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At least 73 records · Page 4

Augmenting Traditional Static Analysis With Commonly Available Metadata

Developers and security analysts have been using static analysis for a long time to analyze programs for defects and vulnerabilities with some success. Generally a static analysis tool is run on the source code for a given program, flagging areas of code that need to be further inspected by a human analyst. These areas may be obvious bugs like potential bu er over flows, information leakage flaws, or the use of uninitialized variables. These tools tend to work fairly well - every year they find many important bugs. These tools are more impressive considering the fact that they only examine the source code, which may be very complex. Now consider the amount of data available that these tools do not analyze. There are many pieces of information that would prove invaluable for finding bugs in code, things such as a history of bug reports, a history of all changes to the code, information about committers, etc. By leveraging all this additional data, it is possible to nd more bugs with less user interaction, as well as track useful metrics such as number and type of defects injected by committer. This dissertation provides a method for leveraging development metadata to find bugs that would otherwise be difficult to find using standard static analysis tools. We showcase two case studies that demonstrate the ability to find 0day vulnerabilities in large and small software projects by finding new vulnerabilities in the cpython and Roundup open source projects.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Real-time software upgrade

The various technologies presented herein relate to upgrading industrial control software in real-time. During utilization of a first software to control an industrial process, a determination can be made that the first software needs to be replaced (e.g., partially or entirely) owing to a newer version of software is ready to be deployed, a vulnerability in the first software has been determined, etc. Rather than closing the industrial process down while the first software is replaced, a second software can be deployed such that the first software and the second software are operating in parallel (e.g., receiving the same operational data, process states). When a critical point (upgrade location) in the first software has been reached, control of the industrial process can be switched to the second software, thereby enabling control of the industrial process to occur without having to temporarily cease operation and/or monitoring of the industrial process.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Creating an Interprocedural Analyst-Oriented Data Flow Representation for Binary Analysts (CIAO)

National security missions require understanding third-party software binaries, a key element of which is reasoning about how data flows through a program. However, vulnerability analysts protecting software lack adequate tools for understanding data flow in binaries. To reduce the human time burden for these analysts, we used human factors methods in a rolling discovery process to derive user-centric visual representation requirements. We encountered three main challenges: analysis projects span weeks, analysis goals significantly affect approaches and required knowledge, and analyst tools, techniques, conventions, and prioritization are based on personal preference. To address these challenges, we initially focused our human factors methods on an attack surface characterization task. We generalized our results using a two-stage modified sorting task, creating requirements for a data flow visualization. We implemented these requirements partially in manual static visualizations, which we informally evaluated, and partially in automatically generated interactive visualizations, which have yet to be integrated into workflows for evaluation. Our observations and results indicate that 1) this data flow visualization has the potential to enable novel code navigation, information presentation, and information sharing, and 2) it is an excellent time to pursue research applying human factors methods to binary analysis workflows.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Empirical Estimates and Observations of 0Day Vulnerabilities

We define a 0Day vulnerability to be any vulnerability, in deployed software, that has been discovered by at least one person but has not yet been publicly announced or patched. These 0Day vulnerabilities are of particular interest when assessing the risk to a system from exploit of vulnerabilities which are not generally known to the public or, most importantly, to the owners of the system. Using the 0Day definition given above, we analyzed the 0Day lifespans of 491 vulnerabilities and conservatively estimated that in the worst year there were on average 2500 0Day vulnerabilities in existence on any given day. Then using a small but intriguing set of 15 0Day vulnerability lifespans representing the time from actual discovery to public disclosure, we made a more aggressive estimate. In this case, we estimated that in the worst year there were, on average, 4500 0Day vulnerabilities in existence on any given day.

0Day lifespan↗

Visualizing Comparisons of Bill of Materials

Protecting critical infrastructure from cyber attacks, natural disasters, and other disruptions is a priority of the U.S. Government. Critical infrastructure includes providing electricity to homes and businesses, supplying natural gas for heating, and producing renewable energy sources. A loss of these services, as seen in the Solarwinds supply chain attack in 2020 , Texas snowstorm of 2021, the Colonial Pipeline cyber incident of 2021, and the Washington power substation attacks in 2022 result in high costs to consumers, disruption of everyday life, and even death. To protect the infrastructure, we first have to know what equipment we are protecting. The complexity of distributed manufacturing and development coupled with the increasing prevalence of cyber and supply chain attacks necessitates a greater understanding of the hardware and software components that comprise equipment in critical infrastructure. When a vulnerability in a single software library can have disastrous consequences, it is vital to understand critical equipment and systems at a granular level. This need has led to increased energy around the development and incorporation of bill-of-materials (BOM) into existing asset management practices to aid in mitigating, and responding to future attacks \cite{noauthor_software_nodate}. While much of the current research is devoted to creating BOMs, it is equally important to develop methodologies for leveraging BOMs to answer questions, such as: How has my software changed? Are two pieces of equipment equivalent? Does this piece of equipment that just arrived match my historical information? In this work, we demonstrate how BOMs can be represented by graph structures. We then describe how these structures can be fed into a graph comparison algorithm to produce a novel interactive visualization that allows us to not only identify differences in BOMs, but show exactly where they are in the product.

Jones, Rebecca D.↗

Behavior Computation for Smart Grid Software Analysis

Smart grid embedded software is subject to intrusion and compromise with potentially serious consequences. Current methods of cybersecurity analysis are increasingly challenged by the scope the problem. Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) is pioneering the new technology of software behavior computation to help address these risks. Software behavior computation and its instantiation in Function eXtraction (FX) systems apply mathematical foundations of denotational semantics to compute the behavior of software in all circumstances of use. Research has shown how to make the effects of recursion-theoretic limitations on this process arbitrarily small. Behavior computation operates on the functional semantics of programs, and is not subject to the limitations of syntactic recognition or testing. ORNL is applying FX technology to help evaluate cyber security properties in smart grid systems, with initial focus on vulnerabilities in embedded software that controls smart meters.

denotational semantics↗

Generating SBoMs Utilizing Structured Threat Information Expression JSON bundles

With cyber-attacks on the rise, information is one of the first lines of defense. Now more than ever, security experts and developers need efficient ways to know if their software may be outdated or vulnerable to emerging threats. By generating a Software Bill of Material based on STIX2/JSON bundles, security experts and developers can ensure that they know where to find what can go wrong with their systems before the hackers do. As part of the Infrastructure Expression project, Idaho National Laboratory (INL) is currently working on ways that can aid in the development of efficient SBOMs using Structured Threat Information Expression (STIX). Doing so can provide an efficient first line of defense for detection and monitoring that can be easily used by cyber personnel from beginners to highly skilled experts.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Modeling, Simulation and Analysis of Complex Networked Systems: A Program Plan for DOE Office of Advanced Scientific Computing Research

Many complex systems of importance to the U.S. Department of Energy consist of networks of discrete components. Examples are cyber networks, such as the internet and local area networks over which nearly all DOE scientific, technical and administrative data must travel, the electric power grid, social networks whose behavior can drive energy demand, and biological networks such as genetic regulatory networks and metabolic networks. In spite of the importance of these complex networked systems to all aspects of DOE's operations, the scientific basis for understanding these systems lags seriously behind the strong foundations that exist for the 'physically-based' systems usually associated with DOE research programs that focus on such areas as climate modeling, fusion energy, high-energy and nuclear physics, nano-science, combustion, and astrophysics. DOE has a clear opportunity to develop a similarly strong scientific basis for understanding the structure and dynamics of networked systems by supporting a strong basic research program in this area. Such knowledge will provide a broad basis for, e.g., understanding and quantifying the efficacy of new security approaches for computer networks, improving the design of computer or communication networks to be more robust against failures or attacks, detecting potential catastrophic failure on the power grid and preventing or mitigating its effects, understanding how populations will respond to the availability of new energy sources or changes in energy policy, and detecting subtle vulnerabilities in large software systems to intentional attack. This white paper outlines plans for an aggressive new research program designed to accelerate the advancement of the scientific basis for complex networked systems of importance to the DOE. It will focus principally on four research areas: (1) understanding network structure, (2) understanding network dynamics, (3) predictive modeling and simulation for complex networked systems, and (4) design, situational awareness and control of complex networks. The program elements consist of a group of Complex Networked Systems Research Institutes (CNSRI), tightly coupled to an associated individual-investigator-based Complex Networked Systems Basic Research (CNSBR) program. The CNSRI's will be principally located at the DOE National Laboratories and are responsible for identifying research priorities, developing and maintaining a networked systems modeling and simulation software infrastructure, operating summer schools, workshops and conferences and coordinating with the CNSBR individual investigators. The CNSBR individual investigator projects will focus on specific challenges for networked systems. Relevancy of CNSBR research to DOE needs will be assured through the strong coupling provided between the CNSBR grants and the CNSRI's.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

CYBER/PHYSICAL SECURITY VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT INTEGRATION

This internally funded Laboratory-Directed R&D project by the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, in conjunction with QinetiQ North America, is intended to identify and properly assess areas of overlap (and interaction) in the vulnerability assessment process between cyber security and physical protection. Existing vulnerability analysis (VA) processes and software tools exist, and these are heavily utilized in the determination of predicted vulnerability within the physical and cyber security domains. These determinations are normally performed independently of one another, and only interact on a superficial level. Both physical and cyber security subject matter experts have come to realize that though the various interactive elements exist, they are not currently quantified in most periodic security assessments. This endeavor aims to evaluate both physical and cyber VA techniques and provide a strategic approach to integrate the interdependent relationships of each into a single VA capability. This effort will also transform the existing suite of software currently utilized in the physical protection world to more accurately quantify the risk associated with a blended attack scenario. Performance databases will be created to support the characterization of the cyber security elements, and roll them into prototype software tools. This new methodology and software capability will enable analysts to better identify and assess the overall risk during a vulnerability analysis.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

WISP: Watching grid Infrastructure Stealthily through Proxies (Final Technical Report)

The complex interdependencies of cyber systems (sensors and communications), physical grids and associated electricity market operations make protecting electric power grids a significant challenge. The energy sector is constantly under new, targeted, advanced and dangerous cyber-attacks that have the potential to result in the loss of human life. These threats are further exacerbated by our need to modernize the grid. One focus of cyber security research in smart grids is the securing of the SCADA system through advanced intrusion detection systems (IDS) and bad data detection algorithms in state estimation. These methods either require full knowledge of the system topology and parameters or fail to understand the physical behaviors under attack. WISP (Watching grid Infrastructure Stealthily through Proxies) is designed to provide additional protection to the power grid using only publicly available data. In particular, WISP exploits the spatio-temporal nature of the real time locational marginal prices (LMPs), in conjunction with other information such as bids, weather, outages and load data to analyze anomalous power pricing behaviors and then correlate those observations to localize regions of interest and identify potential cyber events. WISP is non-intrusive as the tool is deployed as a service in the Cloud or on premise and provides reliable information to system operators for enhanced situational awareness, without impeding energy delivery functions. The WISP technology comprises three modules: the data-driven anomaly detection core, the vulnerability and risk analysis and the root cause analysis. The data-driven anomaly detection core performs the tasks of feature selection, anomaly detection and attack region localization. The vulnerability and risk analysis module provides system level information of the vulnerable variables and times, assisting the operators in selecting monitoring and protection nodes. The root cause analysis module takes the detection results and identifies potential operational conditions that contribute to the detected anomalies. In Phase I, we have demonstrated the feasibility and effectiveness of WISP. We developed a realistic electricity market simulator capable of generating normal and attack market data under various operational conditions. We developed a series of cyber-attack detection and analysis algorithms and evaluated them under multiple data sources. Finally, we integrated all modules into an end-to-end software, providing functions for data management, data analytics and visualization. Specifically, we have achieved: (i) real-time data acceptance from external utility interfaces with >99% acceptance rate; (ii) high performance anomaly detection algorithms with >98% detection accuracy and <0.1% false alarm rate; and (iii) ultra-low computing delay <50 milliseconds. Additionally, our team developed algorithms to identify the vulnerable variables in electricity market operations and root cause analysis functions to identify major contributors to the price spikes. These ancillary modules are necessary when deploying WISP in real world industry environment. In Phase II, we have demonstrated the effectiveness of WISP software on realistic largescale power systems. We performed red team testing for the Phase I WISP software and identified software vulnerabilities and implemented corresponding mitigation solutions. We adapted the electricity market simulator for the Texas synthetic 2000-bus system and generated datasets for the false data injection attacks. We created database and visualization interfaces for the Texas system and the ISO New England system. We performed software optimization in terms of operation efficiency, computing speed and detection accuracy. Finally, we tested the software on the Texas system and the ISO New England system and evaluated the detection performance. Overall, we achieved above 89% detection rate, below 3% false alarm rate and below 37 seconds of end-to-end detection delay.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Evaluating Methods of Software Bill of Materials Generation to Enhance Nuclear Power Plant Cybersecurity

Instrumentation and control (I&C) systems in nuclear power plants (NPPs) are potential targets of cyberattacks and can prove deleterious for the safety of the NPPs. A Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) provides a detailed list of the various components and their dependencies in software, which helps in vulnerability and risk assessment for cyber hygiene and situational awareness. For an NPP, the process of generating an accurate SBOM report can be complex due to the legacy systems and firmware binaries involved. While most current SBOM tools are focused more on modern internet technology software, this research provides insights and guidelines for an NPP to generate an accurate and efficient SBOM. Here, the paper proposes a new methodology to help NPPs categorize software and use appropriate tools to generate SBOMs for their digital I&C systems.

SBOM↗

Towards Automatically Matching Security Advisories to CPEs: String Similarity-based Vendor Matching

When a vulnerability is reported by the National Vulnerability Database (NVD), affected products are listed in the structured Common Platform Enumeration (CPE) format. Unfortunately, if the vulnerability is in a software library (e.g., Log4j), it will not include CPEs for each product containing that library. In these cases, security operators need to manually read the vendor's or third-party security advisories to see if their product is affected. However, these advisories do not report affected products in a structured format, which prevents automated processing, This paper makes the first effort towards automatically constructing structured CPEs for the vulnerable products in a non-NVD security advisory from the unstructured data in the advisory. Since this is a very challenging problem, this paper specifically focuses on the initial but key step of matching the un-structured vendor names in security advisories to the structured vendor representations in the standard CPE format. We explore the feasibility of using string similarity to solve the problem. The basic idea is to compare a vendor name from the non-NVD advisory with each vendor in the official CPE dictionary. The CPE vendor with the highest similarity score to the advisory's vendor will be considered as the match. We first conduct an experimental, comparative study of multiple mainstream string similarity metrics for this matching problem. To improve the performance, we then design a new string similarity metric that is adapted from an existing metric by weighing different tokens in the advisory's vendor name differently.

McClanahan, Kylie↗

Application of Rank-Weight Methods to Blockchain Cybersecurity Vulnerability Assessment Framework

Cybersecurity vulnerability assessment tools, frameworks, and methodologies are used to understand the cybersecurity maturity of a system or a facility. However, these tools are strictly developed based on standards defined by organizations such as the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and the U.S. Department of Energy; the majority of these tools and frameworks do not provide a platform to prioritize the requirements to reach a desired cybersecurity maturity. To address that challenge, we have been developing a framework and software application called cybersecurity vulnerability mitigation framework through empirical paradigm (CyFEr). CyFEr treats the problem at hand as a multi-criteria decision analysis (MCDA) problem, which requires that various criteria be weighed relatively. Defining those weights is non-trivial and often leads to subjective decisions leading to undesired complications. To facilitate such a weighting system in CyFEr, we evaluated the application of various rank-weight methods (such as rank sum, reciprocal rank, rank exponent, and rank order centroid). The efficacy of those rank-weight methods was evaluated by applying them and testing against the blockchain cybersecurity framework (BC2F). BC2F was developed using the NIST cybersecurity framework to evaluate the cybersecurity posture of the blockchain nodes and networks in a given blockchain application or use-case. This paper provides 1) technical insights on the application of rank-weight methods to cybersecurity vulnerability assessments, 2) an overview of BC2F, 3) the application of rank-weight methods to BC2F, and 4) a depiction of the integration of the discussed rank-weight methods in CyFEr.

Gourisetti, Sri Nikhil G.↗

Cybersecurity Vulnerability Mitigation Framework through Empirical Paradigm: Enhanced Prioritized Gap Analysis

Existing cybersecurity vulnerability assessment tools were designed based on the policies and standards defined by organizations such as the U.S. Department of Energy and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). Frameworks such as the cybersecurity capability maturity model (C2M2) and the NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) are often used by the critical infrastructure owners and operators to determine the cybersecurity maturity of their facility. Although these frameworks are exceptional at performing qualitative cybersecurity analysis and identifying vulnerabilities, they do not provide a means to perform prioritized mitigation of those vulnerabilities in order to achieve a desired cybersecurity maturity. To address that challenge, we developed a framework and software application called the cybersecurity vulnerability mitigation framework through empirical paradigm (CyFEr). This paper presents the detailed architecture of CyFEr’s enhanced prioritized gap analysis (EPGA) methodology and its application to CSF. The efficacy of the presented framework is demonstrated by comparing against existing similar models and testing against the cyber injects from a real-world cyber-attack that targeted industrial control systems (ICS) in critical infrastructures.

Gourisetti, Sri Nikhil G.↗

Invensys Foxboro Control Software Security Assessment

Idaho National Laboratory, in collaboration with Invensys, performed a laboratory assessment on Invensys Foxboro Control Software. During this assessment, vulnerabilities were discovered, evaluated, and mitigation strategies developed.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

PathTrace and MPVEASI: A Path Analysis Comparative Validation Study

Developed in 2018, PathTrace is a software package built with the intention of making path analysis simple and intuitive. PathTrace is a top-down pathway analysis software where a user is able to explore vulnerable pathways into a facility. The intention of utilizing a software tool like PathTrace is to characterize an existing physical protection system (PPS) and to upgrade the system to achieve a high level of response interruption, or probability of interruption (P I ) of the adversary. There are four steps for conducting path analysis using PathTrace. The first step is to identify an image to use to build the model and scale the model within PathTrace using a section of known distance (wall or fence perimeter, for example). The scaling process will produce a grid of cells through which the user is able to build a model. The second step is to fill out the grid of cells with four categories of materials: Barriers, Detection Areas, Jumps, and Targets. These materials apply associated delay and detection values to the cells in which they are applied. The third step is to represent the adversary and response forces. The adversaries are represented by their capabilities in interacting with the materials identified in step two, and the response is represented by how quickly they will be able to respond to an adversary attack. Finally, the user is able to take all of the information from the previous three steps and perform a Most Vulnerable Path (MVP) analysis. In this stage, the user is able to visualize vulnerable adversary pathways and reason about how to upgrade these pathways to provide a high level of P I .

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Software Bill of Materials in the Nuclear Industry

Nuclear power plants (NPP) have thousands of digital assets throughout their facility. Typically, NPPs have asset and configuration management programs that capture the make, model, and version of a component. This information, however, usually only includes first- or second-tier components and does not capture the complete enumeration of software components and their dependencies within operational technology (OT) equipment. As seen with recent cyberattacks, this level of detail is insufficient for identifying if and where an exploitable vulnerability exists within a facility. A software bill of materials (SBOM) provides this detailed enumeration. Further, integrating SBOMs with vulnerability data sources and vulnerability attestation reports can provide improved awareness leading to better cyber risk management and incident response. Preferably, SBOMs are provided by the supplier; however, when an NPP already owns a device, it is less likely they will have a supplier provided-SBOM. Fortunately, SBOMs can be generated on installed digital assets. This paper provides an introduction to the U.S. Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy paper titled “Towards Software Bill of Materials in the Nuclear Industry,” which describes the SBOM ecosystem and provides a suggested approach to methodically and seamlessly integrate an SBOM program in an NPP.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

VULCON: A System for Vulnerability Prioritization, Mitigation, and Management

Vulnerability remediation is a critical task in operational software and network security management. In this paper, an effective vulnerability management strategy, called VULCON (VULnerability CONtrol), is developed and evaluated. The strategy is based on two fundamental performance metrics: i). Time-to-Vulnerability Remediation (TVR) and; ii). Total Vulnerability Exposure (TVE). VULCON takes as input real vulnerability scan reports, metadata about the discovered vulnerabilities, asset criticality, and personnel resources. VULCON uses a mixed integer multi-objective optimization algorithm to prioritize vulnerabilities for patching, such that the above performance metrics are optimized subject to the given resource constraints. VULCON has been tested on multiple months of real scan data from a Cyber-Security Operations Center (CSOC). Results indicate an overall Total Vulnerability Exposure reduction of 8.97\% when VULCON optimizes a realistic security analyst workforce's effort. Additionally, it is demonstrated that VULCON can determine monthly resources required to maintain a target TVE score. As such, VULCON provides valuable operational guidance for improving vulnerability response processes in CSOCs.

Farris, Katheryn A.↗