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At least 739 records · Page 41
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS1993

SCATHA mission termination report

The SCATHA (Spacecraft Charging at High Altitudes) satellite was operated from the Consolidated Space Test Center in Sunnyvale, California from February 1979 to May 1991. It was a spin stabilized vehicle in a highly eccentric orbit that collected data on spacecraft charging. The purpose of such data gathering was to predict and/or model the effects of the Earth's magnetic field on synchronous and near synchronous satellites. During the majority of its lifetime, attitude precession maneuvers were done every 10-15 days to maintain solar panel orientation. Maneuver planning was difficult due to the structural characteristics of SCATHA. It is cylindrically shaped and has seven booms ranging in length from 2 to 50 meters. These precession maneuvers induced predictable nutation that damped out after a few days. Eventually fuel began running low due to these frequent maneuvers. Experiments that had required the spin axis be in the orbit plane had already been turned off or had collected all their data. To increase the vehicle lifetime, the spin axis was moved to ecliptic normal. While this stopped the need for frequent attitude maneuvering (only two per year required now), this movement of the spin axis caused nutation that would not damp out for the remainder of the mission. This phase of the mission, with the ecliptic normal orientation, lasted for approximately three years. Although nutation never damped, data gathering was uninterrupted. In late 1990, when SCATHA's transmitter became seriously degraded, the Air Force decided to turn SCATHA off. This would only be done after the satellite was made 'safe'. The most difficult part of making the vehicle safe was quickly purging the fuel. Several plans were considered. The selected plan was to perform a series of 20 degree attitude precession maneuvers (3 days apart to allow for the worst nutation to damp) until the fuel was depleted. Although this sounded simple, the actual execution proved difficult. This was due to a nearly complete lack of available telemetry data, large undamped motion of the long booms, inadequacies in attitude determination software, and an error in the fuel level calculation software. This paper discusses the various proposed termination plans and execution of the selected one. Attitude determination methodologies, nutation from maneuvers, and effects of the flexible booms on the termination mission are presented and analyzed from a satellite analyst point of view.

Stakkestad, Kjell↗
NASA NTRS1990

Growing the Space Station's electrical power plant

For over a decade NASA LeRC has been defining, demonstrating, and evaluating power electronic components and multi-kilowatt, multiply redundant, electrical power systems as part of OAST charter. Whether one considers aircraft (commercial transport/military), Space Station Freedom, growth station, launch vehicles, or the new Human Exploration Initiative, the conclusions remain the same: high frequency AC power distribution and control is superior to all other approaches for achieving a fast, smart, safe, versatile, and growable electrical power system that will meet a wide range of mission options. To meet the cost and operability goals of future aerospace missions that require significantly higher electrical power and longer durations, we must learn to integrate multiple technologies in ways that enhance overall system synergisms. The way NASA is doing business in space electric power is challenged and some approaches for evolving large space vehicles and platforms in well constructed steps to provide safe, ground testable, growable, smart systems that provide simple, replicative logic structures, which enable hardware and software verification, validation, and implementation are proposed. Viewgraphs are included.

Sundberg, Gale R.↗
NASA NTRS1992

Design and Conduct of a Windshear Detection Flight Experiment

A description of the design and conduct of a series of flight experiments which tested the performance of candidate windshear detection devices is presented. With prototype windshear sensors installed, a NASA Boeing 737 test aircraft conducted numerous low altitude penetrations of microburst windshear conditions. These tests were preceded by extensive preparations which included piloted simulations, determination of safe operating limits, and the development of unique flight test hardware, displays, and procedures. The test aircraft and more than 50 research and support personnel were deployed to Orlando, Florida, and Denver, Colorado, during June and July 1991 for field testing. Upon receiving a forecast of developing weather activity, the aircraft crew launched and proceeded to the storm location, guided by uplinked ground radar information and voice communications with ground weather personnel. The tests required constant monitoring of numerous factors including aircraft flight parameters, ground obstructions, windshear magnitude, lightning, escape routes, ATC coordination, storm cell development, and others. The flight tests were extremely successful, safely recording more than 25 low altitude microburst windshear and strong gust front approaches and penetrations, along with completing a full test matrix of additional requirements related to windshear sensor performance. Data quality from the tests was excellent and indicates strong potential for airborne remote sensors to accurately predict and warn the flight crew of hazardous windshear conditions with ample time for precautionary crew action.

Flight Testing↗
NASA NTRS1992

Verifying command sequences for satellite systems

We present a formal basis for the design of a Checker used in validating safe schedules and in selecting error recovery schedules for satellite control systems. This design includes a high-level specification of Checker behavior and properties (called flight rules) of safe schedules. Specifications are written in Timed Linear Logic (TLL). Validation of schedules is performed in terms of real-time telemetry and deduction system proof rules. Telemetry (state information for satellite subsystems) serves as input to the Checker. Detection of violation of a flight rule by the Checker results in the selection of a contingency plan (error recovery schedule). The Checker is illustrated in terms of the TOPEX/Poseidon Oceanographic Satellite System.

Peters, James F., III↗
NASA NTRS1993

NASA safety program activities in support of the Space Exploration Initiatives Nuclear Propulsion program

The activities of the joint NASA/DOE/DOD Nuclear Propulsion Program Technical Panels have been used as the basis for the current development of safety policies and requirements for the Space Exploration Initiatives (SEI) Nuclear Propulsion Technology development program. The Safety Division of the NASA Office of Safety and Mission Quality has initiated efforts to develop policies for the safe use of nuclear propulsion in space through involvement in the joint agency Nuclear Safety Policy Working Group (NSPWG), encouraged expansion of the initial policy development into proposed programmatic requirements, and suggested further expansion into the overall risk assessment and risk management process for the NASA Exploration Program. Similar efforts are underway within the Department of Energy to ensure the safe development and testing of nuclear propulsion systems on Earth. This paper describes the NASA safety policy related to requirements for the design of systems that may operate where Earth re-entry is a possibility. The expected plan of action is to support and oversee activities related to the technology development of nuclear propulsion in space, and support the overall safety and risk management program being developed for the NASA Exploration Program.

Sawyer, J. C., Jr.↗
NASA NTRS1992

Appraisal of digital terrain elevation data for low-altitude flight

The use of terrain elevation databases in advanced guidance and navigation systems has greatly expanded. However, the limitations and accuracies of these databases must be considered and established prior to safe system flight evaluation. A simple approach to quantify reasonable flight limits is presented and evaluated for a helicopter guidance system dependent on a terrain database. The flight test evaluated involved a helicopter equipped with a Global Positioning System (GPS) receiver and radar altimeter, and a ground station GPS receiver which provided improved helicopter positioning. The precision navigation and radar altimeter data was acquired while flying low-altitude missions in south-central Pennsylvania. The aircraft-determined terrain elevations were compared with the terrain predicted by the Defense Mapping Agency (DMA) Level 1 terrain elevation data for the same area. The results suggest a safe set clearance altitude of 220 ft for flight testing of a DMA-based guidance avionic in the same area.

Zelenka, Richard E.↗
NASA NTRS1992

A systems approach to water recovery testing for space life support - Initial biomedical results from the ECLSS Water Recovery Test and plans for testbed utilization

Among the challenges of designing and constructing Space Station Freedom is the development of the water system. A review of past efforts in reclaiming waste water in enclosed environments reveals that there are many gaps in the biomedical understanding of this process. Some of the key uncertainties of human interaction with a closed water system include determining potential contaminants and establishing safe levels of multiple compounds in the enclosed system of Space Station. Another uncertainty is the microbial constituency of such a system and what impact it could have on crew health and performance. The use of iodine as the passive biocide may have both an indirect and direct impact on the crew. In this paper the initial results of the Water Recovery Test are reviewed from a biomedical perspective, revealing areas where more information is needed to develop the ECLSS water system. By including the approach of 'man as a subsystem', consideration is given to how man interacts with the total water system. Taking this systems approach to providing the crew with a safe source of water gives useful insight into the most efficient design and utilization of closed system testbeds.

Aten, Laurie A.↗
NASA NTRS1993

The challenges of simulating wake vortex encounters and assessing separation criteria

During landings and take-offs, the longitudinal spacing between airplanes is in part determined by the safe separation required to avoid the trailing vortex wake of the preceding aircraft. Safe exploration of the feasibility of reducing longitudinal separation standards will require use of aircraft simulators. This paper discusses the approaches to vortex modeling, methods for modeling the aircraft/vortex interaction, some of the previous attempts of defining vortex hazard criteria, and current understanding of the development of vortex hazard criteria.

Dunham, R. E.↗
NASA NTRS1993

STS-55 pad abort: Engine 2011 oxidizer preburner augmented spark igniter check valve leak

The STS-55 initial launch attempt of Columbia (OV102) was terminated on KSC launch pad A March 22, 1993 at 9:51 AM E.S.T. due to violation of an ME-3 (Engine 2011) Launch Commit Criteria (LCC) limit exceedance. The event description and timeline are summarized. Propellant loading was initiated on 22 March, 1993 at 1:15 AM EST. All SSME chill parameters and launch commit criteria (LCC) were nominal. At engine start plus 1.44 seconds, a Failure Identification (FID) was posted against Engine 2011 for exceeding the 50 psia Oxidizer Preburner (OPB) purge pressure redline. The engine was shut down at 1.50 seconds followed by Engines 2034 and 2030. All shut down sequences were nominal and the mission was safely aborted. The OPB purge pressure redline violation and the abort profile/overlay for all three engines are depicted. SSME Avionics hardware and software performed nominally during the incident. A review of vehicle data table (VDT) data and controller software logic revealed no failure indications other than the single FID 013-414, OPB purge pressure redline exceeded. Software logic was executed according to requirements and there was no anomalous controller software operation. Immediately following the abort, a Rocketdyne/NASA failure investigation team was assembled. The team successfully isolated the failure cause to the oxidizer preburner augmented spark igniter purge check valve not being fully closed due to contamination. The source of the contaminant was traced to a cut segment from a rubber O-ring which was used in a fine clean tool during valve production prior to 1992. The valve was apparently contaminated during its fabrication in 1985. The valve had performed acceptably on four previous flights of the engine, and SSME flight history shows 780 combined check valve flights without failure. The failure of an Engine 3 (SSME No. 2011) check valve to close was sensed by onboard engine instruments even though all other engine operations were normal. This resulted in an engine shutdown and safe sequential shutdown of all three engines prior to ignition of the solid boosters.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS1992

Design and development of the second generation Mars Habitat

The second generation of Mars Habitat is to be utilized as an advanced permanent base for 20 crew members to live on Mars for a period of 6-12 months. It is designed to be a self-contained environment accommodating five main facilities: living, working, service, medical, and a greenhouse. The objective of the design is to create a comfortable, safe, living environment. Hexamars-2 and Lavapolis-2 are two different concepts for the advanced Mars Habitat. The design team assumes there will be an initial habitat located near or on the site from earlier missions that satisfies the requirement for a short-term habitation for the crew to use while constructing Hexamars-2 or Lavapolis-2. Prefabricated structures and materials will be shipped to the site before the long-term crew members arrive. Partial construction and preparation for the long-term habitat will be done by crew members or robotics from a previous mission. The construction of the long-term base will occur in phases. Hexamars-2 consists of six sphere-shaped inflatable modules that will be partially buried below the Martian surface. The construction of each sphere will occur in ten steps. Shape charges will be used to create the crater in which the spherical structure will be placed. The interior core will be unloaded and put into place followed by the exterior structure. The foundation will be filled, the interior bladder will be inflated, floor-to-floor joists connected, and sand pockets filled. Finally, the life support system and interior partitions are put in place. Each sphere consists of three levels of which the lower level will be safe haven. Particular attention is given to structural support, the dominance of internal pressure, the process of construction, and human factors.

Sabouni, Ikhlas↗
NASA NTRS1992

Pressurized Lunar Rover (PLR)

The objective of this project was to design a manned pressurized lunar rover (PLR) for long-range transportation and for exploration of the lunar surface. The vehicle must be capable of operating on a 14-day mission, traveling within a radius of 500 km during a lunar day or within a 50-km radius during a lunar night. The vehicle must accommodate a nominal crew of four, support two 28-hour EVA's, and in case of emergency, support a crew of six when near the lunar base. A nominal speed of ten km/hr and capability of towing a trailer with a mass of two mt are required. Two preliminary designs have been developed by two independent student teams. The PLR 1 design proposes a seven meter long cylindrical main vehicle and a trailer which houses the power and heat rejection systems. The main vehicle carries the astronauts, life support systems, navigation and communication systems, lighting, robotic arms, tools, and equipment for exploratory experiments. The rover uses a simple mobility system with six wheels on the main vehicle and two on the trailer. The nonpressurized trailer contains a modular radioisotope thermoelectric generator (RTG) supplying 6.5 kW continuous power. A secondary energy storage for short-term peak power needs is provided by a bank of lithium-sulfur dioxide batteries. The life support system is partly a regenerative system with air and hygiene water being recycled. A layer of water inside the composite shell surrounds the command center allowing the center to be used as a safe haven during solar flares. The PLR 1 has a total mass of 6197 kg. It has a top speed of 18 km/hr and is capable of towing three metric tons, in addition to the RTG trailer. The PLR 2 configuration consists of two four-meter diameter, cylindrical hulls which are passively connected by a flexible passageway, resulting in the overall vehicle length of 11 m. The vehicle is driven by eight independently suspended wheels. The dual-cylinder concept allows articulated as well as double Ackermann steering. The primary power of 8 kW is supplied by a dynamic isotope system using a closed Brayton cycle with a xenon-hydrogen mixture as the working fluid. A sodium-sulfur battery serves as the secondary power source. Excess heat produced by the primary power system and other rover systems is rejected by radiators located on the top of the rear cylinder. The total mass of the PLR 2 is 7015 kg. Simplicity and low total weight have been the driving principles behind the design of PLR 1. The overall configuration consists of a 7-m-long, 3-m-diameter cylindrical main vehicle and a two-wheeled trailer. The cylinder of the main body is capped by eight-section, faceted, semi-hemispherical ends. The trailer contains the RTG power source and is not pressurized. The shell of the main body is constructed of a layered carbon fiber/foam/Kevlar sandwich structure. Included in the shell is a layer of water for radiation protection. The layer of water extends from the front of the rover over the crew compartment and creates a safe haven for the crew during a solar flare-up. The carbon fiber provides the majority of the strength and stiffness and the Kevlar provides protection from micrometeoroids. The Kevlar is covered with a gold foil and multi-layer insulation (MLI) to reduce radiation degradation and heat transfer through the wall. A thin thermoplastic layer seals the fiber and provides additional strength.

Creel, Kenneth↗
NASA NTRS1993

STS-51 pad abort. OV103-engine 2033 (ME-2) fuel flowmeter sensor open circuit

The STS-51 initial launch attempt of Discovery (OV-103) was terminated on KSC launch pad 39B on 12 Aug. 1993 at 9:12 AM E.S.T. due to a sensor redundancy failure in the liquid hydrogen system of ME-2 (Engine 2033). The event description and time line are summarized. Propellant loading was initiated on 12 Aug. 1993 at 12:00 AM EST. All space shuttle main engine (SSME) chill parameters and Launch Commit Criteria (LCC) were nominal. At engine start plus 1.34 seconds a Failure Identification (FID) was posted against Engine 2033 for exceeding the 1800 spin intra-channel (A1-A2) Fuel Flowrate sensor channel qualification limit. The engine was shut down at 1.50 seconds followed by Engines 2032 and 2030. All shut down sequences were nominal and the mission was safely aborted. SSME Avionics hardware and software performed nominally during the incident. A review of vehicle data table (VDT) data and controller software logic revealed no failure indications other than the single FID 111-101, Fuel Flowrate Intra-Channel Test Channel A disqualification. Software logic was executed according to requirements and there was no anomalous controller software operation. Immediately following the abort, a Rocketdyne/NASA failure investigation team was assembled. The team successfully isolated the failure cause to an open circuit in a Fuel Flowrate Sensor. This type of failure has occurred eight previous times in ground testing. The sensor had performed acceptably on three previous flights of the engine and SSME flight history shows 684 combined fuel flow rate sensor channel flights without failure. The disqualification of an Engine 2 (SSME No. 2033) Fuel Flowrate sensor channel was a result of an instrumentation failure and not engine performance. All other engine operations were nominal. This disqualification resulted in an engine shutdown and safe sequential shutdown of all three engines prior to ignition of the solid boosters.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS1994

Non-aqueous cleaning solvent substitution

A variety of environmental, safety, and health concerns exist over use of chlorinated and fluorinated cleaning solvents. Sandia National Laboratories, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories, and the Kansas City Division of AlliedSignal have combined efforts to focus on finding alternative cleaning solvents and processes which are effective, environmentally safe, and compliant with local, state, and federal regulations. An alternative solvent has been identified, qualified, and implemented into production of complex electronic assemblies, where aqueous and semi-aqueous cleaning processes are not allowed. Extensive compatibility studies were performed with components, piece-parts, and materials. Electrical testing and accelerated aging were used to screen for detrimental, long-term effects. A terpene, d-limonene, was selected as the solvent of choice, and it was found to be compatible with the components and materials tested. A brief history of the overall project will be presented, along with representative cleaning efficiency results, compatibility results, and residual solvent data. The electronics industry is constantly searching for proven methods and environmentally-safe materials to use in manufacturing processes. The information in this presentation will provide another option to consider on future projects for applications requiring high levels of quality, reliability, and cleanliness from non-aqueous cleaning processes.

Meier, Gerald J.↗
NASA NTRS1992

Autonomous hazard detection and avoidance

During GFY 91, Draper Laboratory was awarded a task by NASA-JSC under contract number NAS9-18426 to study and evaluate the potential for achieving safe autonomous landings on Mars using an on-board autonomous hazard detection and avoidance (AHDA) system. This report describes the results of that study. The AHDA task had four objectives: to demonstrate, via a closed-loop simulation, the ability to autonomously select safe landing sites and the ability to maneuver to the selected site; to identify key issues in the development of AHDA systems; to produce strawman designs for AHDA sensors and algorithms; and to perform initial trade studies leading to better understanding of the effect of sensor/terrain/viewing parameters on AHDA algorithm performance. This report summarizes the progress made during the first year, with primary emphasis on describing the tools developed for simulating a closed-loop AHDA landing. Some cursory performance evaluation results are also presented.

Pien, Homer↗
NASA NTRS1993

Soyuz-TM-based interim Assured Crew Return Vehicle (ACRV) for the Space Station Freedom

The concept of using the available Soyuz-TM Assured Crew Return Vehicle (ACRV) spacecraft for the assurance of the safety of the Space Station Freedom (SSF) crew after the departure of the Space Shuttle from SSF was proposed by the NPO Energia and was accepted by NASA in 1992. The ACRV will provide the crew with the capability to evacuate a seriously injured/ill crewmember from the SSF to a ground-based care facility under medically tolerable conditions and with the capability for a safe evacuation from SSF in the events SSF becomes uninhabitable or the Space Shuttle flights are interrupted for a time that exceeds SSF ability for crew support and/or safe operations. This paper presents the main results of studies on Phase A (including studies on the service life of ACRV; spacecraft design and operations; prelaunch processing; mission support; safety, reliability, maintenance and quality and assurance; landing, and search/rescue operations; interfaces with the SSF and with Space Shuttle; crew accommodation; motion of orbital an service modules; and ACRV injection by the Expendable Launch Vehicles), along with the objectives of further work on the Phase B.

Yu P Semenov↗
NASA NTRS1993

Lunar surface operations. Volume 3: Robotic arm for lunar surface vehicle

A robotic arm for a lunar surface vehicle that can help in handling cargo and equipment, and remove obstacles from the path of the vehicle is defined as a support to NASA's intention to establish a lunar based colony by the year 2010. Its mission would include, but not limited to the following: exploration, lunar sampling, replace and remove equipment, and setup equipment (e.g. microwave repeater stations). Performance objectives for the robotic arm include a reach of 3 m, accuracy of 1 cm, arm mass of 100 kg, and lifting capability of 50 kg. The end effectors must grip various sizes and shapes of cargo; push, pull, turn, lift, or lower various types of equipment; and clear a path on the lunar surface by shoveling, sweeping aside, or gripping the obstacle present in the desired path. The arm can safely complete a task within a reasonable amount of time; the actual time is dependent upon the task to be performed. The positioning of the arm includes a manual backup system such that the arm can be safely stored in case of failure. Remote viewing and proximity and positioning sensors are incorporated in the design of the arm. The following specific topic are addressed in this report: mission and requirements, system design and integration, mechanical structure, modified wrist, structure-to-end-effector interface, end-effectors, and system controls.

Shields, William↗
NASA NTRS1992

Review of performance, medical, and operational data on pilot aging issues

An extensive review of the literature and studies relating to performance, medical, operational, and legal data regarding pilot aging issues was performed in order to determine what evidence there is, if any, to support mandatory pilot retirement. Popular misconceptions about aging, including the failure to distinguish between the normal aging process and disease processes that occur more frequently in older individuals, continue to contribute to much of the misunderstanding and controversy that surround this issue. Results: Review of medical data related to the pilot aging issue indicate that recent improvement in medical diagnostics and treatment technology have made it possible to identify to a high degree individuals who are at risk for developing sudden incapacitating illness and for treating those with disqualifying medical conditions. Performance studies revealed that after controlling for the presence of disease states, older pilots are able to perform as well as younger pilots on many performance tasks. Review of accident data showed that older, healthy pilots do not have higher accident rates than younger pilots, and indeeed, evidence suggests that older pilots have an advantage in the cockpit due to higher experience levels. The Man-Machine-Mission-Environment interface of factors can be managed through structured, supervised, and enhanced operations, maintenance, flight reviews, and safety procedures in order to ensure safe and productive operations by reducing the margin of error and by increasing the margin of safety. Conclusions: There is no evidence indicating any specific age as an arbitrary cut-off point for pilots to perform their fight duties. A combination of regular medical screening, performance evaluation, enhanced operational maintenance, and safety procedures can most effectively ensure a safe pilot population than can a mandatory retirement policy based on arbitrary age restrictions.

Stoklosa, J. H.↗
NASA NTRS1994

Residual strength of thin panels with cracks

The previous design philosophies involving safe life, fail-safe and damage tolerance concepts become inadequate for assuring the safety of aging aircraft structures. For example, the failure mechanism for the Aloha Airline accident involved the coalescence of undetected small cracks at the rivet holes causing a section of the fuselage to peel open during flight. Therefore, the fuselage structure should be designed to have sufficient residual strength under worst case crack configurations and in-flight load conditions. Residual strength is interpreted as the maximum load carrying capacity prior to unstable crack growth. Internal pressure and bending moment constitute the two major components of the external loads on the fuselage section during flight. Although the stiffeners in the form of stringers, frames and tear straps sustain part of the external loads, the significant portion of the load is taken up by the skin. In the presence of a large crack in the skin, the crack lips bulge out with considerable yielding; thus, the geometric and material nonlinearities must be included in the analysis for predicting residual strength. Also, these nonlinearities do not permit the decoupling of in-plane and out-of-plane bending deformations. The failure criterion combining the concepts of absorbed specific energy and strain energy density addresses the aforementioned concerns. The critical absorbed specific energy (local toughness) for the material is determined from the global specimen response and deformation geometry based on the uniaxial tensile test data and detailed finite element modeling of the specimen response. The use of the local toughness and stress-strain response at the continuum level eliminates the size effect. With this critical parameter and stress-strain response, the finite element analysis of the component by using STAGS along with the application of this failure criterion provides the stable crack growth calculations for residual strength predictions.

Madenci, Erdogan↗