Engineering Papers⌕ Search

SEARCH · Engineering Papers

Results for “risk objectives”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 73 records · Page 4

OSIRIS-REx Screening Experience & Lessons Learned

On September 24, 2023, the NASA OSIRIS-REx spacecraft returned a sample of asteroid Bennu, approaching on a hyperbolic impact trajectory relative to Earth. At approximately 108,000 km altitude and four hours prior to hitting the top of the atmosphere, the Sample Return Capsule (SRC) separated from the spacecraft bus, targeting the Utah Test and Training Range. Twenty minutes later, the bus performed a large divert maneuver to fly by at a perigee altitude of ~780 km. Given the immense scientific value of the sample, substantial efforts were undertaken by NASA CARA and the OSIRIS-REx mission to ensure safe passage of the objects from GEO through LEO. This presentation provides an overview of collision avoidance maneuver (CAM) options, results of screenings, coordination with DoD for contingency observations, and lessons learned for screening future Earth flyby and entry trajectories. Two particular challenges included screening two objects using a much larger than normal 250 km spherical monitor volume and decision planning for a single CAM while the SRC was still attached that would alter both trajectories. The larger, non-standard screening volume resulted in custom procedures that CARA personnel had to run manually for each screening, and the initial long propagation times while the objects were more than a week out required significant computing resources. With a single CAM opportunity at 13 hours out, the decision to execute a maneuver had to consider the risk to both objects, where one could imagine a situation where the maneuver would clear a high-risk conjunction for one object and introduce one for the other – begging the question of relative risk posture between the SRC and bus. These among other unique aspects of Earth flyby and entry missions led to novel planning and implementation procedures to support future missions of this type.

Dolan E. Highsmith↗

Population Aging and Heat Exposure in the 21st Century: Which U.S. Regions Are at Greatest Risk and Why?

Abstract Background and Objectives The co-occurring trends of population aging and climate change mean that rising numbers of U.S. older adults are at risk of intensifying heat exposure. We estimate county-level variations in older populations’ heat exposure in the early (1995–2014) and mid (2050) 21st century. We identify the extent to which rising exposures are attributable to climate change versus population aging. Research Design and Methods We estimate older adults’ heat exposure in 3,109 counties in the 48 contiguous U.S. states. Analyses use NASA NEX Global Daily Downscaled Product (NEX-GDDP-CMIP6) climate data and county-level projections for the size and distribution of the U.S. age 69+ population. Results Population aging and rising temperatures are documented throughout the United States, with particular “hotspots” in the Deep South, Florida, and parts of the rural Midwest. Increases in heat exposure by 2050 will be especially steep in historically colder regions with large older populations in New England, the upper Midwest, and rural Mountain regions. Rising temperatures are driving exposure in historically colder regions, whereas population aging is driving exposure in historically warm southern regions. Discussion and Implications Interventions to address the impacts of temperature extremes on older adult well-being should consider the geographic distribution and drivers of this exposure. In historically cooler areas where climate change is driving exposures, investments in warning systems may be productive, whereas investments in health care and social services infrastructures are essential in historically hot regions where exposures are driven by population aging.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

CubeSat Laser Infrared CrosslinK

The CubeSat Laser Infrared CrosslinK (CLICK) mission will demonstrate technology to advance the state of the art in communications between small spacecraft as well as the capability to gauge their relative distance and location. CLICK is comprised of two sequential missions. The first mission, CLICK A, is a risk reduction mission that will test out elements of the optical (laser) communications with a single 3-unit (3U) spacecraft. The key objective of this risk reduction testing is to demonstrate the fine steering mirror control system's high precision pointing performance which enables the use of a lower power laser in CLICK B/C. The goal of CLICK B/C, the second mission, is to demonstrate full-duplex (send and receive) optical communication crosslink between two 3U small spacecraft, in low-Earth-orbit, at distances between 15 and 360 miles (25 - 580 kilometres) apart at data rates greater than 20 Mbps.

precision ranging↗

Continuous Risk Management: An Overview

Software risk management is important because it helps avoid disasters, rework, and overkill, but more importantly because it stimulates win-win situations. The objectives of software risk management are to identify, address, and eliminate software risk items before they become threats to success or major sources of rework. In general, good project managers are also good managers of risk. It makes good business sense for all software development projects to incorporate risk management as part of project management. The Software Assurance Technology Center (SATC) at NASA GSFC has been tasked with the responsibility for developing and teaching a systems level course for risk management that provides information on how to implement risk management. The course was developed in conjunction with the Software Engineering Institute at Carnegie Mellon University, then tailored to the NASA systems community. This is an introductory tutorial to continuous risk management based on this course. The rational for continuous risk management and how it is incorporated into project management are discussed. The risk management structure of six functions is discussed in sufficient depth for managers to understand what is involved in risk management and how it is implemented. These functions include: (1) Identify the risks in a specific format; (2) Analyze the risk probability, impact/severity, and timeframe; (3) Plan the approach; (4) Track the risk through data compilation and analysis; (5) Control and monitor the risk; (6) Communicate and document the process and decisions.

Rosenberg, Linda↗

Surrogate modeling for efficiently, accurately and conservatively estimating measures of risk

We present a surrogate modeling framework for conservatively estimating measures of risk from limited realizations of an expensive physical experiment or computational simulation. Risk measures combine objective probabilities with the subjective values of a decision maker to quantify anticipated outcomes. Given a set of samples, we construct a surrogate model that produces estimates of risk measures that are always greater than their empirical approximations obtained from the training data. These surrogate models limit over-confidence in reliability and safety assessments and produce estimates of risk measures that converge much faster to the true value than purely sample-based estimates. We first detail the construction of conservative surrogate models that can be tailored to a stakeholder’s risk preferences and then present an approach, based on stochastic orders, for constructing surrogate models that are conservative with respect to families of risk measures. Our surrogate models include biases that permit them to conservatively estimate the target risk measures. We provide theoretical results that show that these biases decay at the same rate as the L 2 error in the surrogate model. Numerical demonstrations confirm that risk-adapted surrogate models do indeed overestimate the target risk measures while converging at the expected rate.

42 ENGINEERING↗

FY2021 Savannah River Site Composite Analysis Annual Summary Review

This document provides the Department of Energy (DOE) Order 435.1 and its manual, Radioactive Waste Management (DOE 2021a, 2021b) required Annual Review for the Savannah River Site (SRS) Composite Analysis (CA). Progress made to-date toward addressing the secondary issue from the LFRG review of the 2010 SRS CA has focused primarily upon inventory estimate improvements. Inventory impacts dose in a linear fashion and reduces the uncertainty with the CA conclusions. Maintenance items are addressed, as funding allows, based on the relative risk associated with meeting the performance objectives. Currently, there is minimal risk in exceeding the DOE 100 mrem/yr CA primary dose limit or the DOE 30 mrem/yr dose constraint (administrative limit).

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Quantifying Investment Risk: Analysis of the Purchase Decision of a Nuclear Power Plant (Presentation)

Cost overruns are an ill-fated part of the deployment history of nuclear power plants (NPPs) in the United States, and yet studies increasingly show the important role nuclear technologies must play in decarbonizing the U.S. economy. Paradoxically, then, a key piece of a coherent decarbonization strategy depends on attracting investor action to a purchase where historical cost overruns have been sizable. To address this challenge, this study aims to develop a financial model that quantifies the risk of cost overruns in the decision-making process for purchasing advanced reactor concepts. Using the concept of value at risk (VaR), the model is built to evaluate financial risk nuclear construction with the aim to identify risk mitigation strategies. The objective is to identify strategies to mitigate cost-risk challenges and assess the potential reduction in investor risk exposure. This paper presents the initial development and preliminary verification of the financial risk analysis model. The development of this model involved a comprehensive approach to estimating financial risk over the operating life of NPP that stems from construction uncertainties. By utilizing net present value (NPV) with discounted cash flows, the model captures the complex interconnections of project costs, construction timelines, revenue, and uncertainties. Verifying the model involved testing historical data from previous reactor construction projects against the construction project of Vogtle 3 and 4. This paper’s results present the comparison of the preconstruction cost overrun prediction with the current cost estimates from a nearly complete Vogtle 3 and 4.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Quantifying Investment Risk: Analysis of the Purchase Decision of a Nuclear Power Plant

Cost overruns are an ill-fated part of the deployment history of nuclear power plants (NPPs) in the United States, and yet studies increasingly show the important role nuclear technologies must play in decarbonizing the U.S. economy. Paradoxically, then, a key piece of a coherent decarbonization strategy depends on attracting investor action to a purchase where historical cost overruns have been sizeable. To address this challenge, this study aims to develop a financial model that quantifies risk of cost overruns in the decision-making process for purchasing advanced reactor concepts. Using the concept of Value at Risk (VaR), the model is built to evaluate financial risk nuclear construction with the aim to identify risk mitigation strategies. The objective is to identify strategies to mitigate cost-risk challenges and to assess the potential reduction in investor risk exposure. The paper presents the initial development and preliminary verification of the financial risk analysis model. The development of this model involved a comprehensive approach to estimating financial risk over the operating life of NPP that stems from construction uncertainties. By utilizing net present value (NPV) with discounted cash flows, the model captures the complex interconnections of project costs, construction timelines, revenue, and uncertainties. Verification of the model involved testing historical data from previous reactor construction projects against the construction project of Vogtle 3 and 4. The results of this paper present the comparison of the preconstruction cost overrun prediction with the current cost estimates from a nearly complete Vogtle 3 and 4.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Risk analysis approach

The assessment of the carbon fiber hazard is outlined. Program objectives, requirements of the risk analysis, and elements associated with the physical phenomena of the accidental release are described.

Huston, R. J.↗

Independent Orbiter Assessment: Assessment of the FMEA/CIL Instructions and Ground Rules

The McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company was selected to conduct an independent assessment of the Orbiter Failure Mode and Effects Analysis/Critical Items List (FMEA/CIL). Part of this effort involved an examination of the FMEA/CIL preparation instructions and ground rules. Assessment objectives were to identify omissions and ambiguities in the ground rules that may impede the identification of shuttle orbiter safety and mission critical items, and to ensure that ground rules allow these items to receive proper management visibility for risk assessment. Assessment objectives were followed during the performance of the assessment without being influenced by external considerations such as effects on budget, schedule, and documentation growth. Assessment personnel were employed who had a strong reliability background but no previous space shuttle FMEA/CIL experience to ensure an independent assessment would be achieved. The following observations were made: (1) not all essential items are in the CIL for management visibility; (2) ground rules omit FMEA/CIL coverage of items that perform critical functions; (3) essential items excluded from the CIL do not receive design justification; and (4) FMEAs/CILs are not updated in a timely manner. In addition to the above issues, a number of other issues were identified that correct FMEA/CIL preparation instruction omissions and clarify ambiguities. The assessment was successful in that many of the issues have significant safety implications.

Traves, S. T.↗

Space Launch System (SLS) Safety, Mission Assurance, and Risk Mitigation

SLS Driving Objectives: I. Safe: a) Human-rated to provide safe and reliable systems for human missions. b) Protecting the public, NASA workforce, high-value equipment and property, and the environment from potential harm. II. Affordable: a) Maximum use of common elements and existing assets, infrastructure, and workforce. b) Constrained budget environment. c) Competitive opportunities for affordability on-ramps. III. Sustainable: a) Initial capability: 70 metric tons (t), 2017-2021. 1) Serves as primary transportation for Orion and exploration missions. 2) Provides back-up capability for crew/cargo to ISS. b) Evolved capability: 105 t and 130 t, post-2021. 1) Offers large volume for science missions and payloads. 2) Modular and flexible, right-sized for mission requirements.

May, Todd↗

Statistical Issues for Uncontrolled Reentry Hazards

A number of statistical tools have been developed over the years for assessing the risk of reentering objects to human populations. These tools make use of the characteristics (e.g., mass, shape, size) of debris that are predicted by aerothermal models to survive reentry. The statistical tools use this information to compute the probability that one or more of the surviving debris might hit a person on the ground and cause one or more casualties. The statistical portion of the analysis relies on a number of assumptions about how the debris footprint and the human population are distributed in latitude and longitude, and how to use that information to arrive at realistic risk numbers. This inevitably involves assumptions that simplify the problem and make it tractable, but it is often difficult to test the accuracy and applicability of these assumptions. This paper looks at a number of these theoretical assumptions, examining the mathematical basis for the hazard calculations, and outlining the conditions under which the simplifying assumptions hold. In addition, this paper will also outline some new tools for assessing ground hazard risk in useful ways. Also, this study is able to make use of a database of known uncontrolled reentry locations measured by the United States Department of Defense. By using data from objects that were in orbit more than 30 days before reentry, sufficient time is allowed for the orbital parameters to be randomized in the way the models are designed to compute. The predicted ground footprint distributions of these objects are based on the theory that their orbits behave basically like simple Kepler orbits. However, there are a number of factors - including the effects of gravitational harmonics, the effects of the Earth's equatorial bulge on the atmosphere, and the rotation of the Earth and atmosphere - that could cause them to diverge from simple Kepler orbit behavior and change the ground footprints. The measured latitude and longitude distributions of these objects provide data that can be directly compared with the predicted distributions, providing a fundamental empirical test of the model assumptions.

Matney, Mark↗

Empirical Tests of the Predicted Footprint for Uncontrolled Satellite Reentry Hazards

A number of statistical tools have been developed over the years for assessing the risk of reentering object to human populations. These tools make use of the characteristics (e.g., mass, material, shape, size) of debris that are predicted by aerothermal models to survive reentry. The statistical tools use this information to compute the probability that one or more of the surviving debris might hit a person on the ground and cause one or more casualties. The statistical portion of the analysis relies on a number of assumptions about how the debris footprint and the human population are distributed in latitude and longitude, and how to use that information to arrive at realistic risk numbers. Because this information is used in making policy and engineering decisions, it is important that these assumptions be tested using empirical data. This study uses the latest database of known uncontrolled reentry locations measured by the United States Department of Defense. The predicted ground footprint distributions of these objects are based on the theory that their orbits behave basically like simple Kepler orbits. However, there are a number of factors in the final stages of reentry - including the effects of gravitational harmonics, the effects of the Earth s equatorial bulge on the atmosphere, and the rotation of the Earth and atmosphere - that could cause them to diverge from simple Kepler orbit behavior and possibly change the probability of reentering over a given location. In this paper, the measured latitude and longitude distributions of these objects are directly compared with the predicted distributions, providing a fundamental empirical test of the model assumptions.

Matney, Mark↗

Statistical Issues for Uncontrolled Reentry Hazards Empirical Tests of the Predicted Footprint for Uncontrolled Satellite Reentry Hazards

A number of statistical tools have been developed over the years for assessing the risk of reentering objects to human populations. These tools make use of the characteristics (e.g., mass, material, shape, size) of debris that are predicted by aerothermal models to survive reentry. The statistical tools use this information to compute the probability that one or more of the surviving debris might hit a person on the ground and cause one or more casualties. The statistical portion of the analysis relies on a number of assumptions about how the debris footprint and the human population are distributed in latitude and longitude, and how to use that information to arrive at realistic risk numbers. Because this information is used in making policy and engineering decisions, it is important that these assumptions be tested using empirical data. This study uses the latest database of known uncontrolled reentry locations measured by the United States Department of Defense. The predicted ground footprint distributions of these objects are based on the theory that their orbits behave basically like simple Kepler orbits. However, there are a number of factors in the final stages of reentry - including the effects of gravitational harmonics, the effects of the Earth s equatorial bulge on the atmosphere, and the rotation of the Earth and atmosphere - that could cause them to diverge from simple Kepler orbit behavior and possibly change the probability of reentering over a given location. In this paper, the measured latitude and longitude distributions of these objects are directly compared with the predicted distributions, providing a fundamental empirical test of the model assumptions.

Matney, Mark↗

Mission design challenges posed by the Voyager 2 Neptune encounter

A major challenge for the Voyager 2 Neptune encounter lies in the detailed design of a trajectory that achieves science objectives at the planet as well as at its large satellite, Triton. This achievement demands a close flyby of the primary, whereas the planet's great distance makes such an undertaking especially challenging. Changing estimates and uncertainties of parameters characterizing the Neptune environment, particularly ring, atmosphere and radiation models, affect the mission design. These effects are investigated and trade-offs among candidate trajectories are examined with respect to spacecraft performance, avoidance of risk and science objective achievement.

Cesarone, R. J.↗

Cost, capability, and risk for planetary operations

The three key factors for flight projects - cost, capability, and risk - are examined with respect to their interplay, the uplink process, cost drivers, and risk factors. Scientific objectives are translated into a computer program during the uplink process, and examples are given relating to the Voyager Interstellar Mission, Galileo, and the Comet Rendezvous Asteroid Flyby. The development of a multimission sequence system based on these uplinks is described with reference to specific subsystems such as the pointer and the sequence generator. Operational cost drivers include mission, flight-system, and ground-system complexity, uplink traffic, and work force. Operational risks are listed in terms of the mission operations, the environment, and the mission facilities. The uplink process can be analyzed in terms of software development, and spacecraft operability is shown to be an important factor from the initial stages of spacecraft development.

Mclaughlin, William I.↗

How Engineers Really Think About Risk: A Study of JPL Engineers

The objectives of this work are: To improve risk assessment practices as used during the mission design process by JPL's concurrent engineering teams. (1) Developing effective ways to identify and assess mission risks (2) Providing a process for more effective dialog between stakeholders about the existence and severity of mission risks (3) Enabling the analysis of interactions of risks across concurrent engineering roles.

risk identification↗

Statistical Issues for Calculating Reentry Hazards

A number of statistical tools have been developed over the years for assessing the risk of reentering object to human populations. These tools make use of the characteristics (e.g., mass, shape, size) of debris that are predicted by aerothermal models to survive reentry. This information, combined with information on the expected ground path of the reentry, is used to compute the probability that one or more of the surviving debris might hit a person on the ground and cause one or more casualties. The statistical portion of this analysis relies on a number of assumptions about how the debris footprint and the human population are distributed in latitude and longitude, and how to use that information to arrive at realistic risk numbers. This inevitably involves assumptions that simplify the problem and make it tractable, but it is often difficult to test the accuracy and applicability of these assumptions. This paper builds on previous IAASS work to re-examine many of these theoretical assumptions, including the mathematical basis for the hazard calculations, and outlining the conditions under which the simplifying assumptions hold. This study also employs empirical and theoretical information to test these assumptions, and makes recommendations how to improve the accuracy of these calculations in the future.

Matney, Mark↗