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At least 721 records · Page 40

Overview of Observed and Measured Physical and Geophysical Effects of Historic Underground Nuclear Tests at the Nevada National Security Site

As detailed in a variety of sources (e.g., Allen et al. [1997]; Grasso [2001]), underground explosions can leave visible evidence of their occurrence in the geologic medium. The appearance and extent of the effects visible at the surface depend on a variety of factors, including scaled depth of burial (SDOB; actual depth of burial divided by the cube root of the yield of the explosion) and geologic medium characteristics. Surface effects were routinely documented for most of the underground nuclear explosions (UNEs) conducted at the former Nevada Test Site (now Nevada National Nuclear Site) and spatial data for them are available to the public (Grasso, 2001). Other effects, including collapse chimneys, glass-lined surfaces indicative of the initial explosion cavity, and shock damage to the medium, have also been characterized in various ways. These studies were done for a variety of purposes such as determining how closely UNEs could safely be positioned to conserve testing “real estate,” as input for containment design, to obtain survivability data for various types of equipment and instrumentation, and to understand device performance. Here we present examples of various mapped and measured explosion effects for the two main types of historical UNEs conducted at the NNSS, those in vertical shafts and those in horizontal tunnels. We do not include here cratering tests, which were shots conducted at shallow SDOBs for the purpose of creating a surface excavation.

explosion effects, Nevada National Security Site↗

Vectoring into Potential Blind Geothermal Systems in the Granite Springs Valley Area, Western Nevada: Application of the Play Fairway Analysis at Multiple Scales

The Great Basin region of the western USA is capable of generating much greater amounts of geothermal energy than currently produced. Most geothermal resources in this region are blind, and thus the favorable characteristics for geothermal activity must be synthesized and methodologies developed to discover new commercial-grade systems. The geothermal play fairway concept involves integration of multiple parameters indicative of geothermal activity as a means of identifying promising areas for new development. In the Nevada play fairway project, nine geologic, geochemical, and geophysical parameters were initially synthesized to produce a new geothermal potential map of 96,000 km2. Granite Springs Valley in western Nevada is a particularly promising site selected for detailed study. It contains several favorable structural settings, including terminations of major Quaternary normal faults and fault intersections. Geologic, geophysical, and geochemical techniques were employed to define the most likely sites for high permeability and select drilling targets for temperature-gradient holes. Local and intermediate permeability models were revised to reflect results of detailed analyses and generate new detailed play fairway maps of the area. The most promising site lies in the northeastern part of the basin directly east of Adobe Flat, where the horse-tailing termination of a major normal fault (as revealed by new gravity data), opaline sinter deposits, warm shallow wells, and a low-resistivity anomaly are collocated. Geothermometry suggests a blind system with temperatures as high as ~130°C in this area. Four new temperature-gradient holes document temperatures of ~80°C at ~150 m depth. Lessons learned in the detailed studies of this project include: 1) initially identified sites commonly include multiple favorable settings at a finer scale; 2) promising sites in Cenozoic basins cannot be well defined without detailed geophysical surveys; and 3) play fairway analysis is critical at multiple scales, providing a means to select regional prospects as well as vectoring into drilling targets at individual sites.

15 GEOTHERMAL ENERGY↗

Progress Report on the Nevada Play Fairway Project: Integrated Geological, Geochemical, and Geophysical Analyses of Possible New Geothermal Systems in the Great Basin Region

The Great Basin region of the western USA is capable of producing much greater amounts of geothermal energy than the current ~670 MW from ~25 power plants. Most geothermal resources in this region are blind, and thus the favorable characteristics for geothermal activity must be synthesized and methodologies need to be developed to discover new commercial-grade systems. In the Nevada play fairway project, nine geologic, geochemical, and geophysical parameters were synthesized to produce a new detailed geothermal potential map of 96,000 km2 from west-central to eastern Nevada. These parameters were grouped into subsets and individually weighted to delineate rankings for local permeability, regional permeability, and heat, which collectively defined geothermal play fairways (i.e., most likely locations for significant geothermal fluid flow). This work is aimed at reducing the risks in geothermal exploration and therefore facilitating discovery of new commercial-grade systems in blind settings, as well as in areas with surface expressions of geothermal activity. Twenty-four highly prospective areas, including both known undeveloped systems and previously undiscovered potential blind systems, were identified across the region for further analysis. Five of the most promising sites have been selected for detailed studies: Granite Springs Valley, Sou Hills, southern Gabbs Valley, Crescent Valley, and Steptoe Valley. Multiple techniques, including detailed geologic mapping, shallow temperature surveys, detailed gravity surveys, LiDAR, geochemical studies, seismic reflection analysis, and 3D modeling, are now being employed in these areas. The ultimate goal of these detailed studies is to determine the most likely areas for high permeability thermal fluids such that potential drill sites can be targeted. Potential new blind systems discovered in this project include southern Gabbs Valley and Granite Springs Valley currently undergoing detailed study, as well as step-overs in the Dun Glen area and along the west flank of the Humboldt Range.

15 GEOTHERMAL ENERGY↗

Discovery of a Blind Geothermal System in Southern Gabbs Valley, Western Nevada, through Application of the Play Fairway Analysis at Multiple Scales

The Great Basin region is capable of generating much greater amounts of geothermal energy than currently produced. Most geothermal resources in this region are blind, and thus favorable characteristics for geothermal activity must be synthesized and methodologies developed to discover new commercial-grade systems. The geothermal play fairway concept involves integration of multiple parameters indicative of geothermal activity to identify promising areas for new development. In the Nevada play fairway project, geologic, geochemical, and geophysical parameters were initially synthesized to produce a new geothermal potential map of 96,000 km2. Southern Gabbs Valley in western Nevada is a particularly promising site selected for detailed study. It contains favorable structural settings, including Quaternary fault intersections and a displacement transfer zone. Geologic, geophysical, and geochemical techniques were employed to define the most likely sites for high permeability and select targets for temperature-gradient holes. Permeability models were revised to reflect results of detailed analyses and generate new detailed play fairway maps. The most promising site lies in an area of multiple fault intersections in a broader displacement transfer zone directly north of the Petrified Springs dextral fault, as revealed by gravity, magnetic, and MT data. A 2-m temperature anomaly and warm temperature gradient wells (~120oC at ~150 m depth) confirm the presence of a geothermal system and provide initial validation of the play fairway methodology. The system is blind, with no surface hot springs, fumaroles, or paleo-geothermal deposits. Lessons learned in the detailed studies include: 1) initially identified sites commonly include multiple favorable settings at a finer scale; 2) promising sites in Cenozoic basins cannot be recognized without detailed geophysical surveys; and 3) play fairway analysis is critical at multiple scales.

15 GEOTHERMAL ENERGY↗

Machine learning for natural resource assessment: An application to the blind geothermal systems of Nevada

A study is underway to apply machine learning methods to evaluate natural resource potential. In particular, we are considering the search for blind geothermal systems in Nevada. Beginning with the data and experience from the previous Nevada play fairway analysis project, we are building models in TensorFlow/Keras and gaining experience toward predicting the geothermal resource potential as a probability map. During the first year of this project we have encountered several issues particular to using geological and geophysical data sets with these tools. Through an illustrative example we develop a promising workflow for future use as more data become available and are analyzed.

15 GEOTHERMAL ENERGY↗

A Title 40 Code of Federal Regulations Part 191 Evaluation of Buried Transuranic Waste at the Nevada Test Site

In 1986, 21 m{sup 3} of transuranic (TRU) waste was inadvertently buried in a shallow land burial trench at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site on the Nevada Test Site (NTS). The U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office is considered five options for management of the buried TRU waste. One option is to leave the waste in-place if the disposal can meet the requirements of Title 40 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 191, 'Environmental Radiation Protection Standard for Management and Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-Level, and Transuranic Radioactive Wastes'. This paper describes analyses that assess the likelihood that TRU waste in shallow land burial can meet the 40 CFR 191 standards for a geologic repository. The simulated probability of the cumulative release exceeding 1 and 10 times the 40 CFR 191.13 containment requirements is estimated to be 0.009 and less than 0.0001, respectively. The cumulative release is most sensitive to the number of groundwater withdrawal wells drilled through the disposal trench. The mean total effective dose equivalent for a member of the public is estimated to reach a maximum of 0.014 milli-Sievert (mSv) at 10,000 years, or approximately 10 percent of the 0.15 mSv 40 CFR 191.15 individual protection requirement. The dose is predominantly from inhalation of short-lived Rn-222 progeny in air produced by low-level waste disposed in the same trench. The transuranic radionuclide released in greatest amounts, Pu-239, contributes only 0.4 percent of the dose. The member of public dose is most sensitive to the U-234 inventory and the radon emanation coefficient. Reasonable assurance of compliance with the Subpart C groundwater protection standard is provided by site characterization data and hydrologic processes modeling which support a conclusion of no groundwater pathway within 10,000 years. Limited quantities of transuranic waste in a shallow land burial trench at the NTS can meet the requirements of 40 CFR 191. (authors)

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The evolution of the Nevada National Security site waste acceptance criteria - 15312

The Nevada National Security Site Waste Acceptance Criteria (DOE/NV--325) is an evolution of requirements spanning almost three decades of waste acceptance at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). The original waste acceptance criteria (WAC) document was written in 1978 (document NVO-185) and underwent multiple revisions as time passed and disposal experience was gained. This document came into being when the NNSS first started receiving significant quantities of low-level radioactive waste (LLW) from offsite U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) generators, such as the Mound and Rocky Flats Plants. The original WAC was far less prescriptive and rigorous than the current criteria since many of the current DOE order directives, Federal/State laws, and regulations did not exist. The current WAC reflects the results of numerous revisions in order to address the nuances of the varied waste streams and package configurations accepted for disposal at the NNSS. This includes waste streams that exhibit challenges not previously faced or covered by the WAC and therefore, from time to time, require new information and or changes to be made to the WAC. These wastes now represent a growing percentage of the remaining waste at cleanup sites across the DOE Complex. These waste streams present challenges, such as the technical basis for ensuring safe transportation to and disposal at the NNSS. The current WAC (Rev. 10 dated June 2013), is Available online at: http://www.nv.energy.gov/library/publications/Environmental/DOENV{sub 3}25.pdf). Other challenges for the NNSS include incorporating new and emerging technologies and addressing stakeholder concerns. Addressing these challenges sometimes results in changes to the NNSS WAC. Drivers for revising the NNSS WAC over the years have included operating experience improvements, the need to specify waste origin/ownership, and identifying preferred transportation routing. This paper will discuss various aspects of the NNSS WAC, and how it has evolved based upon DOE orders and requirements, acceptance of offsite mixed wastes, acceptance of non-radioactive classified wastes, stakeholder concerns and agreements, and the changing face of the remaining legacy waste at DOE sites across the United States. (authors)

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Macro-encapsulation as Manufactured Components for Disposal at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) - 16213

Macro-encapsulation as Manufactured is a relatively new terminology that supports the disposal of classified legacy weapon components at the Area 5 Disposal Cell at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). These components are composed of hundreds and sometimes thousands of parts. Examples of this type of item include firing sets, trainers, radar assemblies, neutron generators and other similar components. Sometimes there are hazardous Resource Conservation and Recovery Act-regulated (RCRA) metals involved in the parts that make up the components. The typical regulated metals in the components can be lead and silver from circuit boards and wiring, cadmium or chromium from plating operations of the parts. To perform the Toxicity Characteristic Leaching Procedure (TCLP) components have to be completely disassembled and sanitized prior to being sent to laboratories for analysis. The results vary but the majority of times there are regulated metals present in these samples. The levels are relatively low and since analysis has been performed then a disposal process needs to be followed. A process needed to be developed and approved by governing boards to allow disposal of these items as long as this material meets the Waste Acceptance Criteria (WAC) (No liquids, compressed gases, explosives, SNM, etc.) before being sent to the Nevada desert for disposal. (authors)

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Execution of an Alternative Modeling Strategy for Closure of the Rainier Mesa Corrective Action Unit at the Nevada National Security Site - 19099

The Underground Test Area (UGTA) Project of the U.S Department of Energy (DOE) is investigating radionuclide contaminant movements in groundwater derived from a decades-long period of underground nuclear testing at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) to support regulatory corrective action and closure requirements. The project is built around an integrated campaign of drilling and sampling, data interpretation, computer modeling, and broader monitoring activities conducted under a joint Federal Facilities Agreement and Consent Order (1996 as amended) (FFACO) between the State of Nevada, the DOE, and the U.S. Department of Defense. The FFACO strategy is applied to individual Corrective Action Units (CAUs) that roughly envelop disparate geographic testing areas at the NNSS. The Rainier Mesa/Shoshone Mountain (RMSM) CAU is a geologically and hydrologically complex system lying in a remote up-gradient section of the NNSS. It was the site of 67 underground tests conducted between 1957 and 1992, 61 at Rainier Mesa proper, and 6 at Shoshone Mountain, isolated to its south. The original strategy to close the RMSM CAU required a simulation-based investigation to define the evolution of contaminated volumes of groundwater (in 3D) under uncertainty as a means to define a surface-projected contaminant boundary and to serve as a basis for longer term monitoring activities. Early models developed under this strategy proved to be quite complex and difficult to calibrate. Additional costs required to better characterize the system were judged to be out of balance with the low risks associated with this particular CAU. As a result, an Alternative Modeling Strategy (AMS) was adopted. The AMS removes the requirement for developing ensembles of 3D simulations and replaces it with a simpler one requiring the generation of multiple 1D streamline models. These are meant to encompass a range of alternative, yet plausible release and transport scenarios as a means to bound the overall lateral extent of contaminant transport. This paper will review the modeling approach developed under the AMS and its application to the Rainier Mesa portion of the CAU. Preliminary model results made under different parametric assumptions and boundary condition scenarios will be presented. Additional refinements of the model and its further application will be discussed. (authors)

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Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report 2024 with Attachment A Site Description and Summary Report

This Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report (NNSSER) summarizes actions taken in 2024 to protect the environment and the public while achieving the NNSA/NFO mission goals. It is prepared for the public and our stakeholders in hopes that it is readily understandable and usable. It is a key component in our efforts to keep the public informed of environmental conditions at the NNSS and its support facilities in Las Vegas, Nevada.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report 2024 - Summary Report

This Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report (NNSSER) summarizes actions taken in 2024 to protect the environment and the public while achieving the NNSA/NFO mission goals. It is prepared for the public and our stakeholders in hopes that it is readily understandable and usable. It is a key component in our efforts to keep the public informed of environmental conditions at the NNSS and its support facilities in Las Vegas, Nevada. This supplemental Summary report provides an abbreviated version of the full report.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

A Title 40 Code of Federal Regulations Part 191 Evaluation of Buried Transuranic Waste at the Nevada Test Site

In 1986, 21 m{sup 3} of transuranic (TRU) waste was inadvertently buried in a shallow land burial trench at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site on the Nevada Test Site (NTS). The U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office is considered five options for management of the buried TRU waste. One option is to leave the waste in-place if the disposal can meet the requirements of Title 40 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 191, 'Environmental Radiation Protection Standard for Management and Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-Level, and Transuranic Radioactive Wastes'. This paper describes analyses that assess the likelihood that TRU waste in shallow land burial can meet the 40 CFR 191 standards for a geologic repository. The simulated probability of the cumulative release exceeding 1 and 10 times the 40 CFR 191.13 containment requirements is estimated to be 0.009 and less than 0.0001, respectively. The cumulative release is most sensitive to the number of groundwater withdrawal wells drilled through the disposal trench. The mean total effective dose equivalent for a member of the public is estimated to reach a maximum of 0.014 milliSievert (mSv) at 10,000 years, or approximately 10 percent of the 0.15 mSv 40 CFR 191.15 individual protection requirement. The dose is predominantly from inhalation of short-lived Rn-222 progeny in air produced by low-level waste disposed in the same trench. The transuranic radionuclide released in greatest amounts, Pu-239, contributes only 0.4 percent of the dose. The member of public dose is most sensitive to the U-234 inventory and the radon emanation coefficient. Reasonable assurance of compliance with the Subpart C groundwater protection standard is provided by site characterization data and hydrologic processes modeling which support a conclusion of no groundwater pathway within 10,000 years. Limited quantities of transuranic waste in a shallow land burial trench at the NTS can meet the requirements of 40 CFR 191.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Closure Strategy for a Waste Disposal Facility with Multiple Waste Types and Regulatory Drivers at the Nevada Test Site

The U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO) plans to close the waste and classified material storage cells in the southeast quadrant of the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS), informally known as the '92-Acre Area', by 2011. The 25 shallow trenches and pits and the 13 Greater Confinement Disposal (GCD) borings contain various waste streams including low-level waste (LLW), low-level mixed waste (LLMW), transuranic (TRU), mixed transuranic (MTRU), and high specific activity LLW. The cells are managed under several regulatory and permit programs by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP). Although the specific closure requirements for each cell vary, 37 closely spaced cells will be closed under a single integrated monolayer evapotranspirative (ET) final cover. One cell will be closed under a separate cover concurrently. The site setting and climate constrain transport pathways and are factors in the technical approach to closure and performance assessment. Successful implementation of the integrated closure plan requires excellent communication and coordination between NNSA/NSO and the regulators.

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ABSTRACT: CONTAMINANT TRAVEL TIMES FROM THE NEVADA TEST SITE TO YUCCA MOUNTAIN: SENSITIVITY TO POROSITY

Yucca Mountain (YM), Nevada, has been proposed by the U.S. Department of Energy as a geologic repository for spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste. In this study, we investigate the potential for groundwater advective pathways from underground nuclear testing areas on the Nevada Test Site (NTS) to the YM area by estimating the timeframe for advective travel and its uncertainty resulting from porosity value uncertainty for hydrogeologic units (HGUs) in the region. We perform sensitivity analysis to determine the most influential HGUs on advective radionuclide travel times from the NTS to the YM area. Groundwater pathways and advective travel times are obtained using the particle tracking package MODPATH and flow results from the Death Valley Regional Flow System (DVRFS) model by the U.S. Geological Survey. Values and uncertainties of HGU porosities are quantified through evaluation of existing site porosity data and expert professional judgment and are incorporated through Monte Carlo simulations to estimate mean travel times and uncertainties. We base our simulations on two steady state flow scenarios for the purpose of long term prediction and monitoring. The first represents pre-pumping conditions prior to groundwater development in the area in 1912 (the initial stress period of the DVRFS model). The second simulates 1998 pumping (assuming steady state conditions resulting from pumping in the last stress period of the DVRFS model). Considering underground tests in a clustered region around Pahute Mesa on the NTS as initial particle positions, we track these particles forward using MODPATH to identify hydraulically downgradient groundwater discharge zones and to determine which flowpaths will intercept the YM area. Out of the 71 tests in the saturated zone, flowpaths of 23 intercept the YM area under the pre-pumping scenario. For the 1998 pumping scenario, flowpaths from 55 of the 71 tests intercept the YM area. The results illustrate that mean minimum travel time from underground testing areas on the NTS to the YM area can vary from just over 700 to nearly 700,000 years, depending on the locations of the underground tests, the pumping scenarios considered, and the porosity value distributions used. The sensitivity analysis further illustrates that for both pre-pumping and 1998 pumping scenarios, the uncertainties in porosity values for five of the 27 HGUs considered account for well over 90% of the porosity-related travel time uncertainties for the flow paths having the shortest mean travel times to the YM area.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Transuranic (TRU) Waste Repackaging at the Nevada Test Site

This paper describes the activities required to modify a facility and the process of characterizing, repackaging, and preparing for shipment the Nevada Test Site’s (NTS) legacy transuranic (TRU) waste in 58 oversize boxes (OSB). The waste, generated at other U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) sites and shipped to the NTS between 1974 and 1990, requires size-reduction for off-site shipment and disposal. The waste processing approach was tailored to reduce the volume of TRU waste by employing decontamination and non-destructive assay. As a result, the low-level waste (LLW) generated by this process was packaged, with minimal size reduction, in large sea-land containers for disposal at the NTS Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Complex (RWMC). The remaining TRU waste was repackaged and sent to the Idaho National Laboratory Consolidation Site for additional characterization in preparation for disposal at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), near Carlsbad, New Mexico. The DOE National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office and the NTS Management and Operating (M&O) contractor, NSTec, successfully partnered to modify and upgrade an existing facility, the Visual Examination and Repackaging Building (VERB). The VERB modifications, including a new ventilation system and modified containment structure, required an approved Preliminary Documented Safety Analysis prior to project procurement and construction. Upgrade of the VERB from a radiological facility to a Hazard Category 3 Nuclear Facility required new rigor in the design and construction areas and was executed on an aggressive schedule. The facility Documented Safety Analysis required that OSBs be vented prior to introduction into the VERB. Box venting was safely completed after developing and implementing two types of custom venting systems for the heavy gauge box construction. A remotely operated punching process was used on boxes with wall thickness of up to 3.05 mm (0.120 in) to insert aluminum bronze filters and sample ports to prevent sparking during penetration. A remotely operated cold-drilling process with self-drilling, self-tapping titanium coated spark-resistant filters was used for boxes with wall thickness of up to 6.35 mm (0.25 in). The box headspace was sampled for the presence of flammable gases. To further accelerate the project schedule, an innovative treatment process was used. Several of the OSBs were re-assayed and determined to be mixed low-level waste (MLLW) which allowed treatment, followed by disposal in the Mixed Waste Disposal Unit at the NTS Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Complex (RWMC). The MLLW boxes were certified using real-time radiography and overpacked into custom-built polyethylene-lined macroencapsulation containers. The polyethylene-lined lid was welded to the poly-lined box using automatically controlled resistance heating through embedded wiring in the lid. The work was performed under the existing Documented Safety Analysis since plastic welding is accomplished at low temperature and does not introduce the risks of other macroencapsulation processes, such as welding stainless steel containers. The macroencapsulation process for MLLW not only accelerated the schedule by reducing the number of boxes requiring size reduction, but it also resulted in significantly improved safety with as low as reasonable achievable levels of exposure to workers plus reduced cost by eliminating the need to perform repackaging in the VERB.

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Overview of Nevada Test Site Radioactive and Mixed Waste Disposal Operations

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office Environmental Management Program is responsible for carrying out the disposal of on-site and off-site generated low-level radioactive waste (LLW) and low-level radioactive mixed waste (MW) at the Nevada Test Site (NTS). Core elements of this mission are ensuring safe and cost-effective disposal while protecting workers, the public, and the environment. This paper focuses on the impacts of new policies, processes, and opportunities at the NTS related to LLW and MW. Covered topics include: the first year of direct funding for NTS waste disposal operations; zero tolerance policy for non-compliant packages; the suspension of mixed waste disposal; waste acceptance changes; DOE Consolidated Audit Program (DOECAP) auditing; the 92-Acre Area closure plan; new eligibility requirements for generators; and operational successes with unusual waste streams.

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The Underground Test Area Project of the Nevada Test Site: Building Confidence in Groundwater Flow and Transport Models at Pahute Mesa Through Focused Characterization Studies

Pahute Mesa at the Nevada Test Site contains about 8.0E+07 curies of radioactivity caused by underground nuclear testing. The Underground Test Area Subproject has entered Phase II of data acquisition, analysis, and modeling to determine the risk to receptors from radioactivity in the groundwater, establish a groundwater monitoring network, and provide regulatory closure. Evaluation of radionuclide contamination at Pahute Mesa is particularly difficult due to the complex stratigraphy and structure caused by multiple calderas in the Southwestern Nevada Volcanic Field and overprinting of Basin and Range faulting. Included in overall Phase II goals is the need to reduce the uncertainty and improve confidence in modeling results. New characterization efforts are underway, and results from the first year of a three-year well drilling plan are presented.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗

Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order Nevada National Security Site Use Restriction Management Plan

This Use Restriction Management Plan (URMP) provides the information needed to create, modify, and manage use restrictions (URs) for sites on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), and sites accessed through the NNSS main gate, that were closed using the corrective action alternative (CAA) of closure in place under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) (1996, as amended).

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗