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Aqueous stream of human waste is mixed with soluble ruthenium salts and is introduced into reactor at temperature where ruthenium black catalyst forms on internal surfaces of reactor. This provides catalytically active surface to convert oxidizable wastes into breakdown products such as water and carbon dioxide.
Two thermoplastic processes for improved treatment of radioactive, hazardous, and mixed wastes were developed from bench scale through technology demonstration: polyethylene encapsulation and modified sulfur cement encapsulation. The steps required to bring technologies from the research and development stage through full scale implementation are described. Both systems result in durable waste forms that meet current Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Environmental Protection Agency regulatory criteria and provide significant improvements over conventional solidification systems such as hydraulic cement. For example, the polyethylene process can encapsulate up to 70 wt pct. nitrate salt, compared with a maximum of about 20 wt pct. for the best hydraulic cement formulation. Modified sulfur cement waste forms containing as much as 43 wt pct. incinerator fly ash were formulated, whereas the maximum quantity of this waste in hydraulic cement is 16 wt pct.
The dechlorination and vitrification apparatus (DeVA) discussed in this report is a prototype conceptualization of a device that could be used to remove halogens from salt-based waste streams so that the remaining salt cations can be converted to oxides and immobilized in a glass-based waste form.
The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) provides for safe, permanent disposal of government-owned transuranic (TRU) and TRU mixed wastes. Receipt and disposal of waste at the WIPP site began in March 1999. The Sandia report, Consideration of Nuclear Criticality When Disposing of Transuranic Waste at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, addressed potential nuclear criticality safety issues based on the projected inventory characteristics known at the time [1]. As designs for inventory, waste forms, and disposal packages have changed, new analyses have been performed, and updates have been made to address any potential effects to the WIPP safety basis. New analyses performed include Saylor 2017 [2] and Brickner 2019 [3], which address certain waste containers with specified loadings under post-closure conditions. Both examined several hypothetical scenarios and included analyses to bound (from a criticality potential standpoint) credible configurations that could occur at WIPP during the repository regulatory post-closure disposal time period for feature, event, and process (FEP) considerations—10,000 years. During this post-closure period at WIPP, the screening of FEPs is governed by the risk-based standards and implementing regulations of the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) (i.e., 40 CFR 191 and 40 CFR 194, respectively) [4,5]. An FEP screening can be based on either a low-consequence or low-probability rationale. A low-probability rationale includes either (a) a qualitative rationale that the FEP is not credible or (b) a quantitative demonstration that the probability is less than 10-4 in 104 years. In this evaluation, a qualitative lowprobability rationale of not credible is used by demonstrating that bounding configurations of the waste are not critical. The demonstration of subcriticality is through quantitative calculations, but a probability of criticality is not evaluated. Rather, the rationale for this evaluation is that bounding configurations with an effective neutron multiplication factor (keff) well below the upper subcriticality limit (USL) make criticality incredible. Reference [2] documented a nuclear criticality assessment of the WIPP repository for disposal of dilute surplus plutonium materials using the Dilute and Dispose Approach and packaging in criticality control overpacks (CCOs). The CCO is the waste disposal container recently designed to allow for up to 380 fissile gram equivalent (FGE) 239 Pu per drum, which is a higher fissile loading than typical waste containers. The CCO consists of a criticality control container (CCC) positioned by upper and lower plywood spacers within a standard 55 gal drum. The CCC is used to establish a geometry control for fissile materials during transportation and WIPP emplacement operations. The current WIPP waste acceptance criteria for CCO payloads limit beryllium to less than or equal to 1% by weight of the waste contents and require the waste form to be non-machine compacted. Reference [2] considered two scenario progressions—room closure from salt creep, hereafter referred to as the reconfigured dry scenario, and flooding with brine, hereafter referred to as the reconfigured wet scenario. The subsequent drying out of the reconfigured wet scenarios was also considered. For all scenarios, subcriticality was maintained when 50 g of B 4 C (acting as a neutron absorber) per CCC was intermixed within the plutonium disposition waste form. The analysis used a waste form description that limits the amount of moderation that could be present within the waste form (i.e., it limits the amount of water and polyethylene that could be present based on planned processing conditions). This analysis to evaluate increased limits on the amount of moderation that could be present was performed as a companion to Reference [2] to address concerns associated with verifying moisture and/or plastic contents of waste materials following packaging of dilute surplus plutonium in the CCO. To that end, this analysis used the models and methods from Reference [2] to evaluate a more generic base waste form consisting of water and polyethylene that is more similar (and nearly identical) to the generic waste forms utilized in other models/analyses supporting the TRU Package Transporter Model II (TRUPACTII) safety analysis [6] (all are without moderation controls). The waste form in this analysis uses a base mixture of 75% water and 25% polyethylene, the total amount of which is varied to determine the optimum moderation to fissile material (H/Pu) ratio. The fissile loading is maintained at up to 380 FGE 239 Pu (modeled as PuO 2 ) per CCO with an additional 545 g of beryllium (to bound the 1% by weight contents restriction) and 50 g of B 4 C intermixed per CCO. The beryllium content (1% by weight) is based on the total allowed waste weight (this does not include packaging and container weights). Figures ES-1 and ES-2 display summary results, showing that with this model including 50 g of B 4 C per CCO, the system keff remains under 0.85 for all moderator amounts and provides a significant margin against post-closure criticality under postulated bounding conditions for compaction. Figure ES-1 compares an infinite model with a room model at the initial emplacement spacing and under full radial compaction. Full radial compaction places each CCC in direct contact and does not credit any anticipated spacing associated with current post-closure geomechanical modeling of the repository [7]. The effects of variations in the H/Pu ratio were evaluated by varying the amount of the water/polyethylene component of the waste model, with fissile loading maintained at 380 239 Pu FGE. Similarly, Figure ES-2 illustrates how various amounts of B 4 C per CCO influence k eff at different radial compactions, all at the H/Pu ratio of 200 (in the room array model). Therefore, while the results from Saylor 2017 [2] modeled more realistic process limits associated with packaging of dilute surplus plutonium, this analysis demonstrates that limits on moderation (plastic and water content) are not necessary to ensure subcriticality in the WIPP repository, provided the requisite B 4 C absorber is present.
Based on the higher interest in Advanced Reactor (AR) deployment (e.g., ARDP[1]) for potential new fuel cycles, the Spent Fuel & Waste Science and Technology (SFWST) Program has begun to evaluate the possible implications of long-term management and final disposition of potential Advance Reactor spent nuclear fuels (SNF) that would be generated in potential advanced reactors. Safely managing and dispositioning the potential future AR SNF, and any other associated radioactive wastes, is the primary focus of this initial preliminary assessment of those. This paper summarizes the efforts by the Spent Fuel & Waste Science and Technology (SFWST) in evaluating characteristics and packaging options for advanced reactor spent nuclear fuel forms. The fuel forms were categorized into three types: (1) tristructural isotropic (TRISO), (2) metallic, and (3) fuel salt. This work emphasized TRISO and metallic SNF and waste streams because of the near-term anticipated operation of the Xe-100 and the Natrium reactors as advanced-reactor demonstrations. Preliminary information for the spent-fuel salts discharged from molten-salt reactors (MSRs) is also examined to provide a baseline for future efforts. All calculations and assumptions used publicly available information. The following characteristics are calculated or estimated for use in the preliminary assessments: SNF volume and mass, radiation/activity levels through time, thermal conditions through time, potential radionuclide source terms, chemical interactions and evolutions, disposal inventories, and waste-form lifetime. Using those characteristics, calculations to determine the applicability of existing canister designs were performed. These evaluations included geometric (e.g., dimension, volume) and mass/weight considerations, known operational approaches and loading procedures, physical and chemical considerations/conditions for storage environments, as-loaded radiation, thermal, and criticality analyses to identify constraints for storage, transportation, and disposal. The paper also includes a literature review and analysis on the storage, transportation, and disposal evaluations and experiences from reactors with similar fuel forms. Advanced-reactor vendors cite past experiences with Fort St. Vrain for TRISO and the Experimental Breeder Reactor II (EBR-II) for metallics that have major influences on fuel design. Finally, the paper includes preliminary concepts of operation for advanced-reactor SNF. This encompasses storage, transportation, potential treatment, and disposal activities from both a per-canister and systems-integration perspective.
In 2019, Savannah River Remediation developed a revision to the performance assessment (PA) on behalf of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Savannah River Operations Office (SR) for the near-surface disposal of low-level waste at the Savannah River Site (SRS) Saltstone Disposal Facility (SDF). Soluble waste from SRS Tank Farms undergoes salt processing to remove cesium and other high activity constituents. The low-activity decontaminated salt solution (DSS) is then immobilized by mixing it into a cementitious waste form known as saltstone. After mixing, the saltstone is poured into leak-tight concrete vaults, known as saltstone disposal units (SDUs), where the waste form cures. By the time of facility closure, the SDF is expected to consist of 15 SDUs with a combined capacity of 1.06 E+09 L (280 Mgal) of cured saltstone. The facility operates under a Disposal Authorization Statement (DAS) from DOE and a permit from the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC). Since the start of operations in 1990, the SDF has received almost 6.7 E+07 L (18 Mgal) of DSS, resulting in the safe disposal of 2.7 E+16 Bq (7.3 E+05 Ci) of activity. Due to the radioactive decay of short-lived contaminants, the total remaining activity in the disposed waste is estimated to be approximately 1.4 E+16 Bq (3.9 E+05 Ci), as of September 2018. The Disposal Authorization Statement requires a demonstration that the system of engineered and natural features of the disposal facility will limit releases from the facility and be protective of human health and the environment for at least the next 1,000 years. The long-term performance of the facility was evaluated under the requirements of the DoE's Radioactive Waste Management Manual (US DOE Manual 435.1-1). Simulations were performed to demonstrate that the disposal facility would meet performance objectives specified in the manual. The evaluation was based on numerical models that simulate the releases of contaminants from the saltstone waste form. Contaminants were transported through groundwater and air pathways to points of assessment to evaluate compliance. In addition, the potential consequences of an inadvertent human intrusion (IHI) were also evaluated. In accordance with the guidance and recommendations in US DoE's technical standard for DAS, deterministic and probabilistic analyses were performed to demonstrate the SDF system, which includes the engineered cover system, the SDUs, the waste form, and the natural features of the site, provides a reasonable expectation that saltstone disposal will meet performance objectives. Post-closure doses to future members of the public (MOP) were evaluated; dose estimates from the air pathway were well below the 1.0 E-04 Sv/yr (10 mrem/yr) performance objective within 1,000 years, and the calculated doses to the MOP from all exposure pathways, including the groundwater and air pathways, were well below the 2.5 E-04 Sv/yr (25 mrem/yr) performance objective within 1,000 years. Doses following an assumed intrusion event within the facility boundaries were well below the IHI performance objectives, where the acute IHI dose was below the acute IHI dose performance objective of 5.0 E-03 Sv (500 mrem) and the chronic IHI dose was below the chronic IHI dose performance objective of 1.0 E-03 Sv/yr (100 mrem/yr) within 1,000 years. (author)
In 2019, Savannah River Remediation developed a revision to the performance assessment (PA) on behalf of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Savannah River Operations Office (SR) for the near-surface disposal of low-level waste at the Savannah River Site (SRS) Saltstone Disposal Facility (SDF). Soluble waste from SRS Tank Farms undergoes salt processing to remove cesium and other high-activity constituents. The low-activity decontaminated salt solution (DSS) is then immobilized by mixing it into a cementitious waste form known as saltstone. After mixing, the saltstone is poured into leak-tight concrete vaults, known as saltstone disposal units (SDUs), where the waste form cures. By the time of facility closure, the SDF is expected to consist of 15 SDUs with a combined capacity of 1.06 E+09 L (280 Mgal) of cured saltstone. The facility operates under a Disposal Authorization Statement from DOE and a permit from the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC). Since the start of operations in 1990, the SDF has received almost 6.7 E+07 L (18 Mgal) of DSS, resulting in the safe disposal of 2.7 E+16 Bq (7.3 E+05 Ci) of activity. Due to the radioactive decay of short-lived contaminants, the total remaining activity in the disposed waste is estimated to be approximately 1.4 E+16 Bq (3.9 E+05 Ci), as of September 2018. The Disposal Authorization Statement requires a demonstration that the system of engineered and natural features of the disposal facility will limit releases from the facility and be protective of human health and the environment for at least the next 1,000 years. The long-term performance of the facility was evaluated under the requirements of the DoE's Radioactive Waste Management Manual (US DOE Manual 435.1-1). Simulations were performed to demonstrate that the disposal facility would meet performance objectives specified in the manual. The evaluation was based on numerical models that simulate the releases of contaminants from the saltstone waste form. Contaminants were transported through groundwater and air pathways to points of assessment to evaluate compliance (i.e., 100 m from the SDUs). In addition, the potential consequences of an inadvertent human intrusion (IHI) were also evaluated. A number of issues were overcome during the development of these simulations. These issues were identified as part of internal technical reviews. Simulations are developed by people and people make mistakes, so the internal technical review process is a vital step in PA development. Specific examples of resolved issues include a unit-conversion error, an inappropriate definition for a model boundary condition, a model time-stepping issue, and an error in the calculation for the buildup of contaminants in soil. Actions taken to address these issues resulted in an improved product with a better supported technical basis and more defensible results. The identification and correction of these issues are discussed. By understanding these issues, model developers and technical reviewers working on PAs in the future may avoid repeating these types of mistakes. Transparency with respect to these mistakes builds trust between waste management sites, regulators, and stakeholders. (authors)
The Tank Closure Cesium Removal (TCCR) process at the Savannah River Site (SRS) is currently processing waste from Tank 10H, generating decontaminated salt solution that is sent to Tank 11H. Transfers out of Tank 11H are then disposed of on site as a grout wasteform in the SRS Saltstone Processing Facility. This is a full-scale demonstration of the use of Crystalline Silicotitanate (CST) for the decontamination of aqueous nuclear waste supernate. CST primarily removes cesium from the high sodium alkaline feed, but also adsorbs strontium, actinides, and some other trace metals. The TCCR unit is an at-tank set of four ion exchange columns, with two typically being operated in series during waste processing. Tank 10H is serving a dual function as both the salt dissolution tank as well as the feed tank for the TCCR system. Prior to operation of TCCR, Tank 10H must undergo dissolution campaigns, dissolving the salt cake to form an aqueous salt solution (supernate). After each dissolution campaign, the supernate created must be qualified prior to processing through the TCCR system. Qualification includes detailed characterization of the supernate as well as in-tank batch contact tests to determine the equilibrium loading of Cs-137 on the CST ion exchange media (IONSIV{sup TM} R9120-Ba). In support of the in-tank batch contact testing, Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) developed a CST sample holder, also referred to as a 'tea-bag', to hold a measured amount (∼0.1 grams) of pretreated CST between stainless steel screens. The tea-bag fits within a standard stainless steel sample vial that has been modified to allow the flow of supernate to the CST. This sample holder is then immersed in the waste tank allowing free contact between the CST beads and the surrounding liquid, at an effectively infinite liquid-to-solid phase ratio. A pair of tea-bags are deployed in the tank for a period of 10 days for each batch, after which the CST is recovered, digested, and analyzed to determine the loading of cesium isotopes on the CST. This result then supports the TCCR column thermal loading limits for processing as part of the TCCR safety basis. This paper will discuss the design and testing of the CST sample holder, as well as results from the first few batches of waste qualified and subsequently processed through the TCCR system. In addition, results from analyses of Tank 11H samples, showing decontamination of the product will be included. (authors)
Savannah River Remediation (SRR) manages and operates the liquid waste facilities at Savannah River Site (SRS) for the Department of Energy (DOE). Stored liquid waste is a complex mixture of insoluble solids (sludge) and soluble salts in an alkaline solution. SRR has deployed the Tank Closure Cesium Removal (TCCR) system, a tank-side ion exchange process, to remove radioactive cesium from salt waste and enable onsite disposal of the resulting decontaminated salt solution as low-level waste at the Saltstone facilities. The TCCR system consists of two prefilters, four ion exchange (IX) columns, one resin trap, and a ventilation system. The IX process uses a form of inorganic crystalline silicotitanate (CST), which has a high affinity for cesium and other alkali metals, strontium, and actinides. This process is currently deployed utilizing salt feed from Tank 10, with future plans to dissolve solid salt in Tank 9 and transfer the salt solution to Tank 10 for processing through TCCR. The feed for TCCR must be created from salt-cake in Tank 10 through a dissolution process. Once enough salt has been dissolved, a qualification process is entered. This process characterizes the feed and ensures the cesium loading on the columns will not cause boiling of waste within the columns during or after processing. Once the batch has been qualified, salt waste is fed to the TCCR system through a transfer pump in the center of the tank. The waste is filtered through a set of two shielded, dead-end prefilters that prevent solids buildup in the columns. The filtered salt solution then travels to the shielded IX columns, which can be operated individually or in series, where the cesium is sorbed on the CST media. The decontaminated salt solution (DSS) then travels through a resin trap and out of the module to Tank 11. TCCR has successfully processed approximately 795,000 L of Tank 10H radioactive salt waste over two batches to date. There has not yet been a system induced shutdown. The prefilters performed as expected with only minor degradation in recovery of differential pressure after a backflush sequence. The time between backflushes decreased as each batch reached the end of processing. The hydraulics in the IXCs mostly performed as expected at all flow rates, except for one IXC that will be further investigated during Batch 3 processing. The TCCR system has shown some opportunities for more efficient processing during the length of the demonstration so far. For future processing of material from Tank 9H through Tank 10H and the TCCR unit, TCCR 1A will implement changes to the prefilters and the IXCs. The prefilters will have an increased surface area and a new filter media in an effort to increase time between filter swaps and improve backwashing cleaning capability. The IXCs will have a reduced diameter to allow for increased heat transfer out of the column and increased loading of Cs-137. Additionally, a new form of CST with an increased kinetic performance is being investigated for use during TCCR 1A operation. (authors)
Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) has been requested by Savannah River Mission Completion (SRMC)/ Salt Waste Processing Facility (SWPF) personnel to investigate the potential routes for titanium and mercury accumulations within the SWPF Flowsheet. The first part of this work examined how various forms of mercury can migrate through the solvent extraction system. This entailed single stage distribution tests, a multi-stage Extraction-Scrub-Strip (ESS) test, and a detailed speciation analysis of several salt batch feed samples.
A wet oxidation process was developed for oxidizing waste materials, comprising dissolved ruthenium salt in a reactant feed stream containing the waste materials. The feed stream is introduced into a reactor, and the reactor contents are then raised to an elevated temperature to effect deposition of a catalytic surface of ruthenium black on the interior walls of the reactor. The feed stream is then maintained in the reactor for a period of time sufficient to effect at least partial oxidation of the waste materials.
Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) has been requested by Savannah River Mission Completion (SRMC)/ Salt Waste Processing Facility (SWPF) personnel to investigate the potential routes for titanium and mercury accumulations within the SWPF Flowsheet. This report documents work performed to examine how various forms of mercury can migrate through the multiple flowsheets of a solvent extraction system. This entailed 29 single stage distribution tests, a multi-stage Extraction-Scrub-Strip (ESS) test, and a detailed speciation analysis of several salt batch feed samples.
Based on the higher interest in Advanced Reactor (AR) deployment (e.g., ARDP ) for potential new fuel cycles, the Spent Fuel & Waste Science and Technology (SFWST) Program has begun to evaluate the possible implications of long-term management and final disposition of potential Advance Reactor spent nuclear fuels (SNF) that would be generated in potential advanced reactors. Safely managing and dispositioning the potential future AR SNF, and any other associated radioactive wastes, is the primary focus of this initial preliminary assessment of those. This paper summarizes three primary tasks the Spent Fuel & Waste Science and Technology (SFWST) Program is executing (or collaborating on) related to the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle (BENFC) for potential future advanced reactors: 1. Advanced Reactors Spent Fuel and Waste Streams: Strategies for the BENFC This set of activities define a high-level strategy for how to systematically approach, identify, and close research and development (R&D) gaps/potential issues associated with long-term management and final disposition of AR SNF and other possible AR waste streams. This task involves summarizing advanced reactor concepts, their likely SNF and other waste forms, and identifying previous experience with similar materials, for example from DOE-managed SNF, with closely related characteristics to the potential future AR SNF. Technical R&D gaps between the breadth of detailed understanding for safe storage, transportation and disposal of the existing light water reactor SNF fuel cycle (e.g., see NASEM, 2022) and potential future fuel cycles based on advanced reactors would then be identified. 2. Characterization and Packaging Options of Advanced Reactor SNF These activities evaluate characteristics and packaging options for advanced reactor spent fuel forms. The fuel forms are categorized into three types: (1) tri-structural isotropic (TRISO), (2) metallic, and (3) fuel salt. Emphasis is given to TRISO and metallic SNF and additional waste streams from such AR as driven by the near-term anticipated operation of the Xe-100 and the Natrium reactors as advanced-reactor demonstrations1. Preliminary information for the spent-fuel salt discharged from molten-salt reactors (MSRs) is examined to provide a baseline for future efforts. All calculations and assumptions in this work are based on publicly available information. The following characteristics are calculated or estimated for use in the preliminary assessments: SNF volume and mass, radiation/activity levels through time, thermal conditions through time, potential radionuclide source terms, chemical interactions and evolutions, disposal inventories, and waste-form lifetime. Using those characteristics, calculations to determine the applicability of existing canister designs were performed. These evaluations included geometric (e.g., dimension, volume) and mass/weight considerations, known operational approaches and loading procedures, physical and chemical considerations/conditions for storage environments, as-loaded radiation, thermal, and criticality analyses to identify constraints for storage, transportation, and disposal. 3. Back-End Management of Advanced Reactors (BEMAR) The DOE NE-8 organization has defined an Integrated Project Team to evaluate the Back End Management of Advanced Reactors (BEMAR) (includes DOE staff from a range of organizations (e.g., NE-81, NE-82, OCED) and national laboratory technical staff within the DOE NE-81 and NE-82 programs). This BEMAR group works directly with advance reactors developers to assess for the DOE the technical feasibility of storage, transportation, and disposal of AR SNF based on the characteristics provided by the developers to DOE (much of which is proprietary). The BEMAR is also tasked to develop rough-order-of-magnitude cost estimates to compare the waste management system for individual advanced reactors to existing light-water reactor management practices. To accomplish this, the BEMAR group is implementing a Systems Engineering approach.
Due to increased interest in advanced reactor deployment and their associated potential new fuel cycles, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Spent Fuel and Waste Science and Technology (SFWST) program has begun to evaluate the possible implications of long term management and final disposition of the spent nuclear fuel (SNF) generated. Safely managing and dispositioning this SNF, along with any other associated radioactive waste, is the primary focus of this initial preliminary assessment. This paper summarizes efforts to evaluate the characteristics and packaging options for three types of advanced reactor SNF forms: (1) tristructural isotropic (TRISO), (2) metallic, and (3) irradiated fuel salt presented in the report titled “Storage, Transportation, and Disposal of Advanced Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Waste”. TRISO and metallic SNF and their associated waste streams were emphasized because of the near-term anticipated demonstrations of X-energy’s Xe-100 and TerraPower and GE Hitachi’s Natrium advanced reactors. Preliminary information on spent fuel salts discharged from molten-salt reactors (MSRs) was also examined to provide a baseline for future efforts. All calculations and assumptions were based on publicly available information. This paper identifies several different reactors that produce either TRISO or metallic SNF as well as a few of the reactor and fuel characteristics used for the assessments. Based on these characteristics, calculations were performed to determine the applicability of packaging SNF into existing canister designs. The evaluations included geometric (e.g., dimension, volume) and mass/weight considerations, known operational approaches and loading procedures, physical and chemical considerations/conditions for storage environments, and as-loaded radiation, thermal, and criticality analyses to identify constraints on storage, transportation, and disposal. Gaps in publicly available data pertaining to reactor operation and/or fuel composition provide increased uncertainty in some evaluations. Additionally, uncertainty in packaging and SNF management operations provide additional uncertainty. However, preliminary conclusions can still be assessed through this work and are presented in this paper.
Savannah River Mission Completion is the Liquid Waste (LW) contractor at the Savannah River Site (SRS). The LW mission is tasked with treating and disposing of legacy nuclear waste. There are multiple facilities involved in this work, including the Concentration, Storage, and Transfer Facilities (CSTF), the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF), the Salt Waste Processing Facility (SWPF), and the Saltstone Production Facility (SPF). The CSTF includes 43 underground waste tanks used to store and support processing of radioactive liquid waste. Waste removal activities, such as salt dissolution campaigns and sludge agitation, are conducted within the CSTF waste tanks to convert the waste into a form that allows for downstream processing at other LW facilities. While performing these waste removal campaigns, camera inspections are performed to assess the quantity and distribution of the remaining waste within the waste tank (i.e. saltcake or sludge). Understanding the quantity and distribution of the salt/sludge within the waste tanks allows for improved waste removal strategies (e.g. mixing pump operation) and refined safety controls. Typically, several camera inspections are performed during a waste removal transfer to verify the elevation of the visible salt/sludge mounds against the known elevation of the liquid surface. The camera inspection footage must then be interpreted by a trained engineer who will develop a 2-D map that depicts the waste distribution at various elevations within the waste tank. This tank mapping is then used in conjunction with conservative assumptions to evaluate the volume of saltcake or sludge that is present within the waste tank.
There is significant domestic and international interest, investment, and research and development momentum to pursue advanced nuclear reactor technologies. Molten salt reactor (MSR) concepts display the largest variability in fuel type and design features among the current advanced concepts. MSRs have been proposed with various core designs, sizes (power), and fuel cycles. Salt-fueled molten salt systems represent the only advanced reactor type with fuel that is not in a solid form during operation. These “liquid-fueled” MSRs are unique from perspectives of fuel fabrication, spent irradiated fuel and waste components, licensing, and material control and accountability (MC&A) including the potential of fissile material holdup. The liquid fuel salt is the defining distinction in comparison to other advanced reactors that propose TRI-structural ISOtropic particle fuel pebbles, various coolant options (e.g., molten salts or metals, high temperature gas), or small modular alternatives using solid fuel variants including both light water reactors and non-light water reactors. MSRs are appealing to the nuclear energy industry because of the diverse reactor characteristics they can support including various neutron energy spectra, fueling requirements, fuel cycles, and/or fuel utilization. However, because of the significant deviation and diversity of a salt-fueled system compared to traditional solid fuel light water-cooled reactors (LWRs), the history, regulatory licensing framework, modeling capabilities, and supporting engineering technology are either lacking or, in some cases, nonexistent. Therefore, the research community is actively supporting advanced MSR development on many of these fronts in particular to assist MSR vendors with licensing requirements. ORNL is leading the research and development of respective MC&A approaches for salt-fueled MSRs. This report summarizes the research performed at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) under the US Department of Energy, Office of Nuclear Energy, Advanced Reactor Safeguards (ARS) program to investigate safeguards and security by design concepts, licensing and regulatory considerations, and dynamic system-level modeling to understand radioisotope concentrations for salt-fueled MSRs. The report builds upon the previous research and literature, identifies the MC&A challenges inherent to a salt-fueled MSR, reviews current regulatory frameworks for LWRs and their applicability towards salt-fueled MSRs, summarizes the status and progress of an MSR dynamic modeling tool, and discusses a prospective MC&A approach based on the Molten Salt Demonstration Reactor (MSDR) model.
The work in this report documents the efforts conducted to assess the feasibility of some of the ideas documented in Pacific Northwest National Laboratory invention disclosure reports (IDRs) including: 1) Iodine capture in polyacrylonitrile (PAN)-containing composite sorbents (32451-E). In this work, the composites evaluated included Ag0, Bi0, Cu0, Bi2S3, and Cu2S embedded in PAN. 2) Metal iodide removal from these sorbents through dissolution in dimethyl sulfoxide (DMSO) (32729-E). In this work, PAN dissolution was evaluated for multiple types of sorbents including Ag-Pan, Bi-PAN, Cu-PAN, Bi2S3-PAN, and Cu2S-PAN. 3) Using metal-sulfide sorbents for iodine capture (32647-E). In this work, the composites evaluated under this IDR included Ag2S, Bi2S3, and Cu2S embedded in PAN. 4) Using low-melting metals to immobilize (encapsulate) iodine-loaded and polymer-containing sorbents into polymer-ceramic-metal (called polycermet) or polymer-halide-metal (called polyhalmet) composite waste forms (32625-E). In this work, the iodine-loaded PAN composites included AgI-PAN, BiI-PAN, and CuI-PAN. 5) Ceramic-metal composite waste form synthesis of polymer-containing materials using low-melting metals like bismuth, tin, or bismuth-tin alloys (32537-E). In this work, the metals evaluated included Bi, 58Bi-42Sn eutectic. 6) Cermets for immobilizing commercial sorbents loaded with radioiodine (32806-E). In this work, AgIX (iodine-loaded silver faujasite zeolite) was evaluated in cermet form.