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Global Security delivers innovative engineering solutions to protect the nation from strategic threats home and abroad. Global Security programs focus on developing and implementing technical solutions to address global security challenges through three enduring missions: Global Monitoring, Preventing Proliferation, and Nuclear Weapon Security.
Electrochemical reprocessing (also commonly known as “pyroprocessing”) of used nuclear fuel is an alternative to aqueous reprocessing that confers a number of advantages, including the ability to process more recently-discharged fuel, smaller resultant waste volumes, and the lack of isolation of plutonium in the product stream. While electrochemical reprocessing systems have seen a significant research and development effort, nuclear safeguards and security of these systems remains under-developed, particularly given the significant differences in operating environment and process flowsheet compared with established aqueous methods. Objective 4 of DOE’s nuclear energy research and development activities in Nuclear Energy Research and Development Roadmap is: “Understand and minimize the risks of nuclear proliferation and terrorism.” Material Control & Accountancy (MC&A) programs at nuclear processing plants deter and detect theft and diversion of nuclear material by both outside and inside adversaries. Empirical modeling and data analytics of online measurements and state indicators can improve the timeliness of detection and reduce the uncertainty in accountancy measures. To support the development and demonstration of such methods, data are needed that capture expected measurement values collected throughout electrochemical reprocessing facilities. A review of the available literature of current research in measurements for electrochemical reprocessing systems identified twenty-two candidate measurement methodologies, which characterize fuel/salt composition, concentrations of various isotopes and elements, and operational parameters throughout the reprocessing facility. Four primary measurement methodologies have been simulated based on either physical simulations or empirical correlations: gamma emissions, neutron emissions, hybrid k-edge densitometry (HKED), and cyclic voltammetry. Initial investigation into the use of these measures for process monitoring and detection suggests the approach is viable and worthy of further investigation. This report summarizes efforts to generate signatures of key measurements during operation of electrochemical reprocessing facilities and initial investigation of data analytics to support process monitoring, diversion detection, and accountancy.
Nuclear weapons stockpile planning is a complex process. The Non-Proliferation Treaty,' New START Treaty,2 DOE/NNSA, STRATCOM, Navy, Air Force, and Executive-Branch all have objectives that drive requirements for the types and quantities of nuclear weapons, which in turn drive how nuclear weapons are designed, manufactured, tested, maintained, deployed, transported, stored, retired, and ultimately dismantled. An estimated 200 distinct individuals contribute to the development, completion, and approval of this plan. And once that plan is completed, herein called the N NSA Program of Record (POR), ensuring that the plan is feasible — that the stockpile work can get done — ensures that the Nuclear Security Enterprise (NSE) can deliver the intended nuclear force posture.
We are asked to look into the improvements for the measurement of Pu of a variety of material types (MT): MT41 (Pu-242, 20 – 60% enriched), MT42 (Pu-242 > 60% enrichment), and MT-82 (Np-237). Many of these are legacy items that were packaged years ago (Fig 1&2), and when the items are re-packaged for long-term storage, they must be re-measured using either NDA (nondestructive analysis methods or radiochemical methods. It is of interest to improve the NDA and radiochemistry to reduce the un-certainty in the measurements, as in the case of larger items (250 g to 2 kg items) the uncertainty in measurements makes it difficult to certify the mass of the material down to the 0.5 g accountability requirement per DOE orders by only doing NDA measurement. It would be of interest to look into methods to improve the detection of these materials, which would not only benefit the weapon manufacturing community, but also has the ability to significantly improve the non-proliferation community.
Hyperspectral imaging is a very promising technology for nuclear proliferation detection. However, due to size and weight restrictions, small hyperspectral platforms such as satellites and small drones lack the on-board computing resources for accurate, real-time analysis of the enormous flow of data that a continuously operating hyperspectral sensor generates. This severely limits satellite systems, which can collect far more data than what they can telemeter, and hinders the ability of all platforms to adapt their missions on the fly in response to observations. This program addresses the hyperspectral data processing challenge through development of new, fast and accurate algorithms that produce data products in real time. The algorithms circumvent the major computational bottlenecks in existing processing streams, and would be incorporated in lightweight, power-efficient single-board computer systems. The toolkit of fast algorithms will be immediately useful in current and future hyperspectral systems being built by the Government and by private industry, including drone-based systems and satellite constellations that acquire timely global imagery.
Nuclear power offers the promise of long-term electrical power for remote areas. Recent advances in passive safety and long-life cores make a reactor that can be operated autonomously for 20 years or more a real possibility. This white paper discusses a reactor concept that offers the potential for further development, resulting in a permanently hermetically-sealed "nuclear cartridge." The term "nuclear cartridge" is meant to imply a nuclear energy source that can be inserted into a site and operated autonomously until its energy has been depleted, then withdrawn and replaced by another cartridge. The concept can be scaled for various sizes, ranging from about 1 megawatt-electric (MWe) to about 100 MWe. The paper also discusses the concept of Integrated Safety, Operations, Security, and Safeguards (ISOSS) by design as it applies to this reactor design. Finally, a discussion of smart grids and how they can benefit the transfer of power to the end user is included. The Nuclear Cartridge concept has been developed with the following characteristics in mind: highly reliable autonomous operation coupled with international monitoring, requiring minimal on-site operations personnel; walkaway passively safe design; cartridge replacement cycle on the order of 20 years; load following capability; physical security by design requiring minimal security personnel during operations; and proliferation resistance by design. As illustrated in figure 1, integrating the reactor with advanced power conversion, smart grids, and other sources of energy results in a resilient and sustainable energy source.
Genomic variation at the sequence level fundamentally affects the phenotypic state of all organisms at all stages of development, while dynamic processes such as changes in the epigenome (e.g. DNA methylation state) and transcriptome regulate the specific phenotype expressed at any given state of development based upon that genomic variation. In plants, DNA methylation is a particularly important mechanism for both regulating transcriptomic expression and for management of genomic variations that could be deleterious to the organism due to the presence of active retrotransposons in plant genomes. While DNA methylation is heritable, it is also dynamic through a given plant’s development and life cycle, particularly during the development from seed to mature specimen suggesting variations in DNA methylation could be critical regulators of biologically and commercially important phenotypes such as time to flowering; in addition, plant DNA methylation is more complex than that of animals, with methylation of CHG and CHH trinucleotides evident in addition to the better-known CG methylation. The complexity of plant DNA methylation and its interplay with genomic sequence variation, transcriptomics and other epigenomic factors demand a storage and analysis framework that can cope with the complexity both within a single specimen and with analyses that span many individuals and even many species, such as attempts to extend models from model organisms to commercially relevant species. In addition to complexity, the rapid development and proliferation of sequencing technology has led to an explosion of data volume that conventional storage and analysis solutions will likely be unable to cope with in the long run. We proposed to study these with suitable distributed storage and computation and therefore for the application of cloud computing to biological analyses; integrate with existing data sources and compatible with virtually any interface use case, from fully automated shell scripts to notebooks and do all these at scale in this STTR grant.
Major disruptive technologies are set to redefine the way in which people view travel, particularly in dense urban areas. Already, ride-hailing services have redefined mobility expectations of a new generation of urban dwellers in some places around the country. Over the next few decades, the proliferation of autonomous vehicles, which are generally referred to in the industry as “automated vehicles (AVs),” will be enhanced by the next generation of shared mobility. This combination of AV operations with on-demand service will provide convenience of mobility similar to that being exhibited in today’s transportation networking companies (TNCs). Shared, automated, public mobility resulting from the cross-hybridization of AVs with on-demand mobility service will bring economic and system efficiencies. Economic efficiencies may be realized by less vehicle ownership and more vehicle “usership.” Many companies are already exploring avenues for shared automated mobility through fleet operations as the wave of the future.
The U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Office of Material Management and Minimization (M 3 ) has developed and is pursuing an integrated approach to address the persistent threat posed by unintentional proliferation of nuclear materials. The NNSA M 3 approach reduces the risk of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium falling into the hands of non-state actors by minimizing the use of and, when possible, eliminating weapons-usable nuclear material around the world. In this geopolitical context, most research and test reactors, both domestic and international, have completed or started a program of conversion from the use of HEU to low-enriched uranium (LEU) as fuel.
Deep convolutional neural networks (DCNNs) currently provide state-of-the-art performance on image classification and object detection tasks, and there are many global security mission areas where such models could be extremely useful. Crucially, the success of these models is driven in large part by the widespread availability of high-quality open source data sets such as Image Net, Common Objects in Context (COCO), and KITTI, which contain millions of images with thousands of unique labels. However, global security relevant objects-of-interest can be difficult to obtain: relevant events are low frequency and high consequence; the content of relevant images is sensitive; and adversaries and proliferators seek to obscure their activities. For these cases where exemplar data is hard to come-by, even fine-tuning an existing model with available data can be effectively impossible. Recent work demonstrated that models can be trained using a combination of real-world and synthetic images generated from 3D representations; that such models can exceed the performance of models trained using real-world data alone; and that the generated images need not be perfectly realistic (Tremblay, et al., 2018). However, this approach still required hundreds to thousands of real-world images for training and fine tuning, which for sparse, global security-relevant datasets can be an unrealistic hurdle. In this research, we validate the performance and behavior of DCNN models as we drive the number of real-world images used for training object detection tasks down to a minimal set. We perform multiple experiments to identify the best approach to train DCNNs from an extremely small set of real-world images. In doing so, we: Develop state-of-the-art, parameterized 3D models based on real-world images and sample from their parameters to increase the variance in synthetic image training data; Use machine learning explainability techniques to highlight and correct through targeted training the biases that result from training using completely synthetic images; and Validate our results by comparing the performance of the models trained on synthetic data to one another, and to a control model created by fine-tuning an existing ImageNet-trained model with a limited number (hundreds) of real-world images.
The Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), with its quinquennial review conferences (RevCons), has become the foundation of the international nonproliferation regime over the course of its 50-year history. With more states parties than any other arms control agreement (currently 191), the Treaty provides a legally binding framework for all states parties, constraining proliferation of nuclear weapons and committing the five recognized states who possess nuclear weapons to work toward disarmament. The NPT has enjoyed wide success in constraining the spread of nuclear weapons. Only one state party has left the agreement and gone on to acquire these weapons, and the overall track record of compliance with IAEA safeguards has been robust. However, for all its effectiveness in the area of nonproliferation, its achievements on the disarmament front have been relatively unimpressive. While the NWS – most notably the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia – have decreased the overall size of their nuclear arsenals significantly since 1970, these arsenals have remained an important feature of NWS security policies. The limited progress towards disarmament has created friction between the NNWS and NWS and has been the source of mounting tension within the NPT regime. The 2020 RevCon, the 50th anniversary of the NPT and 25th anniversary of its indefinite extension, faces a range of contentious challenges, old and new, which call into question the Treaty’s future viability.
The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) for Policy requested that Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory conduct a Congressionally directed study on homeland missile defense, pursuant to Section 1692 of the fiscal year 2020 National Defense Authorization Act. In accordance with the statutory language, this study considers whether the security benefits obtained by deployment of homeland missile defenses of the United States are undermined or counterbalanced by adverse reactions of potential adversaries, and considers the effectiveness of homeland missile defense efforts of the United States to deter the development of ballistic missiles. Almost a half-century has elapsed since the United States and the Soviet Union signed the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, and almost two decades since the former withdrew. Since withdrawing, the United States has sought to develop and deploy a layered missile defense system to defend against regional threats to U.S. and allied interests abroad and to counter limited threats to the U.S. homeland. As such, missile defense supports key national defense policy objectives. Protecting the U.S. homeland, forces abroad, allies, and partners. Deterring attacks against the United States, its allies, and partners. Assuring allies an strengthening U.S. diplomatic activities in peacetime and crisis. We offer five key findings: 1. The primary benefit of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system is the protection it provides the U.S. homeland against a limited but evolving rogue-state missile threat. While this system has never been tested in combat, it appears thus far to have effectively paced North Korea’s development and deployment of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). In the absence of such a defensive capability, the United States would likely have been more heavily exposed to North Korean actions, would have operated at a much higher-risk posture, and would have had less negotiating room with which to navigate coercive tactics and crises. Its allies would have been more concerned about U.S. willingness in time of crisis and war to run the risks of protecting them. The GMD system also serves as a hedge against Iranian breakout. 2. Potential adversaries continue to develop long-range ballistic missiles despite deployment of a U.S. homeland missile defense system. This includes both rogue states and major power rivals whose long-range missile programs predated the deployment of U.S. missile defenses. While North Korea has continued its long-range missile developments and achieved an intercontinental capability, Iran has not yet reached this threshold. The broader proliferation of long-range missiles anticipated in the late 1990s has not materialized. 3. While Russia has used the existence of a U.S. homeland missile defense system as a justification for its substantial and continuing weapon modernization program, neither Russian force modernization nor the limited U.S. homeland missile defense system has altered the strategic balance. Russia has long considered U.S. missile defenses—both theater and homeland—as directed against its strategic forces and as a capability that could rapidly advance, thereby eroding Russian confidence in its nuclear deterrent. Russia’s political and military actions appear excessive and negatively impact areas such as arms control, but they do not undermine the primary benefit of the U.S. system cited in Key Finding 1. 4. China’s expansion and diversification of nuclear and missile forces has been influenced by its concerns about U.S. homeland missile defense, but those concerns are only one of many factors in China’s force planning. Although China’s actions to preserve and expand its assured retaliation prospects have not fundamentally altered the strategic balance, its buildup and lack of transparency about its force modernization goals are troubling. Taken together, the aggregate pattern of China’s modernization activities over the past two decades strongly suggests a concerted effort to develop a modern military force commensurate with its intended geopolitical status. Whatever China’s legacy concerns over the survivability of its strategic nuclear forces, its ability to overwhelm the GMD system appears intact today and will be further strengthened in the years ahead as it continues its long-term modernization program. China’s political and military actions negatively affect U.S. security interests but do not undermine the primary benefit of the U.S. system cited in Key Finding 1. 5. The basic finding that benefits have not so far been undermined by adverse reactions is a function of circumstances that are increasingly in flux. The existing GMD-centered system is under increasing pressure from the pace and scope of North Korean missile deployments. The proposed “layered” system seeks to mitigate this impending capability gap in the near term and to complement future capabilities, such as the Next Generation Interceptor, when they come online. Given the pace of U.S. missile defense developments since 2000, it is possible that adversary advances in capability will outpace the U.S. system’s ability to adapt. Additionally, because this layered system is in principle more readily scaled, it will almost certainly be viewed skeptically by China and Russia. In a context of growing great-power security competition, the Department of Defense (DoD) should consider undertaking a broader net assessment of the U.S., Russian, and Chinese force balance.
In line with the Global Health Security Agenda for Vietnam SNL has successfully engaged in country by ensuring long term sustainability of its programs and building BRM capacity by engaging with Government Institutions and strengthening the national biosafety and biosecurity and also by engaging with academic institutions through Vietnam One Health University Network to educate the One Health Workforce and promote a shared culture of responsibility, reduce dual use risks, mitigate biological proliferation and deliberate use threats.
Declaratory policy and public statements about the potential use of nuclear weapons serve many important roles. They provide an assessment of the security environment, and inform the public debate. These statements also enhance deterrence messages and signals towards adversaries, and reassure allies and partners. On the global level, U.S. declaratory policy has the potential to shape international trends and norms, influence nuclear proliferation, and it may also affect the policy decisions of other nuclear possessors. As the Biden administration reviews the elements of U.S. nuclear declaratory policy, the issue of sole purpose and no-first-use is likely to resurface. Previous administrations have examined these policies in multiple rounds of review, and they decided that the time was not right for such declarations. This literature review was prepared to inform the debate by collecting some of the most prominent articles on the topic that highlight the potential risks and benefits of these policies.
The Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) provides advanced capabilities to simulate the uranium enrichment process to support international negotiations on the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Uranium isotope separation centrifuges connected in a cascade configuration can produce the low-enriched uranium needed for nuclear power. However, those same centrifuges connected in a different configuration can also produce highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons. Having the capability to assess cascade operations and identify nefarious activities promotes the peaceful uses of nuclear energy while restricting nuclear weapons proliferation. DNN R&D's Nonproliferation Stewardship Program Adaptive Computing Environment and Simulations (ACES) project is creating a modern, sustainable ecosystem of physics-based models and data-analytics tools that enables analysts to model uranium enrichment systems, simulate operational scenarios, and apply various policy options to explore potential outcomes.
In FY2018 through FY2020, NA-22, the Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Research and Development Program, funded a Data Science project to develop and implement statistical methodology to effectively host data competitions with the goal of leveraging the opportunity provided by crowdsourcing. By accessing and engaging expertise from a broader research community, there is an opportunity to attract innovative solutions from a variety of different research disciplines to advance the ability to solve important non-proliferation problems. This report summarizes the key results of this project after hosting two data competitions focused on urban radiation detection. The first competition was focused on attracting participants from the U.S. national laboratories, while the second, hosted by TopCoder, was open to the broader international community and awarded prize money to the top 10 competitors. At the start of the project, there was strong interest from NA-22 to explore and develop the capability to host data competitions as a means of leveraging the broader community to solve important nuclear nonproliferation problems. Having a standard data set on which to compare different approaches based on clearly defined criteria was desirable to be able to evaluate the state of solutions for important problems. Initially, it was not clear that it would even be possible logistically and bureaucratically to host a competition with an international field of competitors and to award the prize money needed to attract solutions from top competitors. Happily, a path to host the competitions was ultimately found that allowed this powerful accelerator of improvements to be leveraged.
The Idaho National Laboratory (INL), through its designated mission of advancing innovative nuclear energy solutions, is actively engaged in the research, development, demonstration and deployment of advanced nuclear technology, as well as in fostering private-public partnership for technology development. Key to the success of INL’s mission is the Materials and Fuels Complex (MFC), the only complex in the U.S. that hosts a world-class assemblage of facilities, capabilities and instruments for handling, testing, and characterizing radioactive materials. Driven by its mission/vision of “Engineering and Experiments that Drive the World’s Nuclear Energy Future,” MFC is at the center of INL’s – and indeed the Department of Energy’s – advanced nuclear technology development initiatives, providing essential capabilities such as engineering-scale high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU) fuel production, reactor demonstration facilities, post-irradiation examination, and transient irradiation testing. Furthermore, MFC provides an ideal environment for test beds that are utilized for research, development and demonstration (RD&D) activities on used fuel treatment, nuclear non-proliferation, forensics, and nuclear power sources used for space exploration missions conducted by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA).
Sodium-cooled Fast Reactors (SFRs) present unique challenges for international safeguards. SFRs possess neutron physics characteristics that if configured appropriately could produce more fissile material than consumed. An adversary state may choose to build an SFR, justified by a lack of domestic natural uranium and limited access or interest to procuring uranium from international markets. Once constructed, the state may choose to misuse the SFR for the purpose of diverting fissile plutonium from declared operation. This work shows that a demonstration SFR does not need to be configured as a plutonium breeder to create one Significant Quantity (SQ) of plutonium in a short amount of time (e.g., one to few years). However, such an extreme case of misuse would change the core reactivity in such a way as to be easily indicated by deviations of control rod position compared to declared operation. In this work a contrived SFR demonstration reactor was modeled for the purpose of exploring proliferation scenarios and how such misuse could be detected using the SFR's Reactor Data Acquisition System (RDAS). Typically, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) does not have access to the control rod position, power, thermal, pressure sensing and indicating systems of nuclear power plants. However, this work shows that such data streams can be compared against a parallel detailed simulation model (a Digital Twin) to detect possible misuse.