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Achieving Verifiable and High Integrity Instrumentation and Control Systems through Complexity Awareness and Constrained Design. Final Report

While most process control industries have been able to embrace digital Instrumentation and Control (I&C) technology to improve performance, reliability, maintainability, and efficiency of production, the nuclear industry has been relatively slow to adopt digital I&C for safety critical plant functions. There are a variety of reasons for this, but in general the nuclear industry takes a conservative stance that new technologies must mature before adoption. A deeper underlying reason for not fully realizing digital I&C and automation in nuclear power is associated with the complexity that can manifest in software-based systems that is different in nature from the complexity of their analog predecessors. Accordingly, this research pursued the development of innovative architectures and methods to “constrain complexity” to enhance verifiability of digital I&C devices. These constraints can positively impact the reduction of Software Common Cause Failures (SCCF) and other systematic errors. The architectural concept developed in this research effort is called SymPLe. SymPLe is specifically aimed at safety critical functions within Nuclear Power Plants and other critical infrastructure where constraining device complexity to support verifiability and safety case arguments is important. The SymPLe architecture is designed to promote “accessible verification” between OEM/utility engineers and the regulatory agencies who review and license nuclear power plant I&C systems. The major contributions of this work to the nuclear industry are: Demonstration of SymPLe as a viable approach to “complexity aware” I&C systems and Embedded Digital Devices.Comprehensive use of model-based design and engineering to produce verifiable I&C systems for the nuclear industry with clear findings on the usability of model-based engineering. Employ comprehensive use of model-based engineering, testing, and verification in an IEC 61508 workflow in support of design assurance. Gathered evidence of “difficult to find” design flaws found using model-based design and testing methods. Detailed the nature of these SCCFs including where they were introduced, the triggers, and how they were found. Gathered evidence on the synergistic use of practical formal methods and testing and how these methods can be used to significantly increase assurance of reduction and avoidance of design flaws.

Testing↗

Evaluation Report on "The Department's Unclassified Cyber Security Program"

Industry experts report that security challenges and threats are continually evolving as malicious activity has become more web-based and attackers are able to rapidly adapt their attack methods. In addition, the number of data breaches continues to rise. In an effort to mitigate and address threats and protect valuable information, the Department of Energy anticipated spending about $275 million in Fiscal Year (FY) 2009 to implement cyber security measures necessary to protect its information technology resources. These systems and data are designed to support the Department's mission and business lines of energy security, nuclear security, scientific discovery and innovation, and environmental responsibility. The Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 (FISMA) provides direction to agencies on the management and oversight of information security risks, including design and implementation of controls to protect Federal information and systems. As required by FISMA, the Office of Inspector General conducts an annual independent evaluation to determine whether the Department's unclassified cyber security program adequately protects its information systems and data. This memorandum and the attached report present the results of our evaluation for FY 2009. The Department continued to make incremental improvements in its unclassified cyber security program. Our evaluation disclosed that most sites had taken action to address weaknesses previously identified in our FY 2008 evaluation report. They improved certification and accreditation of systems; strengthened configuration management of networks and systems; performed independent assessments; and, developed and/or refined certain policies and procedures. In addition, the Department instituted a centralized incident response organization designed to eliminate duplicative efforts throughout the Department. As we have noted in previous reports, the Department continued to maintain strong network perimeter defenses against malicious intruders and other externals threats. These are positive accomplishments. However, in our judgment, additional action is required to further enhance the Department's unclassified cyber security program and help reduce risks to its systems and data. For example, our current review identified opportunities for improvements in areas such as security planning and testing, systems inventory, access controls, and configuration management. In particular, we issued a number of findings at sites managed by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). We also identified weaknesses across various Department program elements. Issues that warrant further attention include: (1) Weaknesses such as outdated security plans and not completing annual security control self-assessments were identified at several sites; (2) The Department had not yet resolved systems inventory issues and had yet to deploy a complex-wide automated asset management tool to help track information technology resources and identify interfaces between systems or networks; (3) Although certain improvements had been made to enhance access controls, we noted deficiencies such as a lack of periodic account reviews and inadequate password management at a number of sites; and (4) Previously identified weaknesses in configuration management had been corrected, however, we found problems related to weak administrator account settings and failure to install software patches, as well as incomplete implementation of the Federal Desktop Core Configuration. These internal control weaknesses existed, at least in part, because certain cyber security roles and responsibilities were not clearly delineated. Program officials also had not effectively performed monitoring and review activities essential for evaluating the adequacy of cyber security performance. In some cases, officials had not ensured that weaknesses discovered during audits and other evaluations were recorded and tracked to resolution in the organizations' Plans of Action and Milestones. Our testing disclosed that about 39 percent of existing corrective action milestones had missed estimated remediation dates, with many exceeding planned completion dates by at least one year. As a consequence, the risk of compromise to the Department's information and systems remained higher than necessary. To assist the continuing efforts to improve, we made several recommendations designed to help the Department's managers to strengthen the unclassified cyber security program and, thereby, protect its computer resources from unauthorized modification, loss, or disclosure of information. Due to security considerations, information on specific vulnerabilities and locations has been omitted from this report. Management officials at the sites evaluated were provided with detailed information regarding identified vulnerabilities, and, in many instances, initiated corrective actions.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Development of a diversity and defense-in-depth strategy for the TerraPower TWR-P Advanced nuclear power plant - 380

A Diversity and Defense in Depth (D3) analysis was performed for the Traveling Wave Reactor, which is a Generation IV fast reactor design. The analysis demonstrated that the current I and C design for TWR-P provides sufficient diversity in the reactor shutdown system, the engineered safety features, and the post-accident monitoring system. In addition, an analysis was performed for the Embedded Digital Devices (EDD) to ensure a postulated Software Common Cause Failure (SWCCF) will not affect the safety functions of the TWR-P I and C system. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

A Statistical Testing Approach for Quantifying Software Reliability; Application to an Example System

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) encourages the use of probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) technology in all regulatory matters, to the extent supported by the state-of-the-art in PRA methods and data. Although much has been accomplished in the area of risk-informed regulation, risk assessment for digital systems has not been fully developed. The NRC established a plan for research on digital systems to identify and develop methods, analytical tools, and regulatory guidance for (1) including models of digital systems in the PRAs of nuclear power plants (NPPs), and (2) incorporating digital systems in the NRC's risk-informed licensing and oversight activities. Under NRC's sponsorship, Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) explored approaches for addressing the failures of digital instrumentation and control (I and C) systems in the current NPP PRA framework. Specific areas investigated included PRA modeling digital hardware, development of a philosophical basis for defining software failure, and identification of desirable attributes of quantitative software reliability methods. Based on the earlier research, statistical testing is considered a promising method for quantifying software reliability. This paper describes a statistical software testing approach for quantifying software reliability and applies it to the loop-operating control system (LOCS) of an experimental loop of the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) at Idaho National Laboratory (INL).

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

DAKOTA reliability methods applied to RAVEN/RELAP-7.

This report summarizes the result of a NEAMS project focused on the use of reliability methods within the RAVEN and RELAP-7 software framework for assessing failure probabilities as part of probabilistic risk assessment for nuclear power plants. RAVEN is a software tool under development at the Idaho National Laboratory that acts as the control logic driver and post-processing tool for the newly developed Thermal-Hydraulic code RELAP-7. Dakota is a software tool developed at Sandia National Laboratories containing optimization, sensitivity analysis, and uncertainty quantification algorithms. Reliability methods are algorithms which transform the uncertainty problem to an optimization problem to solve for the failure probability, given uncertainty on problem inputs and a failure threshold on an output response. The goal of this work is to demonstrate the use of reliability methods in Dakota with RAVEN/RELAP-7. These capabilities are demonstrated on a demonstration of a Station Blackout analysis of a simplified Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR).

Swiler, Laura Painton↗

Software Requirements for a System to Compute Mean Failure Cost

In earlier works, we presented a computational infrastructure that allows an analyst to estimate the security of a system in terms of the loss that each stakeholder. We also demonstrated this infrastructure through the results of security breakdowns for the ecommerce case. In this paper, we illustrate this infrastructure by an application that supports the computation of the Mean Failure Cost (MFC) for each stakeholder.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Hazard analysis for identifying common cause failures of digital safety systems using a redundancy-guided systems-theoretic approach

Replacing the existing aging analog instrumentation and control (I&C) systems with modern safety control and protection, digital technology offers one of the foremost means of performance improvements and cost reductions for the existing nuclear power plants (NPPs). However, the qualification of digital I&C systems remains a challenge, especially considering the issue of software common-cause failures (CCFs), which are difficult to address. With the application and upgrades of advanced digital I&C systems, software CCFs have become a potential threat to plant safety because most redundant designs use similar digital platforms or software in the operating and application systems. With complex designs of multilayer redundancy to meet the single-failure criterion, digital I&C safety systems (e.g., engineered safety-features actuation system [ESFAS]) are of a particular concern in the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensing procedures. Here, this paper applies a modularized approach to conduct redundancy-guided systems-theoretic hazard analysis for an advanced digital ESFAS with multilevel redundancy designs. Systematic methods and risk-informed tools are incorporated to address both hardware and software CCFs, which provide guidance to eliminate the causal factors of potential single points of failure in the design of digital safety systems in advanced plant designs.

42 ENGINEERING↗

The Peridigm Meshfree Peridynamics Code

Abstract Peridigm is a meshfree peridynamics code written in C++ for use on large-scale parallel computers. It was originally developed at Sandia National Laboratories and is currently managed as an open-source, community driven software project. Its primary features include bond-based, state-based, and non-ordinary state-based constitutive models, bond failure laws, contact, and support for explicit and implicit time integration. To date, Peridigm has been used primarily by methods developers focused on solid mechanics and material failure. Peridigm utilizes foundational software components from Sandia’s Trilinos project and was designed for extensibility. This paper provides an overview of the solution methods implemented in Peridigm , a discussion of its software infrastructure, and demonstrates the use of Peridigm for the solution of several example problems.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

An Integrated Framework for Risk Assessment of Safety-related Digital Instrumentation and Control Systems in Nuclear Power Plants: Methodology Refinement and Exploration

This report documents activities performed by Idaho National Laboratory (INL) during Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Program, Risk Informed Systems Analysis (RISA) Pathway, digital instrumentation and control (DI&C) risk assessment project. In FY 2019, the RISA Pathway initiated a project to develop a risk assessment strategy for delivering a technical basis to support effective, and secure DI&C technologies for digital upgrades/designs. A risk assessment-informed framework was proposed for this strategy, which aims to (1) provide a best-estimate, risk informed capability to quantitatively estimate the safety margin obtained from plant modernization, especially for safety-related DI&C systems, (2) support and supplement existing risk informed DI&C design guides by providing quantitative risk information and evidence, (3) offer a capability of design architecture evaluation of various DI&C systems, (4) assure the long-term safety and reliability of safety-related DI&C systems, and (5) reduce uncertainty in costs and support integration of DI&C systems in the plant. To achieve these technical goals, the LWRS-developed framework provides a means to address relevant technical issues by: (1) defining a risk informed analysis process for DI&C upgrade that integrates hazard analysis, reliability analysis, and consequence analysis, (2) applying risk informed tools to address common cause failures (CCFs) and quantify corresponding failure probabilities for DI&C technologies, particularly software CCFs, (3) evaluating the impact of digital failures at the component level, system level, and plant level, and (4) providing insights and suggestions on designs to manage the risks, thus to support the development and deployment of advanced DI&C technologies in nuclear power plants (NPPs). Adding diversity within a system or components is the primary means to eliminate and mitigate CCFs, but diversity also increases system complexity and may not address all sources of systematic failures. Optimization of diversity and redundancy applications for the safety-critical DI&C systems remains a challenge. To deal with the technical issues in addressing potential software CCFs in safety-related DI&C systems of NPPs and supporting relevant design optimization, the proposed framework provides: (a) A best-estimate, risk informed capability to address new technical digital issues quantitatively, focusing on software CCFs in safety-related DI&C systems of NPPs; (b) A common and a modularized platform for DI&C designers, software developers, cybersecurity analysts, and plant engineers to predict and prevent risk in the early design stage of DI&C systems; (c) Technical bases and risk informed insights to assist users address the risk informed alternatives for evaluation of CCFs in safety-related DI&C systems of NPPs; and (d) A risk informed tool that offers a capability of design architecture evaluation of various DI&C systems to support system design decisions in diversity and redundancy applications. The research and development efforts of this project in FY 2023 are focused on refining current methods on software CCF modeling and estimation and exploring additional innovative approaches to risk assessment of DI&C systems to enable a more comprehensive and complete assessment of various safety-related DI&C design architectures. The primary audience of this report are DI&C designers, engineers, and probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) practitioners. This includes stakeholders, such as the nuclear utilities and regulators who consider the deployment and upgrade of DI&C systems, DI&C software developers and reviewers, and cybersecurity specialists. It should be noted that all the analyses are performed for the demonstration of the methodology, not for the evaluation of an actual digital control system. Results are obtained based on limited design information and testing data.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Risk Analysis of Various Design Architectures for High Safety-significant Safety-related Digital Instrumentation and Control Systems of Nuclear Power Plants during Accident Scenarios

This report documents the plus-up activities performed by Idaho National Laboratory (INL) during Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Program, Risk Informed Systems Analysis (RISA) Pathway, digital instrumentation and control (DI&C) risk assessment project. In FY 2019, the RISA Pathway initiated a project to develop a risk assessment strategy for delivering a strong technical basis to support effective, licensable, and secure DI&C technologies for digital upgrades/designs. An integrated risk assessment technology for the DI&C systems was proposed for this strategy, which aims to (1) provide a best-estimate, risk-informed capability to quantitatively and accurately estimate the safety margin obtained from plant modernization, especially for the high safety-significant safety-related (HSSSR) DI&C systems, (2) support and supplement existing advanced risk-informed DI&C design guides by providing quantitative risk information and evidence, (3) offer a capability of design architecture evaluation of various DI&C systems to support system design decisions and diversity and redundancy applications, (4) assure the long-term safety and reliability of HSSSR DI&C systems, and (5) reduce uncertainty in costs and support integration of DI&C systems in the plant. To achieve these technical goals and deal with the expensive licensing justifications from regulatory insights, the LWRS-developed framework instructs nuclear vendors and utilities on how to effectively lower the costs associated with digital compliance and speed industry advances by: (1) defining an integrated risk-informed analysis process for DI&C upgrade, including hazard analysis, reliability analysis, and consequence analysis, (2) applying systematic and risk-informed tools to address common cause failures (CCFs) and quantify corresponding failure probabilities for DI&C technologies, particularly software CCFs, (3) evaluating the impact of digital failures at the component level, system level, and plant level, and (4) providing insights and suggestions on designs to manage the risks, thus to support the development, licensing, and deployment of advanced DI&C technologies on nuclear power plant (NPPs). Adding diversity within system or components is the main means to eliminate and mitigate CCFs, but diversity also increases plant complexity and errors and may not address all sources of systematic failures. How to optimize the diversity and redundancy applications for the safety-critical DI&C systems remains a challenge. To deal with the technical issues in addressing potential software CCFs in HSSSR DI&C systems of NPPs and supporting relevant design optimization, the framework provides: ? An integrated best-estimate, risk-informed capability to address new technical digital issues quantitatively, accurately, and efficiently in plan modernization progress, such as software CCFs in HSSSR DI&C systems of NPPs ? A common and a modularized platform for DI&C designers, software developers, cybersecurity analysts, and plant engineers to efficiently predict and prevent risk in the early design stage of DI&C systems ? Technical bases and risk-informed insights to assist U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and industry to address and fulfill the risk-informed alternatives for evaluation of CCFs in HSSSR DI&C systems of NPPs ? An integrated risk-informed tool that offers a capability of design architecture evaluation of various DI&C systems to support system design decisions in diversity and redundancy applications. The plus-up research and development efforts of this project in FY 2022 are focused on methodology improvement of software CCF modeling and estimation, prevention analysis, importance analysis and risk analysis of various design architectures of HSSSR DI&C systems. This work greatly enhances the capability of the LWRS-developed framework for the risk assessment and design optimization of safety-critical DI&C systems. It should be noted that all the analyses are performed for the demonstration of the LWRS-developed framework, not for the evaluation of relevant systems. Results are obtained based on very limited design information and testing data.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

An Integrated Framework for Risk Assessment of High Safety Significant Safety-related Digital Instrumentation and Control Systems in Nuclear Power Plants: Methodology and Demonstration

This report documents the activities performed by Idaho National Laboratory (INL) during Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Program, Risk Informed Systems Analysis (RISA) Pathway, digital instrumentation and control (DI&C) risk assessment project. In FY 2019, the RISA Pathway initiated a project to develop a risk assessment strategy for delivering a technical basis to support effective and secure DI&C technologies for digital upgrades/designs. A framework was proposed for this strategy, which aims to (1) provide a best-estimate, risk-informed capability to quantitatively and accurately estimate the risk impact of plant modernization, considering the introduction of high safety-significant safety-related (HSSSR) DI&C systems, (2) support and supplement existing risk-informed DI&C design guides by providing quantitative risk information and evidence, (3) offer a capability of design architecture evaluation of various DI&C systems, (4) assure the long-term safety and reliability of HSSSR DI&C systems, and (5) reduce uncertainty in costs and support integration of DI&C systems in the plant. To achieve these technical goals, the framework provides a means to address relevant technical issues by: (1) defining a risk-informed analysis process for DI&C upgrade, that integrates hazard analysis, reliability analysis, and consequence analysis, (2) applying risk-informed tools to address common cause failures (CCFs) and quantify corresponding failure probabilities for DI&C technologies, particularly software CCFs, (3) evaluating the impact of digital failures at the component level, system level, and plant level, and (4) providing insights and suggestions on designs to manage the risks, thus to support the development and deployment of advanced DI&C technologies on nuclear power plant (NPPs).

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Investigating Various Failure Models on Commercial Silicon Carbide

Structures and components made from ceramic materials are often brittle and can fail by the unstable growth of existing flaws such as voids and cracks. There have been several failure criteria developed for ceramics, in the past and they are broadly categorized based on their dependency on crack geometry. The present work implements eight failure criteria using an open-source software package – srlife, which predicts the lifetime or failure probability of concentrated solar power (CSP) structural components. The present work also checks the viability of building a ceramic CSP receiver, by analyzing the reliability predictions from srlife for a SiC ceramic. The reliability predictions for a biaxial loading problem indicated the Shetty Mixed-Mode criterion gives the most conservative predictions. Whereas, in case of the CSP receiver, the predictions show that the co-planar strain energy criterion gives the most conservative predictions as it is agnostic towards the type of stress, and therefore, is not recommended to be used designing ceramic receivers.

Chaugule, Pawan (ORCID:0000000275706572)↗

Defining and Characterizing Methods, Tools, and Computing Resources to Support Pseudo Exhaustive Testability of Software Based I&C Devices

Under the Department of Energy’s Light Water Reactor Sustainability Program, within the Plant Modernization research pathway, the Digital I&C Qualification Project is identifying new methods that would be beneficial in qualifying digital I&C systems and devices for safety-related usage. One such method that would be useful in qualifying field components such as sensors and actuators is the concept of testability. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) considers testability to be one of two design attributes sufficient to eliminate consideration of software-based or software logic-based common cause failure (the other being diversity). The NRC defines acceptable “testability” as follows: Testability – A system is sufficiently simple such that every possible combination of inputs and every possible sequence of device states are tested and all outputs are verified for every case (100% tested). [NUREG 0800, Chapter 7, Branch Technical Position (BTP) 7-19] This qualification method has never proven to be practical in view of the very large number of combinations of inputs and sequences of device states for a typical I&C device. However, many of these combinations are not unique in the sense that they represent the same state space or in that that they represent state space that would not affect the critical design basis functions of the device. Therefore, the state space of interest might possibly be reduced to a manageable dimension through such analysis. This project focuses on a representative I&C device similar in design, function, and complexity to the types of devices that would likely be deployed in nuclear power plants as digital or software based sensors and actuators (e.g. Smart Sensors). Analysis will be conducted to determine the feasibility of testing this device in a manner consistent with the NRC definition. This report describes acceptable test methods, needed tools (existing or new), and computing resources, all based on engineering and computer science principles. This information will then be used in a later phase of this project to develop a test specification for I&C device testability that can be used in a future phase of this project to demonstrate digital qualification with respect to common cause failure. Following that, testing will be conducted and the results analyzed to determine if the methods employed are sufficient to eliminate consideration of software common cause failure in accordance with the concept of testability.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Quantifying effectiveness of failure prediction and response in HPC systems : methodology and example.

Effective failure prediction and mitigation strategies in high-performance computing systems could provide huge gains in resilience of tightly coupled large-scale scientific codes. These gains would come from prediction-directed process migration and resource servicing, intelligent resource allocation, and checkpointing driven by failure predictors rather than at regular intervals based on nominal mean time to failure. Given probabilistic associations of outlier behavior in hardware-related metrics with eventual failure in hardware, system software, and/or applications, this paper explores approaches for quantifying the effects of prediction and mitigation strategies and demonstrates these using actual production system data. We describe context-relevant methodologies for determining the accuracy and cost-benefit of predictors. While many research studies have quantified the expected impact of growing system size, and the associated shortened mean time to failure (MTTF), on application performance in large-scale high-performance computing (HPC) platforms, there has been little if any work to quantify the possible gains from predicting system resource failures with significant but imperfect accuracy. This possibly stems from HPC system complexity and the fact that, to date, no one has established any good predictors of failure in these systems. Our work in the OVIS project aims to discover these predictors via a variety of data collection techniques and statistical analysis methods that yield probabilistic predictions. The question then is, 'How good or useful are these predictions?' We investigate methods for answering this question in a general setting, and illustrate them using a specific failure predictor discovered on a production system at Sandia.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

A cascading failure analysis tool for post processing TRANSCARE simulations

This is a MATLAB-based tool to post process simulation results in the EPRI software TRANSCARE, for massive cascading failure analysis following severe disturbances. There are a few key modules available in this tool, including: 1. automatically creating a contingency list to run TRANSCARE simulations, including substation outages above a certain kV threshold, N-k (1, 2 or 3) generator outages and branch outages; 2. read in and analyze a CKO file of PCG definition, an initiating event list, and a CDN file; 3. post process all the simulation results saved in a CDN file and perform critical event corridor analysis; 4. provide a summary of TRANSCARE simulations; 5. Identify the most frequently occurring event corridors in the system; and 6. Rank the contingencies using a user defined security index to quantify consequences in terms of total load loss, total number of cascades, etc.

Source record↗

A qualitative assessment of current CCF guidance based on a review of safety system digital implementation changes with evolving technology - 148

This paper is a summary of a study performed in support of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to evaluate current policy on software common-cause failure (CCF). The study reported in this paper is one of several that contributed to the technical basis to inform NRC staff. The study first reviewed policies and assessment guidance as discussed in the Staff Requirements Memorandum to the Secretary of the Commission, Office of the NRC (SECY) 93-087, Policy, Technical, and Licensing Issues Pertaining to Evolutionary and Advanced Light Water Reactor (ALWR) Designs, and Branch Technical Position (BTP) 7-19, Guidance on Evaluation of Defense-in-Depth and Diversity in Digital Computer-Based Instrumentation and Control Systems, as well as Chapter 7, 'Instrumentation and Controls', in NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan for Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants. The study then examined instrumentation and controls (I and C) technology implementations in nuclear power plants in the light of current CCF guidance. The intent was to assess whether the current position on CCF remains appropriate given the evolutions in digital safety system implementations and, if gaps in the guidance were found, to provide recommendations as to how these gaps could be closed. The methodology adopted was to review the vendors' technology and software implementation processes for digital safety systems as technology evolved. The following three representative safety systems were selected to provide illustrative examples: - Eagle 21 was selected to represent vintage microprocessor-based technology used from the 1980's to mid-1990's, - TELEPERM XS (TXS) was selected to represent second generation microprocessor-based technology used from the mid-1990's to the 2000's, and - The advanced logic system (ALS) was selected to represent the latest trend of using technology based on field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs). Technology implementations were reviewed in light of the basic premise of the NRC in BTP 7-19 (Revision 6), that software-based or software-logic-based digital system development errors are a credible source of CCF and therefore are susceptible to CCF because identical copies of the software-based logic and architecture are present in redundant divisions of safety-related systems. BTP 7-19 categorizes firmware and logic developed from software-based development systems all under software. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Software Resilience using Kokkos Ecosystem

Due to the cost of hardware failures within mission critical and scientific applications, it is necessary for software to provide a mechanism to prevent or recover from interruptions. The Kokkos ecosystem is a programming environment that provides performance and portability to many applications that run on DOE supercomputers as well as smaller scale systems. These applications require a higher level of service due to the cost associated with each simulation or the critical nature of the mission. Software resilience enables an application of manage hardware failures reducing the cost of an interruption. Two different resilience methodologies have been added to the Kokkos ecosystem: checkpointing has been added for restart capabilities and a resilient execution model has been added to account for failures in compute devices. The design and implementation of each of these additions are described, and appropriate examples are included for end users.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗