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In 2019, Savannah River Remediation developed a revision to the performance assessment (PA) on behalf of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Savannah River Operations Office (SR) for the near-surface disposal of low-level waste at the Savannah River Site (SRS) Saltstone Disposal Facility (SDF). Soluble waste from SRS Tank Farms undergoes salt processing to remove cesium and other high activity constituents. The low-activity decontaminated salt solution (DSS) is then immobilized by mixing it into a cementitious waste form known as saltstone. After mixing, the saltstone is poured into leak-tight concrete vaults, known as saltstone disposal units (SDUs), where the waste form cures. By the time of facility closure, the SDF is expected to consist of 15 SDUs with a combined capacity of 1.06 E+09 L (280 Mgal) of cured saltstone. The facility operates under a Disposal Authorization Statement (DAS) from DOE and a permit from the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC). Since the start of operations in 1990, the SDF has received almost 6.7 E+07 L (18 Mgal) of DSS, resulting in the safe disposal of 2.7 E+16 Bq (7.3 E+05 Ci) of activity. Due to the radioactive decay of short-lived contaminants, the total remaining activity in the disposed waste is estimated to be approximately 1.4 E+16 Bq (3.9 E+05 Ci), as of September 2018. The Disposal Authorization Statement requires a demonstration that the system of engineered and natural features of the disposal facility will limit releases from the facility and be protective of human health and the environment for at least the next 1,000 years. The long-term performance of the facility was evaluated under the requirements of the DoE's Radioactive Waste Management Manual (US DOE Manual 435.1-1). Simulations were performed to demonstrate that the disposal facility would meet performance objectives specified in the manual. The evaluation was based on numerical models that simulate the releases of contaminants from the saltstone waste form. Contaminants were transported through groundwater and air pathways to points of assessment to evaluate compliance. In addition, the potential consequences of an inadvertent human intrusion (IHI) were also evaluated. In accordance with the guidance and recommendations in US DoE's technical standard for DAS, deterministic and probabilistic analyses were performed to demonstrate the SDF system, which includes the engineered cover system, the SDUs, the waste form, and the natural features of the site, provides a reasonable expectation that saltstone disposal will meet performance objectives. Post-closure doses to future members of the public (MOP) were evaluated; dose estimates from the air pathway were well below the 1.0 E-04 Sv/yr (10 mrem/yr) performance objective within 1,000 years, and the calculated doses to the MOP from all exposure pathways, including the groundwater and air pathways, were well below the 2.5 E-04 Sv/yr (25 mrem/yr) performance objective within 1,000 years. Doses following an assumed intrusion event within the facility boundaries were well below the IHI performance objectives, where the acute IHI dose was below the acute IHI dose performance objective of 5.0 E-03 Sv (500 mrem) and the chronic IHI dose was below the chronic IHI dose performance objective of 1.0 E-03 Sv/yr (100 mrem/yr) within 1,000 years. (author)
The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) facility is a U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) operating repository 654 m below the surface in a thick salt formation in southeastern New Mexico. The DOE disposes transuranic (TRU) waste produced from atomic energy defense activities at the WIPP facility. A portion of the waste shipped to the WIPP facility contains TRU radionuclides co-mingled with polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), which fall under U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulations implementing the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA). This report documents the risks of PCBs co-mingled with TRU waste (hereafter designated as PCB/TRU waste) designated for disposal at the WIPP facility. This analysis is input to the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) assessment by the DOE Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO) for the proposed increase of the WIPP facility disposal area to include additional waste panels (but not to increase the legislated WIPP volume). This analysis is not a compliance calculation to support a certification renewal nor does it support a planned change request (PCR) or planned change notice (PCN) to be submitted to the EPA.
In 2019, Savannah River Remediation developed a revision to the performance assessment (PA) on behalf of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Savannah River Operations Office (SR) for the near-surface disposal of low-level waste at the Savannah River Site (SRS) Saltstone Disposal Facility (SDF). Soluble waste from SRS Tank Farms undergoes salt processing to remove cesium and other high-activity constituents. The low-activity decontaminated salt solution (DSS) is then immobilized by mixing it into a cementitious waste form known as saltstone. After mixing, the saltstone is poured into leak-tight concrete vaults, known as saltstone disposal units (SDUs), where the waste form cures. By the time of facility closure, the SDF is expected to consist of 15 SDUs with a combined capacity of 1.06 E+09 L (280 Mgal) of cured saltstone. The facility operates under a Disposal Authorization Statement from DOE and a permit from the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC). Since the start of operations in 1990, the SDF has received almost 6.7 E+07 L (18 Mgal) of DSS, resulting in the safe disposal of 2.7 E+16 Bq (7.3 E+05 Ci) of activity. Due to the radioactive decay of short-lived contaminants, the total remaining activity in the disposed waste is estimated to be approximately 1.4 E+16 Bq (3.9 E+05 Ci), as of September 2018. The Disposal Authorization Statement requires a demonstration that the system of engineered and natural features of the disposal facility will limit releases from the facility and be protective of human health and the environment for at least the next 1,000 years. The long-term performance of the facility was evaluated under the requirements of the DoE's Radioactive Waste Management Manual (US DOE Manual 435.1-1). Simulations were performed to demonstrate that the disposal facility would meet performance objectives specified in the manual. The evaluation was based on numerical models that simulate the releases of contaminants from the saltstone waste form. Contaminants were transported through groundwater and air pathways to points of assessment to evaluate compliance (i.e., 100 m from the SDUs). In addition, the potential consequences of an inadvertent human intrusion (IHI) were also evaluated. A number of issues were overcome during the development of these simulations. These issues were identified as part of internal technical reviews. Simulations are developed by people and people make mistakes, so the internal technical review process is a vital step in PA development. Specific examples of resolved issues include a unit-conversion error, an inappropriate definition for a model boundary condition, a model time-stepping issue, and an error in the calculation for the buildup of contaminants in soil. Actions taken to address these issues resulted in an improved product with a better supported technical basis and more defensible results. The identification and correction of these issues are discussed. By understanding these issues, model developers and technical reviewers working on PAs in the future may avoid repeating these types of mistakes. Transparency with respect to these mistakes builds trust between waste management sites, regulators, and stakeholders. (authors)
Based on the rationale presented, nuclear criticality is improbable after salt creep causes compaction of criticality control overpacks (CCOs) disposed at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, an operating repository in bedded salt for the disposal of transuranic (TRU) waste from atomic energy defense activities. For most TRU waste, the possibility of post-closure criticality is exceedingly small either because the salt neutronically isolates TRU waste canisters or because closure of a disposal room from salt creep does not sufficiently compact the low mass of fissile material. The criticality potential has been updated here because of the introduction of CCOs, which may dispose up to 380 fissile gram equivalent plutonium-239 in each container. The criticality potential is evaluated through high-fidelity geomechanical modeling of a disposal room filled with CCOs during two representative conditions: (1) large salt block fall, and (2) gradual salt compaction (without brine seepage and subsequent gas generation to permit maximum room closure). Geomechanical models of rock fall demonstrate three tiers of CCOs are not greatly disrupted. Geomechanical models of gradual room closure from salt creep predict irregular arrays of closely packed CCOs after 1000 years, when room closure has asymptotically approached maximum compaction. Criticality models of spheres and cylinders of 380 fissile gram equivalent of plutonium (as oxide) at the predicted irregular spacing demonstrate that an array of CCOs is not critical when surrounded by salt and magnesium oxide, provided the amount of hydrogenous material shipped in the CCO (usually water and plastics) is controlled or boron carbide (a neutron poison) is mixed with the fissile contents.
This Interim Measure (IM) Report for Location of Concern (LOC) 2D and LOC 2E summarizes the activities associated with implementation of an IM to address soil and concrete contamination at the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) Headquarters Building Area (KHQA) located at KSC, Florida. KHQA has been designated Solid Waste Management Unit (SWMU) 104 under KSC’s Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Corrective Action Program. The IM consisted of excavating/removing residual polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB) contamination in soil and concrete from two separate areas, LOC 2D and LOC 2E, which were associated with electrical transformer locations. IM activities were conducted in accordance with the Interim Measure Work Plan (IMWP), Revision 1, for KHQA dated June 2018, which was approved by the Florida Department of Environmental Protection in a correspondence letter dated April 2016 and the United States Environmental Protection Agency in a correspondence letter dated August 2018. The objective of the IM was to remove all remaining contaminated media with total PCB concentrations greater than the State of Florida Residential Soil Cleanup Target Level (RSCTL) (0.5 milligrams per kilogram [mg/kg]). This cleanup goal meets unrestrictive re-use conditions in Florida, and is below federal regulations for PCB Bulk Remediation Waste Cleanup of 1 mg/kg for high occupancy, unrestricted use areas, as outlined in 40 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 761.61(a). The timeline of the IM was coordinated with demolition of the former KSC Headquarters Building (demolished in 2021) in order to safely remove contaminated media after electrical equipment was de-energized and removed from the site. Excavation activities were conducted between January 10, 2022, and February 8, 2022, and included two waste streams for off-site disposal: (1) PCB-remediation waste greater than or equal to 50 mg/kg, and (2) PCB-remediation waste less than 50 mg/kg. A total of approximately 347 cubic yards (478 tons) of PCB-contaminated soil and concrete was initially removed from the LOC 2D and LOC 2E areas, as defined in the IMWP. An additional 4.35 tons of soil and concrete were removed based on verification sampling, which was conducted until the cleanup goal was achieved. The total area of excavation from both LOC 2D and LOC 2E was approximately 5,186 square feet (0.12 acres), and excavation depths ranged from 0.5 to 4.0 feet below land surface Excavated soils and concrete were stockpiled based on waste stream and subsequently transported and disposed of at Waste Connections of Osceola County, LLC – JED Landfill in St. Cloud, Florida (PCBs less than 50 mg/kg) or the Chemical Waste Management Landfill in Emelle, Alabama (PCBs greater than or equal to 50 mg/kg). Following excavation, clean backfill was brought to the site and provided to the Demolition Contractor to complete backfill and grading in conjunction with their final site restoration activities from building demolition. Post-IM groundwater sampling was conducted in May 2022 at three monitoring wells installed in April 2022 to confirm that PCBs did not leach into groundwater. These wells were installed where the highest PCB concentrations were detected at LOC 2D, LOC 2E, and from the Building Perimeter IM (previously completed in 2020). All PCB results in groundwater were non-detect. Volatile organic compounds were also analyzed based on potential past use of solvents in transformers with PCB-dielectric fluids and the potential release of dielectric fluids containing volatile organic compounds, and all results were non-detect. Based on completion of a successful IM at LOC 2D and LOC 2E, as well as previous remedial actions that have addressed other contamination at KHQA (SWMU 104), No Further Action without controls will be recommended for SWMU 104. NASA will submit separate Site Rehabilitation Completion Order request documentation for SWMU 104 to support an NFA without controls recommendation.
The decommissioning of nuclear sites involves the management of large volumes of radioactive waste, other conventional waste, and the clean-up of land and groundwater contamination. In the UK, the disposal of radioactive waste from nuclear sites is regulated by the Environment Agency (England), Natural Resources Wales (Wales) and the Scottish Environment Protection Agency (Scotland). All three environment agencies seek to make sure that the generation and disposal of radioactive waste is optimised: ensuring impacts to people are 'as low as reasonably achievable' (ALARA). With a large proportion of UK nuclear sites embarking on decommissioning, the environment agencies have collaboratively developed new guidance: the 'Management of radioactive waste from the decommissioning of nuclear sites: Guidance on the Requirements for Release from radioactive substances regulation' (referred to as the GRR)[1]. The environment agencies worked in liaison with the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR), the UK nuclear safety regulator, and the UK government body responsible, the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA). Prior to finalising the guidance, a 12 month trial was completed at three of the NDA's nuclear sites, enabling the environment agencies to test their draft GRR guidance against 'real world scenarios' and the challenge of incorporating its requirements into decommissioning plans. Experience gained during the trial was incorporated into the current version of the GRR, published in July 2018. The GRR represents the 'new beginning' of this paper's title because for the first time, the UK environmental regulators have expressed in detail their requirements for surrender of environmental permits for nuclear sites. The GRR provides a framework for a UK nuclear site to plan, assess and justify its management of radioactive waste and deliver through decommissioning, an optimal, environmentally safe and sustainable end-state. This paper will describe the requirements and technical standards within the GRR, the establishment of defensible clean-up criteria and the production of a Waste Management Plan (WMP), supported by a Site-Wide Environmental Safety Case (SWESC). It will describe the experience gleaned by operators and regulators during the trial and it will highlight current work by regulators to implement the new approach proportionately. Finally, this paper will look forward and outline planned amendments to legislation in the UK affecting nuclear sites that should enable the full benefits of the GRR to be realised in the future. (authors)
The FY21 NNSA NA-22 Final Report represents the progress achieved over the past year (FY21) by the research team for Topic Area 3, Waste Management & Subsurface Science (WM3), and Topic Area 7, Radiation and Thermal Effects on Bituminous Rocks (WM7). WM3 and WM7 are part of Science Area V (Subsurface Science and Waste Management) in the NNSA-IAEC Science and Technology Working Group. The project was initiated four years ago (2017) with an MOU agreement between the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and the Israel Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) to evaluate the feasibility of geological subsurface disposal of radioactive waste in Israel. The core WM3 and WM7 teams are comprised of scientists and engineers from Los Alamos National Laboratory, the Geologic Survey of Israel (GSI), and the Nuclear Research Center - Negev (NRCN), with a close collaboration to the teams from Sandia National Laboratory (SNL) and Lawrence Livermore Laboratory (LLNL)
Waste monomethyl hydrazine scrubber liquor, consisting of aqueous solutions containing small amounts of CH4, Cl2, CH3Cl, CH2Cl2, and CHCl3 as well as large amounts of CH3OH is scheduled to be dumped in stabilization ponds along with nitrate and nitrite salt solutions obtained as waste liquors from the N2O4 scrubbers. The wastes are investigated as to the hazardous materials generated by such combinations of items as described as well as the finite lifetime of such materials in the stabilization ponds. The gas liquid chromatograph was used in the investigation. A series of experiments designed to convert nitrate and nitrite salts to the environmentally innocuous N2O and N2 using solar energy is reported. Results indicate that this solar conversion is feasible.
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Nitrate form anion exchange resins are specifically prohibited for disposal in TRU waste. At some DOE sites, spent resin was mixed with cement to immobilize the resin in a monolith with varying success. At SRS starting in the 1980s, spent anion resin has generally been converted to a more chemically stable form or it was digested with permanganate and transferred as a slurry to the HLW tank farm. In the early years of the site it is reported that over 20 metric tons of organic resin were transferred directly to the tank farm without any attempt to digest it. It appears that in the future conversion to a stable sulfate form could well be the favored disposal path for spent nitrate-form anion resin. This report will document the site history of converting between ionic forms (nitrate to sulfate) and will document process flowsheet conditions for performing that conversion.
During the last decades, the nuclear and non-nuclear industry has produced a considerable amount of low and intermediate level radioactive wastes. In many countries, it is foreseen to dispose of these waste packages safely in a final repository under strict waste acceptance requirements (e.g. the radiological and material characterization) defined by national licensing and supervisory authorities. The material characterization of waste packages can be performed on the basis of existing documentation or, if the documentation is insufficient, on further destructive or non-destructive analysis. Non-destructive methods are to be preferred to minimize radiation exposures of operating personnel as well as costs. We offer here an innovative non-destructive technology called QUANTOM{sup R} (Quantitative Analysis of Toxic and nontoxic Materials) based on prompt and delayed gamma neutron activation analysis (P and DGNAA). This technology is able to identify, quantify and thus verify the amount of hazardous and non-hazardous substances in 200-l radioactive drums, which is required for a final disposal characterization. (authors)
A workshop was held at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) on July 25th and 26th, 2022. The objective was to develop a blueprint for educating next-generation engineers and scientists about nuclear waste management and disposal, which requires knowledge from diverse disciplines, including nuclear, chemical, civil, environmental, and geological science and engineering. The 49 participants included university professors, researchers, industry experts, and government officials from different areas. First, we have developed a list of key fundamental knowledge on waste management and disposal across the nuclear fuel cycle. In addition, we discussed strategies on how to teach students with diverse backgrounds through innovative teaching strategies as well as how to attract students into this area. Through the workshop, we identified the critical needs to (1) develop community resources for nuclear waste education; (2) synthesize historical perspectives, including past contamination and the management of general hazardous waste; (3) emphasize a complete life-cycle perspective, including proper waste management as the key component for energy sustainability; (4) teach students how to communicate about the key facts and risks to technical and non-technical audiences; and (5) accelerate the use of the state-of-art-technologies to attract and retain a young workforce. Furthermore, we aim to build a diverse, inclusive community that supports students in developing their own narratives about nuclear waste, particularly in recognizing that antagonistic views have been important to improving safety and protecting public health and the environment.
For disposal of nuclear waste a clear identification of the nuclear inventory is mandatory. Since this waste is usually filled in drums, nuclear specific characterization methods using HPGe detectors usually require the understanding of the limitations of the method assumptions (such as the homogeneity criteria), and often results in applying high uncertainties to the result in waste that is not well known a priori. There are several methods and approaches such as Far-Field, Segmented Gamma Scans (SGS) or Tomographic Gamma Scans (TGS) available. The SGS allows measuring the waste drum in different segments (or 'layers') which allows getting more detailed information about the activity distribution inside a waste drum. In addition, with the transmission source used in tomographic scans, it is possible to also determine the material (and its homogeneity) composition inside a drum. Mirion Technologies developed in cooperation with Aachen Institute for Nuclear Training (AiNT) an innovative measurement approach which allows more accurate results and therefore applying lower uncertainties. This new measurement approach extends the concept of SGS by partitioning the drum into single drum sectors instead of segments. The goal is to perform measurements with high throughput and an accurate analysis based on the reconstruction of activities for each sector. (authors)
A multinational collaboration on salt repository research, design and operation has enjoyed remarkable success since reinvigorating efforts in 2010. Nations now engaged in the shared salt repository research agenda include Germany, the United States, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Poland. The scientific basis for safe and permanent disposal of nuclear waste in salt formations has been strengthened by annual workshops that recognize and address contemporary research, including breakout sessions to stimulate open discussion and focus planning for ongoing investigations. Collaboration not only identifies pertinent technical issues, but facilitates timely, expert, and cost-effective consideration. Contemporary workshops have been held annually since 2010 and are documented in yearly state-of-the-art Proceedings, which summarize content and conclusions. The Proceedings help preserve scientific understanding and provide timely source references. These workshops often produce valuable joint publications coordinated with the Nuclear Energy Agency and other suitable external forums for dissemination. Nuclear waste management programs face growing challenges, while permanent disposal in salt formations provides a robust, safe option for several nations. Workshop format and publications provide a cost-effective insurance against loss of scientific expertise and institutional memory. This paper summarizes ten US/German workshops since formal reinitiation, reexamines key technical issues, discusses the evolving research agenda, and highlights successes and challenges. (authors)
As part of its periodic re-certification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), an operating repository in bedded salt for the disposal of transuranic (TRU) waste from atomic energy defense activities, the United States Environmental Protection Agency expects a re-evaluation of features, events, and processes, such as post-closure nuclear criticality. Although salt creep beneficially encapsulates the TRU waste in the closed WIPP repository, the spacing between an array of waste packages is disrupted as the salt creep closes disposal rooms and containers lose structural integrity. For most TRU waste, the possibility of post-closure criticality is exceedingly small either because the salt neutronically isolates TRU waste canisters or because closure of a disposal room from salt creep does not sufficiently compact the low mass of fissile material. The criticality evaluation was updated, however, because of the introduction of criticality control overpack (CCO) containers, which may dispose up to 380 fissile gram equivalent plutonium-239 in each container. The criticality potential is evaluated through high-fidelity geomechanical modeling of a disposal room filled with CCO containers during two representative conditions: (1) large salt block fall, and (2) gradual disposal room closure from salt creep. Geomechanical models of roof fall demonstrate three tiers of CCO containers are not greatly disrupted. Geomechanical models of gradual room closure from salt creep (without brine seepage and subsequent gas generation to permit maximum room closure) were used to predict irregular arrays of closely packed CCOs after 1000 years, when room closure has asymptotically approached maximum compaction. Models of spheres or cylinders with 380 fissile gram equivalent of plutonium (as oxide) at the predicted irregular compacted spacing demonstrate that an array of CCO containers is not critical when surrounded by salt and magnesium oxide, provided the mass of hydrogenous material shipped in CCO containers (usually plastics) is controlled or boron carbide (a neutron poison) is mixed with the fissile contents.