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At least 739 records · Page 41
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2017

International Cyber Incident Repository System: Information Sharing on a Global Scale

According to the 2016 Internet Security Threat Report, the largest number of cyber attacks were recorded last year (2015), reaching a total of 430 million incidents throughout the world. As the number of cyber incidents increases, the need for information and intelligence sharing increases, as well. This fairly large increase in cyber incidents is driving the need for an international cyber incident data reporting system. The goal of the cyber incident reporting system is to make available shared and collected information about cyber events among participating international parties. In its 2014 report, Insurance Industry Working Session Readout Report-Insurance for CyberRelated Critical Infrastructure Loss: Key Issues, on the outcomes of a working session on cyber insurance, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security observed that “many participants cited the need for a secure method through which organizations could pool and share cyber incident information” and noted that one underwriter emphasized the importance of internationally harmonized data taxonomies. This cyber incident data reporting system could benefit all nations that take part in reporting incidents to provide a more common operating picture. In addition, this reporting system could allow for trending and anticipated attacks and could potentially benefit participating members by enabling them to get in front of potential attacks. The purpose of this paper is to identify options for consideration for such a system in fostering cooperative cyber defense.

Joyce, Amanda L.↗
DOE OSTI2023

Systems and methods for control system security

A component security device may be disposed at an interface between a component and a cyber-physical system. The disclosed component security device may be physically and/or electrically coupled between the component and infrastructure of the cyber-physical system, such as a backplane, bus, and/or the like. The component security device may be configured to monitor the component, and selectively isolate the component from the cyber-physical system. Since the component security device is interposed at the interface of the component, the component security device may be capable of isolating the component regardless of whether the component has been compromised (e.g., regardless of whether the component is capable of complying with system commands).

Rieger, Craig G.↗
DOE OSTI2017

Emulation Platform for Cyber Analysis of Wireless Communication Network Protocols

Wireless networking and mobile communications is increasing around the world and in all sectors of our lives. With increasing use, the density and complexity of the systems increase with more base stations and advanced protocols to enable higher data throughputs. The security of data transported over wireless networks must also evolve with the advances in technologies enabling more capable wireless networks. However, means for analysis of the effectiveness of security approaches and implementations used on wireless networks are lacking. More specifically a capability to analyze the lower-layer protocols (i.e., Link and Physical layers) is a major challenge. An analysis approach that incorporates protocol implementations without the need for RF emissions is necessary. In this research paper several emulation tools and custom extensions that enable an analysis platform to perform cyber security analysis of lower layer wireless networks is presented. A use case of a published exploit in the 802.11 (i.e., WiFi) protocol family is provided to demonstrate the effectiveness of the described emulation platform.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2022

Secure Firmware Update and Device Authentication for Smart Inverters using Blockchain and Physically Uncloable Function (PUF)-Embedded Security Module

Cybersecurity of inverters has been significantly important as inverters become smarter in cyber-physical environments. However, firmware security of smart inverters against firmware attacks from various attack vectors has been less studied. Furthermore, this paper proposes a secure firmware update and device authentication method using a blockchain-based public key infrastructure (PKI) management system and a physically unclonable function (PUF)-embedded security module in a smart inverter. The proposed method is validated by experiments.

blockchain↗
DOE OSTI2021

Design and evaluation of a cyber‐physical testbed for improving attack resilience of power systems

Abstract A power system is a complex cyber‐physical system whose security is critical to its function. A major challenge is to model, analyse and visualise the communication backbone of the power systems concerning cyber threats. To achieve this, the design and evaluation of a cyber‐physical power system (CPPS) testbed called Resilient Energy Systems Lab (RESLab) are presented to capture realistic cyber, physical, and protection system features. RESLab is architected to be a fundamental platform for studying and improving the resilience of complex CPPS to cyber threats. The cyber network is emulated using Common Open Research Emulator (CORE), which acts as a gateway for the physical and protection devices to communicate. The physical grid is simulated in the dynamic time frame using Power World Dynamic Studio (PWDS). The protection components are modelled with both PWDS and physical devices including the SEL Real‐Time Automation Controller (RTAC). Distributed Network Protocol 3 (DNP3) is used to monitor and control the grid. Then, the design is exemplified and the tools are validated. This work presents four case studies on cyberattack and defence using RESLab, where we demonstrate false data and command injection using Man‐in‐the‐Middle and Denial of Service attacks and validate them on a large‐scale synthetic electric grid.

Sahu, Abhijeet↗
DOE OSTI2020

EVALUATING NUCLEAR SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF THE SPLINTERNET

The internet, which for years has been viewed as a global online commons with standardized protocols but few regulations is, according to some experts, starting to mirror the contentious political and commercial contours of the physical world. Contributing to this is the rise in data breaches, cyber-enabled attacks on critical infrastructure, government surveillance operations, theft of intellectual property, manipulation of electoral processes, and perceived erosion of privacy, all of which are resulting in a growing skepticism that an open internet will naturally serve the best interests of users, communities, countries, and the global economy. In addition, the rapidly emerging and increasingly lucrative power of data has global superpowers scrambling to protect their informational sovereignty as an urgent matter of national security. Underscoring this urgency is the fact that, despite its global reach and cosmopolitan contributor base, internet infrastructure and governance of the World Wide Web remain largely under U.S. corporate auspices, which reinforces the perception of U.S. control. Whether fragmentation is politically, economically, or socially motivated, there appears to be a growing appetite for an internet that is partitioned and controlled at the national level. From “the Great Firewall of China” to the “Halal” internet of Iran, the trend towards a “Splinternet” has courts and governments embarking on what some call a "legal arms race" to impose a maze of national or regional rules, often conflicting, in the digital realm. The paper explores the emerging Splinternet phenomenon, analyses the implications of this trend on nuclear security, and identifies questions that present opportunities for future research.

Internet, Data Security, Cyber Security, Nuclear S↗
DOE OSTI2019

Alliance Project: Secure Control Systems for the Energy Sector

The Alliance Project addresses Area of Interest 4: Secure Remote Access for the Energy Sector, by combining physical and cyber access under one cybersecurity access system. The Alliance Project built on the successful completion of the Lemnos and Padlock Project (DOE-Funded Project started in 2007 and 2010) and researched and developed a solution for an Ethernet Security Gateway with the functionality required to integrate the physical access control cyber system and interface with legacy and new proximity card readers used for physical access requests. This project focused on securing and enhancing the cyber system the physical access control system operates on. The team tested and demonstrated the system solution on the SEL campus. Currently the physical access cyber system is completely separate from the cyber access control cyber system. With a single system industry benefits include: (1) Single system to learn and teach employees; (2) Single system that collects and alerts on logs and events simplifying incident response plans and NERC CIP compliance; (3) Unifies trust management to a single system reducing the potential errors in privilege escalation or revocation; (4) Provides a stronger cybersecurity platform the physical access control system operates on. Today they are mostly plain text protocols and little cyber awareness; (5) Integration of physical access awareness allows the cyber system to react and adjust. In some cases, the cyber access can be enhanced with authorized physical access and other cases the cyber access can be more restricted with unauthorized physical access; and (6) Enables the utility to establish as large or as small a physical access control system as they require. One example would be when a utility shares a substation with a neighbor utility and can’t rely on the substation door for the physical access control. The Alliance technology enables them to lock equipment racks simply with no scalability issues because it stands on the cyber security infrastructure which is already highly scalable.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2015

Interdisciplinary Education through “Edutainment”: Electric Grid Resilient Control Systems Course

As energy companies and governments attempt to get more from the existing power grid and other critical infrastructures, more automatic control systems are being applied 1-2. With this greater reliance on network-based, digital automation and the stresses of pressing existing infrastructure for greater performance, the power grid and underlying systems have become more susceptible to both malicious attacks and unexpected, natural threats. Governments and other stakeholders have chosen to address infrastructure issues by the implementation of a smarter grid. In the smart grid, operators and control systems supervise power generation, distribution, transmission, and loads to utilize these assets most efficiently3. Such extensive monitoring and control over a distributed system cause complexity that challenge systems designers and human operators in new ways. In addition, cyber vulnerability of these systems has been illustrated in many recent articles on malicious attacks to electric power systems and other similar infrastructure for natural gas, water and communications4. It is therefore critical in the next generation of control systems that resilience plays a large and critical role in the grid design and development. Resilient control systems is a field of research that seeks solutions to the complexity through a holistic approach that combines cognitive science, computer security, communications, and control systems. To enable future researchers and practitioners to assist with designing more resilient systems, science, technology, engineering and mathematics education needs to incorporate interdisciplinary topics. While electrical engineering and computer science programs in the nation include a cyber-security perspective, few if any have focused on the unique control system aspects. Human cognitive aspects are most definitely not addressed in technology education discourse. To this end, a class and education tools in resilient control systems have been created.

17 WIND ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2022

Networked Microgrid Cybersecurity Architecture Design Guide: A New Jersey TRANSITGRID Use Case

Microgrids require reliable communication systems for equipment control, power delivery optimization, and operational visibility. To maintain secure communications, Microgrid Operational Technology (OT) networks must be defensible and cyber-resilient. The communication network must be carefully architected with appropriate cyber-hardening technologies to provide security defenders the data, analytics, and response capabilities to quickly mitigate malicious and accidental cyberattacks. In this work, we outline several best practices and technologies that can support microgrid operations (e.g., intrusion detection and monitoring systems, response tools, etc.). Then we apply these recommendations to the New Jersey TRANSITGRID use case to demonstrate how they would be deployed in practice.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2020

Geothermal Sector Cybersecurity Vulnerability Assessment

A review of geothermal sector-specific cybersecurity vulnerabilities and risks (consequences) was conducted at the request of the Geothermal Technologies Office (GTO). The vulnerabilities and risks reviewed in this study have relevance to achieving the 2019 GeoVision Report (DOE GTO 2019) technological advancements and expected sector growth. The study offers areas for consideration but does not quantify the likelihood (frequency) of the consequences. This cybersecurity analysis project represents a proactive effort to identify areas to enhance cybersecurity in geothermal development and operations. It was not initiated to address any immediate threat or specific known risk. Of the eight identified vulnerabilities analyzed, the review identified reservoir data system monitoring as one that is unique to geothermal systems and may warrant further investigation to better understand risk and mitigation. A detailed analysis of the other vulnerabilities may highlight additional uniqueness relative to other industries. Further research actions are recommended to better quantify risk and enhance cybersecurity preparedness of the sector. As the geothermal industry grows, the cybersecurity strategies to be deployed will be of increasing importance to ensure resilient, reliable, and secure clean energy for years to come.

cyber-physical security↗
DOE OSTI2023

Protecting and Defending against Autonomous Control Systems and Digital Twin Cyber Attacks: Response Strategy for Hyperparameter attacks of Digital Twin Machine Learning Models in Nuclear Power Plants (Final)

Navigating through the complex tapestry of technological advancements, "Response Strategy for Hyperparameter attacks of Digital Twin Machine Learning Model in Nuclear Power Plants" stands at the intersection of cybersecurity and nuclear power plant operations, embarking on a journey through the intricacies of securing digital twins against malicious cyber activities. As nuclear power plants progressively integrate digital twin technology and machine learning models to optimize operations and ensure system reliability, they inadvertently expose themselves to a new spectrum of vulnerabilities, notably in the realm of hyperparameter attacks. Hyperparameters, integral in machine learning model tuning and optimal performance of digital twins, have emerged as a target for adversaries aiming to destabilize the predictive capabilities and therefore, the operational accuracy of these digital entities within critical infrastructures like nuclear plants. This paper, therefore, meticulously threads the needle through the development of a robust response strategy, poised to shield these digital reflections against calculated hyperparameter manipulations, ensuring that the digital twin can effectively and securely function as a reliable proxy for its physical counterpart. The ensuing sections delve into the orchestrated maelstrom of multi-rate time-changing intelligent coordinated hyperparameter attacks and the implementation of event-triggered predictive control, laying down a structured, predictive, and responsive framework that safeguards the nexus where the digital and physical realms of nuclear power plants coalesce. The operational integrity of digital twins in nuclear power plants depends critically on the security of machine learning hyperparameters. This study makes two different contributions. First, a decision-based idea known as a multi-rate time changing intelligent coordinated hyperparameter attack is put forth. In this attack, many hyperparameters are repeatedly changed using both random and intelligent optimal techniques by the attacker. These assaults introduce varied rates at different attack steps, compromise various amounts of hyperparameters, and improve stealth and flexibility. Second, a technique is developed for event triggered predictive control to rapidly respond to potential hyperparameter attacks. This control integrates a sliding window framework, retaining a history of previous data points and employing linear regression to predict the next data point from the current dataset. The control gain K is determined using the Lyapunov-Krasovskii method, and subsequently, an action is developed. Finally, the outcome of the simulation demonstrates the viability of the proposed method for defending nuclear power plant digital twins from hyperparameter attacks.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Strengthening the Security of Operational Technology: Understanding Contemporary Bill of Materials

The evolution of cyber-physical infrastructure has made its security more challenging. The last few years have witnessed a convergence of hardware and software segments in various domains, including operational technology (OT) which is responsible for carrying out critical tasks such as monitoring and controlling power grids, nuclear plants, transportation, and emergency services. Both hardware and software encapsulate numerous open source and proprietary subcomponents, making it crucial for end-users to understand the composition of the products they are using. For example, wind turbines incorporate thousands of lines of code (software) used for the turbine's design, planning, operation, and analytics in addition to the numerous hardware subcomponents that construct it. Due to the highly complex nature of software and hardware, knowledge of the components and subcomponents is required to mitigate cyber vulnerabilities and defend against cyberattacks. There has also been a transformation from a traditional linear supply chain into a global, dynamic, diverse, and interconnected system. The digitization of the supply chain makes it easier to find and exploit vulnerabilities. Critical infrastructures (e.g., power grids, oil, natural gas, water, and wastewater) rely on OT to function, and if the OT is compromised, equipment damage and potential interruption of services could result. A significant security measure to protect OT systems from disruption is to develop a supply chain bill of materials (BoM) corresponding to the software and hardware used in OT, along with attestations amongst vendors and asset owners. A supply chain BoM is a proactive way to understand the inherent vulnerabilities in the system and mitigate them in advance of being exploited. BoMs bolster the trust placed in the digital infrastructure and enhance software supply chain security by sustaining the management of component obsolescence and compliance, along with the seclusion of unsafe segments of a specific product. Adopting BoM tools is becoming increasingly important across various government sectors, as evidenced by the recent U.S. executive order on cybersecurity (NIST 2021). This paper aims to classify BoMs based on structure, functionality, component type, and architecture. The work also discusses case studies to further highlight the benefits of BoMs. In addition, it identifies missing pieces in existing BoM implementations so that future research may identify bounds on where it could expect to make improvements and directly enable researchers to identify promising areas for exploration. Further, the authors provide valuable recommendations to tool developers, researchers, and standardizing organizations (policymakers), additionally benefitting critical infrastructure owners and government executives. This aids in paving a path for future work, thereby, providing suggestions to determine a tool for consumers that best suit their needs.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2024

Investigate the Security of Electric Vehicle (EV) Ecosystem Applications

Apps that run on mobile devices are one of critical components of the electric vehicle (EV) ecosystem and pose possible threat actor points of entry that may impact the trust and security of EV charging systems in the future. Mobile apps often rely on communication between cloud servers and users, thereby creating potential points of entry for cyberattacks. Although app stores such as Apple App Store or Google Play Store generally test the security of apps, the cyber aspects may not be sufficient for many entities including DOD, federal fleets, and commercial entities. A more thorough inspection and the ability to influence developers is imminently needed. This research studies security attributes and vulnerabilities of a sample of mobile applications that support key user functions in the EV ecosystem. The study shows that all analyzed apps have security risks, categorized as either high or medium or both and a comprehensive cybersecurity guideline for developing mobile apps is necessary.

33 ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗
DOE OSTI2015

A Probabilistic Framework for Quantifying Mixed Uncertainties in Cyber Attacker Payoffs

Quantification and propagation of uncertainties in cyber attacker payoffs is a key aspect within multiplayer, stochastic security games. These payoffs may represent penalties or rewards associated with player actions and are subject to various sources of uncertainty, including: (1) cyber-system state, (2) attacker type, (3) choice of player actions, and (4) cyber-system state transitions over time. Past research has primarily focused on representing defender beliefs about attacker payoffs as point utility estimates. More recently, within the physical security domain, attacker payoff uncertainties have been represented as Uniform and Gaussian probability distributions, and mathematical intervals. For cyber-systems, probability distributions may help address statistical (aleatory) uncertainties where the defender may assume inherent variability or randomness in the factors contributing to the attacker payoffs. However, systematic (epistemic) uncertainties may exist, where the defender may not have sufficient knowledge or there is insufficient information about the attacker’s payoff generation mechanism. Such epistemic uncertainties are more suitably represented as generalizations of probability boxes. This paper explores the mathematical treatment of such mixed payoff uncertainties. A conditional probabilistic reasoning approach is adopted to organize the dependencies between a cyber-system’s state, attacker type, player actions, and state transitions. This also enables the application of probabilistic theories to propagate various uncertainties in the attacker payoffs. An example implementation of this probabilistic framework and resulting attacker payoff distributions are discussed. A goal of this paper is also to highlight this uncertainty quantification problem space to the cyber security research community and encourage further advancements in this area.

cyber attacker payoffs↗
DOE OSTI2017

An Artificially Intelligent Physical Model-Checking Approach to Detect Switching-Related Attacks on Power Systems

Decentralized and hierarchical microgrid control strategies have lain the groundwork for shaping the future smart grid. Such control approaches require the cooperation between microgrid operators in control centers, intelligent microcontrollers, and remote terminal units via secure and reliable communication networks. In order to enhance the security and complement the work of network intrusion detection systems, this paper presents an artificially intelligent physical model-checking that detects tampered-with circuit breaker switching control commands whether, due to a cyber-attack or human error. In this technique, distributed agents, which are monitoring sectionalized areas of a given microgrid, will be trained and continuously adapted to verify that incoming control commands do not violate the physical system operational standards and do not put the microgrid in an insecure state. The potential of this approach has been tested by deploying agents that monitor circuit breakers status commands on a 14-bus IEEE benchmark system. The results showed the accuracy of the proposed framework in characterizing the power system and successfully detecting malicious and/or erroneous control commands.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗
DOE OSTI2020

Cyber-Physical Smart Light Control System Integration with Smart Grid using Zigbee

This paper presents a hardware-in-the-loop cyber-physical system architecture design to monitor and control smart lights connected to the active distribution grid. The architecture uses Zigbee-based (IEEE 802.15.4) wireless sensor networks and publish-subscribe architecture to exchange monitoring and control signals between smart-light actuators (SLAs) and a smart-light central controller (SLCC). Each SLA integrated into a smart light consists of a Zigbee-based endpoint module to send and receive signals to and from the SLCC. The SLCC consists of a Zigbee-based coordinator module, which further exchanges the monitoring and control signals with the active distribution management system over the TCP/IP communication network. The monitoring signals from the SLAs include light status, brightness level, voltage, current, and power data, whereas, the control signals to the SLAs include light intensity, turn ON, turn OFF, standby, and default settings. We have used our existing hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) cyber-physical system (CPS) security SCADA testbed to process signals received from the SLCC and respond suitable control signals based on the smart light schedule requirements, system operation, and active distribution grid dynamic characteristics. We have integrated the proposed cyber-physical smart light control system (CPSLCS) testbed to our existing HIL CPS SCADA testbed. We use the integrated testbed to demonstrate the efficacy of the proposed algorithm by real-time performance and latency between the SLCC and SLAs. The experiments demonstrated significant results by 100% realtime performance and low latency while exchanging data between the SLCC and SLAs.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2021

Using the CYBER-Champ Model to Determine Cyber Competencies and Role Alignment

Cybersecurity roles, tasks, and skills are seen by many organizations as nonessential, abstract, or complicated. Although standards are in place, such as the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 800-181 document titled “Workforce Framework for Cybersecurity (NICE Framework)” available since September 2012, companies are still showing security vulnerabilities in their cyber networks (Hatzes, 2020). Barriers towards creating a cyber-ready workforce are not always due to a lack of resources, but often caused by organizational structure. The need for cyber-cognizant job postings, improved communication between Operational Technology (OT) and Information Technology (IT) employees, increases in staffing and funding for cyber teams, and better communication of standards and training can all contribute to increasing an organization’s cyber resilience. Cybersecurity Competency Health and Maturity Progression model (CYBER-CHAMP) is a model aimed at evaluating an organization’s structure and individual employee’s cyber knowledge and helps develop a plan to reach competency. This model was used to engage with organizations to promote proper cyber protocols and policies. The aim of this paper is to answer if it is possible for an organization to build a cyber-ready workforce by providing education and training options for current employees and prepare the future workforce to be ready on day one of employment. Both open source and firsthand interviews with organizations were used to conduct the research contained in this document. Further research may include additional development to the CYBER-CHAMP model and its delivery platform.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Assessment and Coordination of DER Cybersecurity Standards

Distributed energy resources (DERs) are becoming increasingly important to the electric grid, including solar energy systems. However, DERs also introduce new cybersecurity risks, including those posed by cloud computing. Standards harmonization is essential for ensuring that DERs are secure and can be safely integrated into the grid. This panel will discuss cyber standards harmonization for solar security. The panel will feature experts from the S2G Program, National Labs and Industry.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗