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At least 721 records · Page 40
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2025

International Nuclear Security Nuclear Material Accounting and Control Instructions for Use and Supplementary Documentation

This document describes the use of exercise kits (called NMAC Kits) developed to support training and technical engagements sponsored by DOE/NNSA Office of Nuclear Security (INS) in the use of nuclear material accounting and control (NMAC) methodologies in support of nuclear security. INS has previously used other similar kits that were originally designed to support NMAC training for international safeguards purposes. These new kits are specifically designed to be used in nuclear security training and emphasis the role NMAC plays in nuclear security as well as security against the insider threat. Planning for the development of these kits is described in LA-UR-24-30063, FY24 NMAC Kits Upgrade and served as the initial framework for the development of the new NMAC Kit material in FY25.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2025

Arms Control Development Criteria (ACDCs)

The Arms Control Development Criteria (ACDC) have been developed to provide a consistent framework for understanding the readiness of a technology or capability for use in arms control as poten>al components of a verifica>on system. More importantly, they are also intended to serve as a guide for technology developers to beCer address the development needs of a technology from the start of the development process, rather than trying to adapt a technology to arms control aDer it is developed.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2025

International Nuclear Security Nuclear Material Accounting and Control Kit Participant Guides

You work at a facility that stores large amounts of nuclear material in varying containerizations. Management has just approved the establishment of a tamper indicating device program in order to cut down on the effort required to conduct inventories, and to enhance overall control of nuclear materials within the site boundary. You have been assigned, along with your colleagues, to conduct an initial assessment to determine the ideal TID types to be used at your facility. You will apply TIDs to a variety of apparatuses that are representative of the closure mechanisms on different containers and entry points to rooms and vaults onsite.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2020

Beowulf v2.5.3 User Guide: Revision 5

This document is a user guide for the Beowulf (rebranding of Watchmen) tool. It describes how operators can access and utilize the application's functionality. Beowulf is a research software application developed by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) that incorporates the scientific and operational expertise for reviewing data from treaty monitoring radionuclide stations. These stations are part of a worldwide network to monitor for nuclear explosions, and the data they produce are critical to make the determination of whether a sample is from a nuclear explosion or some other source (i.e., nuclear reactor or medical isotope production facility). Stations deliver their measurements and system status to the International Monitoring System (IMS), which forwards it via email to all subscribers. Beowulf is capable of processing data from several radioxenon station types and development is in progress on a solution for particulate stations. Screening of data in Beowulf may be done by a number of different users such as radionuclide analysts, evaluators, and data quality experts. This guide is provided to assist those users in navigating the application. The term Beowulf is used generically throughout this document to refer to any of the various components in the software application. The user interface that is viewed with a web browser is the primary focus of this user guide. Other components include a database to store measurements and state of health (SOH) data; and the data loader that monitors incoming emails, parses the data, populates the database, does the initial analysis, and routes data for review.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2025

Optimizing Geospatial Assessments for Nuclear Safeguards Applications with Large Language Models

A multidisciplinary team at Argonne National Laboratory evaluated the ability of large language models (LLMs) to identify geographic locations from open-source text and assessed post-processing measures to strengthen the reliability of those extractions in support of international nuclear safeguards. The study focused on addressing challenges such as toponym ambiguity, imprecise descriptions, and misinformation, which often undermine the accuracy of LLM-derived geospatial assessments. By integrating authoritative geospatial datasets, employing rigorous validation techniques, and leveraging human-in-the-loop processes, the project aimed to enhance the precision, transparency, and reproducibility of geospatial localization workflows. The findings demonstrate that while LLMs exhibit significant potential for accelerating geospatial analysis, their outputs require systematic grounding and verification to ensure reliability in high-stakes applications. This work contributes to the broader field of geospatial intelligence and supports strategic objectives of international organizations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE).

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2025

Seismic DAS Observations of a large underground chemical explosion in dry tuff

On 18 October 2023 a 16.3-ton TNT equivalent chemical explosion was detonated underground at the Nevada National Security Site, generating a seismic event (Meyers et al., 2024). The associated seismic wavefield was measured on a Distributed Acoustic Sensing (DAS) array with slant range distances from 27 m – 1123 m. The first arriving phase traveled at an apparent velocity of about 2640 m s -1 from 27 m to 420 m slant range and about 2470 m s -1 from 505 m to 1123 m slant range according to the first arrival moveouts on the DAS data. The first arrival from the explosion temporarily saturated the cable from a slant range of 27 m – 186 m and 0.009 s to 0.084 s post detonation. From 186 m slant range to 420 m slant range, peak strain rates of 5.6 x 10 6 nm m -1 s -1 were observed for the first arrival phase. For the first arrival from 505 m slant range to 1123 m slant range, peak strain rates reduced to 8.0 x 10 4 nm m -1 s -1 . A comparison of the scaled accelerations computed from DAS, the geophone pairs, and the measurements of co-located accelerometer pairs show common agreement at the scaled ranges of the single point sensors. This study adds to the body of work reporting near-source DAS observations of the seismic wavefields generated by underground chemical explosions. These results indicate that near-source DAS observations can refine interpretations of phase identification from single-point sensor observations. Phase identification could be one mechanism that contributes scatter to single point seismic measurements which would confound the performance of empirical relationships for small explosions. Removing that mechanism may therefore reduce interstation variability and increase empirical relationship performance for small explosions.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2024

The Cryptographic Obfuscation Sensor System Guarding Restricted Data (CrOSSGRD): Prototype Detailed Design Document

A prototype has been developed at Sandia National Laboratories to collect nominally sensitive data from a mock treaty accountable item, record that information as non-sensitive encrypted outputs, and allow inspectors to subsequently evaluate that information at a time and location of their choice without any risk of the host party’s data being inadvertently (or maliciously) revealed.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2025

Portal Monitoring Considerations for Treaty Verification Applications

Portal monitoring is one method in a suite of options for treaty verification and can assist in verification of treaty accountable items (TAIs). Portal monitor technology spans a wide range of sensors, including radiation detectors, break-beams, or weight sensors. For radiation-detecting portal monitors, they are able to confirm absence / presence of a radiological signature and to track TAI direction of motion. Portal monitoring uses measurements from strategically placed sensors (e.g., radiation detectors) to record the entry or egress of TAIs. The implementation of portal monitoring relies on three key elements: perimeter definition, portal locations, and sensor technology, and can be implemented in either time-bound or continuous operations depending on what is permitted by the Treaty.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2025

Seismic DAS observations of a large underground chemical explosion in dry tuff

On 18 October 2023 a 16.3-ton TNT equivalent chemical explosion was detonated underground at the Nevada National Security Site, generating a seismic event with a magnitude of 1.7 (Meyers et al., 2024). The associated seismic wavefield was measured on a Distributed Acoustic Sensing (DAS) array with slant range distances from 27 m – 1123 m. The first arriving phase traveled at an apparent velocity of about 2640 m s -1 from 27 m to 420 m slant range and about 2470 m s -1 from 505 m to 1123 m slant range according to the first arrival moveouts on the DAS data. The first arrival from the explosion temporarily saturated the cable from a slant range of 27 m – 186 m and 0.009 s to 0.084 s post detonation. From 186 m slant range to 420 m slant range, peak strain rates of 5.6 x 10 6 nm m -1 s -1 were observed for the first arrival phase. For the first arrival from 505 m slant range to 1123 m slant range, peak strain rates reduced to 8.0 x 104 nm m -1 s -1 . A comparison of the scaled accelerations computed from DAS, the geophone pairs, and the measurements of co-located accelerometer pairs show common agreement at the scaled ranges of the single point sensors. This study adds to the body of work reporting near-source DAS observations of the seismic wavefields generated by underground chemical explosions. These results indicate that near-source DAS observations can refine interpretations of phase identification from single-point sensor observations. Phase identification could be one mechanism that contributes scatter to single point seismic measurements which would confound the performance of empirical relationships for small explosions. Removing that mechanism may therefore reduce interstation variability and increase empirical relationship performance for small explosions.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2025

Measurement of AmLi Sources for Active Well Coincidence Counter

To support the use of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) large-volume active well coincidence counter (LV-AWCC) in material control and accountancy (MC&A) measurements, a set of AmLi neutron sources was acquired from Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL). These sources were measured to verify their suitability for use in the ORNL LV-AWCC. The sources produce neutrons at a rate that is within 4% of the rate for one set of AmLi sources already in use and 40% higher than the rate for the other set. These measurements indicate that the SRNL sources are suitable for use in the LV-AWCC because their sensitivity and measurement precision will be similar to those of the sets already in use. However, the SRNL sources still need to be evaluated for MC&A use.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2025

FY 2025 End of Year Report: Seismic Monitoring of Underground Vibration Sources using Distributed Acoustic Sensing (DAS) and Seismometers

This end-of-year report summarizes progress on using seismic monitoring to detect, associate, and locate anomalous vibration signals that may indicate potential containment breaches. The work focused on four key tasks: 1. Developing a database of continuous waveforms and ground-truth event data from multiple sensing modalities. 2. Refining and implementing detection and association algorithms to generate a catalog of anomalous underground activities. 3. Testing and improving distributed acoustic sensing amplitude-based geolocation methods to build an event location catalog. 4. Testing and refining seismic array polarization-based geolocation methods to build an event location catalog. This report provides a brief recap of results from the FY25 midyear report (Tasks 1 and 2) and presents new findings from geolocation methods (Tasks 3 and 4).

58 GEOSCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2025

Capability Building Progression of an Insider Threat Mitigation Program at an International Nuclear Power Plant (Rev. 1)

With threats to nuclear facilities continuously evolving, the development and implementation of insider threat mitigation programs (ITMPs) are increasingly important. The Office of International Nuclear Security (INS) within the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA’s) developed Capability Building Progression of an Insider Threat Mitigation Program at an International Nuclear Power Plant to assist newcomers and existing nuclear power plant (NPP) operators in addressing insider threats and establishing effective response measures for insider activities.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2025

PROACTIVE FA4: Progress Update 2024

The Priority Research Objectives for Arms Control Technology Innovation, Verification, and Evaluation (PROACTIVE) venture’s overall goal is to address the technical challenges that will “enable the negotiation and implementation of future nuclear arms limitation/reduction treaties with verification at the level of individual warheads by advancing the state of the art in verification and monitoring capabilities.” One of the four focus areas of the venture, Focus Area 4 (FA4), is a system-of-systems effort to establish methodologies for the integration of monitoring and verification (M&V) technologies into verification systems that support treaty objectives.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2025

Driver Identification Midyear Report

First, we create a profile for each authorized driver based on their existing driving data. We then train a machine learning model on the driving data from this profile, yielding an individualized model for each driver. Finally during a drive, we pass the Controller Area Network (CAN) data to the model and authen ticate the driver’s identity in real-time. This verification or lack thereof could be used to alert supervisors of threats to their drivers or transported materials. Deviations from their normal driving behavior could indicate high-risk situations, medical events, or even insider threats.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2025

Detection and Association of Operational Events using DAS and Seismometers (FY 2025 Mid-Year Report)

This mid-year report summarizes ongoing work to identify anomalous vibration signals indicative of potential containment breaches. This work includes compiling continuous seismic datasets and testing and refining underground detection and geolocation techniques. In the first two quarters of FY25, we have completed two project work plan tasks: (1) creating a database of continuous waveforms and ground truth event data from multiple modalities and (2) refining and implementing a detection and association algorithm to create a catalog of anomalous underground activities. This report contains a summary of the seismic database including the continuous seismic data collected by a dense array of surface seismic stations above Pleasant Gap Mine, and continuous seismic data collected using subsurface distributed acoustic sensing (DAS) in the subsurface at Sanford Underground Research Facility (SURF) and the ground truth information gathered from both sites. This report also includes results from refining and applying a dynamic power spectral density detector to both continuous seismic datasets. Finally, the report provides an initial catalog of subsurface operational events from both sensing modalities.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2025

Survey Report on Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) Tracking Tools

Radioactive/nuclear (R/N) materials are integral parts of many business sectors such as medicine, industry, and research. In the United States alone, approximately 3 million packages containing R/N materials are shipped annually via highways, rail, air, and water. These materials are utilized in medical diagnostics and treatments, industrial radiography, and scientific research. The secure and efficient transportation of R/N materials is paramount to public safety and national security. Recent incidents involving the loss of R/N materials during transportation highlight significant security and safety concerns. For instance, in December 2024, a package containing four encapsulated Selenium-75 sources was reported lost in transit from the Czech Republic to Madrid, raising alarms about the security of such shipments. Similarly, a Germanium-68 pin source was reported lost in transit in New Jersey in December 2024, underscoring the risks associated with transporting radioactive materials.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗