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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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DOE OSTI2026

JUSTIFI: Open-Source Software for Identifying and Quantifying Non-Energy Benefits

The integration of Non-Energy Benefits (NEBs) into energy efficiency initiatives is essential for operational excellence in manufacturing. This presentation and software demonstration explore how quantifying NEBs such as improved safety, increased quality, and enhanced productivity, can strengthen business cases for energy investments, leading to better payback periods and alignment with organizational goals. We introduce JUSTIFI, a free, open-source software by the U.S. Department of Energy that aids in the measurement of NEBs and enhances understanding of their impact on Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) and return on investment (ROI). JUSTIFI features an intuitive interface for identifying NEBs, customizable reporting tools, and comprehensive system cataloging, empowering companies to effectively communicate the value of energy efficiency projects. By leveraging this innovative tool, organizations can better navigate energy efficiency assessments and drive support for their energy management initiatives.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗
DOE OSTI2023

Precursor Analysis Report: Ryuk Ransomware Attack on Universal Health Services 2020

The Ryuk Ransomware Attack on Universal Health Services (UHS) 2020 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about the 2020 UHS cyber attack and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed in the attack. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. UHS manages over 400 hospitals and is one of the largest healthcare providers in the United States with 3.5 million patients each year. On 27 September 2020, UHS suffered a widespread ransomware attack that resulted in a denial of service to critical internet-dependent healthcare systems including workstations, phones, and data centers. Employees resorted to filing patient details with pen and paper, while other facilities had to redirect ambulances and urgent patients to other facilities for adequate care. Adversaries carried out the attack with Ryuk, a ransomware that encrypts data and generates a RyukReadMe.txt ransom note with the ransom fee to decrypt the data, varying from 15 Bitcoin (BTC) to 50 BTC, equivalent to roughly $\$$353,892 to $\$$964,617. UHS did not pay the ransom and was able to recover data through backups, but still reported an impact of $\$$67 million dollars in recovery costs. On 29 October, one month after the attack, UHS made an official statement that their systems had been restored and they were resuming normal operations. Researchers and analysts identified 18 unique techniques (used in a sequence of 19 steps) utilized during the attack with a total of 185 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Fourteen of the identified techniques used during the UHS cyber attack were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 106 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 82 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the 30 days to two hours preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2023

Precursor Analysis Report: JBS Foods Ransomware Attack 2021

The JBS Foods 2021 Ransomware Attack Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about the JBS ransomware cyber attack and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed in the attack. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. In late May 2021, one of the world’s largest meat producers, JBS Foods, announced they had fallen victim to a worldwide ransomware attack, later found to be REvil ransomware. In the United States alone, JBS Foods accounts for nearly 25% of beef and roughly 20% of pork production. Adversaries initially launched a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack on the company’s Information Technology (IT) networks in Australia, but the attack impacted operations in Brazil, Canada, and the United States, as well. The attack caused plant operations in all four countries to shut down for at least one day. All nine of the U.S. meatpacking plants temporarily shut down because of the attack. The adversaries initially demanded a $\$$22 million ransom for the company’s data, but later negotiated the ransom down to $\$$11 million even after JBS Foods restored most of their systems. JBS Foods eventually paid the $\$$11 Million for reassurance from the adversaries that none of their customers’ data would be compromised in the future. Despite its short duration, the attack still caused large stocks of meat to spoil. The incident also underscored how adversaries can simultaneously compromise and move laterally through global subsidiaries of an organization. Researchers and analysts identified 22 unique techniques (in a sequence of 21 steps) utilized during the attack with a total of 361 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Sixteen of the identified techniques used during the JBS Foods cyber attack were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 308 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 163 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the 75 days preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2023

Precursor Analysis Report: SQL Slammer Worm Infection of Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Plant 2003

The SQL Slammer Worm Infection of Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Plant 2003 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about Davis-Besse’s 2003 cyber attack and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed in the attack. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. On 25 January 2003, the SQL Slammer worm infected more than 90% of vulnerable hosts and crashed the internet in 10 to 15 minutes, making it one of the fastest spreading worms in history. SQL Slammer is a fileless, memory-resident worm that remotely exploits a stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability on local hosts to intensively scan and rapidly self-propagate across the internet. The worm infected approximately 300,000 unpatched hosts running Microsoft Structured Query Language (SQL) Server 2000 or Microsoft Desktop Engine (MSDE) 2000 with SQL Server Resolution Service. The SQL Slammer worm indirectly infected FirstEnergy’s Davis-Besse nuclear power plant by first infecting a consultant’s company network server and then propagating through an external misconfigured connection into Davis-Besse’s site network. The infection caused major network congestion, slow performance, data overloads, and the inability of local hosts to communicate with each other, which eventually caused a loss of availability and a loss of view when the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) and Plant Process Computer (PPC) crashed. At the time of the infection, the plant was already offline, the digital monitoring systems had redundant analog backups, and the plant control and safety functions were not affected, so there were no concerns of a safety breach. However, this incident resulted in many lessons learned and spawned important discussions about cybersecurity’s role in nuclear safety and electric power reliability regulation, policy, and guidance. Researchers and analysts identified 10 unique techniques utilized during the attack with a total of 640 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Eight of the identified techniques used during Davis-Besse cyber attack were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 596 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 428 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the 331 days preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2025

Precursor Analysis Report: Blackmatter Ransomware Attack on New Cooperative 2021

The BlackMatter Ransomware Attack on New Cooperative 2021 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about the New Cooperative cyber attack and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed in the attack. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. The BlackMatter ransomware was first identified in July 2021 and is reported to have infected more than 50 corporations around the world. , The Iowa-based grain cooperative, New Cooperative, was impacted by the BlackMatter ransomware on or before 18 September 2021. The adversary likely resided on New Cooperative’s networks for 15 days prior to encrypting its network and demanding New Cooperative pay $5.9 million in ransom by 25 September to unlock systems and prevent 1 terabyte (TB) of sensitive data from being publicly released. It is not clear if New Cooperative paid the ransom. The full impact of the ransomware attack is not known; however, according to New Cooperative’s general manager, the attack caused the company’s automated processes to revert back to processes used in the 1970s. , As of 6 October, only 50 percent of New Cooperative’s operations were utilizing automated processes. The company took eight weeks to rebuild the entire network and information technology (IT) systems from the ground up, which puts the date of fully recovery around 13 November. Researchers and analysts identified 20 unique techniques utilized during the attack with a total of 404 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Seventeen of the identified techniques used during the New Cooperative cyber attack were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 360 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 284 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the 15 days preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2023

Precursor Analysis Report: Industroyer2 and Wiper Malware Targeting Ukrainian Energy Provider 2022

The Industroyer2 and Wiper Malware Targeting Ukrainian Energy Provider 2022 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about the Industroyer2 cyber attack and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed in the attack. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. An adversary attempted to cause a blackout in Ukraine in April 2022 by using the Industroyer2 malware against a regional Ukrainian energy provider. The adversary targeted eight high-voltage electrical substations and utilized the malware in tandem with disk wipers for Windows, Linux, and Solaris operating systems in an attempt to make response and recovery efforts more difficult. The adversary reused a piece of the original Industroyer malware designed to open circuit breakers and de-energize target substations. The adversary gained initial access to the victim’s enterprise network through unknown means in February 2022 and was able to perform reconnaissance, pivot to the operations network, and reside in the system for at least 51 days. This gave the adversary a detailed understanding of the environment and allowed them to customize the Industroyer2 malware to the victim’s operations network. However, defenders detected and stopped the attack before the adversary could achieve their intended impact. Had the Industroyer2 attack been successful, it could have caused a blackout for more than two million people during the early stages of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Researchers and analysts identified 22 unique techniques (used in a sequence of 31 steps) utilized during the attack with a total of 297 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Twenty-three of the identified techniques used during the Industroyer2 cyber attack were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 224 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 122 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the 51 days preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2022

Precursor Analysis Report: Industroyer Targeting Ukraine Electric Power Transport Utility (Ukrenergo) 2016

The Industroyer Targeting Ukraine Electric Power Transport Utility (Ukrenergo) 2016 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about the December 2016 cyber attack against the Ukrainian Ukrenergo electric transmission utility and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed in the attack. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. Industroyer is a modular malware framework designed to deploy several Industrial Control System (ICS) protocol-specific attack payloads to disrupt electricity distribution. Adversaries deployed Industroyer within the target network on a Microsoft Windows endpoint capable of directly manipulating or communicating with ICS. Industroyer abuses the functionality of a targeted ICS’s legitimate control system to achieve its intended impact. Adversaries likely first gained access to Ukrenergo enterprise networks in early 2016 after a successful spearphishing campaign against organizations in the electric power sector. Adversaries then began capturing credentials beginning on 1 December 2016. This allowed access to the ICS environment at the Pivnichna electric transmission substation outside Kyiv through a device dual-homed on the Information Technology (IT) and ICS networks. Adversaries conducted discovery, targeting, and access to this device using information and previously captured credentials from compromised enterprise IT machines. Finally, the adversaries deployed and launched the Industroyer malware just before midnight on 17 December. By midnight, Ukrenergo had lost control of a targeted substation, resulting in electric power outages for over an hour in the city of Kyiv and the Kyiv region. Researchers and analysts identified 31 unique techniques (used in a sequence of 33 steps) utilized during the attack with a total of 846 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Twenty-nine of the identified techniques used during the Industroyer cyber attack were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 548 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 353 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the 300 days preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2022

Precursor Analysis Report: Conti Ransomware Attack on the Health Service Executive of Ireland 2021

The Conti Ransomware Attack on the Health Service Executive (HSE) of Ireland 2021 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about the attack and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed by the adversary. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. The HSE provides public healthcare corporate services and operational services throughout Ireland, with critical functions including the acute national ambulance service, acute hospital service, and community healthcare service. On 14 May 2021, Conti ransomware encrypted 80 percent of the HSE’s Information Technology (IT) infrastructure across corporate, hospital, community, and electronic health record services. Conti is a ransomware-as-a-service operation that encrypts local files, uses double extortion against victims, and is facilitated by many intrusion tools. The attack forced the HSE to shut down its entire IT infrastructure to contain the ransomware, forcing employees to revert to pen and paper recordkeeping and leading to the cancellation of many appointments and procedures. The adversary also exfiltrated 700 GB of data, compromising the confidentiality of patients’ protected health information. Had the adversary targeted the COVID-19 cloud systems or operational technology assets, such as Internet of Medical Things medical devices or smart building management systems, the impact of the attack would almost certainly have been far more severe. Researchers and analysts identified 21 unique techniques (used in a sequence of 23 steps) likely utilized during the attack with a total of 1,185 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Twenty-one of the identified techniques used during the attack on the HSE were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 1,086 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 850 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the 57 days preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2022

Precursor Analysis Report: Cyber Attack on Thyssenkrupp Blast Furnace 2014

The Cyber Attack on Thyssenkrupp Blast Furnace 2014 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about the Thyssenkrupp Steel Mill cyber attack and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed in the attack. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. In December 2014, the German Government’s Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) released a report detailing a cyber attack on a German steel mill that occurred earlier that year, though exact dates and details of the attack were not revealed. While the report did not specify the name of the company, multiple sources identified the victim as one of Europe’s largest steel manufacturers, Thyssenkrupp AG. Further, Thyssenkrupp announced on 16 May of that year that Europe’s largest blast furnace, “Schwelgern 2,” located at its facility in Duisburg, Germany, would be offline for several weeks for repairs and upgrades, suggesting Schwelgern 2 was likely the target of the attack. The attack began in early 2014, when adversaries infiltrated the victim steel mill’s Information Technology (IT) network via a spearphishing campaign, then worked their way into the Operational Technology (OT) environment, where they executed software that caused denial of service, denial of control, and eventually a loss of control. This led to the blast furnace shutting down without proper safety procedures, resulting in catastrophic physical damage. No lives were lost in the incident, but ThyssenKrupp suffered $4 million in damage to the blast furnace and an additional $6 million in lost revenue. The adversaries required specialized knowledge and expertise in steel production, which enabled them to compromise a variety of internal systems and components across both IT and OT networks. The attack also demonstrated detailed knowledge of the industrial control systems (ICS) and production processes being used. This combination resulted in one of the earliest known publicly reported cybersecurity incidents resulting in physical damage to ICS equipment. Researchers and analysts identified 19 unique techniques (used in a sequence of 20 steps) utilized during the attack with a total of 454 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Fifteen of the identified techniques used during the Thyssenkrupp cyber attack were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 369 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 316 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the 120 days preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2022

Precursor Analysis Report: Doppelpaymer Ransomware Attack on Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX) 2019

The DoppelPaymer Ransomware Attack on Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX) 2019 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about the PEMEX cyber attack and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed in the attack. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. The 2019 DoppelPaymer ransomware attack on PEMEX, Mexico’s nationalized petroleum corporation, highlights a unique threat that ransomware and cybercriminal extortion poses to Operational Technology (OT) environments in critical infrastructure. The incident began with an employee downloading commodity malware that allowed adversaries to gain initial access to PEMEX’s enterprise environment. After conducting privilege escalation, tool ingress, and data exfiltration, the adversaries deployed DoppelPaymer ransomware throughout the PEMEX enterprise environment, resulting in the company having to take dozens of systems offline for at least several days. Although PEMEX stated that their operations were not affected, the data exfiltrated from PEMEX was made available for download on DoppelPaymer’s leak site, as well as on other illicit criminal forums. This stolen data included not only company information, but also sensitive OT-specific configuration data. This incident showcases how cybercriminal exfiltration and posting of sensitive OT architecture documentation can pose security concerns for the targeted organization for years due to the long lifespan of OT assets and architectures. Researchers and analysts identified 18 unique techniques utilized during the attack with a total of 190 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Fifteen of the identified techniques used during the DoppelPaymer ransomware attack were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 163 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 34 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the 60 days preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2022

Precursor Analysis Report: Remote Access Attack on Oldsmar Water Treatment Facility 2021

The Remote Access Attack on Oldsmar Water Treatment Facility 2021 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about the Oldsmar cyber attack and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed in the attack. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. On 5 February 2021, an adversary gained unauthorized remote access to Bruce T. Haddock Water Treatment Plant in Oldsmar, Florida, which provides treated water to 15,000 customers. The adversary accessed the facility’s Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) workstation and human machine interface (HMI) to change the chemical concentration of sodium hydroxide, commonly referred to as lye and used to regulate acidity levels, from 100 parts per million (PPM) to 11,100 PPM. The chemical was raised to lethal levels that if ingested could lead to serious soft tissue damage, burns, or even death. The facility, however, had redundancies and alarms in place to alert personnel of dangerous chemical levels, and facility officials stated it would have taken 24 to 36 hours for the chemical changes to affect the water supply. Researchers and analysts identified six unique techniques utilized during the attack with a total of 23 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Four of the identified techniques used during the Oldsmar cyber attack were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 21 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 20 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the minutes preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2025

DOE Repository Metadata Profile (DRMP): A Metadata Framework for Advancing Interoperability and AI Readiness Across Scientific Repositories

The Department of Energy (DOE) funds a diverse and distributed ecosystem of repositories that steward scientific data, publications, and software across its research programs, user facilities, and national laboratories. While significant progress has been made in standardizing dataset-level metadata, the metadata describing repositories themselves (their identity, governance, access interfaces, policies, and technical capabilities) remains inconsistent and fragmented across DOE-funded systems. This variability limits discoverability, interoperability, automated validation, and AI-driven analysis, all of which are increasingly essential for modern scientific workflows. To address this gap, the DOE Data Curation Working Group (DCWG) developed the DOE Repository Metadata Profile (DRMP). The DRMP is a practical, community-driven framework that defines how repositories can describe themselves in a consistent, machine-actionable, and scalable manner. The DRMP is not a new metadata schema. Instead, it is a mapping profile and structured element set capturing the essential characteristics of DOE repositories. It harmonizes repository-level metadata across six widely adopted community schemas: RE3Data; DCAT-US v3; Schema.org; Dublin Core; DataCite 4.6; and PREMIS 3.0. This harmonization eliminates reinvention and enables interoperability within DOE and across the broader scientific ecosystem. A core objective of the DRMP is to reduce burden on repositories by allowing them to reuse their existing metadata through a Rosetta-style crosswalk rather than redesigning local implementations. The profile introduces a three-level conformance model that supports incremental adoption: • Level 1 – Minimum Viable Record (MVR): foundational identification elements required for workflows, project registration, and basic repository presence. • Level 2 – Interoperable: structured metadata enabling alignment with national and international discovery systems. • Level 3 – AI-Ready: enhanced provenance, policy transparency, fixity, semantic context, and capabilities that support automated reasoning, model training governance, and machine-assisted curation. To support implementation, the DRMP includes JSON Schema definitions, OpenAPI patterns, and MCP templates that allow repositories to publish machine-readable metadata directly within existing platforms. These resources are modular and lightweight, enabling adoption without major architectural change. Adopting the DRMP enables repositories to: • Enhance discoverability and interoperability by aligning identifiers, classifications, and descriptive elements across widely used schema standards. • Support federated discovery and cross-registration across DOE systems, Data.gov, and international catalogs. • Enable AI agents and workflow orchestration systems to interpret repository-level metadata within the American Science Cloud (AmSC) through Model Context Protocol (MCP)-based context publication. • Demonstrate alignment with DOE’s open science, stewardship, and FAIR data priorities. This guidance represents a community-driven step forward. Through voluntary adoption and continued feedback, the DRMP advances a cohesive, machine-actionable description of DOE repositories that supports FAIR data practices, preparing the infrastructure for AI-enabled research, and strengthening the discoverability and reuse of DOE’s scientific outputs.

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗
DOE OSTI2026

A Play-Based Exploration of CO 2 Storage in the Illinois Basin (Final Technical Report)

This report documents the results of "A Play-Based Exploration of CO₂ Storage in the Illinois Basin" (DE-FE0032366), a project funded by the U.S. Department of Energy Office of Fossil Energy and Carbon Management and conducted by the Illinois State Geological Survey (ISGS) at the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign in partnership with Visage Energy. The project adapted play-based exploration (PBE), a systematic basin-scale evaluation methodology from the petroleum industry, to screen areas of Illinois for commercial geologic carbon storage (GCS) in Cambro-Ordovician strata. The traditional play concept was expanded to encompass three play element groups, subsurface geologic factors, surface features, and societal factors, yielding 24 play elements with defensible suitability criteria applied through a five-tier classification scheme. An integrated geospatial database was assembled from ISGS, MGSC, MRCI, NATCARB, and public data sources, supported by significant data-improvement work including correction of legacy well locations, digitization of more than 1,300 well construction records using the DOE CATALOG team's OGRRE tool, compilation of a statewide 2D seismic database, and production of a refined fault and fold geodatabase.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2026

DrEVL Radiometer Calibration

This report details the calibration procedures that were used for the spectral and radiometric part of the DrEVL radiometers. Our goal was to develop a highly repeatable and low cost spectral radiometer that could be deployed at numerous sites to collect a catalog of lightning data. Maximizing the re-usability of that data requires a well-calibrated instrument.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗
DOE OSTI2026

Improving the Performance of NEML2 with Modern Graph Compilation Backends

NEML2 vectorizes constitutive-model evaluation for large-scale multiphysics simulation, using PyTorch as its tensor backend so that a batch of material-point updates runs on CPU or GPU through a single implementation. In the two prior reports in this series it was a C++-native library, deployed through TorchScript tracing and just-in-time (JIT) compilation; it has since been rewritten from the ground up into a Python-native library deployed through Ahead-of-Time Inductor (AOTInductor), a modern PyTorch graph-compilation backend. The rewrite is driven by a persistent tension, not a language preference: NEML2 composes constitutive models at runtime from a registry of small, independently-authored pieces, and that flexibility is difficult to reconcile with the compile-time knowledge an efficient GPU kernel needs. This report documents the rewrite and the investment that accompanied it: the AOTInductor export pipeline that turns a Python-authored model into a portable, Python-free compiled artifact loadable from pure C++; the eager and compiled runtimes and the new implicit solver layer built on them; a head-to-head benchmark of legacy JIT against AOTInductor; the physics-model catalog and its worked examples; the developer tooling; and the corresponding overhaul of MOOSE’s NEML2 integration that lets MOOSE consume it. A central objective is to examine whether modern PyTorch graph-compilation backends are effective for MOOSE GPU integration. The benchmark answers directly: AOTInductor outperforms legacy JIT on every GPU scenario measured, by 1.0–4.5×. Modern graph-compilation backends are effective for MOOSE GPU integration, and AOTInductor specifically – not compilation in the abstract – is why.

Hu, Gary (Tianchen) [Argonne National Laboratory (↗
DOE OSTI2023

Hydropower Energy Storage Capacity (HESC) Dataset

The Hydropower Energy Storage Capacity (HESC) Dataset catalogs characteristics that are relevant to evaluating reservoir storage and estimates of energy storage capacity based on varying levels of detail. Hydropower dams and reservoirs were included based on information from the National Inventory of Dams (NID; USACE, 2021) and Global Reservoir and Dam (GRanD v1.3) and Existing Hydropower Assets datasets. These data provide a foundation for understanding available resources at existing hydropower facilities and their potential to provide storage of energy and more flexible generation. Estimates of energy storage capacity include: • Level 1 – nominal energy storage capacity based on maximum storage capacities and hydraulic head • Level 2 – nominal energy storage capacity based on historical models or observations of reservoir volume and hydraulic head. These estimates are provided based on capacity from the entire historical period as well as monthly values. • Level 3 – modeled energy generation based on volume-elevation relationships, historical storage, observed/modeled inflows, and hydraulic capacity of turbines and calculated both as overall and on a monthly basis. • Level 4 – modeled energy generation incorporating information from Level 3 and operational constraints. For facilities where installed capacity is known, there are also estimates for discharge duration (the length of time when a facility could provide generation at a given capacity).

13 HYDRO ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2020

Where do $AMS-02$ anti-helium events come from?

We discuss the origin of the anti-helium-3 and -4 events possibly detected by AMS-02. Using up-to-date semi-analytical tools, we show that spallation from primary hydrogen and helium nuclei onto the ISM predicts a anti-helium-3 flux typically one to two orders of magnitude below the sensitivity of AMS-02 after 5 years, and a anti-helium-4 flux roughly 5 orders of magnitude below the AMS-02 sensitivity. We argue that dark matter annihilations face similar difficulties in explaining this event. We then entertain the possibility that these events originate from anti-matter-dominated regions in the form of anti-clouds or anti-stars. In the case of anti-clouds, we show how the isotopic ratio of anti-helium nuclei might suggest that BBN has happened in an inhomogeneous manner, resulting in anti-regions with a anti-baryon-to-photon ratio of one in a thousand of the baryon-to-photon ratio. We discuss properties of these regions, as well as relevant constraints on the presence of anti-clouds in our Galaxy. We present constraints from the survival of anti-clouds in the Milky-Way and in the early Universe, as well as from gamma-ray observations. In particular, these require the anti-clouds to be almost free of normal matter. We also discuss an alternative where anti-domains are dominated by surviving anti-stars. We suggest that part of the unindentified sources in the 3FGL catalog can originate from anti-clouds or anti-stars. AMS-02 and GAPS data could further probe this scenario.

79 ASTRONOMY AND ASTROPHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2021

A search for spectral hardening in HAWC sources above 56 TeV

The High Altitude Water Cherenkov (HAWC) Observatory is a wide-field-of-view gamma-ray observatory that is optimized to detect gamma rays between 300 GeV and several hundred TeV. The HAWC Collaboration recently released their third source catalog (3HWC), which contains 65 sources. One of these sources, the ultra-high-energy gamma-ray source 3HWC J1908+063, may exhibit a hardening of the spectral index at the highest energies (above 56 TeV). At least two populations of particles are needed to satisfactorily explain the highest energy emission. This second component could be leptonic or hadronic in origin. If it is hadronic in origin, it would imply the presence of protons with energies up to ~1 PeV near the source. We have searched other 3HWC sources for the presence of this spectral hardening feature. If observed, this would imply that the sources could make good PeVatron candidates.

79 ASTRONOMY AND ASTROPHYSICS↗