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At least 721 records · Page 40
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2019

Fission Reactor Inadvertent Reentry: A Report to the Nuclear Power & Propulsion Technical Discipline Team

The Nuclear Power and Propulsion Technical Discipline Team has directed an effort to consider possible improvements to the launch approval process as it relates to fission reactors. To that end, Reference 1 described possible general design criteria and risk criteria for fission reactors. At the time that Reference 1 was completed, it was felt that additional examination of reentry issues was warranted. This paper presents the next step in that examination, which is to accurately describe and frame the problem and suggest safety criteria that might apply to inadvertent reentry. The report includes a discussion of the issues associated with different types of inadvertent reentry, the possible consequences of those events, a review of previous work in the area, security and nonproliferation issues, and options for safety requirements that might be considered. Note that safety requirements can have significant mission implications, e.g., no operation below a certain orbit.

Camp, Allen↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Runtime Analysis with R2U2: A Tool Exhibition Report

We present R2U2 (Realizable, Responsive, Unobtrusive Unit), a hardware- supported tool and framework for the continuous monitoring of safetycritical and embedded cyber-physical systems.With the widespread advent of autonomous systems such as Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS), satellites, rovers, and cars, real-time, on-board decision making requires unobtrusive monitoring of properties for safety, performance, security, and system health. R2U2 models combine past-time and future-time Metric Temporal Logic, “mission time” Linear Temporal Logic, probabilistic reasoning with Bayesian Networks, and modelbased prognostics. The R2U2 monitoring engine can be instantiated as a hardware solution, running on an FPGA, or as a software component. The FPGA realization enables R2U2 to monitor complex cyber-physical systems without any overhead or instrumentation of the flight software. In this tool exhibition report, we present R2U2 and demonstrate applications on system runtime monitoring, diagnostics, software health management, and security monitoring for a UAS. Our tool demonstration uses a hardware-based processor-in-the-loop “iron-bird” configuration.

Johann Martin Schumann↗
DOE OSTI2014

Subtask 3.11 - Production of CBTL-Based Jet Fuels from Biomass-Based Feedstocks and Montana Coal

The Energy & Environmental Research Center (EERC), in partnership with the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and Accelergy Corporation, an advanced fuels developer with technologies exclusively licensed from Exxon Mobil, undertook Subtask 3.11 to use a recently installed bench-scale direct coal liquefaction (DCL) system capable of converting 45 pounds/hour of pulverized, dried coal to a liquid suitable for upgrading to fuels and/or chemicals. The process involves liquefaction of Rosebud mine coal (Montana coal) coupled with an upgrading scheme to produce a naphthenic fuel. The upgrading comprises catalytic hydrotreating and saturation to produce naphthenic fuel. A synthetic jet fuel was prepared by blending equal volumes of naphthenic fuel with similar aliphatic fuel derived from biomass and 11 volume % of aromatic hydrocarbons. The synthetic fuel was tested using standard ASTM International techniques to determine compliance with JP-8 fuel. The composite fuel thus produced not only meets but exceeds the military aviation fuel-screening criteria. A 500-milliliter synthetic jet fuel sample which met internal screening criteria was submitted to the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) at Wright–Patterson Air Force Base, Dayton, Ohio, for evaluation. The sample was confirmed by AFRL to be in compliance with U.S. Air Force-prescribed alternative aviation fuel initial screening criteria. The results show that this fuel meets or exceeds the key specification parameters for JP-8, a petroleum-based jet fuel widely used by the U.S. military. JP-8 specifications include parameters such as freeze point, density, flash point, and others; all of which were met by the EERC fuel sample. The fuel also exceeds the thermal stability specification of JP-8 fuel as determined by the quartz crystalline microbalance (QCM) test also performed at an independent laboratory as well as AFRL. This means that the EERC fuel looks and acts identically to petroleum-derived jet fuel and can be used interchangeably without any special requirements and thus provides a pathway to energy security to the U.S. military and the entire nation. This subtask was funded through the EERC–DOE Joint Program on Research and Development for Fossil Energy-Related Resources Cooperative Agreement No. DE-FC26- 08NT43291. Nonfederal funding was provided by Accelergy Corporation.

Sharma, Ramesh↗
DOE OSTI2024

YOLO for Radio Frequency Signal Classification

Radio frequency signal classification plays a pivotal role in various applications, including spectrum management, wireless security, and cognitive radio. Extant signal classification methods require significant data throughput and are not multilabel. We propose a novel approach to radio frequency signal classification by leveraging the You Only Look Once (YOLO) object detection method. YOLO is a state-of-the-art deep learning model renowned for its real-time object detection capabilities in computer vision applications. We adapt YOLO for signal classification to enable the automatic and efficient identification of various signal types within a power spectral density image. Index Terms—radio-frequency analysis, object detection, neural networks, machine learning, deep learning.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2016

Used fuel extended storage security and safeguards by design roadmap

In the United States, spent nuclear fuel (SNF) is safely and securely stored in spent fuel pools and dry storage casks. The available capacity in spent fuel pools across the nuclear fleet has nearly reached a steady state value. The excess SNF continues to be loaded in dry storage casks. Fuel is expected to remain in dry storage for periods beyond the initial dry cask certification period of 20 years. Recent licensing renewals have approved an additional 40 years. This report identifies the current requirements and evaluation techniques associated with the safeguards and security of SNF dry cask storage. A set of knowledge gaps is identified in the current approaches. Finally, this roadmap identifies known knowledge gaps and provides a research path to deliver the tools and models needed to close the gaps and allow the optimization of the security and safeguards approaches for an interim spent fuel facility over the lifetime of the storage site.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
NASA NTRS2017

Smashing the Stovepipe: Leveraging the GMSEC Open Architecture and Advanced IT Automation to Rapidly Prototype, Develop and Deploy Next-Generation Multi-Mission Ground Systems

Satellite/Payload Ground Systems - Typically highly-customized to a specific mission's use cases - Utilize hundreds (or thousands!) of specialized point-to-point interfaces for data flows / file transfers Documentation and tracking of these complex interfaces requires extensive time to develop and extremely high staffing costs Implementation and testing of these interfaces are even more cost-prohibitive, and documentation often lags behind implementation resulting in inconsistencies down the road With expanding threat vectors, IT Security, Information Assurance and Operational Security have become key Ground System architecture drivers New Federal security-related directives are generated on a daily basis, imposing new requirements on current / existing ground systems - These mandated activities and data calls typically carry little or no additional funding for implementation As a result, Ground System Sustaining Engineering groups and Information Technology staff continually struggle to keep up with the rolling tide of security Advancing security concerns and shrinking budgets are pushing these large stove-piped ground systems to begin sharing resources - I.e. Operational / SysAdmin staff, IT security baselines, architecture decisions or even networks / hosting infrastructure Refactoring these existing ground systems into multi-mission assets proves extremely challenging due to what is typically very tight coupling between legacy components As a result, many "Multi-Mission" ops. environments end up simply sharing compute resources and networks due to the difficulty of refactoring into true multi-mission systems Utilizing continuous integration / rapid system deployment technologies in conjunction with an open architecture messaging approach allows System Engineers and Architects to worry less about the low-level details of interfaces between components and configuration of systems GMSEC messaging is inherently designed to support multi-mission requirements, and allows components to aggregate data across multiple homogeneous or heterogeneous satellites or payloads - The highly-successful Goddard Science and Planetary Operations Control Center (SPOCC) utilizes GMSEC as the hub for it's automation and situational awareness capability Shifts focus towards getting GS to a final configuration-managed baseline, as well as multi-mission / big-picture capabilities that help increase situational awareness, promote cross-mission sharing and establish enhanced fleet management capabilities across all levels of the enterprise.

GMSEC↗
DOE OSTI2025

Metadata Standards for the NSE: Core Fields

This standard presents a core set of metadata fields required for each managed digital object within the Nuclear Security Enterprise (NSE). Metadata standardization is a critical enabler for two primary objectives: 1) effectively sharing data, documents, and other digital objects between NSE sites; and 2) supporting digital engineering through the digital thread at the object level. Standardization is necessary for both schemas and vocabularies, meaning that both field standards and value standards must be specified. This document serves as a foundational field standard, recommending a core set of fields that should be uniformly required for all managed digital objects within the NSE.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2019

Sampling and Analysis Plan for USDOE/NNSA Pantex Plant Groundwater Remedial Action Progress

This Sampling and Analysis Plan (SAP) was originally developed as part of the Remedial Design Submittal Package required by the Interagency Agreement (IAG) for the United States Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (USDOE/NNSA) Pantex Plant. The SAP describes specifications for data collection, methods of sample collection and analysis, and requirements for quality assurance (QA) and quality control (QC) activities implemented during the life cycle of the program to ensure that data are of sufficient quality for their intended purpose (i.e., to support decision making regarding remediation of the groundwater beneath Pantex). The SAP was prepared according to United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) guidance on preparation of Quality Assurance Project Plans (QAPPs) QA/R-5 (EPA, 2001) and is designed to be a stand-alone document that describes both field sampling activities as well as QA/QC activities. The SAP is incorporated by reference to the compliance plan provisions of Hazardous Waste Permit No. 50284, issued by the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality, and was submitted as part of the Remedial Design/Remedial Action Work Plan submitted to EPA in accordance with the Interagency Agreement.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗
DOE OSTI2011

Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration Plan for Corrective Action Unit 574: Neptune, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada

This Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration (SAFER) Plan identifies the activities required for closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 574, Neptune. CAU 574 is included in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) (1996 [as amended March 2010]) and consists of the following two Corrective Action Sites (CASs) located in Area 12 of the Nevada National Security Site: (1) CAS 12-23-10, U12c.03 Crater (Neptune); (2) CAS 12-45-01, U12e.05 Crater (Blanca). This plan provides the methodology for the field activities that will be performed to gather the necessary information for closure of the two CASs. There is sufficient information and process knowledge regarding the expected nature and extent of potential contaminants to recommend closure of CAU 574 using the SAFER process. Based on historical documentation, personnel interviews, site process knowledge, site visits, photographs, field screening, analytical results, the results of the data quality objective (DQO) process (Section 3.0), and an evaluation of corrective action alternatives (Appendix B), closure in place with administrative controls is the expected closure strategy for CAU 574. Additional information will be obtained by conducting a field investigation to verify and support the expected closure strategy and provide a defensible recommendation that no further corrective action is necessary. This will be presented in a Closure Report that will be prepared and submitted to the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) for review and approval.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2025

Use of Radiofrequency Tamper Indicating Devices (RFTID) to Enhance Remotely Monitoring the Security of Advanced and Small Modular Reactors (A/SMRs)

A/SMRs will likely be deployed in remote locations that are difficult to access, thereby requiring limited on-site staff. • Vendors are considering remote monitoring as a solution to enhance nuclear security. RFTIDs are a candidate technology for maintaining nuclear security of A/SMRs but need to be evaluated for feasibility and implementation into the wider physical protection system.

O'Dowd, Kevin [Savannah River National Laboratory ↗
DOE OSTI2012

Karlsruhe Database for Radioactive Wastes (KADABRA) - Accounting and Management System for Radioactive Waste Treatment - 12275

The data management system KADABRA was designed according to the purposes of the Cen-tral Decontamination Department (HDB) of the Wiederaufarbeitungsanlage Karlsruhe Rueckbau- und Entsorgungs-GmbH (WAK GmbH), which is specialized in the treatment and conditioning of radioactive waste. The layout considers the major treatment processes of the HDB as well as regulatory and legal requirements. KADABRA is designed as an SAG ADABAS application on IBM system Z mainframe. The main function of the system is the data management of all processes related to treatment, transfer and storage of radioactive material within HDB. KADABRA records the relevant data concerning radioactive residues, interim products and waste products as well as the production parameters relevant for final disposal. Analytical data from the laboratory and non destructive assay systems, that describe the chemical and radiological properties of residues, production batches, interim products as well as final waste products, can be linked to the respective dataset for documentation and declaration. The system enables the operator to trace the radioactive material through processing and storage. Information on the actual sta-tus of the material as well as radiological data and storage position can be gained immediately on request. A variety of programs accessed to the database allow the generation of individual reports on periodic or special request. KADABRA offers a high security standard and is constantly adapted to the recent requirements of the organization. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2023

Digital Engineering and Cybersecurity Decision Analysis in Early Phases of SMR-Driven IES Projects

Considerable efforts are underway to ensure cybersecurity is integrated into the systems engineering lifecycle. Cyber-informed engineering and security-by-design frameworks are intended to identify and engineer out cybersecurity risks throughout the lifecycle. While these approaches are valuable for promoting the need to include cybersecurity considerations in early design phases to create more secure systems, they may not consider the entirety of digital risks. Digital risks in a digital instrumentation and control system include adversarial and unintentional risks from internal and external factors, such as human performance errors, design flaws, environmental conditions, and equipment degradation or failure. This report provides a detailed discussion on digital risk prior to describing the background and concept of operations for a small modular reactor-driven integrated energy system connected to industrial applications. The challenges of competing objectives and competing stakeholder requirements are discussed and the impacts on digital engineering, security considerations, and interdependencies are evaluated for mission-level, facility-level, and system-level decisions.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
NASA NTRS2012

Mission Assurance Modeling and Simulation: A Cyber Security Roadmap

This paper proposes a cyber security modeling and simulation roadmap to enhance mission assurance governance and establish risk reduction processes within constrained budgets. The term mission assurance stems from risk management work by Carnegie Mellon's Software Engineering Institute in the late 19905. By 2010, the Defense Information Systems Agency revised its cyber strategy and established the Program Executive Officer-Mission Assurance. This highlights a shift from simply protecting data to balancing risk and begins a necessary dialogue to establish a cyber security roadmap. The Military Operations Research Society has recommended a cyber community of practice, recognizing there are too few professionals having both cyber and analytic experience. The authors characterize the limited body of knowledge in this symbiotic relationship. This paper identifies operational and research requirements for mission assurance M&S supporting defense and homeland security. M&S techniques are needed for enterprise oversight of cyber investments, test and evaluation, policy, training, and analysis.

Gendron, Gerald↗
NASA NTRS2014

Analyzing Risks and Vulnerabilities of Various Computer Systems and Undergoing Exploitation using Embedded Devices

Security is one of the most if not the most important areas today. After the several attacks on the United States, security everywhere has heightened from airports to communication among the military branches legionnaires. With advanced persistent threats (APTs) on the rise following Stuxnet, government branches and agencies are required, more than ever, to follow several standards, policies and procedures to reduce the likelihood of a breach. Attack vectors today are very advanced and are going to continue to get more and more advanced as security controls advance. This creates a need for networks and systems to be in an updated, patched and secured state in a launch control system environment. Attacks on critical systems are becoming more and more relevant and frequent. Nation states are hacking into critical networks that might control electrical power grids or water dams as well as carrying out advanced persistent threat (APTs) attacks on government entities. NASA, as an organization, must protect its self from attacks from all different types of attackers with different motives. Although the International Space Station was created, there is still competition between the different space programs. With that in mind, NASA might get attacked and breached for various reasons such as espionage or sabotage. My project will provide a way for NASA to complete an in house penetration test which includes: asset discovery, vulnerability scans, exploit vulnerabilities and also provide forensic information to harden systems. Completing penetration testing is a part of the compliance requirements of the Federal Information Security Act (FISMA) and NASA NPR 2810.1 and related NASA Handbooks. This project is to demonstrate how in house penetration testing can be conducted that will satisfy all of the compliance requirements of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), as outlined in FISMA. By the end of this project, I hope to have carried out the tasks stated above as well as gain an immense knowledge about compliance, security tools, networks and network devices, as well as policies and procedures.

Penetration Testing↗
NASA NTRS2014

NASA Unmanned Aircraft (UA) Control and Non-Payload Communication (CNPC) System Waveform Trade Studies

Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) represent a new capability that will provide a variety of services in the government (public) and commercial (civil) aviation sectors. The growth of this potential industry has not yet been realized due to the lack of a common understanding of what is required to safely operate UAS in the National Airspace System (NAS). To address this deficiency, NASA has established a project called UAS Integration in the NAS (UAS in the NAS), under the Integrated Systems Research Program (ISRP) of the Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate (ARMD). This project provides an opportunity to transition concepts, technology, algorithms, and knowledge to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and other stakeholders to help them define the requirements, regulations, and issues for routine UAS access to the NAS. The safe, routine, and efficient integration of UAS into the NAS requires new radio frequency (RF) spectrum allocations and a new data communications system which is both secure and scalable with increasing UAS traffic without adversely impacting the Air Traffic Control (ATC) communication system. These data communications, referred to as Control and Non-Payload Communications (CNPC), whose purpose is to exchange information between the unmanned aircraft and the ground control station to ensure safe, reliable, and effective unmanned aircraft flight operation. A Communications Subproject within the UAS in the NAS Project has been established to address issues related to CNPC development, certification and fielding. The focus of the Communications Subproject is on validating and allocating new RF spectrum and data link communications to enable civil UAS integration into the NAS. The goal is to validate secure, robust data links within the allocated frequency spectrum for UAS. A vision, architectural concepts, and seed requirements for the future commercial UAS CNPC system have been developed by RTCA Special Committee 203 (SC-203) in the process of determining formal recommendations to the FAA in its role provided for under the Federal Advisory Committee Act. NASA intends to conduct its research and development in keeping with this vision and associated architectural concepts. The prototype communication systems developed and tested by NASA will be used to validate and update the initial SC-203 requirements in order to provide a foundation for SC-203's Minimum Aviation System Performance Standards (MASPS).

Aircraft Communications↗
DOE OSTI2025

5G Communications in Nuclear: Potential Use Cases and Security Considerations

As fifth-generation (5G) communications continues to revolutionize the future of wireless technology, there is growing demand to utilize its benefits for critical infrastructures such as nuclear power plants (NPPs). In regard to achieving full automation and control in the operation of existing and future nuclear reactors, the unique capabilities of 5G can bring several potential advantages over other wireless technologies. However, a deep investigation is needed for the availability and security of 5G communications under various NPP operational scenarios. This article examines how 5G security capabilities can be architecturally deployed in nuclear applications so as to replace existing communication infrastructures. We discuss the current use of all wireless technologies in NPPs with their key features. Consequently, we investigated several NPP use cases in which 5G offers potential advantages but entails specific security considerations. The present article covers the characteristics of 5G communications, general challenges to its application in nuclear, and the security gaps that need to be addressed. We also highlight certain 5G security-by-design features that can help addressing current stringent NPP requirements. In addition, we discuss some future research direction that can facilitate the implementation of 5G in a nuclear facility. The findings presented herein can help foster 5G deployment in NPPs, thus enabling secured data transmission, cost savings, and increased operational efficiency with enhanced reliability.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
NASA NTRS1990

Smart hands for the EVA retriever

Dexterous, robotic hands are required for the extravehicular activity retriever (EVAR) system being developed by the NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC). These hands, as part of the EVAR system, must be able to grasp objects autonomously and securely which inadvertently separate from the Space Station. Development of the required hands was initiated in 1987. Outlined here are the hand development activities, including design considerations, progress to date, and future plans. Several types of dexterous hands that were evaluated, along with a proximity-sensing capability that was developed to initiate a reflexive, adaptive grasp, are described. The evaluations resulted in the design and fabrication of a 6-degree-of-freedom (DOF) hand that has two fingers and a thumb arranged in an anthropomorphic configuration. Finger joint force and position sensors are included in the design, as well as infrared proximity sensors which allow initiation of the grasp sequence when an object is detected within the grasp envelope.

Hess, Clifford W.↗
NASA NTRS2015

Securing the Global Airspace System Via Identity-Based Security

Current telecommunications systems have very good security architectures that include authentication and authorization as well as accounting. These three features enable an edge system to obtain access into a radio communication network, request specific Quality-of-Service (QoS) requirements and ensure proper billing for service. Furthermore, the links are secure. Widely used telecommunication technologies are Long Term Evolution (LTE) and Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access (WiMAX) This paper provides a system-level view of network-centric operations for the global airspace system and the problems and issues with deploying new technologies into the system. The paper then focuses on applying the basic security architectures of commercial telecommunication systems and deployment of federated Authentication, Authorization and Accounting systems to provide a scalable, evolvable reliable and maintainable solution to enable a globally deployable identity-based secure airspace system.

Communications↗