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NASA NTRS2010

NASA's Earth Science Data Systems - Lessons Learned and Future Directions

In order to meet the increasing demand for Earth Science data, NASA has significantly improved the Earth Science Data Systems over the last two decades. This improvement is reviewed in this slide presentation. Many Earth Science disciplines have been able to access the data that is held in the Earth Observing System (EOS) Data and Information System (EOSDIS) at the Distributed Active Archive Centers (DAACs) that forms the core of the data system.

Ramapriyan, Hampapuram K.↗
NASA NTRS2010

Space Shuttle Main Engine Liquid Air Insulation Redesign Lessons Learned

The Space Shuttle Main Engine Liquid Air Insulation redesign was required to prevent the reoccurance of the STS-111 High Pressure Speed Sensor In-Flight Anomaly. The STS-111 In-Flight Anomaly Failure Investigation Team's initial redesign of the High Pressure Fuel Turbopump Pump End Ball Bearing Liquid Air Insulation failed the certification test by producing Liquid Air. The certification test failure indicated not only the High Pressure Fuel Turbopump Liquid Air Insulation, but all other Space Shuttle Main Engine Liquid Air Insulation. This paper will document the original Space Shuttle Main Engine Liquid Air STS-111 In-Flight Anomaly investigation, the heritage Space Shuttle Main Engine Insulation certification testing faults, the techniques and instrumentation used to accurately test the Liquid Air Insulation systems on the Stennis Space Center SSME test stand, the analysis techniques used to identify the Liquid Air Insulation problem areas and the analytical verification of the redesign before entering certification testing, Trade study down selected to three potential design solutions, the results of the development testing which down selected the final Liquid Air Redesign are also documented within this paper.

Darrell Gaddy↗
NASA NTRS2010

JANNAF Lessons Learned Panel Discussion

The difference between the AS-510 observed and predicted separation distance is attributed to a greater F-1 engine "tail off" impulse than that used in the separation distance prediction. . The F-1 thrust decay was normal and not appreciably different from previous (AS-505 through 509) flights. . Analysis indicates that with an S-IC stage having only four retro motors, failure of one retro motor to ignite would result in marginal separation distances and, in the 3-sigma case, re-contact of the two stages. . S-IC-11 and subsequent flight stages were equipped with eight retro motors rather than the planned four.

Richards, Steve↗
NASA NTRS2010

JANNAF Lessons Learned Panel: Selected Saturn V History

Pogo occurs when the natural frequency of a propellant feed line comes close to a readily excited rocket longitudinal structural vibration natural frequency. Maximum Pogo response corresponds to close tuning of the structural and hydraulic frequencies. On Saturn V, accelerations up to 17 g's (Zero To Peak) at the Launch Vehicle/Payload Interface and up to 34 g's at an Engine have been observed. Nicknamed Pogo because it causes the Rocket to stretch and compress like a Pogo stick. First recognized with the Titan II in 1962, Pogo remains a prime consideration in design of launch vehicles today

Urquhart, Skip↗
NASA NTRS2010

Space Shuttle Program Primary Avionics Software System (PASS) Success Legacy - Major Accomplishments and Lessons Learned Detail Historical Timeline Analysis

This presentation focuses on the Space Shuttle Primary Avionics Software System (PASS) and the people who developed and maintained this system. One theme is to provide quantitative data on software quality and reliability over a 30 year period. Consistent data relates to code break discrepancies. Requirements were supplied from external sources. Requirement inspections and measurements not implemented until later, beginning in 1985. Second theme is to focus on the people and organization of PASS. Many individuals have supported the PASS project over the entire period while transitioning from company to company and contract to contract. Major events and transitions have impacted morale (both positively and negatively) across the life of the project.

Orr, James K.↗
NASA NTRS2002

The Gravity of LBNP Exercise: Lessons Learned from Identical Twins in Bed for 30 Days

Microgravity leads to cardiovascular deconditioning in humans, which is manifested by post-flight reduction of orthostatic tolerance and upright exercise capacity. During upright posture on Earth, blood pressures are greater in the feet than at heart or head levels due to gravity's effects on columns of blood in the body. During exposure to Microgravity, all gravitational blood pressures disappear. Presently, there is no exercise hardware available for space flight to provide gravitational blood pressures to tissues of the lower body. We hypothesized that 40 minutes of supine treadmill running per day in a LBNP chamber at 1.0 to 1.2 body weight (approximately 50 - 60 mm Hg LBNP) with a 5 min resting, nonexercise LBNP exposure at 50 mm Hg after the exercise session will maintain aerobic fitness orthostatic tolerance, and selected parameters of musculoskeletal function during 30 days of bed rest (simulated microgravity). This paper is an interim report of some of our findings on 16 subjects.

Hargens, Alan R.↗
NASA NTRS2010

Solar Dynamics Observatory Lessons Learned

Mission is to study how solar activity is created and how space weather results from that activity. Atmospheric Imaging Assembly (AIA): High Resolution Images of 10 wavelengths every 10 seconds. Extreme Ultraviolet Variability Experiment (EVE): Measure Sun's brightness in EUV. Helioseismic and Magnetic Imager (HMI): Measures Doppler shift to study waves of the Sun. Launched February 11, 2010.

Rivera, Rachel↗
NASA NTRS2010

Implementation and Qualifications Lessons Learned for Space Flight Photonic Components

This slide presentation reviews the process for implementation and qualification of space flight photonic components. It discusses the causes for most common anomalies for the space flight components, design compatibility, a specific failure analysis of optical fiber that occurred in a cable in 1999-2000, and another ExPCA connector anomaly involving pins that broke off. It reviews issues around material selection, quality processes and documentation, and current projects that the Photonics group is involved in. The importance of good documentation is stressed.

Ott, Melanie N.↗
NASA NTRS2010

International Space Station Common Cabin Air Assembly Condensing Heat Exchanger Hydrophilic Coating Failures and Lessons Learned

The ability to control the temperature and humidity of an environment or habitat is critical for human survival. These factors are important to maintaining human health and comfort, as well as maintaining mechanical and electrical equipment in good working order to support the human and to accomplish mission objectives. The temperature and humidity of the International Space Station (ISS) United States On-orbit Segment (USOS) cabin air is controlled by the Common Cabin Air Assembly (CCAA). The CCAA consists of a fan, a condensing heat exchanger (CHX), an air/water separator, temperature and liquid sensors, and electrical controlling hardware and software. The CHX is the primary component responsible for control of temperature and humidity. The CCAA CHX contains a chemical coating that was developed to be hydrophilic and thus attract water from the humid influent air. This attraction forms the basis for water removal and therefore cabin humidity control. However, there have been several instances of CHX coatings becoming hydrophobic and repelling water. When this behavior is observed in an operational CHX, the unit s ability to remove moisture from the air is compromised and the result is liquid water carryover into downstream ducting and systems. This water carryover can have detrimental effects on the cabin atmosphere quality and on the health of downstream hardware. If the water carryover is severe and widespread, this behavior can result in an inability to maintain humidity levels in the USOS. This paper will describe the operation of the five CCAAs within in the USOS, the potential causes of the hydrophobic condition, and the impacts of the resulting water carryover to downstream systems. It will describe the history of this behavior and the actual observed impacts to the ISS USOS. Information on mitigation steps to protect the health of future CHX hydrophilic coatings and potential remediation techniques will also be discussed.

Balistreri, Steven F.↗
NASA NTRS2010

Heritage and Advanced Technology Systems Engineering Lessons Learned from NASA Space Missions

Use of heritage and new technology is necessary/enabling to implementing small, low cost missions, yet overruns decrease the ability to sustain future mission flight rates The majority of the cost growth drivers seen in the D&NF study were embedded early during formulation phase and later realized during the development and I&T phases Cost drivers can be avoided or significantly decreased by project management and SE emphasis on early identification of risks and realistic analyses SE processes that emphasize an assessment of technology within the mission system to identify technical issues in the design or operational use of the technology. Realistic assessment of new and heritage spacecraft technology assumptions , identification of risks and mitigation strategies. Realistic estimates of effort required to inherit existing or qualify new technology, identification of risks to estimates and develop mitigation strategies. Allocation of project reserves for risk-based mitigation strategies of each individual area of heritage or new technology. Careful tailoring of inheritance processes to ensure due diligence.

Barley, Bryan↗
NASA NTRS2011

Space Shuttle Ascent Flight Design Process: Evolution and Lessons Learned

The Space Shuttle Ascent Flight Design team is responsible for defining a launch to orbit trajectory profile that satisfies all programmatic mission objectives and defines the ground and onboard reconfiguration requirements for this high-speed and demanding flight phase. This design, verification and reconfiguration process ensures that all applicable mission scenarios are enveloped within integrated vehicle and spacecraft certification constraints and criteria, and includes the design of the nominal ascent profile and trajectory profiles for both uphill and ground-to-ground aborts. The team also develops a wide array of associated training, avionics flight software verification, onboard crew and operations facility products. These key ground and onboard products provide the ultimate users and operators the necessary insight and situational awareness for trajectory dynamics, performance and event sequences, abort mode boundaries and moding, flight performance and impact predictions for launch vehicle stages for use in range safety, and flight software performance. These products also provide the necessary insight to or reconfiguration of communications and tracking systems, launch collision avoidance requirements, and day of launch crew targeting and onboard guidance, navigation and flight control updates that incorporate the final vehicle configuration and environment conditions for the mission. Over the course of the Space Shuttle Program, ascent trajectory design and mission planning has evolved in order to improve program flexibility and reduce cost, while maintaining outstanding data quality. Along the way, the team has implemented innovative solutions and technologies in order to overcome significant challenges. A number of these solutions may have applicability to future human spaceflight programs.

Picka, Bret A.↗
NASA NTRS2010

Operational Lessons Learned from NASA Analog Missions

National Aeronautics and Space Administration s (NASA) efforts in human space flight are currently focused on the Space Shuttle and International Space Station (ISS) programs, with efforts beginning on the future exploration opportunities. Both the Space Shuttle and ISS programs are important to the development of a capability for human exploration beyond Low Earth Orbit (LEO). The ISS provides extensive research capabilities to determine how the human body reacts to long duration stays in space. Also, the ISS and Shuttle can serve as a limited testbed for equipment or entire systems that may be used on missions to the Moon, Mars, or to a near-Earth asteroid. It has been nearly 35 years since the Apollo astronauts visited the Moon. Future space explorers will have to re-learn how to work and live on planetary surfaces, and how to do that for extended periods of time. Exploration crews will perform a wide assortment of scientific tasks, including material sampling and emplacement of automated instruments. Surface mission operations include the activities of the crew living and working, mission support from the Earth, and the operation of robotic and other remotely commanded equipment on the surface and in planetary orbit. Other surface activities will include the following: exploring areas surrounding a habitat; using rovers to collect rock and soil samples; setting up experiments on the surface to monitor the radiation environment and any seismic or thermal activity; and conducting scientific analyses and experiments inside a habitat laboratory. Of course, the astronauts will also have to spend some of their surface time "doing chores" and maintaining their habitat and other systems. In preparation for future planetary exploration, NASA must design the answers to many operational questions. What will the astronauts do on the surface? How will they accomplish this? What tools will they require for their tasks? How will robots and astronauts work together? What vehicle and system capabilities are required to support the activities? How will the crew and the Earth-based mission control team interact? During the initial phases of manned planetary exploration, one challenge in particular is virtually the same as during the Apollo program: How can scientific return be maximized during a relatively short surface mission? Today, NASA is investigating solutions to these challenges by conducting analog missions. These Earth-based missions possess characteristics that are analogous to missions on the Moon or Mars. These missions are excellent for testing operational concepts, and the design, configuration, and functionality of spacesuits, robots, rovers, and habitats. Analog mission crews test specific techniques and procedures for surface field geology, biological sample collection, and planetary protection. The process of actually working an analog mission reveals a myriad of small details, which either contribute to or impede efficient operations, many of which would never have been thought about otherwise. It also helps to define the suite of tools, containers, and other small equipment that surface explorers will use. This paper focuses on how analog missions have addressed selected operational considerations for future planetary missions.

Arnold, Larissa S.↗
NASA NTRS2011

Science Operations Development for Field Analogs: Lessons Learned from the 2010 Desert RATS Test

Desert Research and Technology Studies (Desert RATS) is a multi-year series of hardware and operations tests carried out annually in the high desert of Arizona on the San Francisco Volcanic Field. Conducted since 1997, these activities are designed to exercise planetary surface hardware and operations in conditions where long-distance, multi-day roving is achievable. Such activities not only test vehicle subsystems through extended rough-terrain driving, they also stress communications and operations systems and allow testing of science operations approaches to advance human and robotic surface capabilities.

Eppler, D. B.↗
NASA NTRS2011

Systems Engineering Using Heritage Spacecraft Technology: Lessons Learned from Discovery and New Frontiers Deep Space Missions

In the design and development of complex spacecraft missions, project teams frequently assume the use of advanced technology or heritage systems to enable a mission or reduce the overall mission risk and cost. As projects proceed through the development life cycle, increasingly detailed knowledge of the advanced or heritage systems and the system environment identifies unanticipated issues that result in cost overruns or schedule impacts. The Discovery & New Frontiers (D&NF) Program Office recently studied cost overruns and schedule delays resulting from advanced technology or heritage assumptions for 6 D&NF missions. The goal was to identify the underlying causes for the overruns and delays, and to develop practical mitigations to assist the D&NF projects in identifying potential risks and controlling the associated impacts to proposed mission costs and schedules. The study found that the cost and schedule growth did not result from technical hurdles requiring significant technology development. Instead, systems engineering processes did not identify critical issues early enough in the design cycle to ensure project schedules and estimated costs address the inherent risks. In general, the overruns were traceable to: inadequate understanding of the heritage system s behavior within the proposed spacecraft design and mission environment; an insufficient level of experience with the heritage system; or an inadequate scoping of the system-wide impacts necessary to implement the heritage or advanced technology. This presentation summarizes the study s findings and offers suggestions for improving the project s ability to identify and manage the risks inherent in the technology and heritage design solution.

Barley, Bryan↗
NASA NTRS2011

NASA Applications and Lessons Learned in Reliability Engineering

Since the Shuttle Challenger accident in 1986, communities across NASA have been developing and extensively using quantitative reliability and risk assessment methods in their decision making process. This paper discusses several reliability engineering applications that NASA has used over the year to support the design, development, and operation of critical space flight hardware. Specifically, the paper discusses several reliability engineering applications used by NASA in areas such as risk management, inspection policies, components upgrades, reliability growth, integrated failure analysis, and physics based probabilistic engineering analysis. In each of these areas, the paper provides a brief discussion of a case study to demonstrate the value added and the criticality of reliability engineering in supporting NASA project and program decisions to fly safely. Examples of these case studies discussed are reliability based life limit extension of Shuttle Space Main Engine (SSME) hardware, Reliability based inspection policies for Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) turbine disc, probabilistic structural engineering analysis for reliability prediction of the SSME alternate turbo-pump development, impact of ET foam reliability on the Space Shuttle System risk, and reliability based Space Shuttle upgrade for safety. Special attention is given in this paper to the physics based probabilistic engineering analysis applications and their critical role in evaluating the reliability of NASA development hardware including their potential use in a research and technology development environment.

Safie, Fayssal M.↗
NASA NTRS2011

Lessons Learned from AIRS: Improved Determination of Surface and Atmospheric Temperatures Using Only Shortwave AIRS Channels

This slide presentation reviews the use of shortwave channels available to the Atmospheric Infrared Sounder (AIRS) to improve the determination of surface and atmospheric temperatures. The AIRS instrument is compared with the Infrared Atmospheric Sounding Interferometer (IASI) on-board the MetOp-A satellite. The objectives of the AIRS/AMSU were to (1) provide real time observations to improve numerical weather prediction via data assimilation, (2) Provide observations to measure and explain interannual variability and trends and (3) Use of AIRS product error estimates allows for QC optimized for each application. Successive versions in the AIRS retrieval methodology have shown significant improvement.

Susskind, Joel↗
NASA NTRS2011

Aeromedical Lessons Learned from the Space Shuttle Columbia Accident Investigation

This slide presentation provides an update on the Columbia accident response presented in 2005 with additional information that was not available at that time. It will provide information on the following topics: (1) medical response and Search and Rescue, (2) medico-legal issues associated with the accident, (3) the Spacecraft Crew Survival Integrated Investigation Team Report published in 2008, and (4) future NASA flight surgeon spacecraft accident response training.

Chandler, Mike↗