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At least 739 records · Page 41

LLGOMAX: Enhancing Industry-Standard Tools for AC Optimal Unit Commitment (CRADA Final Report)

This was a collaborative effort between Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC ("LLNS"), as manager and operator of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory ("LLNL") and ECCO International Inc. ("Participant"). The team designed and implemented a new approach for the Security-Constrained Alternating-Current Unit Commitment (SCACUC) problem. The SCACUC problem is a mathematical optimization problem that decides which generating units should be online and how much power should be produced (and consumed) at each point of the power grid. The decisions are made so as to minimize the total cost of supplying electricity while respecting technical constraints of the power grid, both under normal and emergency conditions. The team developed a solution for SCACUC as specified in the ARPA-E Grid Optimization Competition (GOC) Challenge 3, which put forth a forward-looking version of the problem, which many features not present in today’s electricity market specifications for SCACUC.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Los Alamos National Security, LLC Request for Information from industrial entities that desire to commercialize Laboratory-developed Extremely Low Resource Optical Identifier (ELROI) tech

Los Alamos National Security, LLC (LANS) is the manager and operator of the Los Alamos National Laboratory for the U.S. Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-AC52-06NA25396. LANS is a mission-centric Federally Funded Research and Development Center focused on solving the most critical national security challenges through science and engineering for both government and private customers.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

Design, implementation and migration of security systems as an extreme project.

Decision Trees, algorithms, software code, risk management, reports, plans, drawings, change control, presentations, and analysis - all useful tools and efforts but time consuming, resource intensive, and potentially costly for projects that have absolute schedule and budget constraints. What are necessary and prudent efforts when a customer calls with a major security problem that needs to be fixed with a proven, off-the-approval-list, multi-layered integrated system with high visibility and limited funding and expires at the end of the Fiscal Year? Whether driven by budget cycles, safety, or by management decree, many such projects begin with generic scopes and funding allocated based on a rapid management 'guestimate.' Then a Project Manager (PM) is assigned a project with a predefined and potentially limited scope, compressed schedule, and potentially insufficient funding. The PM is tasked to rapidly and cost effectively coordinate a requirements-based design, implementation, test, and turnover of a fully operational system to the customer, all while the customer is operating and maintaining an existing security system. Many project management manuals call this an impossible project that should not be attempted. However, security is serious business and the reality is that rapid deployment of proven systems via an 'Extreme Project' is sometimes necessary. Extreme Projects can be wildly successful but require a dedicated team of security professionals lead by an experienced project manager using a highly-tailored and agile project management process with management support at all levels, all combined with significant interface with the customer. This paper does not advocate such projects or condone eliminating the valuable analysis and project management techniques. Indeed, having worked on a well-planned project provides the basis for experienced team members to complete Extreme Projects. This paper does, however, provide insight into what it takes for projects to be successfully implemented and accepted when completed under extreme conditions.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Design implementation and migration of security systems as an extreme project.

Decision Trees, algorithms, software code, risk management, reports, plans, drawings, change control, presentations, and analysis - all useful tools and efforts but time consuming, resource intensive, and potentially costly for projects that have absolute schedule and budget constraints. What are necessary and prudent efforts when a customer calls with a major security problem that needs to be fixed with a proven, off-the-approval-list, multi-layered integrated system with high visibility and limited funding and expires at the end of the Fiscal Year? Whether driven by budget cycles, safety, or by management decree, many such projects begin with generic scopes and funding allocated based on a rapid management 'guestimate.' Then a Project Manager (PM) is assigned a project with a predefined and potentially limited scope, compressed schedule, and potentially insufficient funding. The PM is tasked to rapidly and cost effectively coordinate a requirements-based design, implementation, test, and turnover of a fully operational system to the customer, all while the customer is operating and maintaining an existing security system. Many project management manuals call this an impossible project that should not be attempted. However, security is serious business and the reality is that rapid deployment of proven systems via an 'Extreme Project' is sometimes necessary. Extreme Projects can be wildly successful but require a dedicated team of security professionals lead by an experienced project manager using a highly-tailored and agile project management process with management support at all levels, all combined with significant interface with the customer. This paper does not advocate such projects or condone eliminating the valuable analysis and project management techniques. Indeed, having worked on a well-planned project provides the basis for experienced team members to complete Extreme Projects. This paper does, however, provide insight into what it takes for projects to be successfully implemented and accepted when completed under extreme conditions.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

ARCADES: analysis of risk from cyberattack against defensive strategies for the power grid

In this study, the authors introduce ARCADES (Analysis of Risk from Cyberattack against DEfensive Strategy), a technique to systematically explore the cybersecurity defence strategies based on contingency rankings in power systems. While cybersecurity defensive standards exist, these approaches are primarily based on expert opinions, rather than systematic studies of risk. ARCADES presents an approach to identify improved cybersecurity defensive strategies based on a graph‐based cyber‐physical security model that is evaluated by resistance‐distance metrics and then prioritised based on contingency analysis studies of the system. This study also proposed a technique that identifies the most critical cybersecurity mechanisms to protect the power grid. Planning and operation: those two applications for cybersecurity on power grid mainly explored in this study. For planning, a systematic method is developed to verify the effectiveness of security strategies and for operation, prioritised the security mechanism for auditing and monitoring purpose. As a case study, they analyse the IEEE‐14 bus, IEEE‐30 bus, and IEEE‐118 bus systems, observe the defensive strategies, and calculate substation criticality ranking by using the authors’ proposed method.

Touhiduzzaman, Md↗

Cybersecurity Standards for Photovoltaic Operations

Solar energy plays an important role in securing a more resilient, cyber-secure electrical grid in Pennsylvania. Solar's ability to be widely "distributed" on residential and large roofs, marginal lands, and many other locations across Pennsylvania - as opposed to being centralized - offers a strong option for addressing the myriad of potential disruptions that can occur to the grid's infrastructure. And when combined with energy storage, local energy needs can be met immediately without having to wait on the delivery of an off-site fuel source. As more and more distributed solar electricity generation is brought online, researchers, technology developers, solar developers and grid operators are paying close attention to the potential for solar to enhance grid cybersecurity. Although nobody may know when, where, or how the next cyberattack will take place, there are security measures, technical solutions, and management practices that are being implemented across the industry to protect against network control issues and grid operations. Everyone participating in the solar value chain stands to gain from a coordinated, iterative approach to protect against cyber vulnerabilities and build deeper resilience into the architecture of our grid.

cybersecurity↗

Reserve and energy scarcity pricing in United States power markets: A comparative review of principles and practices

Here, errors in forecasting load and renewable-based generation in restructured power systems mean that independent system operators (ISOs) must procure sufficient operating reserves to keep the real-time operation of the system reliable and secure. But when procured reserves turn out to be insufficient in real-time due to the lack of resource capacity or ramp capability, operators often set higher prices for reserves and energy to encourage more supply, and to motivate consumers to decrease usage or shift it to other times. This procedure, which is called scarcity or shortage pricing, is a core feature of U.S. electricity markets. It is receiving increased attention from market designers and stakeholders because scarcity will become more important for spot price formation in the future with the increased penetration of zero-marginal cost renewables, and the shrinking role of fuel costs in setting prices. Scarcity pricing is implemented in various ways by different ISOs. These differences have practical implications for the level of prices and incentives for investment, operations, and demand modification. In this paper, general approaches and specific calculation procedures for reserve and energy scarcity pricing practices and calculations across the seven ISO-based U.S. power markets are reviewed and compared. A consistent terminology is used to facilitate the comparison. Current scarcity pricing practices are grouped into three approaches: (1) imposing an adder after the spot market is run; (2) including stepwise demand curves within market clearing procedures for non-contingency reserve products (e.g., the novel flexiramp product), which tends to yield longer right tails for energy scarcity premium curves; and (3) having stepwise demand curves for traditional contingency reserve products only, which results in shorter right tails in energy scarcity curves. A generic numerical example is presented to highlight the large practical differences among the reserve scarcity pricing approaches and specific implementations. To further investigate factors that contribute the most to demand curves differences among ISOs, a sensitivity analysis is performed. This analysis shows that the largest source of differences among the curves is the scarcity prices assumed in the case of severe scarcity, while the number of steps used and whether flexiramp is considered also yields important differences in scarcity prices. As renewable penetration increases, it will become increasingly crucial to employ administrative demand curves so that spot prices more effectively motivate supply and demand adjustments exactly when and where they are needed. This study shows that the different assumptions yield very different scarcity premiums for reserves and energy, and are likely to provide divergent incentives for resources to respond to shortages. It is concluded that to promote market efficiency, a reserve shortage demand curve should have at least three features: inclusion of the marginal value of reserve products at each shortage level, consideration of the magnitude and probability of supply contingencies, and avoidance of abrupt price discontinuities that can cause excessively volatile market outcomes.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Legacy Sludge Removal and Treatment From Y-12 Storage Tank - 17585

Atkins Nuclear is a subcontractor to Consolidated Nuclear Security LLC (CNS) to perform Operations and Maintenance Services for the Liquid Waste Management Services (LWMS) subcontract at the Y-12 site located in Oak Ridge, TN. The largest of the LWMS treatment facilities is the West End Treatment Facility (WETF). During the water treatment process sludge is accumulated in storage tanks, before final disposal. Approximately 30,000 gallons of legacy sludge was segregated and staged in one of the large tanks and had the potential to be characterized as a mixed waste. Atkins was assigned a lump-sum sub-project and the responsibility to characterize, remove, treat, transport and dispose of the legacy sludge. A removal and treatment system was designed and installed which successfully treated the sludge to meet Land Disposal restrictions (LDR) for disposal at the Nevada Nuclear Security Site disposal facility. This paper discusses the work planning, system design and procurement, sludge removal and treatment process and final disposal including challenges in completing the sub-project. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Cyber Norms for Civilian Nuclear Power Plants

The international community agrees that the safe operation of civilian nuclear infrastructure is in every population’s best interest. One challenge each government must address is defining and agreeing to a set of acceptable norms of behavior in cyberspace as they relate to these facilities. The introduction of digital systems and networking technologies into these environments has led to the possibility that control and supporting computer systems are now accessible and exploitable, especially where interconnections to global information and communications technology (ICT) networks exist. The need for norms of behavior in cyberspace includes what is expected of system architects and cyber defenders as well as adversaries who should abide by rules of engagement even while conducting acts that violate national and international laws. The goal of this paper is to offer three behavioral cyber norms to improve the overall security of the ICT and Operational Technology (OT) networks and systems that underlie the operations of nuclear facilities. These norms of behavior will be specifically defined with the goals of reducing the threats associated to the theft of nuclear materials, accidental release of radiation and sabotage of nuclear processes. These norms would also include instances where an unwitting attacker or intelligence collection entity inadvertently makes their way into a nuclear facility network or system and can recognize they are in a protected zone and an approach to ensuring that these zones are not exploitable by bad actors to place their sensitive cyber effect delivery systems.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Modernization of B-2 Data, Video, and Control Systems Infrastructure

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Glenn Research Center (GRC) Plum Brook Station (PBS) Spacecraft Propulsion Research Facility, commonly referred to as B-2, is NASA s third largest thermal-vacuum facility with propellant systems capability. B-2 has completed a modernization effort of its facility legacy data, video and control systems infrastructure to accommodate modern integrated testing and Information Technology (IT) Security requirements. Integrated systems tests have been conducted to demonstrate the new data, video and control systems functionality and capability. Discrete analog signal conditioners have been replaced by new programmable, signal processing hardware that is integrated with the data system. This integration supports automated calibration and verification of the analog subsystem. Modern measurement systems analysis (MSA) tools are being developed to help verify system health and measurement integrity. Legacy hard wired digital data systems have been replaced by distributed Fibre Channel (FC) network connected digitizers where high speed sampling rates have increased to 256,000 samples per second. Several analog video cameras have been replaced by digital image and storage systems. Hard-wired analog control systems have been replaced by Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC), fiber optic networks (FON) infrastructure and human machine interface (HMI) operator screens. New modern IT Security procedures and schemes have been employed to control data access and process control flows. Due to the nature of testing possible at B-2, flexibility and configurability of systems has been central to the architecture during modernization.

Cmar, Mark D.↗

Modernization of B-2 Data, Video, and Control Systems Infrastructure

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Glenn Research Center (GRC) Plum Brook Station (PBS) Spacecraft Propulsion Research Facility, commonly referred to as B-2, is NASA's third largest thermal-vacuum facility with propellant systems capability. B-2 has completed a modernization effort of its facility legacy data, video and control systems infrastructure to accommodate modern integrated testing and Information Technology (IT) Security requirements. Integrated systems tests have been conducted to demonstrate the new data, video and control systems functionality and capability. Discrete analog signal conditioners have been replaced by new programmable, signal processing hardware that is integrated with the data system. This integration supports automated calibration and verification of the analog subsystem. Modern measurement systems analysis (MSA) tools are being developed to help verify system health and measurement integrity. Legacy hard wired digital data systems have been replaced by distributed Fibre Channel (FC) network connected digitizers where high speed sampling rates have increased to 256,000 samples per second. Several analog video cameras have been replaced by digital image and storage systems. Hard-wired analog control systems have been replaced by Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC), fiber optic networks (FON) infrastructure and human machine interface (HMI) operator screens. New modern IT Security procedures and schemes have been employed to control data access and process control flows. Due to the nature of testing possible at B-2, flexibility and configurability of systems has been central to the architecture during modernization.

Cmar, Mark D.↗

Need for research and training reactors for advanced reactor designs

Full text of publication follows. Research and training reactors have served a valuable role in helping train workforce for currently operating fleet of light water reactors. These research and training reactors have been used in reactor laboratory classes to familiarize the students with such vital concepts as approach to criticality, reactor period, neutron moderation, reactivity, flux distribution and leakage, etc. As the industry moves toward advanced non-light-water reactor designs, it is critical that research and training reactors be developed and deployed at university campuses to help train the new generation of nuclear and non-nuclear engineers who are likely to design, build, and operate these advanced reactors. Among the designs currently being pursued for nuclear power generation include molten salt, sodium cooled, and gas cooled designs, with options for various fuel forms. Thus, industry and DOE in collaboration with academic institutions should devise plans on how to familiarize the next generation of nuclear workforce with hands-on experience necessary for such designs. These research and training reactors will play a vital role in familiarizing the future workforce with hands-on experience with concepts associated with fast spectrum reactors, gas cooled reactors, and other features not associated with light water reactors. In addition to classical nuclear engineering concepts, these advanced research and training reactors can also be used for hands-on training as well as for research on features being considered in the design of GEN-IV reactors: cyber security for digital control room operations, hybrid energy system, hydrogen generation, district heating, autonomous control... (author)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Building Nuclear-Specific Cybersecurity Expertise in Higher Education

The rapid digitalization of nuclear power plants (NPPs) and the deployment of advanced and small modular reactors (A/SMRs) have expanded the cybersecurity attack surface within the nuclear sector. This evolution introduces unique challenges beyond those faced in general information technology (IT), operational technology (OT) and industrial control system (ICS) security, due to nuclear power’s regulatory rigor, safety-critical nature, and operational needs. A pressing workforce gap persists; cybersecurity graduates typically lack nuclear-specific context and retraining them for industry readiness requires 12–18 months, creating a significant burden. This paper addresses this gap by defining the domains of knowledge that nuclear cybersecurity specialists must master, spanning cybersecurity, nuclear engineering, OT/ICS security, and regulatory governance. We propose a curricular framework integrating technical, regulatory, and applied learning components to accelerate workforce readiness. Our approach builds on existing findings that current curricula inadequately integrate nuclear engineering and cybersecurity, shifting the discourse from why specialization is needed to what knowledge must be taught. The recommendations have implications for workforce development and long-term resilience of the nuclear energy sector.

99 - GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Field trial of the enhanced data authentication system (EDAS)

The Enhanced Data Authentication System (EDAS) is means to securely branch information from an existing measurement system or data stream to a secondary observer. In an international nuclear safeguards context, the EDAS connects to operator instrumentation, and provides a cryptographically secure copy of the information for a safeguards inspectorate. However, this novel capability could be a valuable complement to inspector-owned safeguards instrumentation, offering context that is valuable for anomaly resolution and contingency.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

A novel priority selection system for nuclear power plant - 287

The priority selection system is an important component of security level instrument control platform for nuclear power plant, the main function of which is priority processing the manual or automatic command with various security levels and driving engineering safety features and field devices, such as pump and valve. Its stability and safety plays a crucial role in the operation of the power plant. The main objective of the present paper is to describe the new nuclear power plant-oriented priority selection system, which is developed independently by China Nuclear Control System Engineering Company. In this system, the control commands from 1E DCS, ECP and DAS systems are transmitted via hardwire, while those from NC DCS are transmitted by field-bus. The control commands experience priority output to control the field actuators. Meanwhile, in order to control key field devices when failure of the instrument control systems occurs, the issuing interface for native instructions with permissions setting is also offered. The whole system provides collection-feedback functions for field devices, high coverage self-diagnostic functions and periodic test functions for safety systems. Moreover, the feedback information of field devices, the results of self-diagnosis and periodic test will be submitted to DCS of nuclear power plant. In addition, the core part of priority selection system, namely priority selection module, is obtained by pure FPGA technology, which is different from DCS systems and could avoid common cause failure of software effectively. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Cyber Threat Assessment of Uplink and Commanding System for Mission Operation

Most of today's Mission Operations Systems (MOS) rely on Ground Data System (GDS) segment to mitigate cyber security risks. Unfortunately, IT security design is done separately from the design of GDS' mission operational capabilities. This incoherent practice leaves many security vulnerabilities in the system without any notice. This paper describes a new way to system engineering MOS, to include cyber threat risk assessments throughout the MOS development cycle, without this, it is impossible to design a dependable and reliable MOS to meet today's rapid changing cyber threat environment.

ground data↗

Formally Verified ZTA Requirements for OT/ICS Environments with Isabelle/HOL

The clean energy transformation includes the integration of distributed energy resources with the power grid, which has led to a substantial increase in the complexity of power grids infrastructure and the underlying operational technology environment. Power grids infrastructure represents an operational technology environment that has become a system of systems, integrating heterogeneous devices which are both software-and hardware-intensive; as a result, there are increasing demands to exploit advances in the commodity of software-hardware infrastructures to improve energy systems requirements such as cybersecurity and resilience. In such a setting, system requirements at different levels mix, which leads to vulnerabilities and undesirable outcomes. The use of formal methods to characterize and prove system requirements removes ambiguity, increases automation, and provides high levels of assurance and reliability. In this paper, we contribute a methodology and a framework for the system-level verification of zero trust architecture requirements in operational technology environments. We define a formal specification for the core functionalities of operational technology environments, the corresponding invariants, and security proofs. Of particular note is our modular approach for the formal verification of asynchronous interactions in operational technology environments. The formal specification and the proofs have been mechanized using the interactive theorem proving environment Isabelle/HOL.

formal methods↗

Formally Verified ZTA Requirements for OT/ICS Environments with Isabelle/HOL: Preprint

The clean energy transformation led to the integration of distributed energy resources on a top of the grid, and so a substantial increase in the complexity of power grids infrastructure and the underlying operational technology environment. Operational technology environments are becoming a system of systems, integrating heterogeneous devices which are software/hardware intensive, have ever increasing demands to exploit advances in commodity of software/hardware infrastructures, and this for good reasons - improving energy systems requirements such as cybersecurity and resilience. In such a setting, system requirements at different levels mix, thus undesirable outcomes will surely happen. The use of formal methods will remove ambiguity, increase automation and provide high levels of assurance and reliability. In this paper, we contribute a methodology and a framework for the system level verification of zero trust architecture requirements in operational technology environments. We define a formal specification for the core functionalities of operational technology environments, the corresponding invariants, and security proofs. Of particular note is our modular approach for the formal verification of asynchronous interactions in operational technology environments. The formal specification and the proofs have been mechanized using the interactive theorem proving environment Isabelle/HOL.

formal methods↗