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DOE OSTI2024

Cyber100 Compass: Quantification of Cybersecurity Risks for Systems Transitioning to High Levels of Renewables (Final Report)

The shift to high levels of renewable deployment will entail a significant re-engineering of the grid. As investors, utilities, customers, and others prepare for clean energy transitions, there is need to understand how restructuring the grid to accommodate renewables will change the attack surface of the grid and accompanying cyber risk. However, today the cyber-physical risks associated with electric grids incorporating high levels of renewable deployment remain largely unknown. The Cyber100 Compass proof-of-concept application attempts to quantify future cyber-physical security risks by combining risk data gathered from subject matter experts (SMEs) with input from system planners about conditions they expect to be true about their electric systems in the future. Users provide data about their organization’s tolerance for risk; the value they place on avoiding the consequences of different cyber events; and conditions that they expect to be true on their systems at some point in the future. The SMEs provide baseline probabilities for different cyber events; the probability that an event will be low-, moderate-, or high-impact; and the amount by which user-identified conditions on their systems will change the likelihood of the cyber events. The application takes both the user and SME input and performs a series of Monte Carlo simulations to arrive at a quantification of risk.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2021

Cybersecurity Certification Recommendations for Interconnected Grid Edge Devices and Inverter Based Resources

Escalating deployment of PV and grid-edge devices on the distribution grid has increased the sustainability and efficiency of the electric grid. However, the increasing number of distributed energy resources (DERs) deployed creates a heightened cyber-physical interdependency on the distribution grid and thus creates more vectors for cyber-attacks to exploit through information and communication technology (ICT) systems and networks. For example, control signal packets can be modified, intercepted, or corrupted due to vulnerabilities in communication protocols used by microgrid controllers and grid edge devices for power control. Therefore, to mitigate and prevent cyber-attacks on grid edge devices and the inverter-based resources connected to the distribution grid, the U.S. Department of Solar Energy Technologies Office (SETO) awarded funding to the National Renewable Energy Laboratory and Sandia National Laboratory (SNL) to research, develop, and harmonize cybersecurity standards for Photovoltaic (PV) systems and for other kinds of DERs. To help develop a standard for DER cybersecurity, NREL established certification recommendations and test cases, in consensus with the solar industry and UL, for ensuring intrinsic design security for DERs. These recommendations were developed to bolster the cybersecure functionalities such as TLS, MAC, CRL, session resumption/renegotiation, and password, system, and service security management within the DER devices. The proposed test cases verify authentication, authorization, confidentiality, and data integrity for data and communications of DERs that use Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP). They were also developed to protect DER communications from eavesdropping, replay, man-in-the-middle, denial of service (DoS), spoofing through security certificates, least-privilege violation, and brute-force credentials. This report, which has been validated and reviewed by UL, expands upon those test cases to provide DER cybersecurity certification recommendations which increase DER resiliency and help to mitigate cyber-attacks. UL's collaboration with NREL and approval of this document will accelerate the adoption of a UL standard for DER cybersecurity.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2023

Designing an Intrusion Detection for an Adjustable Speed Drive System Controlling a Critical Process

In this article, we address the cyber-security problem of industrial control systems (ICSs) when their sensor measurements may be compromised due to an attacker who has intercepted those measurements via a network. We introduce a general-purpose method “Dynamic Watermarking (DW)” to detect potential cyber-intrusions on speed sensor measurements within industrial control systems, which deploy an adjustable speed drive (ASD) to control a critical process. The DW method is injecting a random private low-amplitude signal with a zero mean Gaussian distribution, “watermark”, into one of the input phase voltages powering the ASD system. The watermark signal propagates through the system including pulse width modulation (PWM) power conversion stage and motor, then ultimately appears in the speed sensor measurements. By deploying two statistical DW tests with two proper thresholds, the system can detect potential cyber-intrusions or unobservable cyber-attacks such as replay attacks and false data injection attacks (FDIA). The DW method tested on a laboratory-scale ASD system experimentally to protect the system against cyber-intrusions. This system, powered by a commercial PWM drive operating at 208 V, 3-phase, and 3.7 kW, served as our experimental platform.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2020

Vulnerability Assessments for Power-Electronics-Based Smart Grids

Here, in this paper, a novel method is proposed to evaluate the cyber security of the power-electronics-based smart grids (PESG). The proposed method considers the performance and stability of both the individual inverter and the grid. To our knowledge, this is a first attempt to evaluate the performance and stability of PESG due to cyber attacks. We first develop impedance-based modeling and cyber-attack modeling for PESG. Then we propose innovative two security criteria to evaluate the security of PESG, including stability-based and metrics-based. For metrics-based criteria, we propose to use both total harmonic distortion (THD) and space phasor model (SPM) to evaluate the inverter performance. The simulation results with a two-inverter-based power grid verify the validity and accuracy of the proposed security evaluation method. Results have shown that the performance and stability of PESG are significantly affected by cyber attacks, and thus there is indeed a need to further study cyber security issues of PESG.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2022

WISP: Watching grid Infrastructure Stealthily through Proxies (Final Technical Report)

The complex interdependencies of cyber systems (sensors and communications), physical grids and associated electricity market operations make protecting electric power grids a significant challenge. The energy sector is constantly under new, targeted, advanced and dangerous cyber-attacks that have the potential to result in the loss of human life. These threats are further exacerbated by our need to modernize the grid. One focus of cyber security research in smart grids is the securing of the SCADA system through advanced intrusion detection systems (IDS) and bad data detection algorithms in state estimation. These methods either require full knowledge of the system topology and parameters or fail to understand the physical behaviors under attack. WISP (Watching grid Infrastructure Stealthily through Proxies) is designed to provide additional protection to the power grid using only publicly available data. In particular, WISP exploits the spatio-temporal nature of the real time locational marginal prices (LMPs), in conjunction with other information such as bids, weather, outages and load data to analyze anomalous power pricing behaviors and then correlate those observations to localize regions of interest and identify potential cyber events. WISP is non-intrusive as the tool is deployed as a service in the Cloud or on premise and provides reliable information to system operators for enhanced situational awareness, without impeding energy delivery functions. The WISP technology comprises three modules: the data-driven anomaly detection core, the vulnerability and risk analysis and the root cause analysis. The data-driven anomaly detection core performs the tasks of feature selection, anomaly detection and attack region localization. The vulnerability and risk analysis module provides system level information of the vulnerable variables and times, assisting the operators in selecting monitoring and protection nodes. The root cause analysis module takes the detection results and identifies potential operational conditions that contribute to the detected anomalies. In Phase I, we have demonstrated the feasibility and effectiveness of WISP. We developed a realistic electricity market simulator capable of generating normal and attack market data under various operational conditions. We developed a series of cyber-attack detection and analysis algorithms and evaluated them under multiple data sources. Finally, we integrated all modules into an end-to-end software, providing functions for data management, data analytics and visualization. Specifically, we have achieved: (i) real-time data acceptance from external utility interfaces with >99% acceptance rate; (ii) high performance anomaly detection algorithms with >98% detection accuracy and <0.1% false alarm rate; and (iii) ultra-low computing delay <50 milliseconds. Additionally, our team developed algorithms to identify the vulnerable variables in electricity market operations and root cause analysis functions to identify major contributors to the price spikes. These ancillary modules are necessary when deploying WISP in real world industry environment. In Phase II, we have demonstrated the effectiveness of WISP software on realistic largescale power systems. We performed red team testing for the Phase I WISP software and identified software vulnerabilities and implemented corresponding mitigation solutions. We adapted the electricity market simulator for the Texas synthetic 2000-bus system and generated datasets for the false data injection attacks. We created database and visualization interfaces for the Texas system and the ISO New England system. We performed software optimization in terms of operation efficiency, computing speed and detection accuracy. Finally, we tested the software on the Texas system and the ISO New England system and evaluated the detection performance. Overall, we achieved above 89% detection rate, below 3% false alarm rate and below 37 seconds of end-to-end detection delay.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2020

IMPLEMENTING CYBERSECURITY INTO AN EXISTING NATIONAL NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION PROGRAMME – A CASE STUDY

Cyber threat profiling and risk mitigation is critical to any nuclear state organization and should be considered as part of any comprehensive nuclear security programme. Defining and evaluating the impact of the cyber threat to mission can be challenging. An existing national nuclear non-proliferation organization undertook an effort to incorporate computer security activities into its programme to address cyber risk. One of the primary goals of this endeavour was to develop a set of prioritised recommendations for organizational follow-through. The organization dedicated subject matter expert resources in the form of a cyber task force to support this goal. Opportunities were identified where computer security could be built into each programme including office-level strategies and tools. Of course, no new identified threat vector is easily considered and incorporated into existing programmes without impact. There are many obstacles to be overcome. Technically literate subject matter experts are difficult to find, management has comparatively less experience applying computer security into its programmes, and trying to change the culture to consider computer security risk at policy and programmatic levels takes time and management attention. As an outcome of this process, a roadmap for program integration was developed, including the establishment of a cyber support team. This paper will discuss the challenges and successes associated with establishing such a team.

Cyber Security, Nuclear, Non-proliferation↗
DOE OSTI2024

Addressing Consequence within Operational Risk (O.T. Gagnon III) 9-18-2024

Addressing Consequence within Operational Risk: Why threats and security are just not that important! When dealing with cyber or physical risk within any critical infrastructure (CI) environment, don’t concern yourself with vulnerabilities and threats, at least not at first! Also, don’t be overly fixated on “securing the systems” within the organization. The endeavor of tackling operational risk focused on consequences in any critical infrastructure environment to include the complex Aviation ecosystem is challenging even for the most resourced entity but can be advanced though a simplified approach: identifying, binning, and prioritizing the infrastructure environment. While no two entities within a single element of the 16 critical infrastructure sectors are exactly alike when it comes to risk, there is a basic process to move toward a greater understanding of operational risk through becoming more informed about the infrastructure environment in which the entity exists. The process starts with bringing internal and external stakeholders and subject matter experts together to analyze key areas such as Information Technology (IT) and Operational Technology (OT) components and points of convergence, analyzing internal and external cyber and physical dependencies, accounting for explosive growth in devices and wireless technology, and leveraging the contributions of people inside and outside the operational environment. Attaining a common understanding of the infrastructure environment as part of addressing consequences within operational risk is not easy to do or resource light, but the process outlined provides the framework to further any entity’s efforts in this space. When it comes to cyber risks, before an organization can consider vulnerabilities within and threats to its operations, it must first have a solid understanding of the consequences existing inside its infrastructure environment. Idaho National Lab’s Consequence-Driven, Cyber-Informed Engineering is offered as an example of this approach to effective and efficient cyber risk mitigation.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Cybersecurity Education, Training, and WFD

Availability of skilled workforce in sufficient number is one of the most often cited barriers to improving cybersecurity. INL's research has determined that this is not a cybersecurity problem but rather a strategic business imperative; in response INL created the Cyber Competency Health and Maturity Progression Model (Cyber-CHAMP) to help organizations learn the realities of their cyber workforce and their development needs. The presentation starts with an overview of Cyber-CHAMP as a unifying theme for workforce development and then provides brief introductions to selected DHS (ICS cybersecurity hands-on training), DOE (CyberStrike, OT Defender Fellowship, Liberty Eclipse), and INL (Cybercore Summer Camp, University Collaboration Laboratory) programs. Cyber-Informed Engineering discussion concludes the presentation, with an update on activities conducted by the CIE Education Working Group to further the second pillar of the National CIE Strategy, Education.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2024

Cybersecurity Assessment in DER-rich Distribution Operations: Criticality Levels and Impact Analysis

The integration of distributed energy resources (DERs) in distribution networks has become a pivotal strategy for achieving decarbonization, enhancing grid resilience, and optimizing grid efficiency. Remote monitoring and control op- erations of such resources rely on a network of sensors and communication infrastructure, exposing the system to potential cyber threats. Therefore, as the deployment of DERs increases, ensuring secure monitoring and control becomes an imperative challenge. This paper utilizes real-time feeder models, which are instrumental in developing cybersecurity testbeds tailored for hardware-in-loop (HIL) systems. These models enable users to simulate cyber attacks in a real-world environment and analyze the power distribution operations during vulnerabilities. Furthermore, we discuss several practical sets of grid parameters to identify critical levels of DERs and evaluate various scenarios that simulate cyber threats on sensitive DERs. The modified IEEE 123-bus model is used as the test case for demonstrating the proposed scenarios. The findings from this study provide valuable insights into the vulnerabilities and potential consequences of cyber attacks on DERs, allowing for better mitigation strategies and improved cyber resilience in future distribution networks.

Maharjan, Manisha↗
DOE OSTI2020

Steady-State Analysis of Microgrid Distributed Control Under Denial of Service Attacks

Distributed control is an effective method to coordinate multiple components in a microgrid. It usually has mandatory requirements for communication graph topology; changing the topology unexpectedly could disrupt the operation of a distributed controller. A denial of service (DoS) attack blocks communication channels to cause variations in communication graph. Unforeseen topology changes render a controller to receive incomplete system information. Control decisions made based on incorrect information can lead to significantly reduced grid supporting capability. As a result, the vital power balance between generation and load may be challenged. Determining power balance requires steady-state power flow analysis; however, the cyber-induced steady-state analysis is not well studied in the literature. Here, in this article, we show that a cyber–physical microgrid with unknown DoS attacks has augmented uncertain power flow equations, whose special structure creates new computational issue to determining power balance. To deal with the issue, we develop a novel cyber-induced microgrid model: the cyber–physical system is transformed into a pure physical model, where the disruption effects of DoS in the cyber layer are shown to be equivalent to the variations of the physical model parameters. With the transformed system, we develop a sufficient condition to ascertain the system power balance under unknown DoS attacks. In addition, practical insights for resilient distributed control design are shown as well.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2022

Anomaly Detection and Mitigation in FACTS-based Wide-Area Voltage Control Systems using Machine Learning

With the increasing deployment of Flexible AC Transmission System (FACTS) devices in wide-area voltage control systems (WAVCS) for achieving improved voltage stability of bulk power systems, the possibility for cyber attacks on these systems is also increasing. Successful stealthy cyber attacks that are difficult to detect by traditional informational technology (IT)-based cybersecurity solutions or threshold-based bad data detectors can lead to a voltage collapse in power grid. This paper presents the testbed-based attacks implementation and real-time evaluation of machine learning (ML) algorithm for detecting and mitigating stealthy cyber attacks on FACTS-based WAVCS on a hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) testbed. Initially, we discuss the implementation of a fuzzy logic controller (FLC) that controls a Static VAR Compensator (SVC) device deployed in a two-area four-machine Kundur power system for improving transient voltage stability. Later, the ML-based Anomaly Detection and Mitigation (ADM) system is implemented on the cyber-physical HIL testbed to detect and mitigate various stealthy cyber attacks, which are injected in real-time over the wide-area network (WAN). The experimental results show accurate and effective performance of ADM system in detecting and mitigating anomalies while keeping the grid stable and within the system operating limits, as defined by the North America Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC).

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2020

National-Tribal Critical Infrastructure Protection: Collaboration for Extraordinary National Security Benefit

This paper examines national and tribal collaborative opportunities to get ahead of the critical infrastructure insecurity problem. Recommendations are viewed through the lens of the Sandia Labs Tribal Cyber-Energy initiative and national security projects. Recommendations include 1) Collaboratively address national priority and shared challenges to gain faster and better solutions to national priority problems on a smaller yet comprehensive American Indian and Alaskan Native sovereign single-point of authority scale 2) Utilize newer standards-based technologies to provide scalable, capable, and manageable solutions for greatly expanded and connected national critical infrastructures 3) Employ Cyber-Physical-Resilient design preliminary analysis to define concept- to-disposition design requirements for preemptive critical infrastructure risk mitigation and baked-in security; 4) Develop data-centric protection to provide increased information asset protection as data shifts from data-owner operated on-premises infrastructure to virtual service provider data-steward owned and operated off-premises infrastructure; and 5) Balance shared solutions with the National Institute of Science and Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity and Risk Management frameworks, and the System Security Engineering Guidelines. As yet unallocated federal funding would support research, development, the timely application of National-Tribal critical infrastructure protection, and critical infrastructure Cyber disruption response and recovery with extraordinary mutual benefits for the foreseeable future. The Critical Infrastructure Insecurity Problem: Rapid modernization and expansive connectivity are due to advances in Information and Communications Technologies that have sweeping cyber impact across all critical infrastructure sectors. Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition and Industrial Control Systems are particularly impacted as systems long separated from the Internet are now being connected and computerized. Virtualization and mobility create a Data Everywhere-User Anywhere paradigm that has evaporated the enterprise network perimeter. There are multi-front technological challenges at play, where long depended on technologies simply don't scale to current needs resulting in a digital dichotomy of competing old and new standards. New standards-based technologies scale but are not as well-known or as widely deployed, which leaves decision makers, stakeholders, and the workforce in a quandary, caught mid-stream between the technological past and the virtual future. Rapid and expansive cyber threat accompanies disruptive change in connectivity and computational dependencies. A lack of action will exacerbate the problem if new technologies roll out without baked-in security design. The Risk: If National-Tribal CIP collaboration to design in security is not done, then an ongoing state of insufficient bolt-on security and elevated threat exposure will remain for years to come.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗
DOE OSTI2021

Understanding How Organizations Handle Cybersecurity

If there is anything we can learn from the media, it is the frequency and severity of cyber-attacks is increasing and there are not enough qualified people to combat the risk organizations are facing. Current estimates say there are 3.5 million available cybersecurity related jobs globally and there has been a 350% growth in cybersecurity jobs since 2013 (Group, 2020). The Idaho Cyber Research Project (ICRP) is focused on finding an implementing solution to the problems in the workforce development pipeline. Our team consists of Cohort 2 of the ICRP, we are tasked with solving issues faced by organizations hiring new cyber personnel. To provide solutions to these issues we focused our research on four components of workforce availability and competency: resume and transcript analysis, apprenticeships, cyber incident response plan development, and adversarial mindset training. From this research we have produced the following focus areas and subsequent steps for each component of workforce capability: transcript and knowledge skills abilities (KSA) focused analysis, cybersecurity apprenticeships programs, the value of an adversarial mindset, and a guide to setting up cyber incident response plans for underprepared organizations. These solutions can be further developed and implemented to reduce the gap in workforce demand and talent.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2021

Advance Reactor Operational Technology Architecture Categorization

Seven generation III+ and generation IV nuclear reactor types, based on twelve reactor concepts surveyed, are examined using functional decomposition to extract relevant operational technology (OT) architecture information. This information is compared to existing nuclear power plants (NPPs) OT architectures to highlight novel and emergent cyber risks associated with next generation NPPs. These insights can help inform operational technology architecture requirements that will be unique to a given reactor type. Next generation NPPs have streamlined OT architectures relative to the current generation II commercial NPP fleet. Overall, without compensatory measures that provide sufficient and efficient cybersecurity controls, next generation NPPs will have increased cyber risk. Verification and validation of cyber-physical testbeds and cyber risk assessment methodologies may be an important next step to reduce cyber risk in the OT architecture design and testing phase. Coordination with safety requirements can result in OT architecture design being an iterative process.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Device Cybersecurity Characterization Process and Profile

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) recognizes that threats in the cyberspace domain continue to grow, which requires CWMD devices and supporting systems to be both cybersecure (ability to protect or defend from cyber-attacks) and resilient (ability to maintain required capability in the face of adversity) to cyber threats. The CWMD cybersecurity characterization approach in this document supports existing cyber resilience activities within the Acquisition Lifecycle Framework. Similarly, this process supports existing Department of Homeland Security Cyber Resilience Test and Evaluation activities, which consist of iterative processes, starting at the initiation of system acquisition and continuing throughout the entire device and system life cycle. Cyber resilience is the ability of an information system to continue to operate while under attack, even if in a degraded or debilitated state, and to rapidly recover operational capabilities for essential functions after a successful attack. The goal of the security characterization task for CWMD is to support the development of a CBRN device-dependent profile that aligns with device network capabilities and maps to recommended security controls to create a characterization security profile impact levels. The impact levels for CWMD devices should be characterized as Low (L), Moderate (M), High (H) to align with the low, moderate, high control baselines. To estimate the impact levels, the device’s security-related attributes are translated into the security objectives: Confidentiality (C), Integrity (I), and Availability (A), known as the CIA triad. The potential impact for each device can be L, M, H, for devices that connect and transmit different types of data and may have different impact levels. National Institute of Standards and Technology Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 199 states, “the potential impact values assigned to the respective security objectives shall be the highest value from among those security categories that have been determined for each type of information resident on the information system.” As CWMD is determining the cybersecurity impact levels of CBRN devices based on network connections and data transfers, the impact levels are aligned with the associated attributes of network connections and communications. For example, if the device system is connected to a wireless network and transmits different data types based on the confidentiality of the data, the highest impact value for each security objective should represent the device’s CIA impact level. This document is intended to be used by test managers, test team, and program managers.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2024

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Device Cybersecurity Characterization Process and Profile

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) recognizes that threats in the cyberspace domain continue to grow, which requires CWMD devices and supporting systems to be both cybersecure (ability to protect or defend from cyber-attacks) and resilient (ability to maintain required capability in the face of adversity) to cyber threats. The CWMD cybersecurity characterization approach in this document supports existing cyber resilience activities within the Acquisition Lifecycle Framework. Similarly, this process supports existing Department of Homeland Security Cyber Resilience Test and Evaluation activities, which consist of iterative processes, starting at the initiation of system acquisition and continuing throughout the entire device and system life cycle. Cyber resilience is the ability of an information system to continue to operate while under attack, even if in a degraded or debilitated state,1 and to rapidly recover operational capabilities for essential functions after a successful attack.2 The goal of the security characterization task for CWMD is to support the development of a CBRN device-dependent profile that aligns with device network capabilities and maps to recommended security controls to create a characterization security profile impact levels. The impact levels for CWMD devices should be characterized as Low (L), Moderate (M), High (H) to align with the low, moderate, high control baselines. To estimate the impact levels, the device’s security-related attributes are translated into the security objectives: Confidentiality (C), Integrity (I), and Availability (A), known as the CIA triad. The potential impact for each device can be L, M, H, for devices that connect and transmit different types of data and may have different impact levels. National Institute of Standards and Technology Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 199 states, “the potential impact values assigned to the respective security objectives shall be the highest value from among those security categories that have been determined for each type of information resident on the information system.”3 As CWMD is determining the cybersecurity impact levels of CBRN devices based on network connections and data transfers, the impact levels are aligned with the associated attributes of network connections and communications. For example, if the device system is connected to a wireless network and transmits different data types based on the confidentiality of the data, the highest impact value for each security objective should represent the device’s CIA impact level. This document is intended to be used by test managers, test team, and program managers.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2025

DRE: Designing for Resilience through Emulation

Threats to cyber- and cyber-physical systems have continued to increase over the past decade. Now more than ever, it is vital that cyber-physical system stakeholders have the tools to deeply understand their systems and the threats they face. High-fidelity modeling capabilities are powerful tools to support system understanding and decision-making, but they currently lack scientifically rigorous experimentation practices and infrastructures. The purpose of the project Designing for Resilience through Emulation (DRE) was to bring together past research and existing tools into a new pipeline to improve our ability to quantitatively evaluate future cyber scenarios. DRE offers new integrated capabilities for large dataset collection, noise studies, sensitivity analysis, uncertainty quantification, and surrogate modeling using a cyber-physical system emulation environment. These new capabilities significantly improve our ability to establish the credibility of the answers derived from emulation environments, ultimately leading to better critical decision support.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2026

Resilience Through Data-Driven, Intelligent Designed Control: A Formal Methods Approach

The PNNL and GTRI team developed a strategy to integrate temporal logic rule specification for detection of cyber-intrusion in the source code and control algorithms of CPS using advanced cyber-data. The GTRI team utilized its capabilities in rule synthesis and temporal logic specifications for software assurance and verification to detect and predict impact of cyber-intrusions and malware in the computational and control algorithms of cyber-physical systems. The team also developed a testing and verification approach that could be used to validate the suggested approach against a realistic use-case CPS showcasing improvements in system impact prediction performance. Temporal logic offers a compact expression of events in absolute and relative time and has a formalized translation to state machines. As such, temporal logic rules can feasibly be synthesized to any system as a rule engine, with the process being formally verified to be correct. The goal here is to utilize temporal logic rules to detect cyber-attacks and manipulations in the computational algorithms and provide real-time software assurance and verification guarantees.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗