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THE NEXT GENERATION SAFEGUARDS PROFESSIONAL NETWORK: PROGRESS AND NEXT STEPS

President Obama has repeatedly stated that the United States must ensure that the international safeguards regime, as embodied by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), has 'the authority, information, people, and technology it needs to do its job.' The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) works to implement the President's vision through the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), a program to revitalize the U.S. DOE national laboratories safeguards technology and human capital base so that the United States can more effectively support the IAEA and ensure that it meets current and emerging challenges to the international safeguards system. In 2009, in response to the human capital development goals of NGSI, young safeguards professionals within the Global Nuclear Security Technology Division at Oak Ridge National Laboratory launched the Next Generation Safeguards Professional Network (NGSPN). The purpose of this initiative is to establish working relationships and to foster collaboration and communication among the next generation of safeguards leaders. The NGSPN is an organization for, and of, young professionals pursuing careers in nuclear safeguards and nonproliferation - as well as mid-career professionals new to the field - whether working within the U.S. DOE national laboratory complex, U.S. government agencies, academia, or industry or at the IAEA. The NGSPN is actively supported by the NNSA, boasts more than 70 members, maintains a website and newsletter, and has held two national meetings as well as an NGSPN session and panel at the July 2010 Institute of Nuclear Material Management Annual Meeting. This paper discusses the network; its significance, goals and objectives; developments and progress to date; and future plans.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Mesoscale to plant-scale models of nuclear waste reprocessing.

Imported oil exacerabates our trade deficit and funds anti-American regimes. Nuclear Energy (NE) is a demonstrated technology with high efficiency. NE's two biggest political detriments are possible accidents and nuclear waste disposal. For NE policy, proliferation is the biggest obstacle. Nuclear waste can be reduced through reprocessing, where fuel rods are separated into various streams, some of which can be reused in reactors. Current process developed in the 1950s is dirty and expensive, U/Pu separation is the most critical. Fuel rods are sheared and dissolved in acid to extract fissile material in a centrifugal contactor. Plants have many contacts in series with other separations. We have taken a science and simulation-based approach to develop a modern reprocessing plant. Models of reprocessing plants are needed to support nuclear materials accountancy, nonproliferation, plant design, and plant scale-up.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Bayesian Radiation Source Localization

Locating illicit radiological sources using gamma ray or neutron detection is a key challenge for both homeland security and nuclear nonproliferation. Localization methods using an array of detectors or a sequence of observations in time and space must provide rapid results while accounting for a dynamic attenuating environment. In the presence of significant attenuation and scatter, more extensive numerical transport calculations in place of the standard analytical approximations may be required to achieve accurate results. Numerical adjoints based on deterministic transport codes provide relatively efficient detector response calculations needed to determine the most likely location of a true source. Probabilistic representations account for uncertainty in the source location resulting from uncertainties in detector responses, the approximations that are used, and the potential for nonunique solutions. A Bayesian approach improves on previous likelihood methods for source localization by allowing the incorporation of all available information to help constrain solutions.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

CHAMPION: Intelligent Hierarchical Reasoning Agents for Enhanced Decision Support

We describe the design and development of an advanced reasoning framework employing semantic technologies, organized within a hierarchy of computational reasoning agents that interpret domain specific information. Designed based on an inspirational metaphor of the pattern recognition functions performed by the human neocortex, the CHAMPION reasoning framework represents a new computational modeling approach that derives invariant knowledge representations through memory-prediction belief propagation processes that are driven by formal ontological language specification and semantic technologies. The CHAMPION framework shows promise for enhancing complex decision making in diverse problem domains including cyber security, nonproliferation and energy consumption analysis.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Safeguards design strategies: designing and constructing new uranium and plutonium processing facilities in the United States

In the United States, the Department of Energy (DOE) is transforming its outdated and oversized complex of aging nuclear material facilities into a smaller, safer, and more secure National Security Enterprise (NSE). Environmental concerns, worker health and safety risks, material security, reducing the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy while maintaining the capability for an effective nuclear deterrence by the United States, are influencing this transformation. As part of the nation's Uranium Center of Excellence (UCE), the Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) at the Y-12 National Security Complex in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, will advance the U.S.'s capability to meet all concerns when processing uranium and is located adjacent to the Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility (HEUMF), designed for consolidated storage of enriched uranium. The HEUMF became operational in March 2010, and the UPF is currently entering its final design phase. The designs of both facilities are for meeting anticipated security challenges for the 21st century. For plutonium research, development, and manufacturing, the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement (CMRR) building at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) in Los Alamos, New Mexico is now under construction. The first phase of the CMRR Project is the design and construction of a Radiological Laboratory/Utility/Office Building. The second phase consists of the design and construction of the Nuclear Facility (NF). The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) selected these two sites as part of the national plan to consolidate nuclear materials, provide for nuclear deterrence, and nonproliferation mission requirements. This work examines these two projects independent approaches to design requirements, and objectives for safeguards, security, and safety (3S) systems as well as the subsequent construction of these modern processing facilities. Emphasis is on the use of Safeguards-by-Design (SBD), incorporating Systems Engineering (SE) principles for these two projects.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DEVELOPMENT OF A TAMPER RESISTANT/INDICATING AEROSOL COLLECTION SYSTEM FOR ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLING AT BULK HANDLING FACILITIES

Environmental sampling has become a key component of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards approaches since its approval for use in 1996. Environmental sampling supports the IAEA's mission of drawing conclusions concerning the absence of undeclared nuclear material or nuclear activities in a Nation State. Swipe sampling is the most commonly used method for the collection of environmental samples from bulk handling facilities. However, augmenting swipe samples with an air monitoring system, which could continuously draw samples from the environment of bulk handling facilities, could improve the possibility of the detection of undeclared activities. Continuous sampling offers the opportunity to collect airborne materials before they settle onto surfaces which can be decontaminated, taken into existing duct work, filtered by plant ventilation, or escape via alternate pathways (i.e. drains, doors). Researchers at the Savannah River National Laboratory and Oak Ridge National Laboratory have been working to further develop an aerosol collection technology that could be installed at IAEA safeguarded bulk handling facilities. The addition of this technology may reduce the number of IAEA inspector visits required to effectively collect samples. The principal sample collection device is a patented Aerosol Contaminant Extractor (ACE) which utilizes electrostatic precipitation principles to deposit particulates onto selected substrates. Recent work has focused on comparing traditional swipe sampling to samples collected via an ACE system, and incorporating tamper resistant and tamper indicating (TRI) technologies into the ACE system. Development of a TRI-ACE system would allow collection of samples at uranium/plutonium bulk handling facilities in a manner that ensures sample integrity and could be an important addition to the international nuclear safeguards inspector's toolkit. This work was supported by the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS), National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA).

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

NGSI: FUNCTION REQUIREMENTS FOR A CYLINDER TRACKING SYSTEM

While nuclear suppliers currently track uranium hexafluoride (UF{sub 6}) cylinders in various ways, for their own purposes, industry practices vary significantly. The NNSA Office of Nonproliferation and International Security's Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) has begun a 5-year program to investigate the concept of a global monitoring scheme that uniquely identifies and tracks UF{sub 6} cylinders. As part of this effort, NGSI's multi-laboratory team has documented the 'life of a UF{sub 6} cylinder' and reviewed IAEA practices related to UF{sub 6} cylinders. Based on this foundation, this paper examines the functional requirements of a system that would uniquely identify and track UF{sub 6} cylinders. There are many considerations for establishing a potential tracking system. Some of these factors include the environmental conditions a cylinder may be expected to be exposed to, where cylinders may be particularly vulnerable to diversion, how such a system may be integrated into the existing flow of commerce, how proprietary data generated in the process may be protected, what a system may require in terms of the existing standard for UF{sub 6} cylinder manufacture or modifications to it and what the limiting technology factors may be. It is desirable that a tracking system should provide benefit to industry while imposing as few additional constraints as possible and still meeting IAEA safeguards objectives. This paper includes recommendations for this system and the analysis that generated them.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Radiological Laboratory, Utility, Office Building LEED Strategy & Achievement

Missions that the Radiological Laboratory, utility, Office Building (RLUOB) supports are: (1) Nuclear Materials Handling, Processing, and Fabrication; (2) Stockpile Management; (3) Materials and Manufacturing Technologies; (4) Nonproliferation Programs; (5) Waste Management Activities - Environmental Programs; and (6) Materials Disposition. The key capabilities are actinide analytical chemistry and material characterization.

ACTINIDES↗

Broad area search for regions and objects of interest

A quad chart provides an overview on the on-going project 'Broad Area Search for Regions and Objects of Interest' funded by the DOE Office of Nonproliferation and Verification Research and Development. Specifically, the quad chart shows: (1) Project title 'Broad Area Search for Regions and Objects of Interest'; (2) PI and Co-investigators; (3) Concept Panel outlining the project's approach built upon front-end scale-space image analysis; (4) Technical Challenges posed by the project, such as robustness, non-conformities, disparate spatial configuration and weak correlation between presence of objects of interest and low-level description of the surrounding geospatial background; and (5) Planned Accomplishment.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

Nuclear Forensics at Los Alamos National Laboratory

The overview of this presentation is: (1) Introduction to nonproliferation efforts; (2) Scope of activities at Los Alamos National Laboratory; (3) Facilities for radioanalytical work at LANL; (4) Radiochemical characterization capabilities; and (5) Bulk chemical and materials analysis capabilities. Some conclusions are: (1) Analytical chemistry measurements on plutonium and uranium matrices are critical to numerous defense and non-defense programs including safeguards accountancy verification measurements; (2) Los Alamos National Laboratory operates capable actinide analytical chemistry and material science laboratories suitable for nuclear material forensic characterization; (3) Actinide analytical chemistry uses numerous means to validate and independently verify that measurement data quality objectives are met; and (4) Numerous LANL nuclear facilities support the nuclear material handling, preparation, and analysis capabilities necessary to evaluate samples containing nearly any mass of an actinide (attogram to kilogram levels).

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Utilizing Regional Centers in Sustaining Upgraded Russian Federation Ministry of Defense Sites

Since the mid-1990s the governments of the United States (U.S.) and the Russian Federation (RF) have been collaborating on nonproliferation projects, particularly in the protection of nuclear material through the Department of Energy's (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). To date, this collaboration has resulted in upgrades to more than 72 RF Ministry of Defense (MOD) sensitive sites and facilities. These upgrades include physical protection systems (PPS), facilities to ensure material remains secure in various configurations, and infrastructure to support, maintain, and sustain upgraded sites. Significant effort on the part of both governments has also been expended to ensure that personnel obtain the necessary skills and training to both operate and maintain the security systems, thereby ensuring long term sustainability. To accomplish this, initial vendor training on physical protection systems was provided to key personnel, and an approved training curriculum was developed to teach the skills of operating, managing, administering, and maintaining the installed physical protection systems. This approach also included documentation of the processes and procedures to support infrastructure, requisite levels of maintenance and testing of systems and equipment, lifecycle management support, inventory systems and spare parts caches. One of the core components in the U.S. exit strategy and full transition to the RF MOD is the development and utilization of regional centers to facilitate centralized training and technical support to upgraded MOD sites in five regions of the RF. To date, two regional centers and one regional classroom facility are functional, and two additional regional centers are currently under construction. This paper will address the process and logistics of regional center establishment and the future vision for integrated regional center support by the RF MOD.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

DISSOLUTION AND ANALYSIS OF YELLOWCAKE COMPONENTS FOR FINGERPRINTING UOC SOURCES

There are a number of chemical and physical parameters that might be used to help elucidate the ore body from which uranium ore concentrate (UOC) was derived. It is the variation in the concentration and isotopic composition of these components that can provide information as to the identity of the ore body from which the UOC was mined and the type of subsequent processing that has been undertaken. Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) in collaboration with Lawrence Livermore and Los Alamos National Laboratories is surveying ore characteristics of yellowcake samples from known geologic origin. The data sets are being incorporated into a national database to help in sourcing interdicted material, as well as aid in safeguards and nonproliferation activities. Geologic age and attributes from chemical processing are site-specific. Isotopic abundances of lead, neodymium, and strontium provide insight into the provenance of geologic location of ore material. Variations in lead isotopes are due to the radioactive decay of uranium in the ore. Likewise, neodymium isotopic abundances are skewed due to the radiogenic decay of samarium. Rubidium decay similarly alters the isotopic signature of strontium isotopic composition in ores. This paper will discuss the chemical processing of yellowcake performed at ORNL. Variations in lead, neodymium, and strontium isotopic abundances are being analyzed in UOC from two geologic sources. Chemical separation and instrumental protocols will be summarized. The data will be correlated with chemical signatures (such as elemental composition, uranium, carbon, and nitrogen isotopic content) to demonstrate the utility of principal component and cluster analyses to aid in the determination of UOC provenance.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

NEN Division Funding Gap Analysis

The work in NEN Division revolves around proliferation detection. The sponsor funding model seems to have shifted over the last decades. For the past three lustra, sponsors are mainly interested in funding ideas and detection systems that are already at a technical readiness level 6 (TRL 6 -- one step below an industrial prototype) or higher. Once this level is reached, the sponsoring agency is willing to fund the commercialization, implementation, and training for the systems (TRL 8, 9). These sponsors are looking for a fast turnaround (1-2 years) technology development efforts to implement technology. To support the critical national and international needs for nonprolifertion solutions, we have to maintain a fluent stream of subject matter expertise from the fundamental principals of radiation detection through prototype development all the way to the implementation and training of others. NEN Division has large funding gaps in the Valley of Death region. In the current competitive climate for nuclear nonproliferation projects, it is imminent to increase our lead in this field.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Next Generations Safeguards Initiative: The Life of a Cylinder

The U.S. Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration Office of Nonproliferation and International Security's Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) has begun a program based on a five-year plan to investigate the concept of a global monitoring scheme that uniquely identifies uranium hexafluoride (UF6) cylinders and their locations throughout the life cycle. A key initial activity in the NGSI program is to understand and document the 'life of a UF6 cylinder' from cradle to grave. This document describes the life of a UF6 cylinder and includes cylinder manufacture and procurement processes as well as cylinder-handling and operational practices at conversion, enrichment, fuel fabrication, and depleted UF6 conversion facilities. The NGSI multiple-laboratory team is using this document as a building block for subsequent tasks in the five-year plan, including development of the functional requirements for cylinder-tagging and tracking devices.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Current Trends in Gamma Ray Detection for Radiological Emergency Response

Passive and active detection of gamma rays from shielded radioactive materials, including special nuclear materials, is an important task for any radiological emergency response organization. This article reports on the current trends and status of gamma radiation detection objectives and measurement techniques as applied to nonproliferation and radiological emergencies.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

TRACKING SURPLUS PLUTONIUM FROM WEAPONS TO DISPOSITION

Supporting nuclear nonproliferation and global security principles, beginning in 1994 the United States has withdrawn more than 50 metric tons (MT) of government-controlled plutonium from potential use in nuclear weapons. The Department of Energy (DOE), including the National Nuclear Security Administration, established protocols for the tracking of this "excess" and "surplus" plutonium, and for reconciling the current storage and utilization of the plutonium to show that its management is consistent with the withdrawal policies. Programs are underway to ensure the safe and secure disposition of the materials that formed a major part of the weapons stockpile during the Cold War, and growing quantities have been disposed as waste, after which they are not included in traditional nuclear material control and accountability (NMC&A) data systems. A combination of resources is used to perform the reconciliations that form the basis for annual reporting to DOE, to U.S. Department of State, and to international partners including the International Atomic Energy Agency.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

NGSI: IAEA Verification of UF6 Cylinders

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is often ignorant of the location of declared, uranium hexafluoride (UF6) cylinders following verification, because cylinders are not typically tracked onsite or off. This paper will assess various methods the IAEA uses to verify cylinder gross defects, and how the task could be ameliorated through the use of improved identification and monitoring. The assessment will be restricted to current verification methods together with one that has been applied on a trial basis—short-notice random inspections coupled with mailbox declarations. This paper is part of the NNSA Office of Nonproliferation and International Security’s Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) program to investigate the concept of a global monitoring scheme that uniquely identifies and tracks UF6 cylinders.

cylinder monitoring tracking IAEA↗

International Internships in Nuclear Safeguards and Security: Challenges and Successes

All students in the Russian safeguards and security degree programs at the National Research Nuclear University MEPhI and Tomsk Polytechnic University, sponsored by the Material Protection, Control and Accounting (MPC&A) Education Project, take part in a domestic internship at a Russian enterprise or facility. In addition, a select few students are placed in an international internship. These internships provide students with a better view of how MPC&A and nonproliferation in general are addressed outside of Russia. The possibility of an international internship is a significant incentive for students to enroll in the safeguards and security degree programs. The U.S. members of the MPC&A Education Project team interview students who have been nominated by their professors. These students must have initiative and reasonable English skills. The project team and professors then select students to be tentatively placed in various international internships during the summer or fall of their final year of study. Final arrangements are then made with the host organizations. This paper describes the benefits of the joint United States/Russia cooperation for next-generation workforce development, some of the international internships that have been carried out, the benefits of these international internships, and lessons learned in implementing them.

education↗