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"Russians in the Grid" Enrichment Process

Threat intelligence sources are numerous, and the quality of their intelligence is equally variable. The need for quality, actionable, and shareable intelligence is becoming increasingly important as cyber-threats continue to increase. In this paper, we describe the process we used to enrich U.S. CERT’s Technical Alert entitled “Russian Government Cyber-Activity Targeting Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure Sectors,” affectionately referred to as “Russians In the Grid,” from a series of separate but related reports to a final, actionable, unified Structured Threat Information Expression (STIX) v2 representation of the report. In the process, we detail the tools and procedures we used, some of which are automated and others highly manual. We identify some of the limitations of current STIX enrichment tools and techniques, and propose enhancements to allow for more effective enrichment and better overall threat intelligence to be used for more effective threat data-sharing, as well as machine learning-based predictive threat work being conducted at Idaho National Laboratory.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Population viability analysis of the Endangered shortnose sturgeon

This study used population viability analysis (PVA) to partition the influences of potential threats to the endangered shortnose sturgeon (Acipenser brevirostrum). A workshop brought together experts to help identify potential threats including groundwater withdrawal, poor water quality, saltwater intrusion, mercury effects, harvest as by-catch, and sedimentation of spawning habitat. During the course of the project, we eliminated some threats and added new ones. Groundwater withdrawal was dismissed after a study failed to identify connection with groundwater and the majority of pumping is from a confined aquifer. We also eliminated activities on Fort Stewart as influences on spawning habitat because any successful spawning must occur upstream of Fort Stewart. We added climate change to the list of threats based on our assessment of temperature effects and expectations of sea-level rise. Our study highlighted the role of populations in nearby rivers in providing metapopulation support, raising the concern that the population in the Ogeechee River acts as a demographic sink. As part of this study, we carried out a field sampling study to analyze effects of training activities on headwater streams. We developed a new methodology for sampling design as part of this effort and used a mixed-modeling approach to identify relationships between land cover-land use, including those associated with military training activity and water quality. We found that tank training was associated with higher suspended sediment and equipment training was associated with higher organic carbon) and water quality. We detected effects of training on suspended sediment and organic carbon. We also carried out a field sampling effort in the Canoochee and Ogeechee Rivers. In the Ogeechee River, we found that dissolved oxygen in 40% of measurements during summer were below 4 mg L-1. To evaluate mercury as a potential threat, we developed a mercury uptake model and analyzed mercury levels in amphipod prey and sturgeon eggs. These did not exceed EPA guidelines. Finally, we developed a PVA model that including linkages between shortnose sturgeon growth, reproduction, and survival and each remaining threat; All three had significant influences. Preliminary simulations suggest that elevated temperatures under future climate will extirpate this population and add support to the hypothesis that this species requires access to spawning habitat far upstream to persist.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

Defensive Cybersecurity Architecture Design Using Force-on-Force Cyber-Physical Modeling

Currently, nuclear power plant physical security systems are highly dependent on air-gaps as a protective measure against cyber-threats. Cyber-physical threats become more likely as advanced cyber-threat capabilities to jump air-gaps transition into common use. Defending against the emerging threat of cyber-enabled physical intrusions is poorly understood. The consequence of these cyber-physical attacks has no quantitative analysis method to inform risk-informed, performance-based cybersecurity approaches. By modifying the physical security simulation tool Dante, cyber-physical threat consequence was able to be analyzed on a notional facility. The results of this analysis are used to design a Defensive Cybersecurity Architecture (DCSA) for the physical security system to produce example resilience measures for this notional facility. A DCSA defines security levels to provide a graded approach for defending plant functions, and security zones for trusted communication between systems. This approach can be applied to real world systems to produce physical protection systems and response measures that are resilient to cyber-physical threats.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Planetary Defense: Options for Deflection of Near Earth Objects

Several recent near-miss encounters with asteroids and comets have focused attention on the threat of a catastrophic impact with the Earth. This document reviews the historical impact record and current understanding of the number and location of Near Earth Objects (NEO’s) to address their impact probability. Various ongoing projects intended to survey and catalog the NEO population are also reviewed. Details are then given of an MSFC-led study, intended to develop and assess various candidate systems for protection of the Earth against NEO’s. An existing program, used to model the NEO threat, was extensively modified and is presented here. Details of various analytical tools, developed to evaluate the performance of proposed technologies for protection against the NEO threat, are also presented. Trajectory tools, developed to model the outbound path a vehicle would take to intercept or rendezvous with a target asteroid or comet, are described. Also, details are given of a tool that was created to model both the un-deflected inbound path of an NEO as well as the modified, post-deflection, path. The number of possible options available for protection against the NEO threat was too numerous for them to all be addressed within the study; instead, a representative selection were modeled and evaluated. The major output from this work was a novel process by which the relative effectiveness of different threat mitigation concepts can be evaluated during future, more detailed, studies. In addition, several new or modified mathematical models were developed to analyze various proposed protection systems. A summary of the major lessons learned during this study is presented, as are recommendations for future work. It is hoped that this study will serve to raise the level attention about this very real threat and also demonstrate that successful defense is both possible and practicable, provided appropriate steps are taken.

Planets↗

Failure Impact Analysis of Key Management in AMI Using Cybernomic Situational Assessment (CSA)

In earlier work, we presented a computational framework for quantifying the security of a system in terms of the average loss a stakeholder stands to sustain as a result of threats to the system. We named this system, the Cyberspace Security Econometrics System (CSES). In this paper, we refine the framework and apply it to cryptographic key management within the Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) as an example. The stakeholders, requirements, components, and threats are determined. We then populate the matrices with justified values by addressing the AMI at a higher level, rather than trying to consider every piece of hardware and software involved. We accomplish this task by leveraging the recently established NISTR 7628 guideline for smart grid security. This allowed us to choose the stakeholders, requirements, components, and threats realistically. We reviewed the literature and selected an industry technical working group to select three representative threats from a collection of 29 threats. From this subset, we populate the stakes, dependency, and impact matrices, and the threat vector with realistic numbers. Each Stakeholder s Mean Failure Cost is then computed.

Algorithms↗

SURVEILLANCE DETECTION FOR TRANSPORTATION OPERATIONS PERSONNEL TO PREVENT HIJACKING, THEFT, SABOTAGE, AND MALICIOUS SECURITY EVENTS DURING TRANSPORTING NUCLEAR MATERIAL

The secure transportation of high-consequence materials, including nuclear and radiological assets, is a critical global priority in the face of escalating terrorism, security threats, and violent protests targeting these operations. Effective surveillance detection—the ability to identify, assess, and respond to potential threats across a continuum of scenarios—is paramount in addressing these challenges. This paper outlines a phased, multi-tiered training program designed to strengthen the surveillance detection capabilities of organizations responsible for nuclear material transport. The proposed training program adopts a progressive approach, gradually increasing in technical complexity to provide participants with comprehensive knowledge and tools for implementing robust security strategies. It targets a wide spectrum of stakeholders, including competent authorities, regulators, inspectors, shippers, carriers, law enforcement, and emergency response personnel, equipping them to plan, evaluate, and safeguard nuclear material transportation effectively. Each phase of the program emphasizes distinct elements of the surveillance detection continuum and transport security, focusing on critical topics such as threat identification, adversary task timelines, protective methodologies, and attack mitigation strategies. The training framework is anchored in technical exchanges and scenario-driven courses that reflect real-world complexities and challenges. By addressing the surveillance detection continuum comprehensively—from early threat assessment to active countermeasures—the program reinforces global efforts to secure nuclear assets. It aligns with international security objectives and fosters a strong security culture within participating organizations, ensuring personnel are prepared to counter potential threats and maintain the safe, secure movement of these materials. Ultimately, this initiative aims to enhance preparedness, security, and response capabilities, supporting the global mission to safeguard high-consequence materials against evolving threats.

Zineddin, Dr. Z. [ORNL] (ORCID:0009000848740725)↗

History of Industrial Control System Cyber Incidents

For many years malicious cyber actors have been targeting the industrial control systems (ICS) that manage our critical infrastructures. Most of these events are not reported to the public, and the threats and incidents to ICS are not as well-known as enterprise cyber threats and incidents. This paper is a brief study of publically reported cyber threats to critical infrastructure that sheds light on the growing cyber threats to ICS devices. It is important to note that this list is not all inclusive. The events selected in this study highlight the significant threats and incidents to industrial control systems and demonstrate that significant cyber incidents to ICS devices are growing and becoming more complex.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Secure Software Central-The VOLTTRON Case

The SSC work arose from VOLTTRON’s PNNL campus deployment and resulted in a Threat Profile containing critical assets, prioritized threats, and controls for mitigating those threats. The Threat Profile outlines controls already in place, controls not yet in place, and recommendations for implementing controls. As a companion to the software, the Threat Profile shows due diligence in cybersecurity risk management in terms of security requirements, security recommendations, security budgeting, justification, and prioritization. This report describes the SSC offerings in general and the specific offerings applied to VOLTTRON.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Improvements in the Method of Radiation Anomaly Detection by Spectral Comparison Ratios

Algorithms for detecting illicit gamma radiation sources must respond to a wide variety of threat signatures and ignore a wider variety of clutter. Previously, we described the Nuisance-rejection Spectral Comparison Ratio Anomaly Detection (N-SCRAD) method for indicating the presence of threat sources during mobile search operations. Our method relies on the formulation of radiation alarm test statistics applied to detector counts in numerous spectral regions of interest and our test statistics are standardized by local estimates of background variability. In this work we present a new automated procedure for selecting test statistics and specifying the regions of interest based on minimizing detectable count rates of prototype threat spectra at a specified false positive rate using simulated annealing. The new procedure can be applied to configuring the detection algorithm when the prototype threats are many and diverse without significantly compromising the detection sensitivity to any one of them. N-SCRAD makes use of estimates of background variability obtained during a search from prior measurements of background. In applications such estimates made purely from past measurements sometimes do not extrapolate well to current conditions. In this work we present a new method for correcting those estimates to current conditions of the total count rate. We demonstrate that the correction lowers detection thresholds for a specified false positive rate, enabling greater sensitivity to targets. The two proposed improvements to N-SCRAD maximize detection power for the expected variety of possible threats while reducing or maintaining the false positive rate.

Anomaly detection, Gamma-ray spectroscopy, Radiati↗

Bio-inspired nanocomposite assemblies as smart skin components.

There is national interest in the development of sophisticated materials that can automatically detect and respond to chemical and biological threats without the need for human intervention. In living systems, cell membranes perform such functions on a routine basis, detecting threats, communicating with the cell, and triggering automatic responses such as the opening and closing of ion channels. The purpose of this project was to learn how to replicate simple threat detection and response functions within artificial membrane systems. The original goals toward developing 'smart skin' assemblies included: (1) synthesizing functionalized nanoparticles to produce electrochemically responsive systems within a lipid bilayer host matrices, (2) calculating the energetics of nanoparticle-lipid interactions and pore formation, and (3) determining the mechanism of insertion of nanoparticles in lipid bilayers via imaging and electrochemistry. There are a few reports of the use of programmable materials to open and close pores in rigid hosts such as mesoporous materials using either heat or light activation. However, none of these materials can regulate themselves in response to the detection of threats. The strategies we investigated in this project involve learning how to use programmable nanomaterials to automatically eliminate open channels within a lipid bilayer host when 'threats' are detected. We generated and characterized functionalized nanoparticles that can be used to create synthetic pores through the membrane and investigated methods of eliminating the pores either through electrochemistry, change in pH, etc. We also focused on characterizing the behavior of functionalized gold NPs in different lipid membranes and lipid vesicles and coupled these results to modeling efforts designed to gain an understanding of the interaction of nanoparticles within lipid assemblies.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Management Principles for Nonproliferation Organizations

This paper identifies business models and six management principles that can be applied by a nonproliferation organization to maximize the value and effectiveness of its products. The organizations responsible for reducing the nuclear proliferation threat have experienced a substantial growth in responsibility and visibility since the September 11 attacks. Since then, the international community has witnessed revelations of clandestine nuclear facilities, nuclear black markets, periodic nuclear tests, and a resurgence of interest by countries worldwide in developing nuclear capabilities. The security environment will likely continue to evolve in unexpected ways since most of the proliferation threats with which the world will be forced to contend remain unforeseen. To better prepare for and respond to this evolving security environment, many nonproliferation organizations are interested in finding new or better ways to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of their operations. Of course, all organizations, whether they are market driven or non-profit, must operate effectively and efficiently if they are to succeed. Indeed, as this study demonstrates, many of the management principles that this study recommends can help all organizations succeed. However, this study pays particular attention to nonproliferation organizations because of the mission they are responsible for fulfilling. Nonproliferation organizations, including nonproliferation programs that operate within a larger national security organization, are responsible for reducing the threat of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. These organizations have an enduring mandate from the public and the international community not to fail in the completion of their mission for failure could have detrimental impacts on international security, public health and the environment. Moreover, the public expects nonproliferation organizations and programs to fulfill their mission, even when resources are limited. They are expected to anticipate and react quickly to prevent a potential threat while staying accountable to their public stakeholders, many of whom remain unaware of the very threats the organization is trying to address. When budgets are flush, it is easy to believe that money will solve all problems; but during times of economic hardship, managers must rely on creative and cost-effective management approaches to implement their missions. Fortunately, managers of nonproliferation organizations can draw on a wealth of research on organizational design and culture to help them identify the management strategies most appropriate for them. Such research can help nonproliferation managers think about their own organizational structures and cultures and adapt accepted management principles to their unique organizational mission. This analytical process is not straight forward, as some managers may find themselves taking risks that others might not take, such as making ostensibly risky investments for the common good, or supporting creative thinking to help mission accomplishment. Some management principles that are relatively straightforward for other organizations may be difficult to envision and implement in a nonproliferation organization. Therefore, the goal of this study is to help nonproliferation managers identify management principles that can be implemented in a nonproliferation organization and, in the process, help maximize the value of the organization's products and effectiveness of its mission.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Advancing Aviation Security

Air travel is a popular mode of transportation. Each year, more than 600 million people board U.S. flights for business or pleasure. As demonstrated on 9/11, a coordinated terrorist strike on commercial airlines has devastating consequences where many lives could be lost and the nation’s economy could be crippled. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has worked diligently to enhance security at airports and on flights so that people and cargo can continue to move freely. Today, all passengers and every piece of checked or carry-on luggage are screened before they are permitted on an aircraft. X-ray systems and walk-through metal detectors allow security personnel to identify dangerous metal objects, such as guns and knives. A more complex problem is the detection of explosives, where detection technologies such as multiple-energy X-ray radiography, computed tomography (CT), full body scanners using millimeter wave and X-ray backscatter and other techniques are used to screen for explosives hidden in luggage, in cargo and on the people boarding the aircraft. Scientists and engineers at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) are working with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Science and Technology Directorate (S&T), Explosives Division (EXD) to help improve aviation security by evaluating and enhancing the performance of next-generation explosives detection technologies. LLNL is providing subject matter expertise to TSA for their multi-billion dollar procurements of explosive detection system (EDS) for the nation’s airports and provides recommendations for process and system improvements. To further improve aviation security, EXD is funding research at LLNL to develop advanced explosives detection technologies that can more accurately discriminate between a wide range of explosives and non-threat materials. One challenge with scanning for explosives is that some nonthreatening materials share similar characteristics with actual threats, leading to false positives or false alarms. When an alarm is generated, security personnel must review the scan images to clear the alarm or manually open and verify the bag’s contents, which can increase labor costs and lead to passenger delays. The Livermore efforts currently focus on CT-based applications. First developed for the medical field as a method for diagnosing disease, X-ray CT has become instrumental in various industrial Non-Destructive Evaluation (NDE) applications. Explosives detection equipment that incorporates CT uses a broad-spectrum X-ray beam to capture projections of an object, in particular, the objects inside a piece of luggage. The CT system then applies complex reconstruction algorithms to the projections to produce a three-dimensional representation of the luggage and its contents. Automated threat-detection algorithms (also referred to as threat-recognition algorithms) further process the images to separate each item and flag potential threats for further review (see Figure 1). Transportation security officers can then examine these images and the relevant data to determine whether further interrogation is needed. LLNL has also performed research on advanced X-ray carry-on bag inspection systems and is helping to better understand the performance of X-ray backscatter and millimeter wave passenger screening systems.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Water Security Toolkit User Manual Version 1.2.

The Water Security Toolkit (WST) is a suite of open source software tools that can be used by water utilities to create response strategies to reduce the impact of contamination in a water distribution network . WST includes hydraulic and water quality modeling software , optimizati on methodologies , and visualization tools to identify: (1) sensor locations to detect contamination, (2) locations in the network in which the contamination was introduced, (3) hydrants to remove contaminated water from the distribution system, (4) locations in the network to inject decontamination agents to inactivate, remove, or destroy contaminants, (5) locations in the network to take grab sample s to help identify the source of contamination and (6) valves to close in order to isolate contaminate d areas of the network. This user manual describes the different components of WST , along w ith examples and case studies. License Notice The Water Security Toolkit (WST) v.1.2 Copyright c 2012 Sandia Corporation. Under the terms of Contract DE-AC04-94AL85000, there is a non-exclusive license for use of this work by or on behalf of the U.S. government. This software is distributed under the Revised BSD License (see below). In addition, WST leverages a variety of third-party software packages, which have separate licensing policies: Acro Revised BSD License argparse Python Software Foundation License Boost Boost Software License Coopr Revised BSD License Coverage BSD License Distribute Python Software Foundation License / Zope Public License EPANET Public Domain EPANET-ERD Revised BSD License EPANET-MSX GNU Lesser General Public License (LGPL) v.3 gcovr Revised BSD License GRASP AT&T Commercial License for noncommercial use; includes randomsample and sideconstraints executable files LZMA SDK Public Domain nose GNU Lesser General Public License (LGPL) v.2.1 ordereddict MIT License pip MIT License PLY BSD License PyEPANET Revised BSD License Pyro MIT License PyUtilib Revised BSD License PyYAML MIT License runpy2 Python Software Foundation License setuptools Python Software Foundation License / Zope Public License six MIT License TinyXML zlib License unittest2 BSD License Utilib Revised BSD License virtualenv MIT License Vol Common Public License vpykit Revised BSD License Additionally, some precompiled WST binary distributions might bundle other third-party executables files: Coliny Revised BSD License (part of Acro project) Dakota GNU Lesser General Public License (LGPL) v.2.1 PICO Revised BSD License (part of Acro project) i Revised BSD License Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * Neither the name of Sandia National Laboratories nor Sandia Corporation nor the names of its con- tributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without specific prior written permission. THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IM- PLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL SANDIA CORPORATION BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUD- ING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. ii Acknowledgements This work was supported by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency through its Office of Research and Development (Interagency Agreement # DW8992192801). The material in this document has been subject to technical and policy review by the U.S. EPA, and approved for publication. The views expressed by individual authors, however, are their own, and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Mention of trade names, products, or services does not convey official U.S. EPA approval, endorsement, or recommendation. The Water Security Toolkit is an extension of the Threat Ensemble Vulnerability Assessment-Sensor Place- ment Optimization Tool (TEVA-SPOT), which was also developed with funding from the U.S. Environ- mental Protection Agency through its Office of Research and Development (Interagency Agreement # DW8992192801). The authors acknowledge the following individuals for their contributions to the devel- opment of TEVA-SPOT: Jonathan Berry (Sandia National Laboratories), Erik Boman (Sandia National Laboratories), Lee Ann Riesen (Sandia National Laboratories), James Uber (University of Cincinnati), and Jean-Paul Watson (Sandia National Laboratories). iii Acronyms ATUS American Time-Use Survey BLAS Basic linear algebra sub-routines CFU Colony-forming unit CVAR Conditional value at risk CWS Contamination warning system EA Evolutionary algorithm EDS Event detection system EPA U.S. Environmental Protection Agency EC Extent of Contamination ERD EPANET results database file GLPK GNU Linear Programming Kit GRASP Greedy randomized adaptive sampling process HEX Hexadecimal HTML HyperText markup language INP EPANET input file LP Linear program MC Mass consumed MILP Mixed integer linear program MIP Mixed integer program MSX Multi-species extension for EPANET NFD Number of failed detections NS Number of sensors NZD Non-zero demand PD Population dosed PE Population exposed PK Population killed TAI Threat assessment input file TCE Tailed-conditioned expectation TD Time to detection TEC Timed extent of contamination TEVA Threat ensemble vulnerability assessment TSB Tryptic soy broth TSG Threat scenario generation file TSI Threat simulation input file VAR Value at risk VC Volume consumed WST Water Security Toolkit YML YAML configuration file format for WST iv Symbols Notation Definition Example { , } set brackets { 1,2,3 } means a set containing the values 1,2, and 3. [?] is an element of s [?] S means that s is an element of the set S . [?] for all s = 1 [?] s [?] S means that the statement s = 1 is true for all s in set S . P summation P n i =1 s i means s 1 + s 2 + * * * + s n . \ set minus S \ T means the set that contains all those elements of S that are not in set T . %7C given %7C is used to define conditional probability. P ( s %7C t ) means the prob- ability of s occurring given that t occurs. %7C ... %7C cardinality Cardinality of a set is the number of elements of the set. If set S = { 2,4,6 } , then %7C S %7C = 3. v

Klise, Katherine A.↗

Health Analysis and Research for Public Events (HARPE) Tool (Final CRADA Report)

Based on its experience in building assessment tools, Argonne National Laboratory (Argonne) has demonstrated expertise in developing comparative methodologies and question sets that provide both a physical and cyber-based risk assessment for the commercial facilities sector. A high-level risk assessment tool can be beneficial for venues and organizations that fall under a wide array of facility characterizations, ultimately accommodating the evolving landscape of threats specific to these facilities. The Health Analysis and Research for Public Events (HARPE) Tool is an assessment that seeks to help facility managers assess and mitigate aspects of safety, security, and emergency management within their venues. With the pandemic featuring prominently in today’s landscape, we have adapted and extended the scope of the HARPE tool so that it offers users the ability to integrate assessments of their preparation for, response to, and recovery from threats faced at the venue arising from the COVID-19 pandemic. Traditional threats and hazards remain prevalent in today’s landscape, and the best defense is a proactive approach to preventing and mitigating these threats. At the very core of prevention and mitigation is the first step of conducting a risk assessment—this is the gap that HARPE fills. While it is obvious that the response to COVID-19 is health and sanitation driven, leaders within the commercial facilities sector must also know where to best extend their efforts in mitigating future threats arising from the pandemic. Public events and mass gatherings are directly impacted by COVID-19; however, with the help of HARPE, leaders can focus their attention on core impact areas related to the safety and security of returning to a new normal, as they assess their risks using the Argonne-developed tool. HARPE provides an important solution to the COVID-19 situation by assisting venue managers and health officials in identifying their risks.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

Inventory of Public Key Cryptography in US Electric Vehicle Charging

Electric vehicles (EVs) and charging infrastructure are networked systems, which employ high-level communications in support of charging and grid service decisions. Public key cryptography (PKC) underlies much of the security and privacy protections of the information exchange. We are entering a new epoch where quantum computing threats must be seriously considered. A sufficiently large quantum computer, so named Cryptographically Relevant Quantum Computer (QRQC), will be able to perform the mathematical operations to efficiently attack the underpinnings of traditional PKC, thus jeopardizing the digital foundations for trust, communications security, and data security. Estimates suggest a QRQC can break public key encryption and digital signatures in the manner of tens to hundreds of hours, compared to traditional computing that would demand more than 10 18 years in a brute force-style attack. A consensus belief of quantum theorists, quantum experimenters, and cryptographers suggest that the quantum threat will be likely realized in the next twenty years. To address the threat, post-quantum cryptography, which is cryptosystems that are designed to be secure against both traditional and quantum computing threats, must be adopted. Migration from traditional PKC to quantum-resilient cryptography is a global undertaking and likely represents the largest transition in computing history. The nascent state of EV public key infrastructure, combined with limited adoption of the vehicle secure charging features, presents an opportunity to establish a preference for quantum-resistant cryptography as a step on the migration path. Delays will stunt the efforts as rapidly accelerating EVs sales and huge infrastructure investments will create large growing bases of long-lived vehicles and infrastructure. Migration preparations can commence while NIST continues the process to standardize post-quantum cryptography (PQC), which are quantum-resilient algorithms designed to be secure against traditional and quantum computing threats. The first step in preparing EV charging is to identify the presence of traditional public key cryptography algorithms and applications. With this objective in mind, this report is intended to advise the vehicle manufacturers, charging station manufacturers, charging station operators, charge network providers and other EV charging stakeholders with information on traditional PKC application and the potential risks when PKC becomes insecure. This report, the first in a series of reports discussing the topics existing at the confluence of post-quantum cryptography adoption and EV charging, identifies traditional public key applications employed and identifies potential consequences of leaving EV charging infrastructure vulnerable to quantum computing. The focus remains squarely on the of EV charging and infrastructure with respect to PKC and is believed by the authors to complement the NIST SP 1800-38 Migration to Post-Quantum Cryptography. While the report is centered on infrastructure, there are implications to vehicles.

33 ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗

A Planetary Defense System For Responsive Space Missions

As King et al succinctly write, “Collision between the Earth and small objects in the solar system are known to occur regularly, and can result in extinction-level events at their most energetic or more commonly widespread loss of life or economic destruction even for relatively low-energy impacts.” Currently, the JPL Sentry System and the NASA NEO Surveyor mission track, identify, and monitor potential asteroid threats. The JPL Sentry System4 is an automated collision monitoring system which scans the current asteroid catalog for potential impact trajectories with Earth. A 2017 study led by P. Tricarico titled “The near-Earth asteroid population from two decades of observations” analyzes the combined observations of nine leading asteroid surveys. The NASA NEO Surveyor mission seeks to identify 90% of near-Earth objects (NEO) with diameters greater than 140 meters (460 feet) within 10 years. The NEO Surveyor combines data from two infrared imaging detectors to measure NEO size, composition, shape, rotational state, and orbits. Recently, the NASA Double Asteroid Redirection Test (DART) mission successfully altered the orbit of asteroid moon Dimorphos in 2022. This demonstrated that orbit alteration is possible. Thus, collisions between the Earth and asteroids are both likely and demonstrate potential for great harm. There is ongoing work to identify, catalog, and track potential threats. However, when a threat is identified there is not yet a system in place to target the threatening asteroid and defend the planet from potentially existential threats. Building on the DART Mission, we explore a planetary defense system to mitigate asteroid threats.

42 ENGINEERING↗

National Security Science and Technology Initiative: Air Cargo Screening

The non-intrusive inspection (NII) of consolidated air cargo carried on commercial passenger aircraft continues to be a technically challenging, high-priority requirement of the Department of Homeland Security's Science and Technology Directorate (DHS S&T), the Transportation Security Agency and the Federal Aviation Administration. The goal of deploying a screening system that can reliably and cost-effectively detect explosive threats in consolidated cargo without adversely affecting the flow of commerce will require significant technical advances that will take years to develop. To address this critical National Security need, the Battelle Memorial Institute (Battelle), under a Cooperative Research and Development Agreement (CRADA) with four of its associated US Department of Energy (DOE) National Laboratories (Oak Ridge, Pacific Northwest, Idaho, and Brookhaven), conducted a research and development initiative focused on identifying, evaluating, and integrating technologies for screening consolidated air cargo for the presence of explosive threats. Battelle invested $8.5M of internal research and development funds during fiscal years 2007 through 2009. The primary results of this effort are described in this document and can be summarized as follows: (1) Completed a gap analysis that identified threat signatures and observables, candidate technologies for detection, their current state of development, and provided recommendations for improvements to meet air cargo screening requirements. (2) Defined a Commodity/Threat/Detection matrix that focuses modeling and experimental efforts, identifies technology gaps and game-changing opportunities, and provides a means of summarizing current and emerging capabilities. (3) Defined key properties (e.g., elemental composition, average density, effective atomic weight) for basic commodity and explosive benchmarks, developed virtual models of the physical distributions (pallets) of three commodity types and three explosive benchmarks combinations, and conducted modeling and simulation studies to begin populating the matrix of commodities, threats, and detection technologies. (4) Designed and fabricated basic (homogeneous) commodity test pallets and fabricated inert stimulants to support experiments and to validate modeling/simulation results. (5) Developed/expanded the team's capabilities to conduct full-scale imaging (neutron and x-ray) experiments of air cargo commodities and explosive benchmarks. (6) Conducted experiments to improve the collection of trace particles of explosives from a variety of surfaces representative of air cargo materials by means of mechanical (air/vibration/pressure), thermal, and electrostatic methods. Air cargo screening is a difficult challenge that will require significant investment in both research and development to find a suitable solution to ensure the safety of passengers without significantly hindering the flow of commodities. The initiative funded by Battelle has positioned this group to make major contributions in meeting the air cargo challenge by developing collaborations, developing laboratory test systems, improving knowledge of the challenges (both technical and business) for air cargo screening, and increasing the understanding of the capabilities for current inspection methods (x-ray radiography, x-ray backscatter, etc.) and potential future inspection methods (neutron radiography, fusion of detector modalities, advanced trace detection, etc.). Lastly, air cargo screening is still an issue that will benefit from collaboration between Department of Energy Laboratories and Battelle. On January 7, 2010, DHS Secretary Napolitano joined White House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs and Assistant to the President for Counterterrorism and Homeland Security John Brennan to announce several recommendations DHS has made to the President for improving the technology and procedures used to protect air travel from acts of terrorism. (This announcement followed the 25 Dec'09 Delta/Northwest Airlines Flight 253 terror attack.) Secretary Napolitano outlined five recommendations DHS will pursue to enhance the safety of the traveling public. One of the five recommendations, read as follows: 'Establish a partnership on aviation security between DHS and the Department of Energy and its National Laboratories in order to develop new and more effective technologies to deter and disrupt known threats and proactively anticipate and protect against new ways by which terrorists could seek to board an aircraft.' In conclusion, it appears very timely that Battelle and its DOE lab partners initiated a serious collaboration on the air cargo topic, and that we should continue to work toward future collaboration in response to the government's needs.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Damage Control Plan for International Space Station Recharge Tank Assembly Composite Overwrapped Pressure Vessel

As NASA has retired the Space Shuttle Program, a new method of transporting compressed gaseous nitrogen and oxygen needed to be created for delivery of these crucial life support resources to the International Space Station (ISS). One of the methods selected by NASA includes the use of highly pressurized, unprotected Recharge Tank Assemblies (RTAs) utilizing Composite Overwrapped Pressure Vessels (COPVs). A COPV consists of a thin liner wrapped with a fiber composite and resin or epoxy. It is typically lighter weight than an all metal pressure vessel of similar volume and therefore provides a higher-efficiency means for gas storage. However COPVs are known to be susceptible to damage resulting from handling, tool drop impacts, or impacts from other objects. As a result, a comprehensive Damage Control Plan has been established to mitigate damage to the RTA COPV throughout its life cycle. The DCP is intended to evaluate and mitigate defined threats during manufacturing, shipping and handling, test, assembly level integration, shipment while pressurized, launch vehicle integration and mission operations by defining credible threats and methods for preventing potential damage while still maintaining the primary goal of resupplying ISS gas resources. A comprehensive threat assessment is performed to identify all threats posed to the COPV during the different phases of its lifecycle. The threat assessment is then used as the basis for creating a series of general inspection, surveillance and reporting requirements which apply across all phases of the COPV's life, targeted requirements only applicable to specific work phases and a series of training courses for both ground personnel and crew aboard the ISS. A particularly important area of emphasis deals with creating DCP requirements for a highly pressurized, large and unprotected RTA COPV for use during Inter Vehicular Activities (IVA) operations in the micro gravity environment while supplying pressurized gas to the ISS for crew life support.

Cook, Anthony J.↗