Engineering Papers⌕ Search

SEARCH · Engineering Papers

Results for “Radiological”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 739 records · Page 41
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2019

Prototype Ceramic HEPA Filter Testing and Filter Media Research and Development for Nuclear Facility Ventilation

This is a brief summary of recent and past Ceramic HEPA Filter research and development activities under an NNSA NSR&D funded project and describes on-going plans for FY19 work as presently planned. Prior work has evaluated concepts for a ceramic HEPA filter including ceramic support materials, filter media including electrospun filter media, and metal housing designs to accommodate the conservative temperature performance target of up to 500°C. This has been supported by modelling efforts discussed with nuclear facility system engineers and their management. The temperature and time-at-temperature are based on conservative, bounding temperatures from fire analysis presented as an EFCOG best practice paper for nuclear facility safety analysis. The overall goal is to improve safety of DOE nuclear facilities during fire scenarios by developing improved filtration technology including increasing temperature performance while maintaining acceptable filter pressure drop. Ceramic filtration technology can provide robust, passive mitigation against radiological releases. The goal of the ceramic HEPA filter is to provide a HEPA filter that provides increased temperature performance in an equivalent form factor (size and shape) that is similar to existing conventional HEPA filters used in facilities. Once development is complete and qualified for use in facilities, ceramic HEPA filters could simplify and reduce safety and support system costs, as well as lower life-cycle costs. Installation, monitoring, and maintenance of active fire suppression systems, as well as other related systems, are a considerable on-going cost to nuclear facilities. Reducing the level of dependence on Safety Class and Safety Significant fire alarm and fire suppression systems could allow significant cost savings, while maintaining safety. At present we are continuing research and development efforts towards the goal of a ceramic filter design, including improved ceramic filter media, that could reduce total operation cost for facilities utilizing HEPA filters.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
DOE OSTI2019

Nuclear Risk Assessment 2019 Update for the Mars 2020 Mission Environmental Impact Statement

In the summer of 2020, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) plans to launch a spacecraft as part of the Mars 2020 mission. The rover on the proposed spacecraft will use a Multi-Mission Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator (MMRTG) to provide continuous electrical and thermal power for the mission. The MMRTG uses radioactive plutonium dioxide. NASA is preparing a Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (SEIS) for the mission in accordance with the National Environmental Policy Act. This Nuclear Risk Assessment addresses the responses of the MMRTG option to potential accident and abort conditions during the launch opportunity for the Mars 2020 mission and the associated consequences. This information provides the technical basis for the radiological risks discussed in the SEIS.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2019

Dose Modeling for Harborview Research and Training Facility

The Harborview Research and Training (R&T) Facility at the University of Washington (UW) was accidently contaminated from a breached sealed source of Cesium-137. The release occurred during removal of the sealed source from its holder within a portable hot cell in the loading dock area near room 220. The loading dock and northeast corner of the building above the ground floor were impacted by the release, whereas the remaining portions of the R&T Facility were minimally affected. Detailed descriptions of the R&T Facility and the affected area/rooms are included in Section 2. The RESRAD Team in the Environmental Science Division of Argonne National Laboratory visited the site on August 12, 2019, and interviewed the R&T Facility building manager and staff working in the building at that time. Site- and building-specific data were collected including building floor plan CAD drawings, building occupants’ working hours, contaminated rooms photos and their dimensions, building air exchange rates, building materials and “curtain wall” details, and so forth. These data are being used in the dose modeling for potential occupants of the building after it is remediated. The dose modeling was performed using the RESRAD-BUILD computer code, which is designed for the evaluation of radiologically contaminated buildings (Yu et al. 2003). Two hypothetical building occupants of the Harborview R&T Facility were evaluated: a researcher occupying room 726 (a research laboratory on the seventh floor) and a custodian occupying room 220 (loading dock and trash compactor room with a rollup door). A maintenance worker that will be spending less time in impacted areas was not modeled because it will be bounded by other two hypothetical building occupants modeled. A summary description of the RESRAD-BUILD is provided in Appendix A, and the modeling of potential doses to a researcher and a custodian is described in detail in Section 3. A summary and a discussion of the dose modeling results are included in Section 4. The parameters used in the RESRAD-BUILD modeling are included in Appendix B. This report documents the dose modeling results; it does not describe measurements of the actual radioactivity levels at the Harborview R&T Facility, nor does it set any expectation for the actual final radioactivity levels. The radiation doses presented are modeling results based on the generic screening values of Cs-137 and several conservative assumptions and are meant only to assist in decision making regarding decontamination of the Harborview R&T Facility.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗
DOE OSTI2019

Actinide Material Processing & Power (AMPP) Newsletter: November 2019

AMPP is known for excellence in our NNSA and DOE missions as well as our operations that support those missions. Excellence in mission operations requires the execution of sustained operations that are reliable and responsive to mission needs across all work being performed in AMPP. For all of us here at TA-55, adherence to the Principles of Conduct of Operations is essential to achieving a safe and productive environment that enables excellence across the board. AMPP is a complex organization, with hazards ranging from radiological to electrical to chemical, and a footprint that extends to other areas of the Laboratory outside of TA-55. Excellence in mission operations is essential to the success of all of our programs. Highlights of our outstanding operational work that benefit our ability to deliver on mission are featured in this issue.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗
DOE OSTI2019

Fundamentals of Nuclear Security Culture [PowerPoint]

We examine the following topics: Nuclear and Radiological Security Culture; Threats and consequences ; The Human Factor; Legal and Regulatory Basis for Security Culture; Security Culture basic concepts; Systematic SC program; Enhancing SC; and, Situational Awareness. We will discuss these aspects and conduct exercises to apply them

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2019

Technology Applicable to Remote Hazardous Constituents and Waste Stream Grouping

Originally, Rocky Flats transuranic (TRU) waste was managed from waste streams that were composed of similar chemical constituents and were generated from identical processes. Early waste processing at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) maintained the Rocky Flats record until INL began generating their own item description codes (IDCs). Ultimately TRU waste management at INL was driven to combine wastes from all IDCs that were assigned by Rocky Flats to a summary category group regardless of whether the chemical constituents in the waste were known or not. At this point, the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) certified program requirements to process the TRU waste according to waste streams was nearly eliminated. In April 2018, operations in the Sludge Repackage Project (SRP) area were halted by a radiological materials release accident in which drums containing waste experienced a loss of containment after over-pressurization occurred. Four SRP drums, repackaged in the Accelerated Retrieval Project (ARP) V area, had an adverse, delayed chemical reaction event occur when prohibited materials from one container were mixed with chemically-incompatible materials from other containers in the repackaging process. This incident was the direct result of processing unknowns under a protocol where the components of the waste were added to incompatible materials resulting in a run-away reaction. After a Difficult Waste Team (DWT) and Los Alamos National Laboratory – Carlsbad Operations (LANL-CO) subject matter expert (SME) visit in September 2019, it was determined by the team that all of the work observed on the September visit was performed upstream of the certified program and that the Visual Examination (VE) and other methods typically used by the certified program were being used for Acceptable Knowledge (AK) augmentation. This augmentation was needed in order to determine what the constituents in the waste might be, and is based primarily on collections of VE results. The waste at INL that is being processed in what is considered to be the Priority 2 (yellow) and Priority 3 (red) lists either needs AK to be completed before certified characterization can occur or is waiting to be processed because the waste has been mixed with unknown wastes resulting in a lack of information that could have impact of the ability to certify and ship the waste to the WIPP.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2019

Energy Harvesting Remotely Monitored Sealing Array (RMSA) (Field Test Annual Report)

Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) is investigating photovoltaic (PV) cell configurations, integrating them with the battery-operated Remotely Monitored Sealing Array (RMSA), and testing and evaluating performance for enhanced battery life under various lighting conditions at a facility at the Savannah River Site (SRS) or Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL). Unattended safeguards equipment (e.g. seals) incorporates many low-power electronic circuits, which are often powered by expensive and environmentally toxic lithium batteries. These batteries must periodically be replaced, adding a radiological hazard for both safeguards inspectors and operators. An extended field test of these prototype PV energy harvesting (EH) RMSAs at an operational nuclear facility will give additional data and allow for an analysis of this technology in a variety of realistic conditions, which will be documented in a final report. RMSAs are used for this testing, but SNL envisions energy harvesting technology may be applicable to additional safeguards equipment.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2019

Site Environmental Report for 2018

Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL, Berkeley Lab) is a multi-program scientific facility operated by the University of California (UC) for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). Berkeley Lab’s research is focused on the physical, biological, environmental, and computational sciences, with the objective of delivering scientific knowledge and discoveries pertinent to DOE’s mission. This annual report describes environmental protection activities and potential impacts resulting from LBNL operations conducted in 2018. The format and content of this report satisfy the requirements of both DOE Order 231.1B, Administrative Change 1 (Environment, Safety, and Health Reporting) and the operating contract between UC and DOE (DOE Contract No. DE-AC02-05CH11231, also known as Contract 31). LBNL activities are planned and conducted with full regard to protecting employees, the public, and the environment, as well as complying with all applicable environmental, safety, and health laws and regulations. As presented in Chapter 2, Berkeley Lab implements an Environmental Management System (EMS) to oversee environmental compliance activities and continually improve overall environmental performance while maintaining operational capability and sustaining its overall mission. The effectiveness of the EMS and environmental programs is reviewed annually as part of the performance evaluation process of Contract 31. For fiscal year (FY) 2018, which began October 1, 2017, and ended September 30, 2018, the EMS was given a performance rating of B plus for its management of environmental activities (on a scale from A plus as the highest grade, to F as the lowest). The measurement and rating system was developed jointly by Berkeley Lab, UC, and DOE. The FY 2018 rating was based on how Berkeley Lab met the objective in DOE’s FY 2018 Performance Evaluation and Measurement Plan (Appendix B in Contract 31, Section J) of providing an efficient and effective EMS. Six significant accomplishments, which ranged from effective teaming on projects and with regulatory agencies to improved program assessment approaches, were factors in the rating. The EMS was also graded through the federal Office of Management and Budget’s annual EMS performance metrics, in which a reporting scorecard rates elements of the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 14001 standard and the degree of integration between the EMS and Berkeley Lab’s sustainable practices. Overall scores fall into one of three categories: green (highest), yellow (middle), or red (lowest). For FY 2018, Berkeley Lab received a score of green. A week-long formal conformity audit of the EMS was conducted at the end of July by a qualified external party, as is required every three years. The audit team found that Berkeley Lab’s EMS continues to conform to the ISO standard with no major nonconformance. An overview of environmental protection and restoration programs is provided in Chapter 3, including information about compliance activities, operating permits, and regulatory agency inspections and audits that occurred during 2018. Twenty-one minor violations and two Class II violations were issued during agency inspections of programs governing aboveground and underground storage tanks, hazardous waste treatment units, hazardous waste storage areas, hazardous materials management, and wastewater, stormwater, and air emission sources. This report also includes information on environmental monitoring performed in 2018 (Chapter 4). The results of these monitoring activities confirmed that groundwater cleanup actions have been effective in reducing concentrations of volatile organic compounds (VOCs) in the groundwater, although concentrations appear to be reaching asymptotic levels in some areas. Site groundwater plumes are stable or are attenuating, and VOCs are not migrating off site. All emissions and discharges from LBNL operations were within environmental compliance release limits except oxides of nitrogen and carbon monoxide from boilers (under 5 million BTUs) from Buildings 2, 66, and 88. The radiological dose assessments (Chapter 5) performed in 2018 concluded that the maximum potential dose to a hypothetical resident from Berkeley Lab’s airborne radionuclide releases was approximately 0.04% of the DOE and U.S. Environmental Protection Agency annual limit of 10 millirem per year (mrem/yr); the potential dose from all radiation sources at Berkeley Lab was approximately 0.15% of the average natural background radiation dose of 310 mrem/yr in the United States, and about 0.5% of the DOE annual limit of 100 mrem/yr from all sources.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2020

Using Radioiodine Speciation to Address Environmental Remediation and Waste Stream Sequestration Problems at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant and a DOE Site

Iodine-129 ( 129 I), with a half-life of half-life of 16 million years, is commonly considered the single greatest risk driver in high-level and low-level nuclear repositories. This risk stems from several basic properties of 129 I, and under many geochemical conditions, it can move as an anion at nearly the rate of water through the subsurface environment. 129 I is also extremely radiologically toxic because over 90% of body burden accumulates in the thyroid, which weighs only about 14g in an adult. There is also a large worldwide inventory of radioiodine as a result of its high fission yield and this inventory is rapidly increasing as a result of nuclear energy production. Radioiodine is produced at a rate of 40 GBq (1 Ci) per gigawatt of electricity produced by nuclear power. To illustrate how the properties of 129 I magnify its risk, 129 I accounts for only 0.00002% of the radiation released from the Savannah River Site in Aiken, South Carolina, but contributes 13% of the population dose, a six orders of magnitude magnification of risk with respect to its radioactivity. The currently favored solid phase for LLW immobilization is cement, while HLW immobilization is the incorporation of waste into glass (vitrification). However, so far, the incorporation into cement and subsequent leaching of only iodide has been seriously investigated. The major problem with this approach is that it ignores the complex speciation of iodine, i.e., it ignores iodate and organo-iodine which have different chemistries. Most of the past research was devoted to the mechanism of iodide uptake in cement hydrate phases that is sorption and/or incorporation. Very few data exist on iodate and organo-iodine incorporation in cement, even though large quantities of liquid waste containing also radioiodine have already been solidified in cement Iodine-129 from low-level waste is commonly disposed of in cementitious materials. Grout, a dense cementitious fluid, mixed with a reducing slag, is often used to immobilize radionuclides. However, the reducing environment might not be conducive to immobilize iodine. For example, the silver based immobilization technologies (e.g., AgCl, Ag-impregnated granular activated carbon, Ag-mordenite) remove iodine from the aqueous phase by promoting the formation of Ag-iodide precipitates. The solubility of AgI is eight orders of magnitude lower than it is for AgIO 3 . Similarly, coprecipitation of iodine into calcium carbonate phases occurs only with IO 3 - and not with I - and org-I. If one would want to immobilize iodine more effectively, different engineering approaches would need to be used to promote binding of I - , IO 3 - , or organo-I. Using laboratory experiments with grout, slag, and silver-based adsorbents, and GC-MS and I K-edge XANES and EXAFS and C K-edge XANES spectroscopy for identifying iodine speciation, the major problems with these methods have been identified as focused too much on just one of the iodine species for immobilization, while others, especially organo-I, remained mobile. Finally, we established that most of the adsorbents that are used contain sufficient amounts of organic matter to create organo-I . It is anticipated that increased attention directed at understanding and quantifying the speciation of radioiodine, as opposed to simply total radioiodine, will lead to improved remediation results to be used for long-term radioiodine disposal in cementitious waste forms.

129-Iodine↗
DOE OSTI2019

Capture of Uranium Particles By Filtration: Effects of Filter Material and Air Humidity

Filtration of airborne particles is a standard technique for removal of radiological particles from the effluent of a nuclear reactor. The effects of humidity on filter performance and uranium particles are however less understood. We have conducted experimental runs in the Environmental Experimental Chamber (EEC) located at ORNL to study the capture of uranyl fluoride particles in supports of NNSA missions. Two filter types, one of Minimum Efficiency Reporting Value (MERV)-9 and the other of MERV-10 American Society of Heating, Refrigerating and Air-Conditioning Engineering) ASHRAE rating, were used in the investigations under two humidity conditions [15% and 65% Relative Humidity (Rh)]. Both MERV9 and MERV10 filters failed to capture uranyl fluoride particles that were smaller than 100 nm. The penetration efficiencies for both filter types were very high, greater than 80%, for particles from 10 to 100 nm. As particles became larger and wetter, the capturing efficiencies of both types of filter improved. Slightly greater than 50% of particles from 1 to 10 μm still escaped the capture by the MERV9 filters. However, MERV10 filters were able to capture higher than 50% of particles in the size range of 1 to 2 μm indicating it is likely to meet ASHRAE requirements. Overall, the capture efficiency of a filter is highly dependent on uranyl fluoride particle size, which humidity plays a major role. These two filter types simply are unable to capture particles smaller than 1 μm. A filter that has a higher ASHRAE rating like the HEPA filter has to be used to capture sub-micron particles. Questions on how uranyl fluoride behave in a condition higher than 65% Rh remain, because the particles could deliquescent at the higher humidity condition. That would complete change the size, shape, and surface properties of the uranyl fluoride particles which could lead to completely different filter performance and filtration dynamics. Furthermore, how high humidity affects filters of all MERV ratings remain unclear. Other filter characteristics such as surface charge could also be affected by high humidity condition and need to be investigated.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2020

Fissionable Materials Handlers Operators-Initial Training

These courses were designed for all Initial Fissionable Material Handlers Operators and Supervisors whose job activities will require the performance of Fissile Material Operations located within the Plutonium Facility (PF-4). The course requirements are based on DOE order 426.2, Personnel Section, Qualification, and Training Requirements for Fissionable Material Handlers. These courses are required training for all initial Fissionable Material Handlers and is specific to TA-55 FMH Certification. It covers the core areas and topics in Criticality Safety, Material-at-Risk, Nuclear Material Control and Accountability, Radiological Protection, TA-55 Material Handling and Movement.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗
DOE OSTI2020

Hanford Site Disposition Baseline for Composite Analysis

An updated version of the Hanford Site Disposition Baseline (HSDB) was prepared to document the evolution of conditions for 637 waste sites within Central Plateau of the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) Hanford Site. The HSDB provides information that will be used to evaluate post-closure radiological dose in the updated composite analysis (CA).

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2019

Real-Time Automated Health Information Technology Hazard Detection

The objective of this project is to develop an automated surveillance tool that will help the US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) to detect potential hazards in health information technology (HIT) systems. To achieve this objective, Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) researchers have developed computational methods and a surveillance tool that will detect safety concerns and identify opportunities to improve HIT and safety within the VA system using Corporate Data Warehouse (CDW) data. This work is limited to the safe operation and safe use of HIT. It does not address the use of HIT to make health care safer. This project leveraged ORNL expertise in computational sciences and its computing resources accordingly.This report documents the FY 2019 accomplishments on this project. There were three major tasks. The first task developed data extraction approaches, which helped provide a better overall understanding of the important data elements in CDW. The outputs of this task served as inputs into the second task, which is the hazard detection and characterization task. This second task involved development of three methods that can be categorized into probabilistic model, event-based hazards detection, and system-based reliability performance evaluation. The third task dealt with the design, development, and demonstration of the automated surveillance tool. The tool currently resides in ORNL’s Private Health Information enclave at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, and operates on the VA’s CDW data. The developed capabilities and tool have been tested on CDW data from different clinical domains including Consult, Radiology, Laboratory, and Medication.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2020

GEMINI Case Study

Sandia's GEMINI-Scout Mine Rescue Robot is an unmanned ground vehicle designed to enter potentially hazardous environments to explore, assess, and evaluate dangerous situations first responders may face when conducting a rescue mission. GEMINI is approximately four feet long and two feet tall, which enables the robot to maneuver through small locations on rough terrains caused by earthquakes, fires, or radiological incidents. GEMINI uses track propulsion to climb stairs, travel through gravel and sand pits, pivot in place, and traverse 45-degree climbs with few problems. Furthermore, the vehicle's dual tracked-chassis design allows it to operate in hostile, dark, muddy, high-temperature, and explosive debris-strewn environments, while maintaining efficient ground mobility. The mobility and modularity of the vehicle allow for easy integration of sensors to conduct gas and temperature sensing and offers pan/tilt, zoom color, and thermal camera video streaming capabilities. The vehicle is also able to carry a payload of about 50 pounds of batteries and can handle an additional 200 pounds of payload, whether for additional diagnostics, supplies, or clothing for those trapped in an effected area. GEMINI is remotely operated through a wireless connection and an onboard computer running a customized embedded control application, which directly communicates to all onboard components except for the audio and video systems. When line of sight is not possible, operators use a shockresistant fiber optic cable to ensure continuous functionality of the vehicle. This allows for direct local control of the vehicle, which streams collected data back to the operator for enhanced situational awareness. In addition, the vehicle incorporates safety features such as explosion proof housing to ensure safe electronic operations in hazardous gas or flooded environments; a four-channel video link and two-way audio to ensure located survivors can communicate with operators; and an MSHA-approved multi-gas sensor to monitor air quality.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2020

Solid Waste Release Calculations for the Composite Analysis Baseline Assessment

The purpose of the Hanford Site Composite Analysis (CA) is to provide an estimate of the cumulative radiological impacts from active and planned low-level radioactive waste disposals and other potentially interacting radioactive waste disposal sources that will remain following Hanford Site closure. The need for a waste form release model addressing multiple solid waste forms is documented in CP-60410, Hanford Site Composite Analysis Technical Approach Description: Waste Form Release.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Independent Verification Plan for Clearance of Real Property of the Operation Roller Coaster Sites

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is pursuing release of the Operation Roller Coaster sites under DOE O 458.1, “Radiation Protection of the Public and the Environment.” The requirements for clearance and release of property under DOE O 458.1 are implemented when DOE intends to facilitate transfer of responsibility or control of real property from DOE. DOE O 458.1 prescribes that all radiological monitoring or surveys performed in support of clearance of property must use methods such as the Multi-Agency Radiation Survey and Site Investigation Manual (MARSSIM) method or other methods approved by DOE. DOE O 458.1 requires an Independent Verification for the clearance of real property. This Independent Verification Plan outlines the process for validating the method and implementation of the MARRSIM process for release of the Operation Roller Coaster sites.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Otowi Well No. 4 Analytical Results

Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL or the Laboratory) collected soil samples near Otowi Well No. 4 on behalf of Los Alamos County (LAC) to address health and safety concerns related to potential radioactive contamination in Los Alamos canyon. Oil had spilled from Otowi Well No. 4 and sampling was to determine if radiological contamination in the soils to be excavated in response to that spill presented a health or safety risk to LAC personnel who would be involved in the cleanup. Results of the sampling event are attached to this memo.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2020

Monitoring Potential Transport of Radioactive Contaminants in Shallow Ephemeral Channels: FY2019

Desert Research Institute (DRI) conducted a field assessment of the potential for contaminated soil to be transported from the Smoky Site Contamination Area (CA) because of storm runoff. This activity supported U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Environmental Management Nevada Program (EM NV) efforts to establish post-closure monitoring plans for the Smoky Site Soils Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 550. The work was intended to confirm the likely mechanism of transport and determine the meteorological conditions that might cause the movement of contaminated soils, as well as determine the particle size fraction most closely associated with transported radionuclide-contaminated soils. These data will facilitate the design of the appropriate post-closure monitoring program. In 2011, DRI installed a meteorological monitoring station on the west side of the Smoky Site CA and a hydrologic (runoff) monitoring station within the CA, near the east side. The meteorological station collected air temperature, wind speed, wind direction, relative humidity, precipitation, solar radiation, barometric pressure, soil temperature, and soil water content data. The maximum, minimum, and average or total values (as appropriate) for each of these parameters were recorded for each 10-minute interval. The maximum, minimum, and average water depth in the flume installed at the hydrologic station were also recorded for each 10-minute interval. This report presents the data collected from these stations during fiscal year (FY) 2019. During the FY2019 reporting period, the warmest months were June, July, and August and the coldest were December and February. The highest monthly solar radiation (i.e., sunshine) values were recorded in June, July, and August, whereas December through February had the lowest solar radiation values. Monthly mean wind speeds were highest in the spring (April) and early summer (June). Winds were predominantly from the north, except in February, July, August, and September when winds were mostly from the west. The monthly average relative humidity ranged from 17 percent to approximately 60 percent. Humidity was lowest in the summer and highest in the winter. Monthly total precipitation ranged from 0.0 during August and September to 2.22 inches (in) (56.39 millimeters [mm]) in February. Total precipitation for FY2019 was 7.83 in (198.88 mm). During the reporting period, a single, nonzero, flow event was recorded at the flume. This occurred over two days between March 6 and 7, 2019, in response to 1.16 in (29.46 mm) of precipitation falling within 9.3 hours on March 6, 2019. This event produced a peak water depth of 0.39 in (0.99 centimeters [cm]) in the flume, and runoff was measured for approximately 23.5 hours. However, the maximum recorded flow depth was less than the limit for flow discharge and velocity that can be calculated for the six-inch (15 cm) throat of a Parshall flume. The runoff event produced insufficient flow velocities through the natural channel to cause local erosion and transport of bedload materials. No bedload samples were collected for radiological analysis. Observing meteorological and environmental conditions that lead to storm runoff will help identify the parameters and threshold conditions that should be incorporated into post-closure monitoring plans for this and similar Soils CAU sites. Routine monitoring of meteorological and hydrologic parameters at the Smoky Site CA has been discontinued at the request of EM NV, effective at the conclusion of FY2019. Environmental data acquisition was completed and the meteorological and runoff monitoring stations were removed from the Smoky Site on October 15, 2019.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗