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This presentation discusses some of the terminology used to model and simulate scenarios for military training.
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This presentation discusses some of the terminology used to model and simulate scenarios for military training.
The military is undergoing a significant transformation as it modernizes for the information age and adapts to address an emerging asymmetric threat beyond traditional cold war era adversaries. Techniques such as traditional large-scale, joint services war gaming analysis are no longer adequate to support program evaluation activities and mission planning analysis at the enterprise level because the operating environment is evolving too quickly. New analytical capabilities are necessary to address modernization of the Department of Defense (DoD) enterprise. This presents significant opportunity to Sandia in supporting the nation at this transformational enterprise scale. Although Sandia has significant experience with engineering system of systems (SoS) and Complex Adaptive System of Systems (CASoS), significant fundamental research is required to develop modeling, simulation and analysis capabilities at the enterprise scale. This report documents an enterprise modeling framework which will enable senior level decision makers to better understand their enterprise and required future investments.
Life Extension Program (LEP) is a program to repair/replace components of nuclear weapons to ensure the ability to meet military requirements. The W78/88-1 LEP encompasses the modernization of two major nuclear weapon reentry systems into an interoperable warhead. Several design concepts exist to provide different options for robust safety and security themes, maximum non-nuclear commonality, and cost. Simulation is one capability used to evaluate the mechanical performance of the designs in various operational environments, plan for system and component qualification efforts, and provide insight into the survivability of the warhead in environments that are not currently testable. The simulation efforts use several Sandia-developed tools through the Advanced Simulation and Computing program, including Cubit for mesh generation, the DART Model Manager, SIERRA codes running on the HPC TLCC2 platforms, DAKOTA, and ParaView. Several programmatic objectives were met using the simulation capability including: (1) providing early environmental specification estimates that may be used by component designers to understand the severity of the loads their components will need to survive, (2) providing guidance for load levels and configurations for subassembly tests intended to represent operational environments, and (3) recommending design options including modified geometry and material properties. These objectives were accomplished through regular interactions with component, system, and test engineers while using the laboratory's computational infrastructure to effectively perform ensembles of simulations. Because NNSA has decided to defer the LEP program, simulation results are being documented and models are being archived for future reference. However, some advanced and exploratory efforts will continue to mature key technologies, using the results from these and ongoing simulations for design insights, test planning, and model validation.
The Internet has changed the world in ways hitherto unknown. The international financial system, air, land and maritime transport systems are all digitally linked. Similarly most militaries are fully or partially networked. This has not only sped up the decision making processes at all levels, it has also rendered these systems vulnerable to cyber-attacks. Cyber-warfare is now recognized as the most potent form of non-kinetic war fighting. In order to prevent large scale network-attacks, cyber-powers are simultaneously spending a lot of time, money and effort to erect redundant cyber-defenses and enhancing their offensive cyber capabilities. Difficulties in creating a stable environment in information-space stem from differing national perceptions regarding the freedom of the Internet, application of international law and problems associated with attribution. This paper discusses a range of Confidence Building Measures that can be created between India and Pakistan in information-space to control malicious cyber behavior and avert an inadvertent war.
Recent discussion of project policy has met with a widespread feeling that important alternatives were not being properly considered. These alternatives will be discussed here from the point of view of research personnel concerned with formulation a laboratory policy based on the wartime experience of Los Alamos. This policy is discussed on the primary assumption that the national investment here in facilities, in tradition, and in the existence of an going research and development laboratory organization ought not to be lightly discarded, but also ought not to be wholly continued without reexamination under the new conditions of peace. Others will discuss this policy more broadly, and others will make the decision of continuation; but the purpose of the present document is to suggest a policy which might help answer the question of what to do with Los Alamos.It is the thesis of this document that fundamental research in fields underlying the military utilization of atomic energy ought to be separated from all development testing and production. It still remains to argue which of these separate functions this mesa should carry out. In the next sections it is proposed to describe what this laboratory can do and what it should stop trying to do, and on this detailed basis a general program is proposed.
In January 1949, Norris Bradbury gave a lecture at the National War College which summarized the progress Los Alamos had made since the end of the war. The transcript of the talk was filed and forgotten until it surfaced fifty years later. It is, perhaps, one of the best summaries of the state of the United States nuclear weapons program in 1949. It is also evidence of how Bradbury saw the future of atomic weapons. It is presented in full, with minor editing, and begins as follows: Since the first use of an atomic bomb on August 5 [sic], 1945, over the city of Hiroshima, Japan, there has been a continual flood of speculation and discussion concerning the effect of this new weapon on military technology. Much of this speculation and discussion has been intelligent and fruitful; much, I regret to say, has had neither of these characteristics. The enormity of the device, in terms of potential destruction and loss of life, and the practical necessity to surround the technical facts with full security restrictions have only combined to make the problem more difficult. At the same time, it is imperative that policymaking personnel in charge of long range national planning know the basic facts concerning atomic weapons and have these facts in a reasonable perspective. This document describes these potentialities in detail.
The Diode-Pumped Alkali Laser (DPAL) system is an R&D effort funded by the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) underway at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). MDA has described the characteristics needed for a Boost Phase directed energy (DE) weapon to work against ICBM-class threat missiles. In terms of the platform, the mission will require a high altitude Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) that can fly in the “quiet” stratosphere and display long endurance – i.e., days on station. In terms of the laser, MDA needs a high power, low size and weight laser that could be carried by such a platform and deliver lethal energy to an ICBM-class threat missile from hundreds of kilometers away. While both the military and industry are pursuing Directed Energy for tactical applications, MDA’s objectives pose a significantly greater challenge than other current efforts in terms of the power needed from the laser, the low size and weight required, and the range, speed, and size of the threat missiles. To that end, MDA is funding two R&D efforts to assess the feasibility of a high power (MWclass) and low SWaP (size, weight and power) laser: a fiber combining laser (FCL) project at MIT’s Lincoln Laboratory, and LLNL’s Diode-Pumped Alkali Laser (DPAL) system.
Mutual vulnerability to strategic forces seems to remain the de facto foundation for strategic stability across the U.S.-Russia and U.S.-China dyadic relationships; This work has suggested the bomber force tasked with delivering the LRSO is characterized by relatively long flight times and rich signature sets which make its use inconsistent with the requirements for a disarming first-strike. Therefore, the LRSO would not be expected to disrupt mutual vulnerability by making a disarming strike more possible or attractive; Even if a stealthy air-launched cruise missile is paired with a stealth bomber aircraft, the signatures associated with bomber generation and aerial refueling from non-stealth tanker aircraft make it unlikely the LRSO could be launched against a peer or near-peer nation-state without advance warning; To the extent a nuclear armed air-launched cruise missile deters would-be U.S. adversaries from nuclear use, maintaining a survivable weapon system is crucial for maintaining that stable deterrent effect. A modern stand-off weapon and stealth delivery platform increase the probability this capability will be maintained in the future against other nations' increasingly capable A2/AD systems; The LRSO has been touted as a flexible option to deter, or conduct should deterrence fail, limited nuclear strikes pursuant to Russia's reported "escalate-to-deescalate" doctrine. The concept of limited nuclear use is still intensely debated, and there is no guarantee that escalation could be controlled even with tailored LRSO employment; The challenge of warhead discrimination has not historically led to a nuclear response to a cruise missile launch, but there is no guarantee that cannot change. Having accurate military intelligence coupled with discerning analysis of the context in which cruise missiles are employed (e.g., how escalated is the conflict, how many missiles have been launched, have there been signatures of strategic force mobilization, or has the nuclear threshold been crossed?) will likely be essential for reducing the danger of misperception. Developing norms and/or communication channels in the aforementioned dyadic relationships may also further these ends. In sum, this work has identified and analyzed many of the major arguments in the debate regarding the LRSO's impact on strategic stability. During this study and survey of other nation's conceptions of strategic stability, it became clear that the LRSO is neither inherently stabilizing or destabilizing; rather, it is one instrument in addition to unambiguous U.S. policy, clear messaging, and signaling of intent that may promote stability by reducing the risk of miscalculation and unintended escalation.
The U.S.Army was prohibited from having atomic weapons until 1949. When President Truman finally conceded that he could not put the nuclear genie back in the bottle he gave the Army permission to pursue nuclear technologies. This presentation relates the efforts of the U.S. Army in their quest to acquire, develop, and deploy specialized nuclear armed systems. Of any service, the U.S. Army by far had the widest range of systems which leads to the most unique, eccentric, and extraordinary nuclear weapons ever constructed. The history of the nuclear Army can only be summed up by commending the skill, the focus, and attentiveness of military organization that for decades developed, maintained, and handled the largest menagerie of nuclear weapons ever amassed in history.
Russia has emerged as an exemplar of an innovative and experimental – though not always completely consistent or successful – alternative approach to information manipulation and control that differs significantly from the more-often discussed Chinese “Great Firewall” system and other approaches with an emphasis on systemic technical censorship. The Russian model relies on a mix of less overt, more plausibly deniable, legalistic, and often non-technical mechanisms to manipulate online information flows, narratives, and framings, to affect and shape public opinion without resort to universal censorship. The government uses surveillance, a panoply of vague laws, the prosecution or censorship of exemplars, proxy actors and hard to track extra-legal pressures, hacking and leaks, and a heavy emphasis on content production and manipulation to influence narratives and shape public opinion. This model for the domestic control of information not only fits with Russia’s own political system, but is likely to prove more resonant and easier to emulate across many other countries in which a systematic-censorship approach is not technologically or politically feasible. The learning and experimentation involved in this type of domestic information manipulation also has direct applicability to the use of information operations in international political and military competition. The future of this model will likely depend on continuing innovation, not least on the leveraging of advances in artificial intelligence and big data analysis. If successful, however, this might look very different from the future of information control in China – and have significantly different repercussions for democracies and the international system.
Assessing impact of high-altitude electromagnetic pulses (HEMP) resulting from the effects of nuclear weapons is a problem of great concern. Some previous studies have estimated the extent and duration of an outage to be severe. In this report, we quantify the extent and duration of an outage resulting from HEMP E1 to the best of our ability given existing knowledge and tools. Our analysis focuses on the impact to civilian consumer of electricity as opposed to the impact on military responsiveness.
The EPA has declared phase-out of Trinitrotoluene (TNT) a priority due to toxicity concerns. LANL and the Army Research Laboratory created a melt-castable next generation high performance explosive to replace TNT. They invented bis(1,2,4-oxadiazole)bis(methylene) dinitrate, or BOM, a higher-performing, safer replacement, which is 50% more energetic than TNT. BOM is less toxic to produce and use than TNT. Unlike competitors, BOM requires no performance-enhancing additives. BOM could replace TNT in a variety of civilian and military applications. BOM has been synthesized at the multi-kilogram scale.
This document provides training examples to provide users practice in using the tool. Detailed instructions on how to use the tool can be found in the User Manual (SAND2015-6028).The Contingency Contractor Optimization project is intended to address former Secretary Gates’ mandate in a January 2011 memo and DoDI 3020.41 by delivering a centralized strategic planning tool that allows senior decision makers to quickly and accurately assess the impacts, risks, and mitigation strategies associated with utilizing contract support. Based on an electronic storyboard prototype developed in Phase 2, the CCOT-P engineering prototype was refined in Phase 3 of the OSD ATL Contingency Contractor Optimization project to support strategic planning for contingency contractors. CCOT-P uses a model to optimize the total workforce mix by minimizing the combined total costs for the selected mission scenarios. The model will optimize the match of personnel groups (military, DoD civilian, and contractors) and capabilities to meet the mission requirements as effectively as possible, based on risk, cost, and other requirements.
Over the past two decades, the cyber domain has emerged and evolved into a key strategic domain for nations across the globe. Security strategies are espoused by heads of state that focus on how to manage the increasingly enormous, crosscutting impact that the cyber domain has on national security across economic, military, intelligence, intellectual property, and countless other facets. These strategies frequently evolve, and even change entirely, as leaders adapt to new technologies and administrations change. Even if these strategies did not change at all, they would take inordinate amounts of time to effectively implement within the organizational structures of government. The time required to go from setting department and agency-level goals, to the time small teams have well-oiled processes and expertise to accomplish tactical objectives that meet the strategic vision is lengthy. With near certainty, by the time objectives and vision are implemented, the landscape, strategy, or both has changed entirely. While this churn will likely never cease due to the rapidly changing nature of the cyber domain, this problem raises an important question: can governmental structures be organized to rapidly adapt to changing cyber strategies? As offices responsible for particular missions in cyberspace shuffle about within the bureaucracy, are technical capabilities enabled or enhanced? No matter how advanced a particular technical capability is or how adept the staff is at solving problems, they will be ineffective if placed haphazardly within the organization: the right authorities may not exist for their office, the correct lines of interpersonal communication may not be established properly, or insufficient resources have not been allocated to effectively deploy a brilliant technical solution. This concept of organizational agility in the context of national cyber capabilities is important when taking into account the National Defense Strategy’s emphasis on cyber capability and the ability of the United States to compete and rapidly adapt to new challenges posed by rivals. As a nation, we are at a point where technology evolves rapidly enough to warrant thoughtful and nimble changes to the bureaucratic structures that support how cyber operations are carried out. Taking these questions and cross-comparing them to the organizational structures across China, Russia, and the United States provides for an interesting thought experiment. As non-democratic regimes, China and Russia have differing priorities and internal power dynamics than the United States and thus organize their governments differently. By combining known and broadcasted strategies of these nations with the observed technical capabilities demonstrated in the public domain, we can begin to see how organizational structures map to strategic goals and directly enable technical capabilities. Insight can be gained by introducing organizational structures into traditional analysis focusing solely around strategies and capabilities; additionally, otherwise unknown capabilities or intents might be discovered or inferred by analyzing organizational structures alone. Analyzing cyber operations from this oft-overlooked perspective could potentially provide useful insight and more concrete actions that can be undertaken to realize the National Defense Strategy’s goals.
On December 15-17, 2020, the Center for Global Security Research (CGSR) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) hosted a workshop titled “The 2021 Defense Strategy Review and Modern Strategic Conflict.” This session was the 7 th Annual Deterrence Workshop that CGSR organized, bringing together participants drawn across the policy, military, and technical communities of the United States and its allies. The workshop examined the challenges of regional wars and multi-domain competition and how a potential 2021 defense strategy review should address them. A special attention was paid to the question of escalation and how it can be controlled at various levels of conflict.
On June 8-10, the Center for Global Security Research (CGSR) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) hosted a workshop titled “Fit for Purpose? The U.S. Nuclear Posture in 2030 and Beyond.” This session brought together participants drawn across the policy, military, and technical communities. The workshop aimed to examine the existing modernization plans, the challenges that might obstruct their implementation, and the new deterrence requirements that might emerge in the future, in light of the modernization efforts of Russia and China.
On February 19-20, the Center for Global Security Research (CGSR) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) hosted a workshop titled “Nuclear Risk Reduction in an Era of Major Power Rivalry.” This session brought together participants drawn across the policy, military, and technical communities. Among the participants, there were experts from allied countries in Europe and the Asia-Pacific region, as well as experts from Russia and China.
On July 8-10, the Center for Global Security Research (CGSR) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) hosted a workshop titled “The Next U.S. Strategic Posture – And the Posture After Next.” This session brought together participants drawn across the policy, military, and technical communities in the United States and among allies. The event was a follow-up discussion to CGSR’s last meeting titled “Fit for Purpose? The U.S. Nuclear Posture in 2030 and Beyond.” The July workshop had a broader scope and looked at the different elements of U.S. strategic posture, including not just nuclear capabilities but missile defense, conventional prompt global strike, and space and cyberspace. Participants assessed the 2030 U.S. posture relative to the predicted Russian and Chinese postures, and they examined what capabilities will be crucial beyond 2030.