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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 757 records · Page 42

Precision calibration of calorimeter signals in the ATLAS experiment using an uncertainty-aware neural network

The ATLAS experiment at the Large Hadron Collider explores the use of modern neural networks for a multi-dimensional calibration of its calorimeter signal defined by clusters of topologically connected cells (topo-clusters). The Bayesian neural network (BNN) approach not only yields a continuous and smooth calibration function that improves performance relative to the standard calibration but also provides uncertainties on the calibrated energies for each topo-cluster. The results obtained by using a trained BNN are compared to the standard local hadronic calibration and to a calibration provided by training a deep neural network. The uncertainties predicted by the BNN are interpreted in the context of a fractional contribution to the systematic uncertainties of the trained calibration. They are also compared to uncertainty predictions obtained from an alternative estimator employing repulsive ensembles.

72 PHYSICS OF ELEMENTARY PARTICLES AND FIELDS↗

Los Alamos National Laboratory SAVY-4000 Field Surveillance Plan Update for 2020

The Packaging Surveillance Program section of the Department of Energy (DOE) Manual 441.1-1, Nuclear Material Packaging Manual (DOE 2008), requires DOE contractors to “ensure that a surveillance program is established and implemented to ensure the nuclear material storage package continues to meet its design criteria.” The Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) SAVY-4000 Field Surveillance Plan was first issued in fiscal year (FY) 2013. The surveillance plan is reviewed annually and updated as necessary based on SAVY-4000 surveillance findings, as well as results of the lifetime extension studies. Five surveillance plan updates have been issued, one in 2014, one in 2016, one in 2017, one in 2018, and one in 2019. This 2020 update documents what was actually done in 2019 and what is planned for 2020. Deviations from the 2019 surveillance plan were necessary because some of the planned surveillance containers were not available for examination. The goal of the surveillance program is to provide data to: evaluate container component performance over time against the initial baseline qualification; validate the current SAVY container design life; provide data for future design life extensions of components as indicated; identify indications of container degradation early and identify similar containers and/or contents that may need remediation; maintain and continuously improve the surveillance information system that documents the complete life cycle of the containers including the initial production baseline, usage history, surveillance, and disposition; identify container issues related to wear and tear that could indicate the need for a maintenance program for in-service containers prior to the end of the design life.

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SAVY-4000 Corrosion Evaluation Plan

Nuclear material packages, with few exceptions, outside of an approved engineered contamination barrier must meet packaging, surveillance, and testing requirements designed to protect workers from airborne contamination per Department of Energy (DOE) Manual 441.1-1, Nuclear Material Packaging. The SAVY-4000 containers were developed at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) in conjunction with Nuclear Filter Technology Inc. (NFT Inc.) as a general purpose vented manually-compliant container system for staging and storage of plutonium for LANL and the DOE complex. The SAVY-4000 containers have a 316L stainless steel containment barrier, which was selected based on its corrosion resistant properties. These containers were approved for use in 2014 with a five-year design life; LANL requested and DOE has approved lifetime extension from 5 to 15 years. The 10-year lifetime extension was proposed as a conservative recommendation based on the corrosion observations for the metal components in surveillance and results from laboratory studies. Extensive accelerated aging studies have been done on the SAVY-4000 O-ring with very little evidence of significant degradation when subjected to aggressive elevated temperature and radiation conditions. Therefore, our current conservative lifetime estimate for the O-ring and the filter is 40 years at 80°C. Additional work is ongoing in a phased approach to further extend the design life of the Manual compliant SAVY-4000 storage container; the limiting component for further life extension is still the 316L containment barrier.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Comparative Approach for Evaluating the Containment Performance of Legacy NM Storage Containers

Many different types of nuclear material storage containers are used throughout TA-55 and specifically PF-4, in some instances these containers are used outside of engineering control barriers in most cases these barriers are gloveboxes. When a container is used outside of a glovebox or open front hood the container itself is relied upon as the primary engineering control barrier for the user. For this reason a process must be established in order to evaluate Non- Manual Compliant or NMC containers used outside of a glovebox in a comparative approach against Manual compliant containers. Legacy containers are typically understood to be non-standards packaged prior to 1998. For the purposes of this document “legacy” refers to any non-Manual compliant containers.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Proposal for a Hagan Container Surveillance Plan

This white paper proposes a Hagan-specific surveillance plan. Currently, Hagan containers are examined on an ad hoc basis as part of the SAVY-4000 surveillance plan. Given the size, aging horizon, and unique potential failure mechanisms of the Hagan population, the authors believe there is a need to have a Hagan-specific surveillance plan.

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Guide for Joint Participation in a DOE Complex Wide SAVY-4000 Surveillance Program

This document describes LANL Storage Program best practices when working with other User Sites to implement DOE M441.1-1 Manual requirements through the use of the SAVY nuclear material packaging system. It is a Manual directive for Field Element Managers to review and approve the SAVY-4000 container series design (with supporting technical basis) as a packaging system for use at their respective sites. This review and approval incorporates an evaluation of the User Site methodology for SAVY surveillance and the process for documenting its nuclear materials storage program. This document aims to assist the Field Element Mangers and User Sites in the processes necessary to credit LANL SAVY surveillance for key elements of the User Site surveillance plan.

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Surveillance Report on SAVY 4000 and Hagan Nuclear Material Storage Containers Update for FY2020

A Surveillance Program is in place to assess how nuclear material storage containers at LANL are aging in-service. This program is guided by the LANL Surveillance Plan which is required by DOE M441.1-1. The plan is modified as necessary to ensure that any issues identified during surveillance or laboratory studies are examined in future surveillances, and that any lifetime implications are taken into account. Under the plan, overall container integrity is evaluated by a combination of visual inspections and photographs. Multiple measurements are made to assess the SAVY 4000 performance, including, helium leakage rate, O-ring hardness (durometer), O-ring compression set, filter performance and filter water resistance. The containers for surveillance are chosen annually based on the previous surveillance program results and observations. The surveillance plan targets items believed to provide the greatest challenge to the SAVY 4000 container integrity.

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A Compilation of Historical Data on Hagan Drop Testing with Results

The Hagan nuclear material storage container was designed in the late 1990’s to provide a robust container for daily use, safe transport within the plutonium facility PF-4, and storage of nuclear material for up to twenty years. There are currently >3000 loaded Hagan containers in use at TA-55. The majority of these are in the TA-55 vault, but they are also used in safes and in floor locations on the main floor of PF-4. The original design criteria are given below

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Evaluation of the Los Alamos Nuclear Material Packaging Risk Ranking Method

Repackaging nuclear material into robust containers to protect workers and the public has been ongoing at LANL and around the DOE complex for nearly two decades. The number of containers at LANL is around 5,000; limited resources for repackaging material has led to extended repackaging campaigns and the need to prioritize repackaging. Various methodologies have been used to prioritize the repackaging efforts and to demonstrate progress in risk reduction over time (e.g., Boerigter, 1997). The 2000-1 DNFSB recommendation recognized the limited DOE resources for repackaging, and acknowledged the need to “prioritize and schedule tasks to be undertaken with available funds according to consideration of risks.” Later, in DNFSB recommendation 2005-1, in addition to recommending that DOE develop a packaging standard, the Board recommended that “Characterization information should also be used to develop a surveillance program prioritized according to expected material and container risk (including, for example, material type, material form, and the age and type of container).” In response to requests and recommendations from the DOE and DNSFB to prioritize according to worker risk, a risk ranking method based on the potential consequence of dropping a container from 3 meters was developed in 2007 (Smith, 2007) and updated in 2014 (Hoffman, 2014). Various LANL implementation plans for repackaging were developed over the years using this methodology (Stone, 2014). Currently, this method is utilized in conjunction with an algorithm to mitigate programmatic risk to prioritize container repackaging and material processing (Prochnow, 2015). The purpose of this study is to document how the current risk ranking method works, how it is used and potential limitations.

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Thermal Evaluation of the SAVY-4000 1 Quart Container at High Heat Loads

The SAVY-4000 Safety Analysis Report (SAR) was published in 2013 which established the design life of the container series through physical testing that meets applicable requirements from DOE M 441.1-1, Nuclear Material Packaging Manual. One critical requirement in DOE M 441.1-1 is to set a maximum heat load for the entire series to ensure that throughout the lifetime of the container, each of the components still performs within manufacture specifications. The original maximum decay heat limit has been defined within the SAVY-4000 SAR, which was accomplished by completing a series of tests that heat loaded the SAVY-4000 series and measured the steady state temperature and graded it against manufacture specifications. The container series is comprised of a corrosion resistant 316L stainless steel containment boundary, ceramic composite filter for the prevention of radiological particulate release and a chemically stable O-ring made of Viton ® . Currently, the SAVY 4000 maximum decay heat load is set at 25 Watts and the heat load expected during normal handling and storage is considered sufficient that the SAVY 4000 container requirements will not be the limiting factor for storage of most common material in use at TA-55, e.g. weapons grade oxide, americium, Pu-238 oxide and encapsulated heat sources. The SAVY 4000 lifetime was originally set as 5 years within the SAVY-4000 SAR, but in July 2019 the lifetime was extended to 15 years through a technical basis justification approved by the Department of Energy (DOE) Los Alamos Field Office. The 25 Watt limit applies to all SAVY 4000 container sizes; 1-quart, 2-quart, 3-quart, 5-quart, 8-quart, 12-quart, 5-gallon, and 10-gallon.

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2021 Hagan Container Surveillance Plan

Prior to 2021, Hagan containers were examined on an ad hoc basis as part of the SAVY-4000 surveillance plan. Given the size, aging horizon, and unique potential failure mechanisms of the Hagan population, the authors identified the need for Hagan-specific surveillance (Kelly, et al., 2020) and have developed this surveillance plan to meet that need.

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Los Alamos National Laboratory SAVY-4000 Field Surveillance Plan (Update for 2021)

The Packaging Surveillance Program section of the Department of Energy (DOE) Manual 441.1- 1, Nuclear Material Packaging Manual (DOE 2008), requires DOE contractors to “ensure that a surveillance program is established and implemented to ensure the nuclear material storage package continues to meet its design criteria.” The Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) SAVY-4000 Field Surveillance Plan was first issued in fiscal year (FY) 2013. The surveillance plan is reviewed annually and updated as necessary based on SAVY-4000 surveillance findings, as well as results of the lifetime extension studies. Six surveillance plan updates have been issued, one in 2014, one in 2016, one in 2017, one in 2018 one in 2019 and one in 2020. This 2021 update documents what was actually done in 2020 and what is planned for 2021. Deviations from the 2020 surveillance plan were necessary because some of the planned surveillance containers were not available for examination.

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Rules of Use Report Engineering evaluations of nuclear material storage containers against the packaging requirements at TA-55

A set of obligations in the yearly storage container surveillance program, ensures that a retrospective approach is applied with loaded containers in inventory to confirm compliance with all “users” to ensure nuclear material storage container requirements are being followed. Validation that packaged containers are properly used, within a specific set of container types prescribed “bounding conditions of use,” is based on meeting requirements as identified in operating procedures associated with TA55-DOP-091, TA-55 Nuclear Material Packaging, and PA-RD-01022, Nuclear Material Packaging Requirements. The surveillance plan obligation requires the application of local area nuclear material accountability software or (LANMAS) to produce queries. The data queries are used to assess attributes of containers in storage these investigations are conducted on a bi-annual basis. This rules of use (ROU) compliance process ensures proper usage of storage containers as containment systems and therefore provides effective worker protection. It is structured as a supporting effort by implementing aspects of PA-AP-01207, Nuclear Material Container Safety Management at TA-55.

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Empirical Estimates of Transmission Value using Locational Marginal Prices [Slides]

This study focuses on one potential benefit of transmission infrastructure—congestion relief. It explores historical grid conditions from 2012 through the first half of 2022, and evaluates the marginal value of transmission in facilitating trade within and across regional boundaries by calculating differences in observed nodal wholesale power prices. The study finds that wholesale power prices exhibit stark geographic differences that, in many cases, are stable over time. Many regional and interregional transmission links have significant potential economic value from reducing congestion and expanding opportunities for trade. In fact, many links have hourly average pricing differences in 2021 that exceeded $\$15$/MWh—equivalent to $130 million per year for a 1000 MW link. The value of transmission is correlated with overall energy prices and varies by region and year. Critically, extreme conditions and high-value periods play an outsized role in the value of transmission, with 50% of transmission’s congestion value coming from only 5% of hours. Transmission planners run the risk of understating the benefits of regional and interregional transmission if extreme conditions and high-value periods are not adequately considered. These periods are natural features of actual market operations. As such, the study highlights the need for planners to more-comprehensively assess the value of transmission under both normal and extreme conditions.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Water-Resistant Container Testing CNUT INGB Container Design (Rev. 1)

The purpose of this report is to detail the results of water ingress testing conducted on the 5Qt Castle Nut In-Glovebox (5QtCNUT INGB) container design and discuss these results against the water-resistant container requirements of TA55-AP- 522 and PA-RD-01009. The CNUT is a general-purpose container option for material storage inside of a glovebox and/or as an approved non-hermetically sealed inner of an approved packaging configuration inside of an approved outer container as listed in PA-RD-01022. The CNUT containment boundary consists of a filtered lid and deep drawn body with welded collar all made of 316L stainless steel, an aluminum bronze spin down ring to provide compression of a to Viton® O-ring to create a seal for closure and containment.

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Lifetime extension drop-test of real-world corroded 5 Quart Hagan nuclear material storage container

A 5Qt Hagan container with a 20-year history of nuclear material storage was challenged with three successive drop tests at a height of 3.7 meters. The total mass of the test package was 12.1 kg. The 1st and 2nd drop tests (center of gravity over the container bottom corner but 180 degrees apart on the container bottom face) passed the pre- and post- impact helium leak criterion at less than 1.00E-6 atm-cc/sec (ambient cubic centimeters per second). The 3rd and final test (center of gravity over top corner) failed with a post-impact gross leak of 1.1E-1 atmcc/sec. The RRFMC (Respirable Release Fraction Measurement Chamber) is a drop tower test system that is critical for the sustainability of the SAVY-4000™ series and Hagan-type (NFT Inc. Golden CO) nuclear material storage containers. These are the primary in-use nuclear material storage container types at the Los Alamos National Laboratory TA-55 facility. Results are presented to expand the technical knowledge basis for container lifetime, regarding actual exposure to corrosive gas species on the container inner surfaces. The primary source of general corrosion throughout the container is gaseous hydrogen chloride (HCl). This gas is generated by the degradation of the polyvinylchloride (PVC) bag-out bag. Additionally, in most cases, the nuclear material itself also releases HCl gas (due to residual chemical components associated with the material formation). The RRFMC drop tower gives the end-user the ability record and analyze high-speed video and photography and if needed aerosol mass release measurements. In this report the principal issue is the physical deformation of the 5Qt Hagan container. There were no mass release experiments of test aerosol mass in the present study.

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