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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2019

Radiation Hardness Assurance: Evolving for NewSpace

During the past decade, numerous small satellites have been launched into space, with dramatically expanded dependence on advanced commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) technologies and systems required for mission success. While the radiation effects vulnerabilities of small satellites are the same as those of their larger, traditional relatives, revised approaches are needed for risk management because of differences in technical requirements and programmatic resources. While moving to COTS components and systems may reduce direct costs and procurement lead times, it undermines many cost-reduction strategies used for conventional radiation hardness assurance (RHA). Limited resources are accompanied by a lack of radiation testing and analysis, which can pose significant risks—or worse, be neglected altogether. Small satellites have benefited from short mission durations in low Earth orbits with respect to their radiation response, but as mission objectives grow and become reliant on advanced technologies operating for longer and in harsher environments, requirements need to reflect the changing scope without hindering developers that provide new capabilities.

Radiation Hardness Assurance (RHA)↗
DOE OSTI2024

Viscosity Measurements of the HLW APPS Glasses

The U.S. Department of Energy is responsible for building the Hanford Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) at the Hanford site in Washington to remediate 56 million gallons of radioactive waste historically stored in 177 underground tanks. The Office of River Protection has requested that the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) contribute in areas of recognized capabilities and expertise for glass waste form development to support successful startup of the WTP. SRNL support of this work is defined in the Task Technical and Quality Assurance Plan.1 This report provides results from viscosity measurements on a series of simulated nuclear waste glasses designed and fabricated at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL). The glasses were designated the high-level waste – Aspen Process Performance Simulation (HLW-APPS) study glasses. The data provided in this report is to be used in the development, validation, and implementation of enhanced property/composition models for nuclear waste glasses.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
NASA NTRS1999

NASA Lewis Launch Collision Probability Model Developed and Analyzed

There are nearly 10,000 tracked objects orbiting the earth. These objects encompass manned objects, active and decommissioned satellites, spent rocket bodies, and debris. They range from a few centimeters across to the size of the MIR space station. Anytime a new satellite is launched, the launch vehicle with its payload attached passes through an area of space in which these objects orbit. Although the population density of these objects is low, there always is a small but finite probability of collision between the launch vehicle and one or more of these space objects. Even though the probability of collision is very low, for some payloads even this small risk is unacceptable. To mitigate the small risk of collision associated with launching at an arbitrary time within the daily launch window, NASA performs a prelaunch mission assurance Collision Avoidance Analysis (or COLA). For the COLA of the Cassini spacecraft, the NASA Lewis Research Center conducted an in-house development and analysis of a model for launch collision probability. The model allows a minimum clearance criteria to be used with the COLA analysis to ensure an acceptably low probability of collision. If, for any given liftoff time, the nominal launch vehicle trajectory would pass a space object with less than the minimum required clearance, launch would not be attempted at that time. The model assumes that the nominal positions of the orbiting objects and of the launch vehicle can be predicted as a function of time, and therefore, that any tracked object that comes within close proximity of the launch vehicle can be identified. For any such pair, these nominal positions can be used to calculate a nominal miss distance. The actual miss distances may differ substantially from the nominal miss distance, due, in part, to the statistical uncertainty of the knowledge of the objects positions. The model further assumes that these position uncertainties can be described with position covariance matrices. With these, and some additional simplifying assumptions, a closed-form solution for the probability of collision is obtained. This solution provides clear insights into how each of the independent parameters affects the probability of collision. It shows that for a given maximum probability of collision and prior knowledge of the objects position uncertainties and sizes, only knowledge of the nominal closest approach distance is required to make the launch/no launch decision. The model was completed and used for the mission assurance COLA analysis for the Cassini spacecraft, which was launched on a Titan IV/Centaur rocket on October 15, 1997. Although the model was specifically developed for the Cassini mission, it is clearly applicable for other launches as well. The effect of COLA closures on the launch window is shown. The bar represents the entire 140-min launch window on October 15, 1997; the blackened areas represent the loss of launch opportunities due to the potential for a collision with an orbiting object.

Bollenbacher, Gary↗
NASA NTRS1996

Development of Design Standards and Guidelines for Electromagnetic Compatibility and Lightning Protection for Spacecraft Utilizing Composite Materials

Preliminary design guidelines necessary to assure electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) of spacecraft using composite materials, are presented. A database of electrical properties of composite materials which may have an effect on EMC is established. The guidelines concentrate on the composites that are conductive but may require enhancement to be adequate for EMC purposes. These composites are represented by graphite reinforced polymers. Methods for determining adequate conductivity levels for various EMC purposes are defined, along with the methods of design which increase conductivity of composite materials and joints to adequate levels.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2006

Safety and Mission Assurance Knowledge Management Retention: Managing Knowledge for Successful Mission Operations

Knowledge Management is a proactive pursuit for the future success of any large organization faced with the imminent possibility that their senior managers/engineers with gained experiences and lessons learned plan to retire in the near term. Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) is proactively pursuing unique mechanism to ensure knowledge learned is retained and lessons learned captured and documented. Knowledge Capture Event/Activities/Management helps to provide a gateway between future retirees and our next generation of managers/engineers. S&MA hosted two Knowledge Capture Events during 2005 featuring three of its retiring fellows (Axel Larsen, Dave Whittle and Gary Johnson). The first Knowledge Capture Event February 24, 2005 focused on two Safety and Mission Assurance Safety Panels (Space Shuttle System Safety Review Panel (SSRP); Payload Safety Review Panel (PSRP) and the latter event December 15, 2005 featured lessons learned during Apollo, Skylab, and Space Shuttle which could be applicable in the newly created Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV)/Constellation development program. Gemini, Apollo, Skylab and the Space Shuttle promised and delivered exciting human advances in space and benefits of space in people s everyday lives on earth. Johnson Space Center's Safety & Mission Assurance team work over the last 20 years has been mostly focused on operations we are now beginning the Exploration development program. S&MA will promote an atmosphere of knowledge sharing in its formal and informal cultures and work processes, and reward the open dissemination and sharing of information; we are asking "Why embrace relearning the "lessons learned" in the past?" On the Exploration program the focus will be on Design, Development, Test, & Evaluation (DDT&E); therefore, it is critical to understand the lessons from these past programs during the DDT&E phase.

Johnson, Teresa A.↗
NASA NTRS1979

Biomedical systems analysis program

Biomedical monitoring programs which were developed to provide a system analysis context for a unified hypothesis for adaptation to space flight are presented and discussed. A real-time system of data analysis and decision making to assure the greatest possible crew safety and mission success is described. Information about man's abilities, limitations, and characteristic reactions to weightless space flight was analyzed and simulation models were developed. The predictive capabilities of simulation models for fluid-electrolyte regulation, erythropoiesis regulation, and calcium regulation are discussed.

Source record↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Space Transformation -- Localizing the Remote and Connecting the Isolated

In motivating the Space Transformation theme for this year’s 4S symposium, the organizers provided the following context, “Transformation of economies are driven by a change in values and accelerated by new technologies.” These words rang particularly true when I read them at the beginning of the holiday season. Like so many others, I was in the early phases of my Christmas shopping procrastination campaign, and I’d just been reflecting on how Amazon Prime was the transformational tool I’d been waiting for. Basic limiting principles of time and space, supply and demand, were all but erased by the Amazon Prime phenomenon. Coupled with emerging 3D printing and other adaptive manufacturing technologies, a transformation from deliberate planning to “think it … have it” had occurred, empowering me to procrastinate longer than I’d ever dreamed possible. The organizers went on to ponder, “Will space transformation also affect society?”, just as our team at the Air Force Research Lab’s (AFRL) Center for Rapid Innovation (CRI) were working alongside partners within our larger Integrated Capabilities Directorate, NASA’s Flight Opportunities and Small Spacecraft Technology programs, and DARPA’s Luna-10 program to develop technologies and execute demonstration missions that leverage the space domain to genuinely connect even the most remote and austere domains on the timeline of need. Picking apart the miracle that is Amazon prime, where does the model fail, and why? More relevantly to the theme of this year’s symposium, how can the space domain be used to overcome its limitations and minimize its weaknesses? Perhaps it is best assessed in the context of Use Cases. What are the Amazon delivery cost, schedule, and cargo limiters to the Amundsen-Scott South Pole Research Station, or the Lunar South Pole Research Station? This paper will explore enabling infrastructure that allows Amazon prime to thrive and assess the transformational enabling technologies that would be necessary to extend that miracle to the truly remote or the truly austere. Localizing the Remote • First, it will evaluate the ability of the on-going AFRL Rocket Cargo and Space Initiatives Ringside Seats systems, coupled with Astrobotic’s Xodiak and Xogdor capabilities, developed to support the NASA Flight Opportunities Program (FOP), to supply orbital/suborbital delivery to both improved and austere sites on the Earth and Moon. • Then, it will add the surface terminal distribution leg, with an examination of Lunar Outpost’s Mobile Autonomous Prospecting Platform (MAPP), equipped with Mobile Autonomous Robotic Swarm (MARS) software, and Intuitive Machine’s Hopper, developed with support of AFRL and NASA’s Commercial Lunar Payload Services (CLPS) program. Connecting the Isolated From there, it will focus on the destination, asking what implied destination services are required to support highly assured autonomous delivery. • Specifically, it will highlight Astrobotic’s Skymage mesh-networked publish and subscribe communication and navigation service, as well as AFRL’s on-going developments of radioisotope and reactor nuclear-sourced thermoelectric power generation and distribution systems under development under the Joint Emergent Technology Supplying On-orbit Nuclear Power (JETSON) program by Lockheed Martin, Westinghouse, Intuitive Machines, and Zeno Power, to provide the power service to locations well off the grid. • Finally, the paper will connect to the “human machine”. What connects the remote or in-situ human consumer to the remote domain? What connects the diverse international government and commercial services to each other? The former will focus on AFRL’s OraCloud feeding their Space Defense Control and Characterization System (SDCCS) and Lunar Station’s MoonHacker systems, while the latter will focus on the BlueHalo/Tensor LunX Technology Platform for the Cislunar Commodity Marketplace. In 1984, Krafft Ehricke famously remarked that, “If God wanted man to become a spacefaring species, He would have given man a Moon.” This paper is not about the Moon, but is about humans as a spacefaring species, shedding the pesky land/air limitations of the Amazon Prime model … so that we can all live a procrastinator’s “think it … have it” existence.

Charles Finley↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Verification and Validation of Safety-Critical Aircraft Systems Operating under Off-Nominal, Contingency, and Emergency Conditions

Verification and validation (V&V) of safety-critical technologies developed for loss of control (LOC) prevention and recovery and other aviation safety concerns pose significant challenges. Aircraft LOC can result from a wide spectrum of hazards, often occurring in combination, which cannot be fully replicated during evaluation. Technologies developed for LOC prevention and recovery must therefore be effective under a wide variety of hazardous and uncertain conditions, and the verification and validation of these technologies must provide some measure of assurance that the new vehicle safety technologies do no harm (i.e., that they themselves do not introduce new safety risks). V&V technologies must also enable the identification of system limitations and constraints, as well as enable the identification of safe and unsafe operating conditions (and their boundaries). Additionally, the V&V of complex, increasingly autonomous systems is a fundamental concern. Scalable, reproducible and cost-effective techniques for the assurance of safety critical systems during their design and operation is a key barrier to fielding new systems or updating current systems. Moreover, these techniques need to provide artifacts that enable a comprehensive evidence-based approach to certification. This briefing summarizes research performed under NASA’s Aviation Safety Program and follow-on research for the V&V of safety-critical aircraft system technologies developed for LOC prevention and recovery and increasingly autonomous systems, and for a broad assurance capability in both current and emerging aviation applications. Note that, in this briefing, the term “validation” refers to a confirmation that the system implementation (e.g., algorithms etc.) is performing the intended function(s), as well as an affirmation of effectiveness in these functions. “Verification” refers to a confirmation that the system implementation in the software and hardware meets its (hopefully validated) specifications (e.g., correctly executes algorithms as designed).

Validation↗
NASA NTRS2016

Enabling Science and Deep Space Exploration through Space Launch System (LSL) Secondary Payload Opportunities

For the first time in almost 40 years, a NASA human-rated launch vehicle has completed its Critical Design Review (CDR). By reaching this milestone, NASA's Space Launch System (SLS) and Orion spacecraft are on the path to launch a new era of deep space exploration. NASA is making investments to expand science and exploration capability of the SLS by developing the capability to deploy small satellites during the trans-lunar phase of the mission trajectory. Exploration Mission 1 (EM-1), currently planned for launch no earlier than July 2018, will be the first mission to carry such payloads on the SLS. The EM-1 launch will include thirteen 6U Cubesat small satellites that will be deployed beyond low earth orbit. By providing an earth-escape trajectory, opportunities are created for advancement of small satellite subsystems, including deep space communications and in-space propulsion. This SLS capability also creates low-cost options for addressing existing Agency strategic knowledge gaps and affordable science missions. A new approach to payload integration and mission assurance is needed to ensure safety of the vehicle, while also maintaining reasonable costs for the small payload developer teams. SLS EM-1 will provide the framework and serve as a test flight, not only for vehicle systems, but also payload accommodations, ground processing, and on-orbit operations. Through developing the requirements and integration processes for EM-1, NASA is outlining the framework for the evolved configuration of secondary payloads on SLS Block upgrades. The lessons learned from the EM-1 mission will be applied to processes and products developed for future block upgrades. In the heavy-lift configuration of SLS, payload accommodations will increase for secondary opportunities including small satellites larger than the traditional Cubesat class payload. The payload mission concept of operations, proposed payload capacity of SLS, and the payload requirements for launch and deployment will be described to provide potential payload users an understanding of this unique exploration capability.

Singer, Jody↗
NASA NTRS1994

Budget estimates: Fiscal year 1994. Volume 1: Agency summary

The NASA FY 1994 budget request of $15,265 million concentrates on (1) investing in the development of new technologies including a particularly aggressive program in aeronautical technology to improve the competitive position of the United States, through shared involvement with industry and other government agencies; (2) continuing the nation's premier program of space exploration, to expand our knowledge of the solar system and the universe as well as the earth; and (3) providing safe and assured access to space using both the space shuttle and expendable launch vehicles. Budget estimates are presented for (1) research and development, including space station, space transportation capability development, space science and applications programs, space science, life and microgravity sciences and applications, mission to planet earth, space research and technology, commercial programs, aeronautics technology programs, safety and mission quality, academic programs, and tracking and data advanced systems; and (2) space operations, including space transportation programs, launch services, and space communications.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS1999

JPL process for tailoring mission assurance to specific projects

This document identifies a processs for tailoring Mission Assurance (MA) activities to JPL flight projects. These MA activities are to be accomplished during appropriate phases of projects involved in design, development, test, fabrication, launch and mission operations. MA is the responsibility of all participants on a project; it enhances their contribution to the success of the mission.

mission assurance↗
NASA NTRS2006

Structural Requirements for the Space Propulsion Engine Systems

In January 2004, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) was given a vision for Space Exploration by President Bush, setting our sight on a bold new path to go back to the Moon, then to Mars and beyond. As NASA gets ready to meet the vision set by President Bush, failures are not an option. Reliability of the propulsion engine systems will play an important role in establishing an overall safe and reliable operation of these new space systems. A new standard, NASA-STD-5012, Strength and Life Assessment for Space Propulsion System Engines, has been developed to provide structural requirements for assessment of the propulsion systems engine. This standard is a complement to the current NASA-wide standard NASA-STD-5001, Structural Design and Test Factors of Safety for Spaceflight Hardware, which excluded the requirement for the engine systems (rotatory structures) along with pressure vessels. As developed, this document builds on the heritage of the multiple industrial standards related to strength and life assessment of the structures. For assuring a safe and reliable operation of a product and/or mission, establishing a set of structural assessment requirements is a key ingredient. Hence, a concentrated effort was made to improve the requirements where there are known lessons learned during the design, test, and operation phases of the Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) and other engine development programs. Requirements delineated in this standard are also applicable for the reusable and/or human missions. It shall be noted that "reliability of a system cannot be tested and inspected but can only be achieved if it is first designed into a system." Hence, these strength and life assessment requirements for the space propulsion system engines shall be used along with other good engineering practices, requirements, and policies.

Aggarwal, Pravin K.↗
NASA NTRS1991

Selenia: A habitability study for the development of a third generation lunar base

When Apollo astronauts landed on the Moon, the first generation of lunar bases was established. They consisted essentially of a lunar module and related hardware capable of housing two astronauts for not more than several days. Second generation lunar bases are being developed, and further infrastructure, such as space station, orbital transfer, and reusable lander vehicles will be necessary, as prolonged stay on the Moon is required for exploration, research, and construction for the establishment of a permanent human settlement there. Human life in these habitats could be sustained for months, dependent on a continual flow of life-support supplies from Earth. Third-generation lunar bases will come into being as self sufficiency of human settlements becomes feasible. Regeneration of water, oxygen production, and development of indigenous construction materials from lunar resources will be necessary. Greenhouses will grow food supplies in engineered biospheres. Assured protection from solar flares and cosmic radiation must be provided, as well as provision for survival under meteor showers, or the threat of meteorite impact. All these seem to be possible within the second decade of the next century. Thus, the builders of Selenia, the first of the third-generation lunar bases are born today. During the last two years students from the School of Architecture of the University of Puerto Rico have studied the problems that relate to habitability for prolonged stay in extraterrestrial space. An orbital personnel transport to Mars developed originally by the Aerospace Engineering Department of the University of Michigan was investigated and habitability criteria for evaluation of human space habitats were proposed. An important finding from that study was that the necessary rotational diameter of the vessel has to be on the order of two kilometers to ensure comfort for humans under the artificial gravity conditions necessary to maintain physiological well being of passengers, beyond the level of mere survival.

Source record↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

An Approach for Defining IASMS Services, Functions, and Capabilities

Assuring safety in the NAS with the inclusion of new entrants, such as Advanced Air Mobility (AAM), will require overcoming unique safety challenges that result from combining innovative technologies with novel airspace concepts for moving people and cargo using autonomous vehicles. The focus of the In-time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS) is to overcome AAM’s safety assurance challenges. The IASMS Concept of Operations (ConOps) describes an interconnected set of services, functions, and capabilities (SFCs) designed to manage operational risks, identify unknown risks, and inform system designs. This paper describes an approach for defining SFCs based on technology trends in research, assessment of known and unknown risks in voluntary safety reports, and causal and contributing factors in aviation accidents and incidents. This approach would identify potential SFCs that further expand the Monitor, Assess, and Mitigate (M-A-M) functionality that represents the enabling framework of the IASMS. Safety implications that will result from integration of AAM in the transformation of the National Airspace System (NAS) were addressed in National Academies committees reports on AAM and IASMS. Development of a ConOps for IASMS was a top recommendation and can be represented as a reframing of safety assurance that builds on real-time alerting such as the Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System, and adds the more encompassing in-time temporal parameter in recognition of the different timelines for collecting and assessing safety data for risk mitigations. For example, mining for safety trends from data sources such as the Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing system occurs over a longer time period. Research on AAM operations poses that SFCs can be designed to monitor the safety margin appropriate for AAM including with regards to the distance between current flight parameters and nominal ideal conditions. These in-time comparisons will become more complex as the density of operations increases at least in certain areas and can include planned and actual 4D trajectory, and in-time comparisons having implications on conflict modeling and prediction including expected and actual departure time, fix/waypoint crossing times, and arrival time. These comparisons would be integrated as part of SFCs that redefine and inform new safety margin. An increased safety margin improves management of operational risks while reducing the potential for anomalies. An increased safety margin also has implications for operator confidence in the certainty of its operations and trust in automation. Technology trends in research could be used to refine existing SFCs and define needs for additional SFCs that provide safety improvements to the design and operation of vehicles, airspace design, and operator performance requirements. NASA is developing innovative approaches to safeguard against major accidents and incidents that have occurred in the NAS and those anticipated with the inclusion of envisioned AAM operations. The innovations use operational performance data to monitor, detect, and predict flight variations exceeding safe nominal patterns, such as would be caused by navigational error, severe weather complications, or hijacking of UAS controls. These innovative approaches have high potential to prevent accidents and incidents in the new AAM era. It is anticipated that elements of the innovations will evolve into SFCs for the IASMS. Voluntary safety reports can be monitored to identify anomalies related to design or operational performance risks. Reports could be periodically monitored and assessed for specific topics. Reports might serve as weak signals or precursors indicative of emergent risk such as when combined with other safety information. The architecture could include SFCs that are based on voluntary safety reports recognizing the periodic temporal nature of data analysis. As previously mentioned, aviation accidents with their causal and contributing precursors can inform the need for SFCs in the IASMS. Accidents and incidents at San Francisco International Airport such as Asiana 214 and Air Canada 759 illustrate how combinations of different factors lead to increased risk. These types of precursors and different factors have implications on the types of SFCs that could be needed to monitor and manage different sources and types of design and operational risk. Continuing to assure the safety of AAM as designs and operations gain in complexity can be accompanied by defining SFCs that also increase in complexity. These SFCs can leverage information from findings and recommendations synthesized across on-going research, voluntary safety reports, and accident and incident reports. These SFCs can serve to refine accuracy of algorithms and resolve limitations with current practices. The IASMS architecture represents the framework for the SFCs and their critical role in safety assurance.

In-Time Aviation Safety Management System↗
NASA NTRS1998

MSFC Optical Metrology: A National Resource

A national need exists for Large Diameter Optical Metrology Services. These services include the manufacture, testing, and assurance of precision and control necessary to assure the success of large optical projects. "Best Practices" are often relied on for manufacture and quality controls while optical projects are increasingly more demanding and complex. Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) has acquired unique optical measurement, testing and metrology capabilities through active participation in a wide variety of NASA optical programs. An overview of existing optical facilities and metrology capabilities is given with emphasis on use by other optical projects. Cost avoidance and project success is stressed through use of existing MSFC facilities and capabilities for measurement and metrology controls. Current issues in large diameter optical metrology are briefly reviewed. The need for a consistent and long duration Large Diameter Optical Metrology Service Group is presented with emphasis on the establishment of a National Large Diameter Optical Standards Laboratory. Proposals are made to develop MSFC optical standards and metrology capabilities as the primary national standards resource, providing access to MSFC Optical Core Competencies for manufacturers and researchers. Plans are presented for the development of a national lending library of precision optical standards with emphasis on cost avoidance while improving measurement assurance.

Burdine, Robert↗
DOE OSTI2021

WOMBAT (Windfarm Operations and Maintenance cost-Benefit Analysis Tool) WISDEM® [SWR-21-68]

The windfarm operations and maintenance cost-benefit analysis tool (WOMBAT) is software to simulate the operations and maintenance phase of either onshore or offshore windfarms. WOMBAT is a medium-fidelity tool that is designed to model turbine, cable, and substation failures at the subassembly level, but is flexible enough that individual component or asset-level modeling can also be performed. WOMBAT enables users to model technological improvements, the use of a wide range of service equipment from drone repairs and remote resets to heavy lift vessels and crawler cranes, to analyze cost trends with varying trade-offs in conjunction with energy production, availability and a growing range of metrics. This library provides a tool to simulate the operation and maintenance phase (O&M) of distributed, land-based, and offshore windfarms using a discrete event simulation framework. WOMBAT is written around the SimPy discrete event simulation framework. Additionally, this is supported using a flexible and modular object-oriented code base, which enables the modeling of arbitrarily large (or small) windfarms with as many or as few failure and maintenance tasks that can be encoded. Please note that this is still heavily under development, so you may find some functionality to be incomplete at the current moment, but rest assured the functionality is expanding. With that said, it would be greatly appreciated for issues or PRs to be submitted for any improvements at all, from fixing typos (guaranteed to be a few) to features to testing. Also available at: https://pypi.org/project/wombat/

Cooperman, Aubryn↗
NASA NTRS1973

Medical operations: Crew surgeon's report

To assure the safety and well being of the Skylab environment simulation crewmembers it was necessary to develop a medical safety plan with emergency procedures. All medical and nonmedical test and operations personnel, except those specifically exempted, were required to meet the medical standards and proficiency levels as established. Implemented programs included health care of the test crew and their families, occupational medical services for chamber operating personnel, clinical laboratory support and hypobaric and other emergency support.

Ross, C. E.↗
NASA NTRS1978

Standardized development of computer software. Part 2: Standards

This monograph contains standards for software development and engineering. The book sets forth rules for design, specification, coding, testing, documentation, and quality assurance audits of software; it also contains detailed outlines for the documentation to be produced.

Tausworthe, R. C.↗