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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 739 records · Page 41
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2022

Unleashing the Frequency: Multi-Megawatt Demonstration of 100% Renewable Power Systems with Decentralized Communication-Less Control Scheme

Power systems, which range in size from small microgrids to island systems to large regional grids, are typically managed by a central controller that requires complex communication methods and can be unreliable and pose cyber security risks in certain applications, especially when controlling a larger number of nodes. We propose an inherently robust, scalable method of integration using multiple energy storage systems and distributed energy resources, which does not require any means of dedicated communication. This method moves beyond the paradigm of controlling grid frequency at a fixed value (e.g., 60 Hz), instead allowing the frequency to fluctuate within certain limits (e.g., 59.6-60.4 Hz). With a greater operating range, the frequency can carry necessary information from energy storage systems to highly variable distributed energy resources like photovoltaics, wind, hydro, etc.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2017

Antarctica Radiological Source Removals (Final Report)

On 18 May 2015, the research vessel Akademik Fedorov of the Russian Antarctic Expedition (RAE) delivered four radioisotope thermoelectric generators (RTGs) from Antarctica to the port of St. Petersburg, Russia. The RTGs had been previously used in the work program of the former Soviet Antarctic Expedition (SAE). From the mid-1970s, RTGs have been used to provide autonomous power at geophysical and meteorological stations located in remote regions of Antarctica. The research was completed in the early 1990s, but not all the generators had been removed when the stations were decommissioned. The remaining four unsecured RTGs, with their strontium-90 ( 90 Sr) radiological material and a combined total activity of 80,000 curies (Ci), still posed a potential risk as they could be used for nefarious purposes. Therefore, a plan of action for the removal of the RTGs from Antarctica was developed. This was done within the framework of the international program for the disposal of Russian RTGs. Financial support and technical oversight was provided by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), while logistical support was provided by the Russian Antarctic Expedition (RAE) of the Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute (AARI) and by subsidiaries of the Russian Federation’s Rosatom State Corporation. Recovering and repatriating the RTGs from the continent of Antarctica to the Russian Federation proved to be a very difficult task, including satisfying all the legal aspects within a very tight timeframe. This involved indemnification issues, adhering to new laws enacted after the Soviet Union era, and obtaining all the necessary permits and certifications for transport of the RTGs by air, sea, and land. It was an international, collaborative effort involving the cooperation of multiple organizations to complete the legal work and preparation of necessary documents. In addition, AARI needed to create a separate structure within its organization to manage the process, including the provision of special medical screenings, training, and certifications of its institute personnel. This was done so AARI could fulfill its obligation for the safe handling of radioactive materials while in the field. Recovery of the RTGs required overcoming several logistical hurdles. The Akademik Fedorov, which transported the RTGs back to the Russian Federation, required retrofits to accommodate the RTGs for safe and secure transport of radioactive material. The United States Project Team (USPT) inspected the vessel while it was in dry dock in Turku, Finland, being retrofitted with their design. Special sleds had to be designed to transport RTGs, as well as equipment for identifying crevasses in the glaciers, over the Antarctic packed snow and ice. Provision of adequate fuel supplies for the long trek to the interior of Antarctica to recover one of the RTGs also had to be addressed. With the successful recovery, repatriation, and disassembly of the RTGs, the Radioactive Heat Sources (RHSs) were extracted and dispositioned, thus eliminating any risk of these radioactive sources being used for terrorist purposes. Successful completion of the project also fulfilled the requirements of the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty concerning the need to remove unused radioactive materials.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2013

Safety Aspects of Dry Spent Fuel Storage and Spent Fuel Management - 13559

Dry storage systems are characterized by passive and inherent safety systems ensuring safety even in case of severe incidents or accidents. After the events of Fukushima, the advantages of such passively and inherently safe dry storage systems have become more and more obvious. As with the storage of all radioactive materials, the storage of spent nuclear fuel (SF) and high-level radioactive waste (HLW) must conform to safety requirements. Following safety aspects must be achieved throughout the storage period: - safe enclosure of radioactive materials, - safe removal of decay heat, - securing nuclear criticality safety, - avoidance of unnecessary radiation exposure. The implementation of these safety requirements can be achieved by dry storage of SF and HLW in casks as well as in other systems such as dry vault storage systems or spent fuel pools, where the latter is neither a dry nor a passive system. Furthermore, transport capability must be guaranteed during and after storage as well as limitation and control of radiation exposure. The safe enclosure of radioactive materials in dry storage casks can be achieved by a double-lid sealing system with surveillance of the sealing system. The safe removal of decay heat must be ensured by the design of the storage containers and the storage facility. The safe confinement of radioactive inventory has to be ensured by mechanical integrity of fuel assembly structures. This is guaranteed, e.g. by maintaining the mechanical integrity of the fuel rods or by additional safety measures for defective fuel rods. In order to ensure nuclear critically safety, possible effects of accidents have also to be taken into consideration. In case of dry storage it might be necessary to exclude the re-positioning of fissile material inside the container and/or neutron moderator exclusion might be taken into account. Unnecessary radiation exposure can be avoided by the cask or canister vault system itself. In Germany dry storage of SF in casks fulfills both transport and storage requirements. Mostly, storage facilities are designed as concrete buildings above the ground, but due to regional constraints, one storage facility has also been built as a rock tunnel. The decay heat is always removed by natural air flow; further technical equipment is not needed. The removal of decay heat and shielding had been modeled and calculated by state-of-the-art computer codes before such a facility has been built. TueV and BAM present their long experience in the licensing process for sites and casks and inform about spent nuclear fuel management and issues concerning dry storage of spent nuclear fuel. Different storage systems and facilities in Germany, Europe and world-wide are compared with respect to the safety aspects mentioned above. Initial points are the safety issues of wet storage of SF, and it is shown how dry storage systems can ensure the compliance with the mentioned safety criteria over a long storage period. The German storage concept for dry storage of SF and HLW is presented and discussed. Exemplarily, the process of licensing, erection and operation of selected German dry storage facilities is presented. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2015

Understanding the Value of a Computer Emergency Response Capability for Nuclear Security

The international nuclear community has a great understanding of the physical security needs relating to the prevention, detection, and response of malicious acts associated with nuclear facilities and radioactive material. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Nuclear Security Recommendations (INFCIRC_225_Rev 5) outlines specific guidelines and recommendations for implementing and maintaining an organization’s nuclear security posture. An important element for inclusion into supporting revision 5 is the establishment of a “Cyber Emergency Response Team (CERT)” focused on the international communities cybersecurity needs to maintain a comprehensive nuclear security posture. Cybersecurity and the importance of nuclear cybersecurity require that there be a specific focus on developing an International Nuclear CERT (NS-CERT). States establishing contingency plans should have an understanding of the cyber threat landscape and the potential impacts to systems in place to protect and mitigate malicious activities. This paper will outline the necessary components, discuss the relationships needed within the international community, and outline a process by which the NS-CERT identifies, collects, processes, and reports critical information in order to establish situational awareness (SA) and support decision-making

CERT↗
DOE OSTI2023

Evaluating Named Data Networking for Industrial Control System [Slides]

Current proposed work is: See if the inherent security that comes with Named Networking (NDN) can be applied to Industrial Control Systems; and, Every packet is required to be cryptographically signed which makes every single piece of data communicated in the system secure and authenticated.

42 ENGINEERING↗
NASA NTRS2003

Earth-to-Orbit Rocket Propulsion

The Earth-to-orbit (ETO) phase of access to space is and always will be the first and most critical phase of all space missions. This first phase of all space missions has unique characteristics that have driven space launcher propulsion requirements for more than half a century. For example, the need to overcome the force of the Earth s gravity in combination with high levels of atmospheric drag to achieve the initial orbital velocity; i.e., Earth parking orbit or =9 km/s, will always require high thrust- to-weight (TN) propulsion systems. These are necessary with a T/W ratio greater than one during the ascent phase. The only type of propulsion system that can achieve these high T/W ratios are those that convert thermal energy to kinetic energy. There are only two basic sources of onboard thermal energy: chemical combustion-based systems or nuclear thermal-based systems (fission, fusion, or antimatter). The likelihood of advanced open-cycle, nuclear thermal propulsion being developed for flight readiness or becoming environmentally acceptable during the next century is extremely low. This realization establishes that chemical propulsion for ET0 launchers will be the technology of choice for at least the next century, just as it has been for the last half century of rocket flight into space. The world s space transportation propulsion requirements have evolved through several phases over the history of the space program, as has been necessitated by missions and systems development, technological capabilities available, and the growth and evolution of the utilization of space for economic, security, and science benefit. Current projections for the continuing evolution of requirements and concepts may show how future space transportation system needs could be addressed. The evolution and projections will be described in detail in this manuscript.

Beaurain, Andre↗
NASA NTRS1979

Flight design system level C requirements. Solid rocket booster and external tank impact prediction processors

The prediction of the SRB and ET impact areas requires six separate processors. The SRB impact prediction processor computes the impact areas and related trajectory data for each SRB element. Output from this processor is stored on a secure file accessible by the SRB impact plot processor which generates the required plots. Similarly the ET RTLS impact prediction processor and the ET RTLS impact plot processor generates the ET impact footprints for return-to-launch-site (RTLS) profiles. The ET nominal/AOA/ATO impact prediction processor and the ET nominal/AOA/ATO impact plot processor generate the ET impact footprints for non-RTLS profiles. The SRB and ET impact processors compute the size and shape of the impact footprints by tabular lookup in a stored footprint dispersion data base. The location of each footprint is determined by simulating a reference trajectory and computing the reference impact point location. To insure consistency among all flight design system (FDS) users, much input required by these processors will be obtained from the FDS master data base.

Seale, R. H.↗
DOE OSTI2025

Small scale electron linear accelerators for industrial applications

Linear accelerators (linacs), producing electron or X-ray radiation in the MeV range, are critical tools for industrial irradiation, medical device sterilization, food pasteurization, non-destructive testing, security, medical, and many other applications. Many of these applications require compact and flexible radiation sources. In this paper, we present new technologies for small-scale electron linear accelerators and examples of their practical implementations. Furthermore, these developments include low energy accelerators with self-shielding options and form factors, ranging from cabinet-size to hand-portable generators; medium-energy accelerators for novel radiotherapy and security applications; and high-energy 10 MeV linacs capable of reaching 20–35 kW beam power for emerging industrial and phytosanitary applications

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗
DOE OSTI2014

Automatic Labeling for Entity Extraction in Cyber Security

Timely analysis of cyber-security information necessitates automated information extraction from unstructured text. While state-of-the-art extraction methods produce extremely accurate results, they require ample training data, which is generally unavailable for specialized applications, such as detecting security related entities; moreover, manual annotation of corpora is very costly and often not a viable solution. In response, we develop a very precise method to automatically label text from several data sources by leveraging related, domain-specific, structured data and provide public access to a corpus annotated with cyber-security entities. Next, we implement a Maximum Entropy Model trained with the average perceptron on a portion of our corpus (~750,000 words) and achieve near perfect precision, recall, and accuracy, with training times under 17 seconds.

Automatic Labeling↗
DOE OSTI2016

Bringing Federated Identity to Grid Computing

The Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory (FNAL) is facing the challenge of providing scientific data access and grid submission to scientific collaborations that span the globe but are hosted at FNAL. Users in these collaborations are currently required to register as an FNAL user and obtain FNAL credentials to access grid resources to perform their scientific computations. These requirements burden researchers with managing additional authentication credentials, and put additional load on FNAL for managing user identities. Our design integrates the existing InCommon federated identity infrastructure, CILogon Basic CA, and MyProxy with the FNAL grid submission system to provide secure access for users from diverse experiments and collab orations without requiring each user to have authentication credentials from FNAL. The design automates the handling of certificates so users do not need to manage them manually. Although the initial implementation is for FNAL's grid submission system, the design and the core of the implementation are general and could be applied to other distributed computing systems.

Teheran, Jeny↗
DOE OSTI2025

Improving Cyber Situational Understanding

Effective cybersecurity operations require the ability to analyze large amounts of information to assess security risks and formulate defensive strategies against adversaries. This has become more complex in recent years as the sprawl and interconnectivity of devices grows through implementation of virtualization, cloud computing, and Internet of Things (IoT). The amount of data and analysis required for effective cybersecurity command and control decisions far exceeds humans’ capacity to perform manually. We characterize the analysis problem as cyber situational understanding. The research presented to improve cyber situational understanding focuses on vulnerability analysis and threat intelligence. Regarding vulnerabilities, entities must analyze and plan work for between thousands and tens of thousands of software vulnerabilities annually. Entities heavily use network firewalls to limit vulnerability exposure. As a result, some of these vulnerabilities permit exposure to adversarial exploitation, whereas others are inaccessible and therefore present negligible risk of exploitation. Distinguishing between high and low risk software vulnerabilities requires a deep understanding of the vulnerability, network firewall protection, and characteristics of the targeted device. This problem is solved by extracting network service features from vulnerability data features using both machine-learning and natural language processing. Then, the network firewall topology is parsed to determine which vulnerabilities are reachable by adversaries. Ultimately, a state-based safety analysis ascertains which vulnerabilities are unsafe. A related vulnerability analysis problem occurs in cybersecurity operations when associating an entity’s hardware and software assets to public vulnerability databases. Assets often reveal hardware and software through installation artifacts and network service identification, and entities store these artifacts in inventory databases. However, software and hardware vendors apply a standard Common Platform Enumeration (CPE) naming convention when publicly reporting vulnerabilities. Associating these two datasets often requires many hours to days of manual inspection. The proposed solution automates the mapping approach of human analysts using fuzzy matching techniques, natural language processing, and, ultimately, machine learning to present a small set of recommendations for mapping the two datasets. The result significantly reduces human analysis time and reduces the occurrence of false positives in vulnerability notifications. Finally, cyber threat intelligence (CTI) requires associating cyber observable artifacts, such as IP addresses, URIs, and file hashes, with cyber threat tactics, techniques, and procedures. Unfortunately, most CTI data is compartmentalized across multiple organizations and cannot be shared due to the legal and reputational risk with cyber threat being associated with the entity. The approach to solving this problem inovlves using a distributed ledger with anonymous token spending and authentication. This allows a consortium of semi-trusted entities to share the workload of curating CTI for a threat sharing community’s cooperative benefit.

Huff, Philip↗
DOE OSTI2012

Industrial Wireless Sensors: A User's Perspective on the Impact of Standards on Wide-spread Deployment

The role of wireless sensing technologies in industrial instrumentation will undoubtedly become more important in the years ahead. . Deployment of such instrumentation in an industrial setting with its heightened security and robustness criteria hinges on user acceptance of verified performance as well as meeting cost requirements. Today, industrial users face many choices when specifying a wireless sensor network, including radio performance, battery life, interoperability, security, and standards compliance. The potential market for industrial wireless sensors is literally millions of wireless instruments and it is imperative that accurate information for applying the technology to real-world applications be available to the end-user so that they can make informed deployment decisions. The majority of industrial wireless automation designs now being deployed or being considered for deployment are based on three different standards . The HART Communications Foundation s WirelessHART (IEC 62591), the International Society of Automation s ISA100.11a, and the offering from the Industrial Wireless Alliance of China known as WIA-PA (IEC 62601). Aside from these industrial automation standards, users must also be cognizant of the underlying wireless network standards IEEE 802.11, IEEE 802.15.4, and IEEE 802.15.3a and their interactions with the three principal industrial automation protocols mentioned previously. The crucial questions being asked by end users revolve around sensor network performance, interoperability, reliability, and security. This paper will discuss potential wireless sensor applications in power plants, barriers to the acceptance of wireless technology, concerns related to standards, and provide an end user prospective on the issues affecting wide-spread deployment of wireless sensors. Finally, the authors conclude with a discussion of a recommended path forward including how standards organizations can better facilitate end user decision making and how end users can locate and use objective information for decision making.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2018

Advanced Materials and Technologies for Resilient Infrastructure Systems

Infrastructure is largely unnoticed until it breaks down and services fail. This includes water supplies, gas pipelines, bridges and highways, phone lines and cell towers, and the electric grid — all of the complex systems that keep our societies and economies running. The secure and reliable functioning of our nation’s critical infrastructure is required; however, U.S. infrastructures face a rising frequency and severity of natural disasters (Figure 1), and a growing number and sophistication of physical and cyber attacks. With increasing technological and economic progress, infrastructures are growing more interconnected, necessitating new considerations for their security. Recent disasters such as Superstorm Sandy provide profound insights into how non-linear interactions combine with network effects to trigger a cascade of events across interdependent systems.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
DOE OSTI2022

Nevada National Security Site Radiological Control Manual

Please have this STIP assigned, documented, and recorded in OSTI as Report Number DOE/NV/03624--0257 Revision 1 and Author as Radiological Control Managers' Council. This manual contains the radiological control requirements to be used for all radiological activities conducted by programs under the purview of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO). (Activities conducted under the purview of the U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Environmental Management Nevada[(EM Nevada] may require additional approval authorities as described in the EM Nevada Prime Contractor’s implementation plan.) Compliance with these requirements will ensure compliance with Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 835, “Occupational Radiation Protection.” This manual represents policies, guidelines, and best practices for implementing the DOE/NV/03624--0082, “Nevada National Security Site Radiation Protection Program,” (NNSS RPP) according to the requirements of 10 CFR 835.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗
DOE OSTI2021

INS–Support for Formal Cyber Security Education in Brazil–After Action Report

The adoption of digital technology into Instrumentation and Control (I&C) systems in nuclear facilities fundamentally changes the nature of these systems. Greater interconnectivity of reprogrammable, and functionally interdependent control systems has given rise to the need for computer security consideration in digital I&C Systems. The cyber security of I&C systems presents a growing risk to nuclear facilities and requires the development of educational and research tools to ensure the safety of these facilities. Currently there is a major gap in formal educational offerings on cyber security for these Operational Technology (OT) systems. To provide formal cyber security education resources, DOE’s office of International Nuclear Security (INS) partnered with the University of São Paulo (USP) to develop a training course on the cyber security of nuclear facility I&C systems using the hypothetical Nuclear Power Plant, Asherah.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2018

Optimising National WM Strategies through early consideration of Nuclear Safeguards - 18607

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards stand alongside safety and security as one of the three pillars for prudent management of all nuclear material, including nuclear waste. Although safety considerations, including public and environmental radiation protection, are the traditional drivers of waste management strategies, there is a requirement for nuclear safeguards in shaping and quantifying long-term solutions for special classes of radioactive waste. This is especially important when considering the disposal of nuclear material in a repository that could be released from regulatory oversight for radiation protection after a period of institutional control, as some safeguards oversight would still be required. Failure to consider nuclear safeguards at the early stages of planning may alternatively lead to excessive volumes for disposal or the need to recondition already treated wastes. At the very least, safeguards measures should be considered before countries seek to dispose of legacy nuclear materials, decommissioning wastes and other materials containing uranium, thorium or plutonium in an operating repository. Nuclear safeguards are the set of tools and techniques used by the IAEA to verify that countries comply with their international obligations not to divert nuclear materials to nuclear explosive devices. Under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), nuclear safeguards apply to all uranium, thorium and plutonium held in non-weapons NPT states, with limited exceptions. In nuclear-weapon states, much of their material is likewise subject to IAEA safeguards through conditions in agreements with respective suppliers of the uranium. Under IAEA safeguards, such nuclear material must remain accounted for and accessible for periodic verification-analogous to the safety concepts of reversibility and retrievability. Nevertheless, safeguards requirements can be terminated - provided that the State and the [IAEA] agree that such nuclear material is practicably irrecoverable - through dilution or immobilisation in solid form (such as cement, glass or ceramic). This means candidate material can be disposed of as non- nuclear material, with no further safeguards requirements, provided this criterion is met. Unlike radiological wastes where repository design strongly influences pathways for radionuclide migration and overall safety performance, repository design is not a factor in considering the termination of safeguards on nuclear material. This paper looks at similarities and differences in the safety, security and safeguards regulatory requirements for the management of radioactive waste and nuclear material in Australia. In particular, it outlines recent experience gained from participation in Australia's waste acceptance criteria working group for a national low-level waste repository and intermediate-level waste store, as well as from Australia's overall waste management strategy. These items of work have coincided with the IAEA update of its internal policy on termination of safeguards on nuclear material. Australia's experience shows how inclusion of safeguards criteria in the planning process is leading to optimisations in choice of facility concepts, project sequencing and equitable distribution of economic risk. By considering the three pillars-safety, security and safeguards-early on in the planning process, Australia's waste management strategy will provide a benchmark for other states in establishing and updating their own waste acceptance criteria for the disposal of nuclear material. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2012

Suspect/Counterfeit Items Information Guide for Subcontractors/Suppliers

Counterfeiting of industrial and commercial grade items is an international problem that places worker safety, program objectives, expensive equipment, and security at risk. In order to prevent the introduction of Suspect/Counterfeit Items (S/CI), this information sheet is being made available as a guide to assist in the implementation of S/CI awareness and controls, in conjunction with subcontractor's/supplier's quality assurance programs. When it comes to counterfeit goods, including industrial materials, items, and equipment, no market is immune. Some manufactures have been known to misrepresent their products and intentionally use inferior materials and processes to manufacture substandard items, whose properties can significantly cart from established standards and specifications. These substandard items termed by the Department of Energy (DOE) as S/CI, pose immediate and potential threats to the safety of DOE and contractor workers, the public, and the environment. Failure of certain systems and processes caused by an S/CI could also have national security implications at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). Nuclear Safety Rules (federal Laws), DOE Orders, and other regulations set forth requirements for DOE contractors to implement effective controls to assure that items and services meet specified requirements. This includes techniques to implement and thereby minimizing the potential threat of entry of S/CI to LANL. As a qualified supplier of goods or services to the LANL, your company will be required to establish and maintain effective controls to prevent the introduction of S/CI to LANL. This will require that your company warrant that all items (including their subassemblies, components, and parts) sold to LANL are genuine (i.e. not counterfeit), new, and unused, and conform to the requirements of the LANL purchase orders/contracts unless otherwise approved in writing to the Los Alamos National Security (LANS) contract administrator/procurements specialist.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗