reduce nuclear data-induced uncertainty in Pu-239 total fission $\tilde{v}$. Sensitivity/uncertainty analysis can be used to determine optimal experiment/detector setup to identify compensating errors in nuclear data. Upcoming work includes investigating other nuclide-reaction pairs and response sensitivities, such as Δ$\rho$, neutron leakage spectra, and reaction rate measurements to constrain nuclear data of interest.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Data Testing with Zero Power Reactor (ZPR), Zero Power Physics Reactor (ZPPR), and New Thermal Epithermal eXperiments (TEX) Plutonium Benchmarks [Slides]

This presentation states that new TSLs in ENDF/B-VIII.0 will reduce the overprediction of the library for the most moderated cases. The differences between VII.1 and VIII.0 are driven by the 239 Pu changes and are consistently higher for all configurations. The VIII.0 239 Pu thermal cross sections were specifically adjusted lower to better predict plutonium thermal solutions criticality benchmarks, yet they overpredict the TEX thermal configurations, moderated by PE. Other, smaller differences have been seen for 240 Pu and 56 Fe. PMM-002 has shown utility in testing cross sections over a wide range of neutron energies.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Technical Evaluation of Accelerated Basin De-Inventory Material Addition to Sludge Batch 11 (Rev. 1)

The Accelerated Basin De-inventory (ABD) program involves discarding spent nuclear fuel that is currently stored in L-Basin to the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) for vitrification. The first ABD discards will occur during the preparation of Sludge Batch (SB) 11. Savannah River Mission Completion has requested that the Savannah River National Laboratory assess the technical gaps related to the increased gadolinium poisoning requirement and the impacts of performing the Low Temperature Aluminum Dissolution (LTAD) process in Tank 51 with H-Canyon discards present. The following summarizes the evaluation of the impacts of increasing the quantity of gadolinium (and related topics) from what was previously evaluated in the SRNL studies of gadolinium-poisoned ABD material solubility, the overall ABD flowsheet review, and increasing the fissile mass loading in glass: 1) Based on literature surveys, there is no indication that organic interactions with gadolinium will be significant at the high pH (typically >13) conditions of the Concentration, Storage, and Transfer Facilities. Any interactions of gadolinium with organics in DWPF are not expected to adversely impact DWPF or downstream facilities. Thus, there is little-to-no residual risk from organic interactions with gadolinium [Gap closed]; 2) Adding depleted uranium to ABD material, targeting 235 U enrichment of 4.90% within each transfer window, will mitigate potential impacts from an increase in soluble 235 U enrichment during sludge washing and LTAD. The plan to take advantage of previous transfers and allow 235 U enrichment of >5% during the final transfer window carries a risk that Tank 51 supernate will have a 235 U enrichment of >5%, which should be evaluated for acceptance; 3) Increasing the gadolinium mass ratio to 3.0:1 Gd: 235 U(eq SLU ) should lead to the same or higher partitioning of gadolinium into the solid phase within the DWPF Chemical Process Cell, resulting in both liquid and solid phases with expected partitioning of Gd consistent with the prior solubility study [Gap closed for SB11]; 4) There are no expected impacts on DWPF melt temperature and melter operations due to the minimal ~0.2 weight percent (wt%) increase in Gd concentration relative to previous sludge batches [Gap closed for SB11]; 5) As observed previously, Gd is expected to enter the off-gas system via physical entrainment, but at a slightly higher concentration than what was observed for SB9 melter off-gas pluggage deposits (0.07 wt%) [Gap closed for SB11] ; 6) There are no expected impacts on DWPF recycle or the Recycle Collection Tank glycolate destruction process. [Gap closed for SB11]; 7) Gd is projected to be a trace component in the SB11 glass (<0.5 wt%) and can be ignored for process control. Trace components do not significantly impact glass durability, thus the conclusions of the previous Product Consistency Test evaluation at a fissile mass loading of 2,500 g fissile/m3 glass still applies to SB11. The ~0.1 wt% increase in Gd2O3 concentration relative to the previous study will not impact the predictability of SB11 glass with the DWPF Product Composition Control System (PCCS) models for durability or the acceptability of glass according to the Waste Acceptance Product Specifications (WAPS) criterion for product consistency [Gap closed for SB11]; 8) No additional Toxicity Characteristic Leaching Procedure testing is necessary for SB11 and the hazardous waste specification of the SB11 DWPF waste form is unchanged after the addition of the ABD stream [Gap closed for SB11]. The following summarizes the evaluation of the impacts of adding two-thirds of the ABD material to Tank 51 prior to LTAD: 1) The addition of two-thirds of the ABD increases overall aluminum mass from 1.39×10 4 kg to 1.64×10 4 kg (15.5% ABD Al). The form of the insoluble portion of the Al resulting from ABD addition should be the more readily dissolved Al(OH) 3 and amorphous forms. The portion of the ABD aluminum that is processed by LTAD is expected to be completely soluble, thus requiring that less of the boehmite in the sludge be dissolved to reach the same Al target in the SB. [Gap closed for SB11]; The expected LTAD impact on other components, as related primarily to the components in ABD, are discussed. Gd is expected to remain insoluble during LTAD and not impact the solubility of other components. [Gap closed for SB11]; The addition of two-thirds of the ABD increases overall projected SB11 uranium mass from 4,740 kg to 13,100 kg (63% ABD U) and the projected plutonium mass from 86.0 kg to 89.5 kg (3.9% ABD Pu). The addition of all of the ABD increases overall projected SB11 uranium mass from 4,740 kg to 16,100 kg (70% ABD U) and the projected plutonium mass from 86.0 kg to 90.4 kg (5.3% ABD Pu). The 235 U enrichment will be ≤5%. The fissile uranium will be adequately poisoned by Gd and the fissile Pu will be adequately poisoned by Fe from the sludge. [Gap closed for SB11]; There is a low risk that ABD addition will impact the rheology or pumpability of the slurry. There is a low but higher risk of ABD addition prior to LTAD impacting the settling rate; Based on the evaluation of adding two-thirds of the ABD material and all of the ABD material prior to the LTAD process, there is no volume or mass limit that would need to be imposed on ABD additions prior to LTAD. [Gap closed for SB11]. Revision 1 of this report addresses a variation on the ABD additions and LTAD strategy where sodium hydroxide additions for LTAD may be performed intermittently or concurrently with an ABD addition window. The proposed change does not alter the conclusions of this evaluation.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2023

Characterization of Aluminum Metal Powders for Plutonium-238 Program

As part of radioisotope thermoelectric generator (RTG) production for power sources in deep space exploration, Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) produces plutonium-238 ( 238 Pu). To produce 238 Pu, neptunium-237 ( 237 Np) targets are fabricated at ORNL and subsequently irradiated at the High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) at ORNL and the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) at Idaho National Laboratory (INL). Specifically, current flowsheets utilize neptunium dioxide ( 237 NpO 2 ) targets. Aluminum (Al) powder is blended with 237 NpO 2 target material to improve thermal conductivity during irradiation. The current composition of 237 NpO 2 /Al pellets (i.e., cermets, or ceramic–metallics) is 20% 237 NpO 2 , 70% Al, and 10% void space. Al powders utilized by the 238 Pu program are high-fired under vacuum before blending into targets. The primary objective of this work is to measure the physical, chemical, and thermal properties of Al before and after the high-firing process. Properties of interest include the morphology, surface texture, particle size, crystal phase(s), and thermal conductivity of the material. These properties are measured with existing materials characterization equipment at ORNL, including powder x-ray diffraction (pXRD), scanning electron microscopy (SEM) with energy-dispersive spectroscopy (EDS), laser flash analysis (LFA), and thermogravimetric analysis (TGA). A secondary objective of this work is to compare the Al powders before and after the high-firing procedure to determine the effects of high-firing on chemical, physical, and thermal properties and to determine the efficacy of the high-firing process.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Evaluation of the Effect of Burnup Acceleration on UO 2 Microstructure Evolution

Accelerated fuel qualification (AFQ) is a methodology by which new nuclear fuels are developed in an accelerated time frame compared with historical fuel qualification approaches. AFQ generally relies on high-fidelity physics-based modeling and simulation tools to adequately describe fuel performance as well as on revolutionary methods to accelerate burnup accumulation and collect relevant data more quickly. This report summarizes the use of advanced fuel modeling and simulation tools to evaluate microstructures from commercially irradiated fuel and microstructures from proposed MiniFuel irradiations, in which burnup accumulation is accelerated while prototypic temperature conditions are maintained. In this milestone, we used the mesoscale fuel performance code MARMOT to model the evolution of irradiated UO 2 microstructures and their potential restructuring at high burnup. The simulation conditions were informed by BISON models of both commercially irradiated fuel and MiniFuel. A first set of simulations investigated the recrystallization behavior of fully dense microstructures and showed full recrystallization at burnups as low as 52 MWd/kgU at 950°C. However, these simulations did not account for the presence of fission gas bubbles (predicted by BISON). Therefore, a second set of simulations including fission gas bubbles was performed and indicated that at the lowest temperature considered (650°C), the porous UO 2 microstructures have the highest total Gibbs free energies and are likely to recrystallize earlier than higher temperature cases (800 and 950°C), which agrees with high-burnup fuel characterization data. The results also showed that at lower temperature (650°C), the total free energies of the PWR fuel and MiniFuel microstructures are not significantly different. However, at the highest temperature (950°C), MiniFuel microstructures have a lower free energy than that of the PWR fuel microstructure. The competing effects between the temperature-dependent grain nucleation rate and the reduction of the free energy of the microstructure at higher temperature as a result of diffusion indicated that restructuring may occur at even higher temperatures than those considered in this study. In addition to the microstructure evolution modeling efforts, the burnup gradient across a single fuel specimen was also considered. This evaluation was for the VXF-15 position of the High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) using the code suite HFIRCON, which was developed to automate the workflow for evaluating targets and fuel as they are irradiated in HFIR. The burnup gradient evaluation showed a dependence on both the axial and radial locations within the specimen, with a maximum difference of 1.7 between the inner and outermost radial layers. This relationship was further supported by considering the fission product speciation with respect to location within the specimen, which showed a higher concentration of 239 Pu, 240 Pu, and 241 Pu on the outer radial locations of the specimen than the center. The findings of the burnup and speciation evaluation show that some amount of self-shielding is occurring in the specimen when irradiated in the high-flux environment of HFIR; however, this impact is more pronounced for natural uranium when compared to 6% enrichment due to the higher ratio of 238 U in the specimen. Further analyses are required to understand the sensitivity of this gradient to spatial mesh and enrichment of the specimen.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Engineering & Microstructure Scale PIE Report on EBR-II X441A Metallic Fuel Pins for the MORPH Experiment

The objectives of this project are to increase fundamental understanding of irradiation induced metallic U-Pu-Zr fuel behavior and to obtain data needed for the development of irradiation models for metallic fuels in MARMOT. The requested metallic fuel pins are from the X441A experiment irradiated in Experimental Breeder Reactor (EBR)-II and will be provided by the PIs for the duration of the experiment. The purpose of the pins irradiated in the X441A assembly was to vary Zr composition and fuel slug diameter in order to provide data for the metallic fuel performance code “LIFEMETAL” [ANL-IFR-125]. The fuels of interest to this project are metallic fuels with several Zr compositions (in wt.%): U-19Pu-6Zr, U-19Pu-10Zr, and U-19Pu-14Zr, which were irradiated to a peak burnup of approximately 11 at.%. The cladding was the same for all three fuel pins (austenitic stainless steel D9), which allows investigation of fuel-cladding interaction (FCI) phenomena. Varying Zr content in fuel pins enables investigation of the effect of Zr on fuel restructuring and fuel-cladding compatibility. Engineering and microstructure scale PIE activities will be focused on investigation of fundamental aspect of fuel performance such as species diffusion and migration, fission product behavior, and constituent redistribution. Obtained microstructural information will be used as the basis for the development of MARMOT models of U-Pu-Zr fuel performance at the mesoscale. Experimental data obtained through this proposal will be used to provide this fundamental understanding which will serve as the foundation of the development of radiation models for U-Pu-Zr in MARMOT. It will also provide a starting point for the design of new experiments to provide data for the validation of these MARMOT models.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Mark-18A Loading Capacity and Dilute Acid Rinse of DGA Resin

Savannah River National Laboratory is developing a separations flowsheet for the recovery of valuable elements from irradiated 242 Pu targets. The primary impetus for this effort is to recover the rich amount of 244 Pu contained in the targets, however, the targets also contain other valuable isotopes such as heavy Cm and 241,243 Am. DGA Resin, developed by Eichrom Technologies Inc., was selected to recover these materials from the 7 – 9 M HNO 3 matrix raffinate of the anion exchange process used to separate Pu. The resin has a high affinity for trivalent actinides and rare earth elements (REEs) in moderate to strong nitric acid. After loading the resin, the extracted materials (including Cm and Am) are to be recovered as oxides in a two-step process by thermally drying and reducing the mass and volume of the resin in the process column followed by calcination of the resultant residue. It is desirable to reduce the amount of residual HNO 3 in the resin bed prior to these furnace operations, but the reduced acid concentration is known to lower the distribution coefficients of the components of interest to the extractant. The purpose of this study was to validate the loading capacity of the resin and determine losses to be expected from rinsing the loaded resin with dilute HNO 3 .

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗
DOE OSTI2024

Impacts of Fast Critical Assembly Fuel Discards on Liquid Waste Processes

The Savannah River Nuclear Solutions (SRNS) Fast Critical Assembly (FCA) mission is reestablishing the electrolytic dissolver for processing of Pu and Pu-U materials clad in stainless steel (SS). H-Canyon is planning to dissolve and neutralize FCA fuel without recovering the special nuclear material (i.e., Pu) prior to discarding to the Concentration, Storage, and Transfer Facilities (CSTF) operated by the Savannah River Mission Completion (SRMC) Liquid Waste (LW) Organization. The FCA discards will be combined with sludge in the CSTF after Low Temperature Aluminum Dissolution (LTAD) if needed. The combined waste will be washed, concentrated, and vitrified at the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF). The high level waste canisters produced will be temporarily stored in the Glass Waste Storage Buildings prior to transfer to a future federal repository. Decants from LTAD and sludge washing will be combined with DWPF recycle and dissolved salt cake to prepare salt batches for processing in the Salt Waste Processing Facility. The resulting decontaminated salt solution will be processed in the Saltstone Production Facility.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2024

Plutonium-238 Loadout Calorimeter Return To Service

The calorimeter in the transfer area in Building 7920 at the US Department of Energy’s Oak Ridge National Laboratory is used to measure the amount of 238 Pu in the Plutonium Heat Source Oxide. The calorimetry measurement is taken after the oxide is packaged in an ORISC (Oak Ridge Inner Shipping Capsule)/FSO (Fuel Storage Outer) assembly before loading into the Containment Vessel and shipping container. The equipment is used in three specific configurations: zero measurement (nothing in the sample cup), FSO measurement (actual measurement of 238 Pu), and reference calibration measurement (using the reference FSO as a known heat source). System checks were performed in July 2023 in preparation for scheduled material loadout. During these checks, personnel discovered that the reference FSO had experienced an electrical short in the heater cable and was no longer functional. The calorimeter was in the reference calibration measurement configuration at this time. Facility management was notified when the damage was discovered. The data from the Yokogawa recorder were pulled and analyzed for a span of time between September 2022 and July 2023. An unusual spike was found in the sample cup temperature data that started on October 19, 2022, and ended on October 20, 2022. The sample cup reached a temperature of 191.1°C. The maximum allowable temperature for the calorimeter thermopile to reach is 220°C based on the manufacturer statement provided in Appendix B of this report [1]. The calorimeter thermopile and the sample cup thermocouple are physically close to each other; therefore, the data suggest that the calorimeter itself never saw a temperature in excess of 191.1°C. Physical damage present on the cable, tape, and insulation suggests that the temperature reached a higher value in some locations within the sample cup than the data shows. Because of this discrepancy, testing of the calorimeter was required to confirm that the calorimeter is functioning the same as it was before the electrical short. The intent of this report is to assess the functionality of the calorimeter and determine if it is acceptable to use for 238 Pu loadout material measurement. Testing showed that the calorimeter is functionally equivalent to the initial calibration that was performed in the summer of 2021, and thus, the calorimeter was cleared to be used for its intended purposes.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2024

Exploring the Nature of f-Element Soft Donor Interactions Using Electronically Tunable Azolate Ionic Liquids

This project was undertaken to advance the understanding of how f-elements interact with moderately soft donors, a heavily investigated yet open question which is of prime importance in spent nuclear fuel processing and fundamental inorganic chemistry. During the course of the project, based on exciting results, a stretch goal was developed to study the hydrolysis products of transuranic actinide metals, a somewhat understudied field even with its significance in nuclear fuel cycle and impacts in environmental chemistry. The stretch goal was to take our serendipitous discovery of an easy route to isolation of crystalline multinuclear ƒ-element hydrolysis products, and apply it to gaining a mechanistic understanding of Pu(III/IV) colloid formation. The simplicity of our techniques should lend themselves to the remote handling required for study of many transuranic elements. We developed several methodologies using azolium azolate chemistry to overcome ƒ-element hydrolysis problems that prohibit the isolation of ƒ-element soft donor complexes and to build a crystallographic library of ƒ-element N-donor complexes as a means to understand the fundamental differences between actinide and lanthanide interactions with moderately soft donor ligands. Our next major endeavor will be to transfer this chemistry from 4ƒ elements to transuranic elements, particularly in the study of hydrolysis of Pu(III/IV). While our work is fundamental in nature, applications of the knowledge we are generating should be felt in such diverse fields as catalysis, separations in general, nuclear waste remediation specifically, and many other applications in f-element magnetic and luminescent properties. The potential ramifications of the consistent and robust formation of hydrolysis controlled hexanuclear lanthanide structures are enormous, with future uses being catalyst formation, higher-nuclearity structure synthesis using our hexanuclear motif as a fundamental building block, Pu waste remediation, separations, and many other potential applications resulting from characteristic magnetic and luminescent properties of lanthanide polynuclear structures. Three synthetic methodologies (direct mixing with variable stoichiometries, use of volatile solvent, metathesis) were developed starting with 7 acidic and 6 basic azoles to obtain ionic liquids suitable for f-element coordination. Proton transfer by acidic/basic azole combination led to suitable low melting salts and two cocrystals. Acid/base reaction of azoles with soft-donor permanent cations of ([X 4444 ][OH] (where [X 4444 ] + = tetrabutylammonium [N 4444 ] + or tetrabutylphosphonium [P 4444 ] + ) with weakly acidic azoles including imidazole, 1,2,3-triazole, 1,2,4-triazole, 5-aminotetrazole, 4,5-dicyanoimidazole, and 2-amino-4,5-dicyanoimidazole) revealed several suitable low-melting salts. Metathesis reactions of Na(azolate) were conducted by first using weakly acidic azoles including 4,5-dicyanoimidazole, 2-amino-4,5-dicyanoimidazole, 5-aminotetrazole, and 1,2,4-triazole to form sodium or lithium salts using group(I) hydroxides in methanolic solutions. The best results were obtained by reacting the basic and acidic azoles directly in 1:1 or 3:1 ratios at elevated temperatures. Twenty-two azole mixtures were identified which are either low melting solids or room temperature liquids. Each of the low melting solids was confirmed to be a new solid phase, each of which is being further characterized. The liquids and solids are anticipated to be ILs, eutectics, or partially ionized systems, all of which will be suitable for the dissolution of f-element salts. Five new synthetic methodologies were developed to finding suitable crystallization conditions for f-element complexation with the goal of finding simple one pot reaction syntheses and crystallization strategies that could be used under the demanding conditions of transuranic chemistries. These synthetic methods yield many new crystalline phases which were studied by single crystal X-ray diffraction.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2023

Development of Spectroscopic Tools for Nuclear Forensics Signatures Development

Diversion of nuclear materialsfrom legitimate commercial processes for use by nefarious actors is a frightening and surreptitious problem. Smuggled nuclear material can be used to manufacture a simple radiological dispersion device (RDD) and potentially incorporated into the development of a nuclear weapon. With some frequency, smuggled nuclear material is interdicted in foreign countries as actors cross border checkpoints. Nuclear material interdicted in this way can be analyzed using a variety of tools. Plutonium-239 is commonly used as the fissile material in nuclear weapon production as an alternative to uranium-235. Plutonium in a production, refining, or finishing facility will exist in many forms including oxide precursors (PuF4, PuF3, Pu oxalate, etc.), oxide, and metal. The ability to identify plutonium in each of these forms and determine properties, characteristics, or history of these materials is crucial for determining if the processes occurring in a nuclear facility are legitimate or not. This presentation will focus on the development and application ofspectroscopic tools developed at SRNL using doubled-walled cells (DWC) to characterize Pu-bearing compounds. Advances in the use of vibrational spectroscopy techniques (Raman and IR), UV-VIS-SWIR diffuse reflectance spectroscopy, gamma emission spectroscopy, luminescence spectroscopy, laser-induced breakdown spectroscopy in conjunction with XRD and SEM in the characterization of Pu-bearing compounds will be presented with emphasis in material processing history.

Villa-Aleman, Eliel↗