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Deposition Velocity Methods For DOE Site Safety Analyses

This report documents the results of an investigation of deposition velocity methods for use in Department of Energy (DOE) Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) modeling. The project was sponsored by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Nuclear Safety Research and Development Program and monitored by the Chief of Nuclear Safety (CNS) from the Office of the Under Secretary for Management and Performance. Based on initial scoping discussions, the primary focus of this effort was on the dry deposition of particulate matter. However, within the constraints of the project, we also explored the sensitivity of safety analysis modeling to other key input parameters (wind direction variability, atmospheric stability, release characteristics, model assumptions), examined the 95 th percentile methodology, and investigated a few aspects of a commonly-used DOE safety analysis code, MACCS2 (MELCOR Accident Consequence Code System).

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Electronic Safety Resource Tools -- Supporting Hydrogen and Fuel Cell Commercialization

The Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) Hydrogen Safety Program conducted a planning session in Los Angeles, CA on April 1, 2014 to consider what electronic safety tools would benefit the next phase of hydrogen and fuel cell commercialization. A diverse, 20-person team led by an experienced facilitator considered the question as it applied to the eight most relevant user groups. The results and subsequent evaluation activities revealed several possible resource tools that could greatly benefit users. The tool identified as having the greatest potential for impact is a hydrogen safety portal, which can be the central location for integrating and disseminating safety information (including most of the tools identified in this report). Such a tool can provide credible and reliable information from a trustworthy source. Other impactful tools identified include a codes and standards wizard to guide users through a series of questions relating to application and specific features of the requirements; a scenario-based virtual reality training for first responders; peer networking tools to bring users from focused groups together to discuss and collaborate on hydrogen safety issues; and a focused tool for training inspectors. Table ES.1 provides results of the planning session, including proposed new tools and changes to existing tools.

08 HYDROGEN↗

Application of Framework for Integrating Safety, Security and Safeguards (3Ss) into the Design Of Used Nuclear Fuel Storage Facility

Department of Energy’s Office of Nuclear Energy, Fuel Cycle Research and Development develops options to the current commercial fuel cycle management strategy to enable the safe, secure, economic, and sustainable expansion of nuclear energy while minimizing proliferation risks by conducting research and development focused on used nuclear fuel recycling and waste management to meet U.S. needs. Used nuclear fuel is currently stored onsite in either wet pools or in dry storage systems, with disposal envisioned in interim storage facility and, ultimately, in a deep-mined geologic repository. The safe management and disposition of used nuclear fuel and/or nuclear waste is a fundamental aspect of any nuclear fuel cycle. Integrating safety, security, and safeguards (3Ss) fully in the early stages of the design process for a new nuclear facility has the potential to effectively minimize safety, proliferation, and security risks. The 3Ss integration framework could become the new national and international norm and the standard process for designing future nuclear facilities. The purpose of this report is to develop a framework for integrating the safety, security and safeguards concept into the design of Used Nuclear Fuel Storage Facility (UNFSF). The primary focus is on integration of safeguards and security into the UNFSF based on the existing Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) approach to addressing the safety/security interface (10 CFR 73.58 and Regulatory Guide 5.73) for nuclear power plants. The methodology used for adaptation of the NRC safety/security interface will be used as the basis for development of the safeguards /security interface and later will be used as the basis for development of safety and safeguards interface. Then this will complete the integration cycle of safety, security, and safeguards. The overall methodology for integration of 3Ss will be proposed, but only the integration of safeguards and security will be applied to the design of the UNFSF. The framework for integration of safeguards and security into the UNFSF will include 1) identification of applicable regulatory requirements, 2) selection of a common system that share dual safeguard and security functions, 3) development of functional design criteria and design requirements for the selected system, 4) identification and integration of the dual safeguards and security design requirements, and 5) assessment of the integration and potential benefit.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Advanced Reactor Safety Program – Stakeholder Interaction and Feedback

In the Spring of 2013, the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) began discussions with industry stakeholders on how to upgrade our safety analysis capabilities. The focus of these improvements would primarily be on advanced safety analysis capabilities that could help the nuclear industry analyze, understand, and better predict complex safety problems. The current environment in the DOE complex is such that recent successes in high performance computer modeling and simulation could lead the nuclear industry to benefit from these advances, as long as an effort to translate these advances into realistic applications is made. Upgrading the nuclear industry modeling analysis capabilities is a significant effort that would require participation and coordination from all industry segments: research, engineering, vendors, and operations. We focus here on interactions with industry stakeholders to develop sound advanced safety analysis applications propositions that could have a positive impact on industry long term operation, hence advancing the state of nuclear safety.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

LNG Safety Assessment Evaluation Methods

Sandia National Laboratories evaluated published safety assessment methods across a variety of industries including Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG), hydrogen, land and marine transportation, as well as the US Department of Defense (DOD). All the methods were evaluated for their potential applicability for use in the LNG railroad application. After reviewing the documents included in this report, as well as others not included because of repetition, the Department of Energy (DOE) Hydrogen Safety Plan Checklist is most suitable to be adapted to the LNG railroad application. This report was developed to survey industries related to rail transportation for methodologies and tools that can be used by the FRA to review and evaluate safety assessments submitted by the railroad industry as a part of their implementation plans for liquefied or compressed natural gas storage ( on-board or tender) and engine fueling delivery systems. The main sections of this report provide an overview of various methods found during this survey. In most cases, the reference document is quoted directly. The final section provides discussion and a recommendation for the most appropriate methodology that will allow efficient and consistent evaluations to be made. The DOE Hydrogen Safety Plan Checklist was then revised to adapt it as a methodology for the Federal Railroad Administration’s use in evaluating safety plans submitted by the railroad industry.

03 NATURAL GAS↗

Beyond Design Basis Event Pilot Evaluations: Results and Recommendations for Improvements to Enhance Nuclear Safety at DOE Nuclear Facilities (DOE, 2013. A Report to the Secretary of Energy)

In the six months after the March 2011 Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident in Japan, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) took several actions to review the safety of its nuclear facilities and identify situations where near-term improvements could be made. These actions and recommendations were addressed in an August 2011 report to the Secretary of Energy, Review of Requirements and Capabilities for Analyzing and Responding to Beyond Design Basis Events. Based on recommendations in the August 2011 report, DOE embarked on a project to develop and refine guidance that supports improvements in DOE’s processes for analyzing and mitigating beyond design basis events (BDBEs), i.e., events such as earthquakes that are more severe than the events that formed the basis of the design for DOE’s nuclear facilities. The results of this BDBE project and recommendations for further DOE actions are provided in this follow-on report. The main activity of the BDBE project was the pilot application of guidance for evaluation of BDBE analysis and mitigation features at four DOE nuclear facilities representing a range of DOE sites, nuclear facility types/activities, and responsible program offices. The pilot evaluations focused on: (1) BDBE evaluations as documented in the facility Documented Safety Analysis (DSA); (2) potential BDBE vulnerabilities and margins to failure for facility safety features as obtained from general area and specific system walkdowns and design document reviews; and, (3) preparations made in facility and site emergency management programs to respond to severe accidents. The BDBE project also evaluated whether draft BDBE guidance on safety analysis and emergency management could be used to improve the analysis of, and preparations for, mitigating severe accidents and BDBEs. The pilot evaluation team paid close attention to related actions being pursued by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the U.S. commercial nuclear industry, and the international nuclear safety community to help refine the guidance developed for the pilot evaluations.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

MN471017 Safety basis Manual

National Technology & Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC, manages the facilities and infrastructure of Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) on behalf of the U.S. Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA). Activities in support of the SNL mission take place at primary facilities located in Albuquerque, New Mexico, and Livermore, California, as well as at supporting facilities located in Nevada, Hawaii, Alaska, Texas, and Washington, D.C. As required by the Management and Operating (M&O) Contract (DE-NA0003525) and DOE orders, standards, and guidance, the M&O contractor maintain a safety basis process, which helps to identify and evaluate hazards related to facilities, operations, and activities at both Sandia-controlled premises (i.e., onsite) and non-Sandia-controlled premises (i.e., offsite) to adequately protect workers, the public, and the environment. This manual describes the SNL safety basis process, which is managed by the Environment, Safety, and Health (ES&H) Planning Department. Safety basis personnel ensure that a centralized and consistent process is implemented for safety basis development, documentation, and evaluation.

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗

A safety and licensing roadmap to identify the research and development gaps of commercial molten salt reactors

Molten salt reactors (MSRs) both inherently and through good design possess highly desirable safety attributes. Successful commercial deployment of MSRs is heavily dependent on establishing their safety characteristics in a well-coordinated licensing requirements program. The approach outlined is based on adapting the MSR licensing process to the current LWR–based NRC process that exists today, which has been the traditional approach used by new technologies such as the Pebble Bed Reactor licensing application, the Clinch River Breeder Reactor licensing application, and more recently the NuScale licensing application. NRC has recognized some of the unique passively safe aspects of advanced non-LWR reactors and has introduced an advanced reactor strategic plan which will address policy issues that need to be addressed to accommodate advanced reactor concepts within the existing regulatory framework. Examples of some of these policy issues are the use of functional containment, the use of mechanistic source terms, and more reliance on performance-based and risk-informed regulatory processes, such as the Licensing Modernization Project, which emphasizes the use of risk-informed processes to select licensing basis events, safety categorization of SSC, and well-defined defense-in-depth systems. Applying performance-based, risk-informed regulatory processes is, consequently, vital to substantially decreasing the cost, time, and uncertainty of commercial MSR reactor licensing while providing for the health and safety of the public and protecting the environment. This document is intended to provide a roadmap for the MSR licensing and safety activities necessary to provide a success path to commercialization.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Integrated Safety Management System Description

Personnel at Sandia National Laboratories (hereinafter referred to as Sandia) comply with United States Department of Energy (DOE) Policy 450.4A, Chg 1, Integrated Safety Management Policy, and implement an Integrated Safety Management System (ISMS) to ensure safe operations. Safety is integrated into management and work practices at all levels so missions are accomplished while protecting Members of the Workforce, the public, and the environment. As a result, safety is effectively integrated into all facets of work planning and execution. Thus the management of safety functions becomes an integral part of mission accomplishment and meets the requirements outlined in the DOE Acquisition Regulation (DEAR) 970.5223-1, Integration of Environment, 4/.01, and Health into Work Planning and Execution, clause incorporated by reference into the Prime Contract.

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗

The Always/Never Safety Framework for Satellite Rendezvous and Proximity Operations and On-Orbit Servicing

Space rendezvous and proximity operations are increasing in numbers, enabling inspections, diagnostics, and maintenance of on-orbit systems. Because collision, loss of control, and unintended damage can impact the system under examination -- and at the extreme, cause system break-up and space debris -- the safety practices for rendezvous and proximity operations can have significant implications for national security. This study examines the applicability of the Always/Never surety framework, which was developed for United States nuclear weapons, as a model safety basis for unmanned space proximity operations. This unclassified framework has understandable safety approaches and principles and focuses on a system being always safenever unsafe. The authors consider that the adapting the framework might present a means for standardization across government and commerce, encouraging a consistent approach and a set of clarifying safety principles and applications for rendezvous and proximity operations. The framework also offers a consistent taxonomy, presents safety and reliability requirements organized by four environment categories, defines accident or abnormal conditions, contributes a strategy for identifying hostile and tactical environments, and enables decision-making for determining if conditions are safe for proximity space operations.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Tritium Fires: Simulation and Safety Assessment

This is the Sandia report from a joint NSRD project between Sandia National Labs and Savannah River National Labs. The project involved development of simulation tools and data intended to be useful for tritium operations safety assessment. Tritium is a synthetic isotope of hydrogen that has a limited lifetime, and it is found at many tritium facilities in the form of elemental gas (T 2 ). The most serious risk of reasonable probability in an accident scenario is when the tritium is released and reacts with oxygen to form a water molecule, which is subsequently absorbed into the human body. This tritium oxide is more readily absorbed by the body and therefore represents a limiting factor for safety analysis. The abnormal condition of a fire may result in conversion of the safer T 2 inventory to the more hazardous oxidized form. It is this risk that tends to govern the safety protocols. Tritium fire datasets do not exist, so prescriptive safety guidance is largely conservative and reliant on means other than testing to formulate guidelines. This can have a consequence in terms of expensive and/or unnecessary mitigation design, handling protocols, and operational activities. This issue can be addressed through added studies on the behavior of tritium under representative conditions. Due to the hazards associated with the tests, this is being approached mainly from a modeling and simulation standpoint and surrogate testing. This study largely establishes the capability to generate simulation predictions with sufficiently credible characteristics to be accepted for safety guidelines as a surrogate for actual data through a variety of testing and modeling activities.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Tommy Morris’ Comments on Nuclear Explosive Safety

Nuclear explosives and weapon systems require special consideration because of their political and military importance, their destructive power, and the potential consequences of an accident. The special consideration translates into specific requirements promulgated by Department of Energy (DOE) O 452.1E “Nuclear Explosive and Weapon Surety,” and Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 3150.02 “DoD Nuclear Weapon System Safety Program.” The Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) W-Division Nuclear Explosive Safety Office mission is to coordinate LANL participation in Nuclear Explosive Safety Studies (NESS) and Nuclear Weapon System Safety Studies (NWSS); to provide qualified members and advisors to the studies; to liaise with the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), the DoD, other national laboratories, the Nevada Test Site, and Pantex Plant with regards to nuclear explosive and weapon system safety. These orders and directives define nuclear detonation as an energy release through a nuclear process, during a period of time on the order of 1 microsecond, in an amount equivalent to the energy released by detonating 4 or more pounds of trinitrotoluene (TNT).

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Onshore U.S. Carbon Pipeline Deployment: Siting, Safety, and Regulation

Carbon capture, utilization, and storage (CCUS) technology has significant potential to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and mitigate the impact of climate change, particularly in hard to decarbonize industrial and commercial sectors. CCUS involves capturing carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) from industrial processes or power generation and utilizing it for other purposes, such as enhanced oil recovery (EOR), or storing the captured CO 2 underground. CCUS technology can reduce the environmental impact of continued fossil fuel use while smoothing the transition to a low-carbon economy. CCUS can create new economic opportunities, such as the development of new industries and job creation, and can enhance energy security by diversifying energy sources. For these reasons, enabling CCUS has become a key objective of the Biden-Harris administration’s clean energy policy and has received bipartisan support. Despite its environmental and economic potential, CCUS faces multiple barriers to widespread deployment. One of the main challenges is the high cost and technical difficulty of implementing and operating large-scale CCUS infrastructure. CCUS remains a relatively expensive way to reduce carbon emissions (e.g., compared to solar photovoltaic technology’s displacement of coal generation). Additionally, financial incentives and supportive policies like those enacted to support solar photovoltaic development, especially at the state level, are inconsistent or nonexistent, which can discourage investment in CCUS projects. There are also technical challenges associated with safe and secure underground CO 2 storage and the development of new carbon utilization technologies. Public opposition to various aspects of CCUS technologies, ranging from concerns that CCUS will extend reliance on fossil fuels to CCUS infrastructure being sited in disadvantaged communities, is a growing challenge. This paper focuses on another significant barrier to broad CCUS deployment: the need for considerable expansion of the dedicated land-based CO 2 pipeline network in the United States to meet CCUS goals and the unique regulatory challenges to its development. To reach carbon emissions targets in the United States by 2050, CCUS technology will need to be supported by tens of thousands of miles of CO 2 pipelines. Estimates range from a minimum of roughly 29,000 pipeline miles (according to a 2020 Great Plains Institute study) to 66,000 pipeline miles (as per a 2021 Princeton University–led study). As of October 2022, however, the U.S. Department of Transportation (U.S. DOT) reports fewer than 5,400 miles of U.S. pipelines carrying CO 2 . This deficit—and what it means for the prospect of moving substantially larger quantities of CO 2 from source to use or storage—threatens to stifle the development of CCUS projects and technologies identified as an important tool to meet emissions targets. The current regulatory landscape facing CO 2 pipeline development can best be described as uncertain. At the federal level, the U.S. DOT Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) oversees safety regulation of pipelines transporting hazardous materials, including CO 2 upon commencement of operation. However, PHMSA’s definition of CO 2 as “a fluid consisting of more than 90 percent CO 2 molecules compressed to a supercritical state” has not been updated since its 1991 addition to the Federal Register. Because CO 2 can be transported in a gaseous, liquid, or supercritical state (indeed, the physical state of CO 2 can fluctuate within a single pipeline due to environmental changes), doubts persist about the extent of PHMSA’s purview—and raise questions about what, if anything, states should do to address this apparent gap. PHMSA has begun a major revision of its existing rules, but the agency does not expect a first draft before 2024. Economic oversight of CO 2 pipelines is even less clear. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and Surface Transportation Board (STB)—which regulate the rates of interstate oil/natural gas and non-energy pipelines, respectively—have both declined jurisdiction over interstate CO 2 pipelines. This presumably leaves economic regulation to state and/or local governments, but few if any states have the laws or resources in place to oversee just and reasonable rates. Further, the interstate nature of CO 2 pipeline development creates questions around how different states should align their rate-making decisions. Onshore U.S. Carbon Pipeline Deployment: Siting, Safety, and Regulation Currently, regulatory responsibilities regarding CO 2 pipeline siting and permitting fall to state and local governments. The variety of laws and regulations across the country, however, creates a maze of requirements for pipeline developers to navigate. To secure necessary permits, most states require pipeline companies to be “common carriers” that provide transport service to the public at uniform rates. However, the specific definition of that term varies. Some states require clear evidence that a pipeline services the public, while others automatically deem any pipeline company transporting energy products or hazardous materials to be a “common carrier”—with little consideration for accessibility to third parties. Other states have eschewed common-carrier terminology entirely, placing private and publicly accessible pipelines on equal footing. Much like the variation in common-carrier requirements, laws governing eminent domain authority to secure rights-of-way (ROW) to commence construction on a planned pipeline route differ by state. Several states have no laws or rules governing CO 2 pipelines. In addition to creating questions about whether long-standing rules for other pipelines (e.g., natural gas or petroleum products) apply to CO 2 , this policy vacuum leaves local governments as the sole authority over sections of pipe within their boundaries. With dozens of counties along a given route, the probability of inconsistent regulation of the same pipeline is significant. Even in states with CO 2 pipeline laws in place, local regulatory attempts to address rising concerns over pipeline routing and safety have triggered lawsuits by pipeline companies seeking to delimit areas of federal, state, and local government responsibility. Meanwhile, legislators across the country have introduced bills to restrict the application of eminent domain to CO 2 pipeline projects, which could threaten a key means of securing ROW that companies cannot secure through negotiation with landowners. Taken separately, any of these regulatory issues—the narrow federal definition of CO 2 , FERC’s and STB’s decisions that CO 2 pipelines are not within their jurisdiction, and the considerable variation in state and local governments’ laws regulating CO 2 pipeline technologies—are extremely difficult to resolve. Adding the required scale of CO 2 pipeline expansion and the currently identified narrow window of time in which to reach climate target goals, the task becomes even more difficult—and raises a host of urgent questions for regulators. How should CO 2 be defined in federal regulations to ensure consistent safety standards across the country? What is the potential impact radius of a CO 2 pipeline rupture, and how should that inform local emergency response? In the absence of centralized federal oversight, what should state legislatures do to increase alignment for interstate CO 2 pipeline projects? This paper intends to serve as a primer for regulators and stakeholders who seek to better understand the regulatory challenges and opportunities facing this critical infrastructure.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Motion Planning Algorithms for Safety and Quantum Computing Efficiency

Motion planning remains a fundamental problem in robotics. Sampling-based algorithms use randomization to allow efficient solutions to this complex problem. As mobile robots and autonomous vehicles become more prevalent in everyday life, motion planning must be applied to increasingly challenging scenarios. Safety has become a paramount concern in motion planning for ensuring robotic applications enrich human lives. To date, many motion planning techniques to increase safety in the face of uncertain and dynamic environments have been developed. This dissertation first addresses distributional safety of Rapidly-Exploring Random Trees (RRT) through our algorithm W-Safe RRT. To acknowledge distributional uncertainty and poor modeling, W-Safe RRT uses the Wasserstein metric to provide a probabilistic bound on the distributional distance between a robot and obstacles. Human-interpretable environmental agent classification allows online safety margin adaptation. We propose and analyze an integrating region method for online classification that increases actor labeling accuracy based on behavioral feature values when compared to state of the art methods. The method performs class assignments based on local maximum likelihood in a created behavioral feature-space, allowing a notion of classification uncertainty. Model-based methods with safety guarantees can quickly become computationally in tractable, especially with multiple agents, higher dimensions, and plentiful unknowns. Sampling based algorithms have been parallelized for computation with multi-core computers and GPUs. We consider the use of quantum algorithms and computers for sampling-based motion planning for the first time. Quantum computing performs operations on superpositions of states and can solve certain problems much more efficiently than classical computers, but introduces previously unseen challenges. With Quantum-RRT, we recast the motion planning problem into a database-search structure and use Quantum Amplitude Amplification to find reachable states in the database with a quadratic performance increase over classical methods. We address two error sources with this method: quantum measurement and quantum oracle errors. We then extend this method to Parallel Quantum-RRT, which uses a manager-worker architecture with multiple parallel quantum workers to increase database search efficiency. We compare algorithm architectures and characterize probabilities of multiple workers finding solutions. Lastly, we test in simulation the quantum algorithms against classical versions in a wide variety of scenarios, concluding that a similar parallelization improvement is to be found in the quantum case as was found in the parallelization of classical RRT.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Safety in Artificial Intelligence: Challenges and Opportunities for the U.S. National Labs and Beyond

This report discusses the importance of the critical and underexplored topic of artificial intelligence (AI) safety, as highlighted during the “Strategy Alignment on AI Safety” workshop convened at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) in April 2024. Through a summary of keynote talks, panel discussions, and breakout sessions, world-leading AI safety experts from academic, industry, national labs, and government agencies clearly agree on the need for and importance of large-scale investments for research and capabilities in AI safety. With the field innovating at unprecedented rates, there is increasing urgency to develop novel evaluation methodologies that allow full considerations of risks/threats of AI technologies in different domains. Quantitative metrics and effective methodologies that can evaluate and audit the “safeness” of how a given AI technology is trained, deployed, or regulated are, at best, nascent for certain scenarios or, more commonly, nonexistent. This maturation gap presents the possibility of serious threats to national security, and further inaction may have serious consequences. Additionally, the gap between the public’s and research community’s perceptions of AI risks/rewards is significant. While numerous voices from the AI community have expressed concern that the risks could be so high that future AI systems could inflict extinction-level damage to humanity if deployed incorrectly, the public largely is aware only of risk in low-impact scenarios. This discrepancy highlights the crucial need for researchers to articulate to governmental bodies what, why, and when various AI risks matter as part of motivating funding requests. Thus, the call to action for this community is to pursue AI safety as a “Big Science” project on a scale comparable to the Manhattan Project. High risks and high payoffs are on the table, but safe AI is a fast-moving target, and large-scale investments are needed to guide development of this technology in a responsible way. We highlight the need for a multilayered solution combining the development of new methods and algorithmic approaches to mitigate threats with an active participation of the government(s) in setting high industry standards and regulations based on state-of-the-art technology. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) national laboratories have served as leading institutions for scientific innovation in the U.S. for more than 70 years. Drawing on their expertise in the AI community and their history of safeguarding critical and sensitive information, and as we look to the future, national labs are the best choice for evaluating and safeguarding AI technologies.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Nuclear Criticality Safety Margin and Handbook Data: Concepts and Applications [Slides]

At the end of this briefing, personnel should be able to: • Define concepts associated with criticality safety margin • Provide and understand practical applications that illustrate safety margin concepts • Describe how safety margin is addressed in criticality safety evaluations • Improve documentation and communication of safety margin • Connect these concepts to related statements in the ANS-8 Standards • Find numerous applications for handbook data.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Credible Criticality Safety Margin in the 30B Package with LEU+ UF 6 and Hypothetical Water Ingress

The commercial nuclear industry is pursuing advancements in fuel and reactor design that increase the uranium enrichment above 5 wt. % 235 U. These advancements will necessitate the ability to transport bulk quantities of UF 6 at increased enrichments. Currently, the 30B cylinder is the primary container used by the industry for UF 6 storage and transportation and has a long history of successful shipments. This container can support up to 2,277 kg of UF 6 at a maximum enrichment of 5 wt. % 235 U. Previous evaluations have assessed the potential impact of criticality safety for 30B transport at higher enrichments but assumed moderator intrusion would not require evaluation. Although current regulations allow for the exception of moderator intrusion for UF 6 packages through the design and quality control of the package content, this exception is limited to enrichments up to 5 wt. % 235 U. Thus, an investigation of moderator intrusion into a 30B cylinder should be performed. Moderator intrusion into a 30B cylinder is a unique condition for criticality safety evaluation in transportation because of the violent chemical reactions that occur between UF 6 and H 2 O. The resulting intrusion is strongly dependent on the breach size, breach location, breach interface solid/ullage of the UF 6 content, the UF 6 distribution (which is temperature dependent), and temperature/pressure conditions which are dynamic in accident conditions. Additionally, the complexity of the HF-UO 2 F 2 -H 2 O interface that occurs during the event can influence the potential solubility of uranium in the system, as well as influence the amount of UF 6 reaction with H 2 O. With the operating experience from Orano Federal Services LLC, the UF 6 chemical expertise from Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), and the criticality safety expertise from ORNL, this paper evaluates the neutronic conditions (i.e., k eff ) that apply the understood chemistry and experimental conditions that occur during moderator intrusion of a breached 30B cylinder under postulated accidents. This report examines the historical evaluations of UF 6 transport and expands these evaluations for the enrichments expected for nuclear industry advancement. These simulations primarily feature a homogeneous mixture of UF 6 and H 2 O as an infinite media system and as a sphere with water reflection given an impurity limit of 0.5 wt. % UF 6 . This report demonstrates that this H/U limit is valid up to 8 wt. % enrichment for both H 2 O and HF as the moderating mixture. The water-reflected homogeneous mixed spheres evaluated demonstrate the amount of safety margin applied by restricting the 30B cylinder impurity limit to 0.5 wt. %. Additionally, this report evaluates moderator ingress scenarios of a 30B cylinder. The 30B cylinder simulations vary the cylinder orientation, the mass of UF 6 in the system, the mass of H 2 O in the system, and how much H 2 O has reacted with UF 6 . The moderator ingress of a 30B cylinder was evaluated for the water-reflected homogeneous mixed spheres to demonstrate the amount of safety margin applied by restricting the 30B cylinder impurity limit to 0.5 wt. %. These simulations are standard practice and are independent of the UF 6 -H 2 O reaction. This work also explored more complex simulations that layer the H 2 O over the UF 6 , which incorporates the amount of reacted UF 6 as a separate layer and considers solubility limits of UO 2 F 2 in H 2 O as it is produced. This approach is intended to simulate the postulated event of a large hairline crack occurring on a submerged cylinder. Finally, this work considers the potential of H 2 O mixing into the UF 6 solid heterogeneously using a sponge-like model. The water ingress into the UF 6 is treated as random size spheres, and the reaction products form into a layer over the spheres.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Conjugate Heat Transfer Modeling of Salt-Filled Fuel Pins for Stable Salt Reactor Safety Analysis

The Stable Salt Reactor (SSR) combines the proven structural design of light water reactor fuel assemblies with the inherent safety and fuel-cycle advantages of molten salt technology. In its fast reactor configuration, the SSR utilizes recycled nuclear waste as fuel, sealed within narrow salt-filled fuel pins and cooled by a surrounding liquid salt coolant. Reliable transfer of heat from the molten fuel salt through the cladding to the external coolant is essential for both reactor safety and performance. This work investigates conjugate heat transfer (CHT) in the SSR’s salt-filled fuel pins using NekRS, a high-fidelity spectral element computational fluid dynamics (CFD) solver. The analyses capture internal natural convection within the molten fuel salt and external forced convection in the coolant, under steady-state and transient operating conditions. Parametric studies evaluate how variations in reactor power and coolant flow rate influence heat transfer distributions and system response. The high-fidelity CFD results are time-averaged and post-processed for direct comparison with moderate-fidelity Reynolds-averaged Navier–Stokes (RANS) models, and for the development of reduced-order models within the SAM system code. These validated models support fast-running safety analyses of normal and off-normal transients, improving predictive capability for key safety margins. By integrating advanced CFD with system-level safety tools, this study strengthens the modeling framework for SSR design, reduces uncertainty in molten salt CHT simulations, and accelerates the engineering and licensing of next-generation nuclear reactors.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗