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Automated Euler and Navier-Stokes Database Generation for a Glide-Back Booster

The past two decades have seen a sustained increase in the use of high fidelity Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) in basic research, aircraft design, and the analysis of post-design issues. As the fidelity of a CFD method increases, the number of cases that can be readily and affordably computed greatly diminishes. However, computer speeds now exceed 2 GHz, hundreds of processors are currently available and more affordable, and advances in parallel CFD algorithms scale more readily with large numbers of processors. All of these factors make it feasible to compute thousands of high fidelity cases. However, there still remains the overwhelming task of monitoring the solution process. This paper presents an approach to automate the CFD solution process. A new software tool, AeroDB, is used to compute thousands of Euler and Navier-Stokes solutions for a 2nd generation glide-back booster in one week. The solution process exploits a common job-submission grid environment, the NASA Information Power Grid (IPG), using 13 computers located at 4 different geographical sites. Process automation and web-based access to a MySql database greatly reduces the user workload, removing much of the tedium and tendency for user input errors. The AeroDB framework is shown. The user submits/deletes jobs, monitors AeroDB's progress, and retrieves data and plots via a web portal. Once a job is in the database, a job launcher uses an IPG resource broker to decide which computers are best suited to run the job. Job/code requirements, the number of CPUs free on a remote system, and queue lengths are some of the parameters the broker takes into account. The Globus software provides secure services for user authentication, remote shell execution, and secure file transfers over an open network. AeroDB automatically decides when a job is completed. Currently, the Cart3D unstructured flow solver is used for the Euler equations, and the Overflow structured overset flow solver is used for the Navier-Stokes equations. Other codes can be readily included into the AeroDB framework.

Chaderjian, Neal M.

Development of Network-based Communications Architectures for Future NASA Missions

Since the Vision for Space Exploration (VSE) announcement, NASA has been developing a communications infrastructure that combines existing terrestrial techniques with newer concepts and capabilities. The overall goal is to develop a flexible, modular, and extensible architecture that leverages and enhances terrestrial networking technologies that can either be directly applied or modified for the space regime. In addition, where existing technologies leaves gaps, new technologies must be developed. An example includes dynamic routing that accounts for constrained power and bandwidth environments. Using these enhanced technologies, NASA can develop nodes that provide characteristics, such as routing, store and forward, and access-on-demand capabilities. But with the development of the new infrastructure, challenges and obstacles will arise. The current communications infrastructure has been developed on a mission-by-mission basis rather than an end-to-end approach; this has led to a greater ground infrastructure, but has not encouraged communications between space-based assets. This alone provides one of the key challenges that NASA must encounter. With the development of the new Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV), NASA has the opportunity to provide an integration path for the new vehicles and provide standards for their development. Some of the newer capabilities these vehicles could include are routing, security, and Software Defined Radios (SDRs). To meet these needs, the NASA/Glenn Research Center s (GRC) Network Emulation Laboratory (NEL) has been using both simulation and emulation to study and evaluate these architectures. These techniques provide options to NASA that directly impact architecture development. This paper identifies components of the infrastructure that play a pivotal role in the new NASA architecture, develops a scheme using simulation and emulation for testing these architectures and demonstrates how NASA can strengthen the new infrastructure by implementing these concepts.

Slywczak, Richard A.

NASA Tech Briefs, July 2003

Topics covered include: Real-Time, High-Frequency QRS Electrocardiograph; Software for Improved Extraction of Data From Tape Storage; Radio System for Locating Emergency Workers; Software for Displaying High-Frequency Test Data; Capacitor-Chain Successive-Approximation ADC; Simpler Alternative to an Optimum FQPSK-B Viterbi Receiver; Multilayer Patch Antenna Surrounded by a Metallic Wall; Software To Secure Distributed Propulsion Simulations; Explicit Pore Pressure Material Model in Carbon-Cloth Phenolic; Meshed-Pumpkin Super-Pressure Balloon Design; Corrosion Inhibitors as Penetrant Dyes for Radiography; Transparent Metal-Salt-Filled Polymeric Radiation Shields; Lightweight Energy Absorbers for Blast Containers; Brush-Wheel Samplers for Planetary Exploration; Dry Process for Making Polyimide/ Carbon-and-Boron-Fiber Tape; Relatively Inexpensive Rapid Prototyping of Small Parts; Magnetic Field Would Reduce Electron Backstreaming in Ion Thrusters; Alternative Electrochemical Systems for Ozonation of Water; Interferometer for Measuring Displacement to Within 20 pm; UV-Enhanced IR Raman System for Identifying Biohazards; Prognostics Methodology for Complex Systems; Algorithms for Haptic Rendering of 3D Objects; Modeling and Control of Aerothermoelastic Effects; Processing Digital Imagery to Enhance Perceptions of Realism; Analysis of Designs of Space Laboratories; Shields for Enhanced Protection Against High-Speed Debris; Study of Dislocation-Ordered In(x)Ga(1-x)As/GaAs Quantum Dots; and Tilt-Sensitivity Analysis for Space Telescopes.

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Ground Software Technologies – Embracing Change: Mission Drivers and Technology Opportunities to Enable Long Lived Missions

Mission lifecycles have proven to extend well beyond their original design. The benefits to this are countless but introduce challenges in today’s rapidly changing ground infrastructure and software technologies used to enable mission success. What remains constant is the risk posture missions maintain when accepting change and the use of new technologies. Larger missions are ready for change in early lifecycle development but near launch and especially in operations, few continue to evolve beyond what is set in place in phase C. This paper will discuss how the Advance Multi-Mission Operations System (AMMOS) intends to address, three driving missions concerns: Maintaining functionality (hardware/software) for decades, rapidly responding to security vulnerabilities in software, and finally the ability to quickly evolve infrastructure and software changes. These driving concerns are briefly described below: 1. Maintaining functionality (hardware/software) for decades. Hardware updates considerably faster than 10 years ago. Expectations that a system can remain in place for more than 10 years is no longer valid. Expecting to find hardware replacements for a system older than 5 years will increasingly become more and more challenging. How than do missions plan for hardware changes for long lived missions? Principle Objective: Provide abstraction by virtualizing and containerizing software abstract away any hardware dependencies and package up the application lightweight units. 2. Rapidly responding to security vulnerabilities in software. Cost is often the main impediment and largely driven by the revalidation and testing of system that undergo change. In todays, environment security updates are a major diver demanding systems remain up to date. How then do missions accept these changes and avoid large testing efforts? Principle Objective: Help reduce the cost of re-testing by automation of testing, deployment, and compartmentalizing change. 3. Ability to quickly evolve infrastructure and software changes. Responding quickly to change is similar to the second concern in this paper regarding security vulnerabilities. In this case, it address broader concerns of updating software and infrastructure on a more realistic timeline. How do missions stay up to date with the most recent versions of software and allowing for improved functionality? Principle Objective: Use continuous integration techniques at the system level to ensure rapid turnaround. This paper explores each of these concerns in more detail. It focuses the AMMOS’s current plans, challenges and current roadmap.

Giovannoni, Brian J.

Additional Security Considerations for Grid Management

The use of Grid computing environments is growing in popularity. A Grid computing environment is primarily a wide area network that encompasses multiple local area networks, where some of the local area networks are managed by different organizations. A Grid computing environment also includes common interfaces for distributed computing software so that the heterogeneous set of machines that make up the Grid can be used more easily. The other key feature of a Grid is that the distributed computing software includes appropriate security technology. The focus of most Grid software is on the security involved with application execution, file transfers, and other remote computing procedures. However, there are other important security issues related to the management of a Grid and the users who use that Grid. This note discusses these additional security issues and makes several suggestions as how they can be managed.

Eidson, Thomas M.

The Spaceport Command and Control System Security Assessor Project

This Summer, I worked as a National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Internships and Fellowships (NIF) intern under my mentor, Jill Giles within the Software Engineering Branch. Within this project, I worked alongside the Cyber Security branch to identify a list of Commercial Off the Shelf (COTS) software to analyze, research, and gain insight about potential vulnerabilities within the software that could become a threat of attack. After identifying the list of COTS software, my team and I used Microsoft Excel to create a worksheet to easily organize and design a questionnaire about the software. Security reports weregiven to us to identify the software used on the machines in the firing rooms. With these reports, we created a script that would populate the database with the software information to identify potential security weaknesses of COTS software.The goal of the project was to produce a final report, summarizing the most vulnerable launch control system servers and configurations and document vulnerabilities, residual risk, likelihood, and consequence. This project is important for the Cyber Security and Information Technology branches because it will identify security weaknesses and help to mitigate risk. From the Spaceport Command and Control System Security Assessor Project, I learned how to properly identify weaknesses and vulnerabilities within software and how to mitigate the risks within the software. This project also taught me how to create databases using scripts and input files.

Destani Satora Van Arsdalen

Dynamic IT Security Database and Analytics for Launch Control Systems Software

During the Summer 2020 session, I worked with intern Destani S. Van Arsdalen of EGS Software. Together, we co-created a tool to aid the dynamic investigation, updated over time,of the security compliance of LCS COTS and open source software. We originally planned touse spreadsheet software for management and analysis, but through this exploratoryproject, chose to use Python and JSON after receiving feedback on our project’s current anddesired capabilities at that time.At first, the project was solely designed to help on-board new COTS software, based on aquestionnaire that could be filled out for each software package. This, combined with usingthe spreadsheet application’s web-query capabilities to fetch information from the NVD,allowed presentation and analytics cells to automatically populate as elements of themanually-filled questionnaire changed. While this system was promising, we decided tochange technologies for a few reasons. In the spreadsheet, single cells could not hold complexdata like arrays and objects. The automatic population of cells and dynamic updates made itdifficult to manage and add new features. And finally, it had limited extensibility sinceadding new software required significant understanding of how both the spreadsheet wasconstructed, and the more obscure, proprietary scripting languages packaged with it.The pivot to a standard computer science database language of JSON, aided by thescripting capabilities of Python, greatly helped to improve the project’s functionality. First,and most importantly, the script’s import and analysis of database data is easilyreproducible. Additional data analysis can be modularly added without requiringmodification of the script and is capable of routine scheduling. The revised process can besplit into three parts. First, the conversion of LCS asset and software documentation into theJSON hierarchical database format. Second, the merging of this database with the NVD,forming a new data structure, using CPEs of the CVE object as a linking element betweenthem. And third, the automatically performed analytics and analysis of the combined data,in a modular and extensible format, to produce better informed business decisions. The outputted graphs, for example, are automatically generated by the Python script inconnection with the combined database. This allows updated graphs and any analytics to be re-rendered automatically following updates to the LCS’s initial asset documentation. Afinal report can then be programmatically and easily constructed from these sources to allow fully reproducible metrics for heavily evidenced risk management decisions.

it

IT Security Support for the Spaceport Command Control Systems Development Ground Support Development Operations

Security is one of the most if not the most important areas today. After the several attacks on the United States, security everywhere was heightened from Airports to the communication among the military branches legionnaires. With advanced persistent threats (APTs) on the rise following Stuxnet, government branches and agencies are required, more than ever, to follow several standards, policies and procedures to reduce the likelihood of a breach. Attack vectors today are very advanced and are going to continue to get more and more advanced as security controls advance. This creates a need for networks and systems to be in an updated and secured state in a launch control system environment. FISMA is a law that is mandated by the government to follow when government agencies secure networks and devices. My role on this project is to ensure network devices and systems are in compliance with NIST, as outlined in FISMA. I will achieve this by providing assistance with security plan documentation and collection, system hardware and software inventory, malicious code and malware scanning and configuration of network devices i.e. routers and IDSsIPSs. In addition I will be completing security assessments on software and hardware, vulnerability assessments and reporting, conducting patch management and risk assessments. A guideline that will help with compliance with NIST is the SANS Top 20 Critical Controls. SANS Top 20 Critical Controls as well as numerous security tools, security software and the conduction of research will be used to successfully complete the tasks given to me. This will ensure compliance with FISMA and NIST, secure systems and a secured network. By the end of this project, I hope to have carried out stated above as well as gain an immense knowledge about compliance, security tools, networks and network devices, policies and procedures.

computer information security

Architecture for Survivable System Processing (ASSP)

The Architecture for Survivable System Processing (ASSP) Program is a multi-phase effort to implement Department of Defense (DOD) and commercially developed high-tech hardware, software, and architectures for reliable space avionics and ground based systems. System configuration options provide processing capabilities to address Time Dependent Processing (TDP), Object Dependent Processing (ODP), and Mission Dependent Processing (MDP) requirements through Open System Architecture (OSA) alternatives that allow for the enhancement, incorporation, and capitalization of a broad range of development assets. High technology developments in hardware, software, and networking models, address technology challenges of long processor life times, fault tolerance, reliability, throughput, memories, radiation hardening, size, weight, power (SWAP) and security. Hardware and software design, development, and implementation focus on the interconnectivity/interoperability of an open system architecture and is being developed to apply new technology into practical OSA components. To insure for widely acceptable architecture capable of interfacing with various commercial and military components, this program provides for regular interactions with standardization working groups (e.g.) the International Standards Organization (ISO), American National Standards Institute (ANSI), Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE), and Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE). Selection of a viable open architecture is based on the widely accepted standards that implement the ISO/OSI Reference Model.

Wood, Richard J.

IT Security Support for the Spaceport Command Control Systems Development Ground Support Development Operations

Security is one of the most if not the most important areas today. After the several attacks on the United States, security everywhere has heightened from airports to the communication among the military branches legionnaires. With advanced persistent threats (APT's) on the rise following Stuxnet, government branches and agencies are required, more than ever, to follow several standards, policies and procedures to reduce the likelihood of a breach. Attack vectors today are very advanced and are going to continue to get more and more advanced as security controls advance. This creates a need for networks and systems to be in an updated and secured state in a launch control system environment. FISMA is a law that is mandated by the government to follow when government agencies secure networks and devices. My role on this project is to ensure network devices and systems are in compliance with NIST, as outlined in FISMA. I will achieve this by providing assistance with security plan documentation and collection, system hardware and software inventory, malicious code and malware scanning, and configuration of network devices i.e. routers and IDS's/IPS's. In addition, I will be completing security assessments on software and hardware, vulnerability assessments and reporting, and conducting patch management and risk assessments. A guideline that will help with compliance with NIST is the SANS Top 20 Critical Controls. SANS Top 20 Critical Controls as well as numerous security tools, security software and the conduction of research will be used to successfully complete the tasks given to me. This will ensure compliance with FISMA and NIST, secure systems and a secured network. By the end of this project, I hope to have carried out the tasks stated above as well as gain an immense knowledge about compliance, security tools, networks and network devices, as well as policies and procedures.

security

Toward Synthesis, Analysis, and Certification of Security Protocols

Implemented security protocols are basically pieces of software which are used to (a) authenticate the other communication partners, (b) establish a secure communication channel between them (using insecure communication media), and (c) transfer data between the communication partners in such a way that these data only available to the desired receiver, but not to anyone else. Such an implementation usually consists of the following components: the protocol-engine, which controls in which sequence the messages of the protocol are sent over the network, and which controls the assembly/disassembly and processing (e.g., decryption) of the data. the cryptographic routines to actually encrypt or decrypt the data (using given keys), and t,he interface to the operating system and to the application. For a correct working of such a security protocol, all of these components must work flawlessly. Many formal-methods based techniques for the analysis of a security protocols have been developed. They range from using specific logics (e.g.: BAN-logic [4], or higher order logics [12] to model checking [2] approaches. In each approach, the analysis tries to prove that no (or at least not a modeled intruder) can get access to secret data. Otherwise, a scenario illustrating the &tack may be produced. Despite the seeming simplicity of security protocols ("only" a few messages are sent between the protocol partners in order to ensure a secure communication), many flaws have been detected. Unfortunately, even a perfect protocol engine does not guarantee flawless working of a security protocol, as incidents show. Many break-ins and security vulnerabilities are caused by exploiting errors in the implementation of the protocol engine or the underlying operating system. Attacks using buffer-overflows are a very common class of such attacks. Errors in the implementation of exception or error handling can open up additional vulnerabilities. For example, on a website with a log-in screen: multiple tries with invalid passwords caused the expected error message (too many retries). but let the user nevertheless pass. Finally, security can be compromised by silly implementation bugs or design decisions. In a commercial VPN software, all calls to the encryption routines were incidentally replaced by stubs, probably during factory testing. The product worked nicely. and the error (an open VPN) would have gone undetected, if a team member had not inspected the low-level traffic out of curiosity. Also, the use secret proprietary encryption routines can backfire, because such algorithms often exhibit weaknesses which can be exploited easily (see e.g., DVD encoding). Summarizing, there is large number of possibilities to make errors which can compromise the security of a protocol. In today s world with short time-to-market and the use of security protocols in open and hostile networks for safety-critical applications (e.g., power or air-traffic control), such slips could lead to catastrophic situations. Thus, formal methods and automatic reasoning techniques should not be used just for the formal proof of absence of an attack, but they ought to be used to provide an end-to-end tool-supported framework for security software. With such an approach all required artifacts (code, documentation, test cases) , formal analyses, and reliable certification will be generated automatically, given a single, high level specification. By a combination of program synthesis, formal protocol analysis, certification; and proof-carrying code, this goal is within practical reach, since all the important technologies for such an approach actually exist and only need to be assembled in the right way.

Schumann, Johann

Failure Assessment

Three questions to which software developers want accurate, precise answers are "How can the software system fail?", "mat bad things will happen if the software fails?t', and "How many failures will the software experience?". Numerous techniques have been devised to answer these questions; three of the best known are: 1) Software Fault Tree Analysis (SFTA) 2) Software Failure Modes, Effects, and Criticality Analysis (SFMECA 3) Software Fault/Failure Modeling. SFTA and SFMECA have been successfully used to analyze the flight software for a number of robotic planetary exploration missions, including Galileo, Cassini, and Deep Space 1. Given the increasing interest in reusing software components from mission to mission, one of us has developed techniques for reusing the corresponding portions of the SFTA and SFMECA, reducing the effort required to conduct these analyses. SFTA has also been shown to be effective in analyzing the security aspects of software systems; intrusion mechanisms and effects can easily be modeled using these techniques. The Bi- Directional Safety Analysis (BDSA) method combines a forward search (similar to SFMECA) from potential failure modes to their effects, with a backward search (similar to SFTA) from feasible hazards to the contributing causes of each hazard. BDSA offers an efficient way to identify latent failures. Recent work has extended BDSA to product-line applications such as flight-instrumentation displays and developed tool support for the reuse of the failure-analysis artifacts within a product line. BDSA has also been streamlined to support those projects having tight cost and/or schedule constraints for their failure analysis efforts. We discuss lessons learned from practice, describe available tools, and identi@ some future directions for the topic. A substantial amount of research has been devoted to estimating the number of failures that a software system will experience during test and operations, as well as the number of faults that have been inserted into that system during its development. One of us has found that the amount of structural change to a system during its development is strongly related to the number of faults inserted into it. Using techniques requiring no additional effort on the part of the development organization, the required measurements of structural evolution can be easily obtained from a development effort's configuration management system and readily transformed into an estimate of fault content. So far, structure-fault relationships have been identified for source code; current work seeks to examine artifacts available earlier in the lifecycle to determine if similar relationships between structure and fault content can be found. In particular, relationships between requirements change requests and the number of faults inserted into the implemented system would provide a significant improvement in our ability to control software quality during the early development phases.

fault tree

Towards Behavioral Reflexion Models

Software architecture has become essential in the struggle to manage today s increasingly large and complex systems. Software architecture views are created to capture important system characteristics on an abstract and, thus, comprehensible level. As the system is implemented and later maintained, it often deviates from the original design specification. Such deviations can have implication for the quality of the system, such as reliability, security, and maintainability. Software architecture compliance checking approaches, such as the reflexion model technique, have been proposed to address this issue by comparing the implementation to a model of the systems architecture design. However, architecture compliance checking approaches focus solely on structural characteristics and ignore behavioral conformance. This is especially an issue in Systems-of- Systems. Systems-of-Systems (SoS) are decompositions of large systems, into smaller systems for the sake of flexibility. Deviations of the implementation to its behavioral design often reduce the reliability of the entire SoS. An approach is needed that supports the reasoning about behavioral conformance on architecture level. In order to address this issue, we have developed an approach for comparing the implementation of a SoS to an architecture model of its behavioral design. The approach follows the idea of reflexion models and adopts it to support the compliance checking of behaviors. In this paper, we focus on sequencing properties as they play an important role in many SoS. Sequencing deviations potentially have a severe impact on the SoS correctness and qualities. The desired behavioral specification is defined in UML sequence diagram notation and behaviors are extracted from the SoS implementation. The behaviors are then mapped to the model of the desired behavior and the two are compared. Finally, a reflexion model is constructed that shows the deviations between behavioral design and implementation. This paper discusses the approach and shows how it can be applied to investigate reliability issues in SoS.

Ackermann, Christopher

Distributed Operations Planning

Maestro software provides a secure and distributed mission planning system for long-term missions in general, and the Mars Exploration Rover Mission (MER) specifically. Maestro, the successor to the Science Activity Planner, has a heavy emphasis on portability and distributed operations, and requires no data replication or expensive hardware, instead relying on a set of services functioning on JPL institutional servers. Maestro works on most current computers with network connections, including laptops. When browsing down-link data from a spacecraft, Maestro functions similarly to being on a Web browser. After authenticating the user, it connects to a database server to query an index of data products. It then contacts a Web server to download and display the actual data products. The software also includes collaboration support based upon a highly reliable messaging system. Modifications made to targets in one instance are quickly and securely transmitted to other instances of Maestro. The back end that has been developed for Maestro could benefit many future missions by reducing the cost of centralized operations system architecture.

Fox, Jason