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The NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) GN and C Technical Discipline Team (TDT): Its Purpose, Practices and Experiences

This paper will briefly define the vision, mission, and purpose of the NESC organization. The role of the GN&C TDT will then be described in detail along with an overview of how this team operates and engages in its objective engineering and safety assessments of critical NASA projects. This paper will then describe key issues and findings from several of the recent GN&C-related independent assessments and consultations performed and/or supported by the NESC GN&C TDT. Among the examples of the GN&C TDT s work that will be addressed in this paper are the following: the Space Shuttle Orbiter Repair Maneuver (ORM) assessment, the ISS CMG failure root cause assessment, the Demonstration of Autonomous Rendezvous Technologies (DART) spacecraft mishap consultation, the Phoenix Mars lander thruster-based controllability consultation, the NASA in-house Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) Smart Buyer assessment and the assessment of key engineering considerations for the Design, Development, Test & Evaluation (DDT&E) of robust and reliable GN&C systems for human-rated spacecraft.

Dennehy, Cornelius J.↗

Development of Risk Assessment Matrix for NASA Engineering and Safety Center

This paper describes a study, which had as its principal goal the development of a sufficiently detailed 5 x 5 Risk Matrix Scorecard. The purpose of this scorecard is to outline the criteria by which technical issues can be qualitatively and initially prioritized. The tool using this score card has been proposed to be one of the information resources the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) takes into consideration when making decisions with respect to incoming information on safety concerns across the entire NASA agency. The contents of this paper discuss in detail each element of the risk matrix scorecard, definitions for those elements and the rationale behind the development of those definitions. This scorecard development was performed in parallel with the tailoring of the existing Futron Corporation Integrated Risk Management Application (IRMA) software tool. IRMA was tailored to fit NESC needs for evaluating incoming safety concerns and was renamed NESC Assessment Risk Management Application (NAFMA) which is still in developmental phase.

Malone, Roy W., Jr.↗

Reaction Control System Thruster Cracking Consultation: NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) Materials Super Problem Resolution Team (SPRT) Findings

The shuttle orbiter s reaction control system (RCS) primary thruster serial number 120 was found to contain cracks in the counter bores and relief radius after a chamber repair and rejuvenation was performed in April 2004. Relief radius cracking had been observed in the 1970s and 1980s in seven thrusters prior to flight; however, counter bore cracking had never been seen previously in RCS thrusters. Members of the Materials Super Problem Resolution Team (SPRT) of the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) conducted a detailed review of the relevant literature and of the documentation from the previous RCS thruster failure analyses. It was concluded that the previous failure analyses lacked sufficient documentation to support the conclusions that stress corrosion cracking or hot-salt cracking was the root cause of the thruster cracking and lacked reliable inspection controls to prevent cracked thrusters from entering the fleet. The NESC team identified and performed new materials characterization and mechanical tests. It was determined that the thruster intergranular cracking was due to hydrogen embrittlement and that the cracking was produced during manufacturing as a result of processing the thrusters with fluoride-containing acids. Testing and characterization demonstrated that appreciable environmental crack propagation does not occur after manufacturing.

MacKay, Rebecca A.↗

Test and Analysis of the 8-foot Diameter Cylindrical Sandwich Composite Test Article CTA8.2B: As part of the NASA Engineering and Safety Center Shell Buckling Knockdown Factor Project

The buckling response of thin-walled cylindrical structures have long been shown to be sensitive to various imperfections. That is, imperfections related to load introduction, boundary conditions, material property variation, and geometric deviations can all contribute to experimentally obtained buckling loads being lower than the buckling loads predicted for perfect representations of the same thin-walled cylindrical structure. To account for the influence of geometry-based imperfections of a thin-walled cylindrical structure on buckling response, a design factor (also known as a buckling knockdown factor) is used during the design phase. Guidelines for buckling knockdown factors are readily available in NASA SP-8007, Buckling of Thin Walled Circular Cylinders, which was updated in 2020. Prior to this recent update, NASA SP-8007 had not been updated since 1969, and since that time, computational analysis, experimental testing, and manufacturing methods have significantly improved. The NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) Shell Buckling Knockdown Factor Project (SBKF, NESC Assessment 07-010-E) had the goal of developing buckling design recommendations for select classes of metallic and composite launch-vehicle structures [3]. Specifically, the test and analysis results from the fourth SBKF composite test article SBKF-P3-CYL-CTA8.2B, which is referred to as CTA8.2B, are described in this paper. This test was the fourth in a series of four tests on sandwich composite cylinders that will be used to experimentally validate analysis methods, which in turn can be used to develop new analysis-based shell buckling design guidelines for typical sandwich composite launch vehicle cylindrical structures. Publications describing previous test validation with analysis are available in Refs. CTA8.2B was designed to occupy one corner of the design space with approximately equal bending stiffnesses in the axial and transverse directions and have a larger ratio of radius to effective shell thickness. Each test article had a unique design and was designed to occupy a specific region of the design space. CTA8.2B was an 8-foot diameter honeycomb-core sandwich cylinder that was fabricated and tested at the NASA Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC). The primary objectives of this test were to interrogate the structural capability of a composite test article, and to verify the test article design and analysis approach for cylinders subjected to axial compression and combined axial and bending loads. First, descriptions of the test article design and test are given in Section 2.0, and modeling and analysis methods used in support of the test article design and testing activities are described briefly in Section 3.0. Then, select test results are presented and compared to predicted results in Section 4.0, and concluding remarks are presented in Section 5.0. Finally, drawings of CTA8.2B and references used to support the test and analysis are provided in the Appendix.

Nonlinear analysis↗

Criticality Safety Evaluation Project Development for University of California Berkely Nuclear Criticality Safety Pipeline Course

The Nuclear Criticality Safety Division at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) has taken a unique approach to developing criticality safety evaluation topics in support of the University of California Berkeley criticality safety pipeline course. The evaluation topics are designed to go beyond the typical evaluation examples used for many training courses including vault storage and variations on storage arrays. These types of evaluations provide in-depth analysis into the fundamentals of criticality safety and are complex but may be far off from what a new criticality safety engineer may actually be evaluating. To provide more practical examples of criticality safety evaluation topics that are better fit for the knowledge level of a criticality safety engineer in-training, variations of current and future operations and research operations performed at LLNL are used as evaluation topics. Additionally, an emphasis on research is included in all evaluation topics as it allows students to take advantage of the concepts learned in class to apply them for process improvement, engineering equipment that is favorable for criticality safety, and negotiation tactics to work with operations personnel. The process used by LLNL to develop project topics for the pipeline course is provided in this paper. The intent is to provide an alternative technique for training students and potentially younger staff members in criticality safety on developing criticality safety evaluations.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Space flight hazards catalog

The most significant hazards identified on manned space flight programs are listed. This summary is of special value to system safety engineers in developing safety checklists and otherwise tailoring safety tasks to specific systems and subsystems.

Source record↗

NASA Engineering and Safety Center Technical Bulletins 2007-2023

An NESC Technical Bulletin captures critical knowledge in the form of new engineering information or best practices in a one-page format that have resulted from NESC independent testing, analysis, and assessments. This document contains all NESC Technical Bulletins from 2007 through 2023.

additive manufacturing, battery, braycote, capacit↗

Roles of Information Technology in Nuclear Criticality Safety Training

For many years, the nuclear criticality safety (NCS) community has recognized the urgent need to develop a criticality safety workforce to meet the country’s nuclear operations support requirements. While there are many causes for the current workforce shortage problem, the retirement of many experienced personnel from NCS has exacerbated the situation. The Department of Energy (DOE) Nuclear Criticality Safety Program (NCSP) has established a website (http://ncsp.llnl.gov) to assist newcomers to this field. Among other things, the DOE NCSP website offers a series of nuclear criticality safety engineer training (NCSET) modules to assist various DOE sites in training nuclear criticality safety engineers. For years, this section of the website has attracted many users worldwide, and records more than eight thousand downloads of the modules per year. Rapid advances in information technology (IT) and communication tools have reshaped the training field and offer improving training modalities. Since the NCSET modules were originally developed in text mode, it was recognized that much of that training could be improved by utilizing these IT innovations. This paper reports a new approach to enhance the NCSET training modules and discusses the use of IT and new communication tools as effective means to help manage NCS workforce development.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Analysis of Debris Trajectories at the Scaled Wind Farm Technology (SWiFT) Facility

Sandia National Laboratories operates the Scaled Wind Farm Technology Facility (SWiFT) on behalf of the Department of Energy Wind and Water Power Technologies Office. An analysis was performed to evaluate the hazards associated with debris thrown from one of SWiFT’s operating wind turbines, assuming a catastrophic failure. A Monte Carlo analysis was conducted to assess the complex variable space associated with debris throw hazards that included wind speed, wind direction, azimuth and pitch angles of the blade, and percentage of the blade that was separated. In addition, a set of high fidelity explicit dynamic finite element simulations were performed to determine the threshold impact energy envelope for the turbine control building located on-site. Assuming that all of the layered, independent, passive and active engineered safety systems and administrative procedures failed (a 100% failure rate of the safety systems), the likelihood of the control building being struck was calculated to be less than 5/10,000 and ballistic simulations showed that the control building would not provide passive protection for the majority of impact scenarios. Although options exist to improve the ballistic resistance of the control building, the recommendation is not to pursue them because there is a low probability of strike and there is an equal likelihood personnel could be located at similar distances in other areas of the SWiFT facility which are not passively protected, while the turbines are operating. A fenced exclusion area has been created around the turbines which restricts access to the boundary of the 1/100 strike probability. The overall recommendation is to neither relocate nor improve passive protection of the control building as the turbine safety systems have been improved to have no less than two independent, redundant, high quality engineered safety systems. Considering this, in combination with a control building strike probability of less than 5/10,000, the overall probability of turbine debris striking the control building is less than 1/1,000,000.

17 WIND ENERGY↗

Model-Based Safety Analysis

System safety analysis techniques are well established and are used extensively during the design of safety-critical systems. Despite this, most of the techniques are highly subjective and dependent on the skill of the practitioner. Since these analyses are usually based on an informal system model, it is unlikely that they will be complete, consistent, and error free. In fact, the lack of precise models of the system architecture and its failure modes often forces the safety analysts to devote much of their effort to gathering architectural details about the system behavior from several sources and embedding this information in the safety artifacts such as the fault trees. This report describes Model-Based Safety Analysis, an approach in which the system and safety engineers share a common system model created using a model-based development process. By extending the system model with a fault model as well as relevant portions of the physical system to be controlled, automated support can be provided for much of the safety analysis. We believe that by using a common model for both system and safety engineering and automating parts of the safety analysis, we can both reduce the cost and improve the quality of the safety analysis. Here we present our vision of model-based safety analysis and discuss the advantages and challenges in making this approach practical.

Joshi, Anjali↗

Reliability Assessment of Safety-Critical Network Communication in a Digitalized Nuclear Power Plant

In analog instrumentation and control (I and C) systems for nuclear power plants (NPPs), most connections are comprised of hardwired point-to-point types. Since they are based on analog technologies, they are fragile to noise and require analog-to-digital conversion time. Therefore, many NPPs have adopted communication network for the exchange of safety-critical data between programmable logic controllers (PLCs) in digital I and C systems to effectively accommodate a huge number of field controllers. However, the primary issue of digital network communication in a safety-critical system involves potential hazards, such as partial or total loss of communication between PLCs, which may result in a failure of safety critical signal generation when it is needed. Therefore, the probability that a safety-critical system in digitalized NPP becomes unsafe due to a network failure must be evaluated to quantify the risk of digital I and C system. In Korea, the Engineered Safety Feature-Component Control System (ESF-CCS) was developed as one of the digital safety-critical system in Advanced Power Reactor- 1400 (APR-1400). The function of a digital engineered safety feature (ESF) actuation system and field actuator controllers of conventional NPPs are performed by the ESF-CCS. In this system, safety-critical network, High Reliable- Safety Data Network (HR-SDN), was employed for the safety-critical data transmission from group controllers (GCs) to loop controllers (LCs). In this study, a framework for assessing the reliability of a HR-SDN network communication between GCs and LCs in the ESF-CCS in addition to a fault-tree model for ESF components considering network failure between GCs and LCs were developed to assess the plant risk effect of a newly developed digitalized ESF-CCS. Based on the case studies and cut set analysis, the risk effect of network failure on plant risk and the important risk contributors of network failure were quantitatively addressed. A framework for identifying the potential hazardous states of network communication in the ESFCCS was proposed. In addition, a fault-tree model for network communication failure was developed to estimate the risk effects of network failure between the GCs and LCs on ESF-CCS signal failure. The developed fault-tree model was then applied to several case studies. The fault-tree model of ESF-CCS signal failure for ESF components required for various mitigation actions regarding NPP DBAs was designed by considering the identified hazardous states of network failure that would result in a failure to provide input signals to the corresponding LC. As a sensitivity study, three case studies were performed based on the periodic test methods for hardware components in HR-SDN module and their test intervals in this study. The quantitative results for three case studies demonstrated that the probability of overall network communication failure, which was calculated as the sum of the failure probability associated with each failure cause, contributed up to 1.58% on the Small-LOCA CD frequency. The results also revealed the important basic events related to network failure in the case studies which included CCF of hardware and software in HR-SDN module. This study is expected to provide insight into the development of the fault-tree model for the network failure in digital I and C system and into the quantification of the risk effect of network failure for safety-critical data transmission in NPPs. As a further study, the risk effects of network failure in the ESF-CCS on the plant risk can be estimated in a more detailed manner by analyzing the failure modes and causes in a sub-component level and the fault detection coverage of the fault tolerance techniques for network failure implemented in ESF-CCS after the detailed configuration of ESF-CCS is decided. In terms of the failure of manual ESF actuation, the relationship among the human action failures must be investigated to consider multiple human error condition since ESF-CCS provides multiple manual actuation to assure the diversity of the system. Since the conventional HEP method cannot accommodate the multiple conditions in a fault tree, condition-based human reliability assessment (CBHRA) method or the dynamic human reliability modeling approach can be applied to include a complex relationship among the automated safety signal generation and the human operator's manual actuation, avoiding the optimistic estimation of HEP of the human action failure.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

NASA Engineering and Safety Center Technical Bulletin No. 23-02: Safety Considerations when Repurposing Commercially Available Flight Termination Systems from Uncrewed to Crewed Launch Vehicles

Both uncrewed and crewed launch vehicles (LV) require Flight Termination Systems (FTS) for Range Safety to protect the public and ground assets in the event of a LV failure. Flight crew safety in this context is an added consideration for human spaceflight. The FTS is an electroexplosive system that activates destruct charges to rupture propellant tanks and shutdown engines during flight termination. Commercially available FTS units have been developed for uncrewed applications and are now being repurposed to crewed applications. A consequence of using these systems is that they are designed for public and ground crew safety, though inadequate for flight crew safety. Missing are Human Space Flight (HSF) design controls for inadvertent activation during crewed ascent and protection for crew emergency abort.

Flight Termination Systems↗

NASA Engineering and Safety Center Lunar Rover Design Concepts Assessments

Mass is a significant risk to programs and projects as they transition from formulation to implementation, especially in larger human space systems where delivery mass or volume can be a constrained commodity. • Concepts developed without an adequate systems-engineering basis, including design and operations experience, may miss significant functionality and subsequent mass required for integration or operations. • Further uncertainty can be associated with not fully understanding design best practices and standards that drive mass, such as design for minimum risk or fault tolerance.1 • Finally, the appropriate systems engineering mass properties management rigor and technical discipline insight are required to set the mass baseline, including appropriate mass growth allowance (MGA) to ensure program success. Mass is a key quantity that should be constantly monitored by the systems engineer and the program/project management stakeholder to ensure mission compatibility throughout the project life cycle. In addition, mass is a key programmatic performance metric monitored by the NASA Chief Financial Officer for current and future program cost estimating. NASA Exploration Systems sought an assessment of reasonableness with respect to different potential rover concepts that balances mass needs and human-class cargo lander capabilities. Appropriate systems engineering mass properties management rigor and technical discipline insight were used, and are required to set the mass baseline, including appropriate MGA to ensure program success. Two independent Lunar rover concepts were evaluated, with a goal to understand concept credibility and the Lunar rover designs potential extensibility for Mars surface operations. A notional generic rover concept is shown in Figure 1.

Systems Engineering↗

Hands-On Criticality Safety Training at Sandia National Laboratories.

The US Department of Energy Nuclear Criticality Safety Program (NCSP) has supported hands-on criticality safety training at Los Alamos National Laboratory in the past and more recently at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. These courses have provided a practical understanding of the processes involved in nuclear criticality through laboratory exercises for a large number of students over many years. The NCSP sponsored the development of an expanded training course for Nuclear Criticality Safety Engineers that includes a one-week session of classroom training to be offered at LANL and two equivalent one-week hands-on training sessions at the critical experiment facility at the Nevada National Security Site and at the critical experiment facility at Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) The class is now being offered as part of the training for Nuclear Criticality Safety Engineers. This paper describes the critical experiment training course offered at SNL.

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗

Development of the Suited Injury Modes and Effects Analysis for Identification of Top Injury Risks in Lunar Missions and Training

A new Exploration Extravehicular Activity Services (xEVAS) suit is being designed to replace the current Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA’s) Artemis program to return astronauts to the lunar surface. This new suit will allow for increased range of motion compared to the current EMU and Apollo era suits and additional features will enhance the health and safety of exploration. With the design of lunar missions and the xEVAS suit progressing, it is important to consider possible injuries and injury mechanisms that could occur in the suit. To address these concerns, the suited Injury Modes and Effects Analysis (IMEA) was developed to outline suited injury scenarios and rank them based on risk score. The IMEA documents possible scenarios and underlying mechanisms of injury. History has shown that more suit injuries occur during training than in flight; therefore, currently planned training events to prepare for lunar missions and tasks during lunar surface EVAs were considered. Each scenario is ranked with likelihood and consequence scorings based on our current understanding of suit and application of Artemis design reference missions. The scoring allowed identification of the high-risk cases that will drive further work in suited injury. Mechanisms of injury, injury outcomes, and mitigation strategies are evaluated within each scenario. The Suited Injury Summit was held on January 5, 2022, to vet the IMEA with external experts. This was an all-day virtual meeting with the suited injury team; ergonomists; suit engineers; safety engineers; the flight operations directorate; flight doctors; astronauts; astronaut strength, conditioning, and rehabilitation specialists (ASCRS); and external subject matter experts (SMEs). External SMEs consisted of surgeons with varying specialties. The intent of this meeting was to walk through the top injury risks identified in the analysis, identify any gaps that were not captured, and discuss mitigations. With participation from all groups, countless lessons-learned came from the Summit meeting. Using these, the top 10 risks have been identified: neutral buoyancy laboratory training, hand/glove injuries, poor suit fit, field training, specific EVA tasks/design of task, boots/ankle injuries, falls from heights, background radiation, repetitive contact, and ambulation/longdistance ambulation. Mitigation steps have also been determined for each of the top risks. The IMEA and documentation of top risks is a living document. Yearly meetings are planned to update the analysis and reevaluate top risks and mitigations. The IMEA is being used to drive work in suited injury, and this work will continue to evolve with IMEA and lunar mission updates.

Teresa Reiber↗