Hydrogen Risk Assessment Models 2.0: Open-source quantitative risk assessment framework.
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One of the primary hindrances to producing a viable, sustainable domestic biomass industry for renewable biofuels, bio-products and bio-power is the lack of understanding and quantification of the risks associated with both the biomass supply chain and preprocessing and conversion technologies. Currently a consistent method for assessing, comparing, and quantifying risks in biomass supply chains does not exist, creating a major investment barrier to bioenergy projects in the U.S. The lack of a standardized approach has resulted in bioenergy stakeholders independently using inconsistent approaches and evaluation criteria, leading to unreliable and incomparable assessments of risks and financing barriers to bio-project development. Along with the challenges of inconsistent risk assessment for supply chain risk, technology specific risks based on variability in biomass properties are not fully understood and can pose significant unforeseen challenges for bioenergy projects. In many cases these properties have not yet been identified and the impacts on the proposed technology and products unquantified. This is particularly challenging for emerging preprocessing and conversion technologies. Without a firm understanding of the preprocessing/conversion technology-specific critical properties, the risk of a proposed bio-project cannot be fully evaluated. To address inconsistent risk evaluation in the biomass supply chain supporting project financing, a Biomass Supply Chain Risk Standards (BSCRS) framework was developed. The BSCRS framework includes a comprehensive list of known and perceived risks (Risk Indicators) to the supply chain developed through 100’s of interviews with bioenergy industry experts spanning from feedstock growers and suppliers to representatives from the financial sector. These risks have been organized into a manageable hierarchy of Risk Categories and Risk Factors that can be practically assessed. This BSCRS framework also provides mitigation strategies for multiple Risk Indicators from best available industry practices and research findings. Additionally, a risk quantification methodology for each Risk Factor, Risk Category, and the bio-project as a whole was developed to enable capital markets to assess feedstock risk more efficiently and more accurately. Multiple case studies representing existing bio-projects have been used to evaluate and verify the BSCRS framework and scoring methodology. To address technological risk along with the supply chain risk captured in the developed BSCRS framework, this work also focuses on development of a systematic criticality assessment tool using well-accepted, quantitative risk analysis methods to evaluate bioenergy feedstock critical properties impacting system unit operations. The proposed Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) approach uses a team of subject area experts (SAEs) for each targeted unit operation within a system. Collectively, the team will develop and use a quantitative scoring system to assess the material attributes, process parameters, and quality attributes for key unit operations that have already been identified. The FMEA process generates Risk Priority Numbers (RPNs) for the various failures and predominant causes for each material/process unit/product combination resulting in a semi-quantitative, standardized methodology for assessing technological risk and biomass properties contributing to that risk.
Artificial intelligence (AI) methods have revolutionized and redefined the landscape of data analysis in business, healthcare, and technology. These methods have innovated the applied mathematics, computer science, and engineering fields and are showing considerable potential for risk science, especially in the disaster risk domain. The disaster risk field has yet to define itself as a necessary application domain for AI implementation by defining how to responsibly balance AI and disaster risk. (1) How is AI being used for disaster risk applications; and how are these applications addressing the principles and assumptions of risk science, (2) What are the benefits of AI being used for risk applications; and what are the benefits of applying risk principles and assumptions for AI-based applications, (3) What are the synergies between AI and risk science applications, and (4) What are the characteristics of effective use of fundamental risk principles and assumptions for AI-based applications? This study develops and disseminates an online survey questionnaire that leverages expertise from risk and AI professionals to identify the most important characteristics related to AI and risk, then presents a framework for gauging how AI and disaster risk can be balanced. This study is the first to develop a classification system for applying risk principles for AI-based applications. This classification contributes to understanding of AI and risk by exploring how AI can be used to manage risk, how AI methods introduce new or additional risk, and whether fundamental risk principles and assumptions are sufficient for AI-based applications.
This report documents activities performed by Idaho National Laboratory (INL) during Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Program, Risk Informed Systems Analysis (RISA) Pathway, digital instrumentation and control (DI&C) risk assessment project. In FY 2019, the RISA Pathway initiated a project to develop a risk assessment strategy for delivering a technical basis to support effective, and secure DI&C technologies for digital upgrades/designs. A risk assessment-informed framework was proposed for this strategy, which aims to (1) provide a best-estimate, risk informed capability to quantitatively estimate the safety margin obtained from plant modernization, especially for safety-related DI&C systems, (2) support and supplement existing risk informed DI&C design guides by providing quantitative risk information and evidence, (3) offer a capability of design architecture evaluation of various DI&C systems, (4) assure the long-term safety and reliability of safety-related DI&C systems, and (5) reduce uncertainty in costs and support integration of DI&C systems in the plant. To achieve these technical goals, the LWRS-developed framework provides a means to address relevant technical issues by: (1) defining a risk informed analysis process for DI&C upgrade that integrates hazard analysis, reliability analysis, and consequence analysis, (2) applying risk informed tools to address common cause failures (CCFs) and quantify corresponding failure probabilities for DI&C technologies, particularly software CCFs, (3) evaluating the impact of digital failures at the component level, system level, and plant level, and (4) providing insights and suggestions on designs to manage the risks, thus to support the development and deployment of advanced DI&C technologies in nuclear power plants (NPPs). Adding diversity within a system or components is the primary means to eliminate and mitigate CCFs, but diversity also increases system complexity and may not address all sources of systematic failures. Optimization of diversity and redundancy applications for the safety-critical DI&C systems remains a challenge. To deal with the technical issues in addressing potential software CCFs in safety-related DI&C systems of NPPs and supporting relevant design optimization, the proposed framework provides: (a) A best-estimate, risk informed capability to address new technical digital issues quantitatively, focusing on software CCFs in safety-related DI&C systems of NPPs; (b) A common and a modularized platform for DI&C designers, software developers, cybersecurity analysts, and plant engineers to predict and prevent risk in the early design stage of DI&C systems; (c) Technical bases and risk informed insights to assist users address the risk informed alternatives for evaluation of CCFs in safety-related DI&C systems of NPPs; and (d) A risk informed tool that offers a capability of design architecture evaluation of various DI&C systems to support system design decisions in diversity and redundancy applications. The research and development efforts of this project in FY 2023 are focused on refining current methods on software CCF modeling and estimation and exploring additional innovative approaches to risk assessment of DI&C systems to enable a more comprehensive and complete assessment of various safety-related DI&C design architectures. The primary audience of this report are DI&C designers, engineers, and probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) practitioners. This includes stakeholders, such as the nuclear utilities and regulators who consider the deployment and upgrade of DI&C systems, DI&C software developers and reviewers, and cybersecurity specialists. It should be noted that all the analyses are performed for the demonstration of the methodology, not for the evaluation of an actual digital control system. Results are obtained based on limited design information and testing data.
This report documents the plus-up activities performed by Idaho National Laboratory (INL) during Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Program, Risk Informed Systems Analysis (RISA) Pathway, digital instrumentation and control (DI&C) risk assessment project. In FY 2019, the RISA Pathway initiated a project to develop a risk assessment strategy for delivering a strong technical basis to support effective, licensable, and secure DI&C technologies for digital upgrades/designs. An integrated risk assessment technology for the DI&C systems was proposed for this strategy, which aims to (1) provide a best-estimate, risk-informed capability to quantitatively and accurately estimate the safety margin obtained from plant modernization, especially for the high safety-significant safety-related (HSSSR) DI&C systems, (2) support and supplement existing advanced risk-informed DI&C design guides by providing quantitative risk information and evidence, (3) offer a capability of design architecture evaluation of various DI&C systems to support system design decisions and diversity and redundancy applications, (4) assure the long-term safety and reliability of HSSSR DI&C systems, and (5) reduce uncertainty in costs and support integration of DI&C systems in the plant. To achieve these technical goals and deal with the expensive licensing justifications from regulatory insights, the LWRS-developed framework instructs nuclear vendors and utilities on how to effectively lower the costs associated with digital compliance and speed industry advances by: (1) defining an integrated risk-informed analysis process for DI&C upgrade, including hazard analysis, reliability analysis, and consequence analysis, (2) applying systematic and risk-informed tools to address common cause failures (CCFs) and quantify corresponding failure probabilities for DI&C technologies, particularly software CCFs, (3) evaluating the impact of digital failures at the component level, system level, and plant level, and (4) providing insights and suggestions on designs to manage the risks, thus to support the development, licensing, and deployment of advanced DI&C technologies on nuclear power plant (NPPs). Adding diversity within system or components is the main means to eliminate and mitigate CCFs, but diversity also increases plant complexity and errors and may not address all sources of systematic failures. How to optimize the diversity and redundancy applications for the safety-critical DI&C systems remains a challenge. To deal with the technical issues in addressing potential software CCFs in HSSSR DI&C systems of NPPs and supporting relevant design optimization, the framework provides: ? An integrated best-estimate, risk-informed capability to address new technical digital issues quantitatively, accurately, and efficiently in plan modernization progress, such as software CCFs in HSSSR DI&C systems of NPPs ? A common and a modularized platform for DI&C designers, software developers, cybersecurity analysts, and plant engineers to efficiently predict and prevent risk in the early design stage of DI&C systems ? Technical bases and risk-informed insights to assist U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and industry to address and fulfill the risk-informed alternatives for evaluation of CCFs in HSSSR DI&C systems of NPPs ? An integrated risk-informed tool that offers a capability of design architecture evaluation of various DI&C systems to support system design decisions in diversity and redundancy applications. The plus-up research and development efforts of this project in FY 2022 are focused on methodology improvement of software CCF modeling and estimation, prevention analysis, importance analysis and risk analysis of various design architectures of HSSSR DI&C systems. This work greatly enhances the capability of the LWRS-developed framework for the risk assessment and design optimization of safety-critical DI&C systems. It should be noted that all the analyses are performed for the demonstration of the LWRS-developed framework, not for the evaluation of relevant systems. Results are obtained based on very limited design information and testing data.
We report that proactive traffic safety management systems can reduce crashes by identifying crash precursors, evaluating real-time crash risks, and implementing suitable interventions. The basic prerequisite for developing such a system is to propose a reliable crash risk evaluation model that takes real-time traffic flow data as input. Previous studies have primarily focused on real-time crash prediction using some statistical or machine-learning methods. However, further quantitative evaluation and classification of crash risks have been ignored. In this study, we conduct a systematic crash risk evaluation workflow, including crash risk prediction, crash risk quantification, and crash risk classification. Specifically, the crash risk prediction using an extended logit model is proposed, from which CAS, CSD, UAS, DAS, DTV are identified to be contributing factors of crash risks. Then a crash risk quantification model based on the parameter evaluation of the extended logit model is developed. The crash risks of urban expressways and their spatial-temporal evolution trends are quantified. Finally, the crash risks are classified into high crash risk level, moderate crash risk level, and low crash risk level by the k-means cluster algorithm. Then the threshold boundaries of different crash risk levels are determined. The research results provide a proactive guidance for traffic safety management of urban expressways.
The history of this Special Issue (https://www.sciencedirect.com/special-issue/10JD7LNJNQ0) indirectly dates back to the early 1990s, when the signature of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change kicked-off an international political process based on one overarching and foundational principle: to avoid “dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system” at the global level. More than three decades later, such a principle remains central, though complementary aims made their way through the climate negotiation process, such as the importance of ensuring equity and justice, to give just one example here. Scientific knowledge also considerably progressed and we know more about the range of risks that climate change imposes and will continue to impose to the biosphere and humankind, worldwide and at all territorial levels. It is also clear that societal responses to these risks —“climate adaptation” as we know it— are increasingly happening, but definitely not at the pace of climate risk trends (Berrang-Ford et al., 2021, Erisken et al., 2021, Olazabal and Ruiz De Gopegui, 2021, Magnan et al., 2023a, Reckien et al., 2023, UNEP, 2023). As a result, concerns have emerged over the recent years in both the scientific and policy arenas around the idea that societies may not be able to address all climate risks, and that limits to adaptation and induced residual risks need to be considered more seriously. Such concerns further highlight the continuing importance of the imperative to minimise dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system, at any scale. But what does “dangerous interference” mean? How can we decide that we are entering the “dangerous” space, compared to a broader range of climate risks that would qualify as problematic but not necessarily “dangerous”? Who should make such a decision? Which conditions drive risk severity over time, including in the future? And what would be the environmental, economic, social and cultural implications of prioritising some climate risks over others? The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was a pioneer in addressing such questions through the development of the “Key Risks” framing that describes those climate risks having the potential to become dangerous or “severe” over the course of this century (Schellnhuber et al., 2006, Schneider et al., 2007, Oppenheimer et al., 2014, O’Neill et al., 2022). The Fifth and Sixth assessment cycles (AR5 and AR6) went a step further by identifying about 120 Key Risks across regions and sectors, and clustering them into 8 “Representative Key Risks” covering a range of geographical systems (low-lying coasts, and to terrestrial and ocean ecosystems), sectors (critical infrastructure, living standards, human health, food security, and water security) and human dimensions (peace and mobility) (Oppenheimer et al., 2014, O’Neill et al., 2022). This Special Issue was born of the efforts of a range of authors, during the development of the IPCC AR6 main Assessment Report between 2019 and 2022, to characterise Key Risks and Representative Key Risks, and advance knowledge on what shapes “severe climate risks” conceptually as well as in the real-world. The series of papers forming this Special Issue is not intended to cover the topic exhaustively, but rather to give readers an overview through the following narrative: defining “severe climate risks” is highly challenging (Magnan et al., 2023b), but knowledge is expanding on the driving climate hazards (Tebaldi et al., 2023) and their implications on geographical systems, sectors and human dimensions, using here food security (Mirzabaev et al., 2023), human mobility (Gilmore et al., 2024) and peace (Buhaug et al., 2023) as illustrative examples. The overall intention is to support especially decision-makers, whatever the scale or sector considered, in asking severity-driven questions to identify sector- and context-specific “priority” risks from climate change.
This paper summarizes the risk assessment and management workflow developed and applied to the Southwest Regional Partnership on Carbon Sequestration (SWP) Phase III Demonstration Project. The risk assessment and management workflow consists of six primary tasks, including management planning, identification, qualitative analysis, quantitative analysis, response planning, and monitoring. Within the workflow, the SWP assembled and iteratively updated a risk registry that identifies risks for all major activities of the project. Risk elements were ranked with respect to the potential impact to the project and the likelihood of occurrence. Both qualitative and quantitative risk analyses were performed. To graphically depict the interactions among risk elements and help building risk scenarios, process influence diagrams were used to represent the interactions. The SWP employed quantitative methods of risk analysis including Response Surface Method (RSM), Polynomial Chaos Expansion (PCE), and the National Risk Assessment Partnership (NRAP) toolset. The SWP also developed risk response planning and performed risk control and monitoring to prevent the risks from affecting the project and ensure the effectiveness of risk management. As part of risk control and monitoring, existing and new risks have been tracked and the response plan was subsequently evaluated. Findings and lessons learned from the SWP’s risk assessment and management efforts will provide valuable information for other commercial geological CO2 storage projects.
STUDY QUESTION Can we simultaneously assess risk for multiple cancers to identify familial multicancer patterns in families of azoospermic and severely oligozoospermic men? SUMMARY ANSWER Here, distinct familial cancer patterns were observed in the azoospermia and severe oligozoospermia cohorts, suggesting heterogeneity in familial cancer risk by both type of subfertility and within subfertility type. WHAT IS KNOWN ALREADY Subfertile men and their relatives show increased risk for certain cancers including testicular, thyroid, and pediatric. STUDY DESIGN, SIZE, DURATION A retrospective cohort of subfertile men (N = 786) was identified and matched to fertile population controls (N = 5674). Family members out to third-degree relatives were identified for both subfertile men and fertile population controls (N = 337 754). The study period was 1966–2017. Individuals were censored at death or loss to follow-up, loss to follow-up occurred if they left Utah during the study period. PARTICIPANTS/MATERIALS, SETTING, METHODS Azoospermic (0 × 10 6 /mL) and severely oligozoospermic (<1.5 × 10 6 /mL) men were identified in the Subfertility Health and Assisted Reproduction and the Environment cohort (SHARE). Subfertile men were age- and sex-matched 5:1 to fertile population controls and family members out to third-degree relatives were identified using the Utah Population Database (UPDB). Cancer diagnoses were identified through the Utah Cancer Registry. Families containing ≥10 members with ≥1 year of follow-up 1966–2017 were included (azoospermic: N = 426 families, 21 361 individuals; oligozoospermic: N = 360 families, 18 818 individuals). Unsupervised clustering based on standardized incidence ratios for 34 cancer phenotypes in the families was used to identify familial multicancer patterns; azoospermia and severe oligospermia families were assessed separately. MAIN RESULTS AND THE ROLE OF CHANCE Compared to control families, significant increases in cancer risks were observed in the azoospermia cohort for five cancer types: bone and joint cancers hazard ratio (HR) = 2.56 (95% CI = 1.48–4.42), soft tissue cancers HR = 1.56 (95% CI = 1.01–2.39), uterine cancers HR = 1.27 (95% CI = 1.03–1.56), Hodgkin lymphomas HR = 1.60 (95% CI = 1.07–2.39), and thyroid cancer HR = 1.54 (95% CI = 1.21–1.97). Among severe oligozoospermia families, increased risk was seen for three cancer types: colon cancer HR = 1.16 (95% CI = 1.01–1.32), bone and joint cancers HR = 2.43 (95% CI = 1.30–4.54), and testis cancer HR = 2.34 (95% CI = 1.60–3.42) along with a significant decrease in esophageal cancer risk HR = 0.39 (95% CI = 0.16–0.97). Thirteen clusters of familial multicancer patterns were identified in families of azoospermic men, 66% of families in the azoospermia cohort showed population-level cancer risks, however, the remaining 12 clusters showed elevated risk for 2-7 cancer types. Several of the clusters with elevated cancer risks also showed increased odds of cancer diagnoses at young ages with six clusters showing increased odds of adolescent and young adult (AYA) diagnosis [odds ratio (OR) = 1.96–2.88] and two clusters showing increased odds of pediatric cancer diagnosis (OR = 3.64–12.63). Within the severe oligozoospermia cohort, 12 distinct familial multicancer clusters were identified. All 12 clusters showed elevated risk for 1–3 cancer types. An increase in odds of cancer diagnoses at young ages was also seen in five of the severe oligozoospermia familial multicancer clusters, three clusters showed increased odds of AYA diagnosis (OR = 2.19–2.78) with an additional two clusters showing increased odds of a pediatric diagnosis (OR = 3.84–9.32). LIMITATIONS, REASONS FOR CAUTION Although this study has many strengths, including population data for family structure, cancer diagnoses and subfertility, there are limitations. First, semen measures are not available for the sample of fertile men. Second, there is no information on medical comorbidities or lifestyle risk factors such as smoking status, BMI, or environmental exposures. Third, all of the subfertile men included in this study were seen at a fertility clinic for evaluation. These men were therefore a subset of the overall population experiencing fertility problems and likely represent those with the socioeconomic means for evaluation by a physician. WIDER IMPLICATIONS OF THE FINDINGS This analysis leveraged unique population-level data resources, SHARE and the UPDB, to describe novel multicancer clusters among the families of azoospermic and severely oligozoospermic men. Distinct overall multicancer risk and familial multicancer patterns were observed in the azoospermia and severe oligozoospermia cohorts, suggesting heterogeneity in cancer risk by type of subfertility and within subfertility type. Describing families with similar cancer risk patterns provides a new avenue to increase homogeneity for focused gene discovery and environmental risk factor studies. Such discoveries will lead to more accurate risk predictions and improved counseling for patients and their families. STUDY FUNDING/COMPETING INTEREST(S) This work was funded by GEMS: Genomic approach to connecting Elevated germline Mutation rates with male infertility and Somatic health (Eunice Kennedy Shriver National Institute of Child Health and Human Development (NICHD): R01 HD106112). The authors have no conflicts of interest relevant to this work.
Ambitious international greenhouse gas emissions reduction targets demand a rapid transformation to a low-carbon economy. This transformation includes the accelerated adoption of carbon dioxide (CO2) capture and storage (CCS) technology. However, as with any large-scale engineering enterprise, the widespread commercial-scale deployment of geologic carbon storage (GCS) raises important questions about technology and cost-effectiveness, safety, environmental risk, and long-term liability. Effectively assessing and managing risks and liability associated with GCS projects is a key technical need throughout the project life cycle-from site selection and permitting to monitoring design, operational risk management, and post-operational site closure. This presentation highlights recent advancements in tools for quantitative risk assessment, being developed by the National Risk Assessment Partnership (NRAP). NRAP is a multi-year, multinational laboratory research collaboration sponsored by the U.S. Department of Energy's Office of Fossil Energy and Carbon Management. Our focus will be on these tools' applications in addressing critical stakeholder questions related to supporting permitting to ensure secure and environmentally protective storage; designing effective and efficient monitoring plans; evaluating the effectiveness of remedial actions and risk management alternatives; and informing liability assessment and investment decisions. This paper will detail the key functionality of NRAP’s Open-Source Integrated Assessment Model (NRAP-Open-IAM), a computational framework for assessing leakage risk and containment assurance. This model features streamlined workflows for calculating leakage risk profiles, delineating risk-based area of review, and assessing contingency plans and post-injection site care requirements. ORION is an open-source, observation-based ensemble forecasting toolkit to help operators assess the seismic hazard at a carbon storage site. The State of Stress Analysis Tool (SOSAT), designed to assess subsurface stress conditions and evaluate geomechanical risk resulting from CO2 injection in an area of interest will also be presented. We will also introduce a prototype model to evaluate storage project costs and liability associated with risk management. The Technoeconomic and Liability Evaluation for Storage (TALES) model uses results from forecasts of leakage and induced seismicity risk to estimate the lifecycle cost of managing risk. Finally, a preliminary example of how the NRAP Risk-based Adaptive Monitoring Plan (RAMP) tool can be used to design efficient and effective site monitoring plans and estimate the detectability of fluid leakage will be provided. The relevance of these tools for addressing key stakeholder questions amidst uncertainty will be emphasized.
The geologic storage of carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) is one method to help reduce or eliminate atmospheric CO 2 emissions. The sequestered CO 2 is originally captured from the atmosphere or from a stationary industrial source and subsequently injected into a deep subsurface porous rock formation. To facilitate the successful deployment of field scale carbon storage projects, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is developing tools and protocols for defensible, science-based frameworks to quantify and mitigate risks associated with the long-term storage of CO 2 . This protocol specifically addresses the risk of induced seismicity due to injection in a geologic carbon storage (GCS) site. This integrated and risk-based protocol is a product of the U.S. DOE Fossil Energy’s National Risk Assessment Partnership (NRAP), a multi-year collaborative research effort of Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL), Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), National Energy Technology Laboratory (NETL), and Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL). These recommended practices describe a set of 7 steps to evaluate, manage, communicate, and mitigate the risk of induced seismicity at GCS sites. The base methodology of the recommended practices follows a framework similar to the Protocol for Addressing Induced Seismicity Associated with Enhanced Geothermal Systems (Majer et al., 2012), developed for the Geothermal Technology Office of the U.S. DOE. These recommended practices present a framework to systematically assess the induced seismicity risk and quantify the associated uncertainties. These recommendations are based on current research and are sufficiently general to allow for modification and application to a variety of different types of sites. The substance of the recommended practices contained herein includes both technical and non-technical issues, and covers all operational stages of the GCS project lifecycle. They start at the preliminary risk assessment phase, continue through site assessment and characterization, include best practice communication and seismic monitoring plan methodologies, discuss the evaluation and mitigation of seismic hazard and risk, and closes with an exploration of operational management plans, which conclude when the induced seismicity risk abates back to background level. The focus of these recommendations is on actively managing the risks associated with induced seismicity by developing an actionable risk management plan that starts at the project proposal stage and continues through site closure through an iterative assessment and improvement process. The audience of this document is expected to include all interested stakeholders (e.g., operators, project developers, regulators, and the general public) and is expressly written to be accessible to this broad range of partners. This document is intended to disseminate knowledge gained through recent advances in the science of induced seismicity hazard and risk assessments, to provide updates based on recent experience gained by similar corollary injection-induced seismicity cases, and most importantly to establish a uniform framework to carry out a successful induced seismicity risk management plan for carbon storage projects in the future. These recommendations do not directly address any domestic or international regulations or standards. A complementary NRAP report makes recommendations for the assessment and management of environmental subsurface risks associated with unwanted fluid migration at GCS sites (Thomas et al., 2021) and should be referred to in order to address those additional GCS site risks.
The geologic storage of carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) is one method to help reduce or eliminate atmospheric CO 2 emissions. The sequestered CO 2 is originally captured from the atmosphere or from a stationary industrial source and subsequently injected into a deep subsurface porous rock formation. To facilitate the successful deployment of field scale carbon storage projects, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is developing tools and protocols for defensible, science-based frameworks to quantify and mitigate risks associated with the long-term storage of CO 2 . This protocol specifically addresses the risk of induced seismicity due to injection in a geologic carbon storage (GCS) site. This integrated and risk-based protocol is a product of the U.S. DOE Fossil Energy’s National Risk Assessment Partnership (NRAP), a multi-year collaborative research effort of Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL), Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), National Energy Technology Laboratory (NETL), and Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL). These recommended practices describe a set of 7 steps to evaluate, manage, communicate, and mitigate the risk of induced seismicity at GCS sites. The base methodology of the recommended practices follows a framework similar to the $\textit{Protocol for Addressing Induced Seismicity Associated with Enhanced Geothermal Systems}$ (Majer et al., 2012), developed for the Geothermal Technology Office of the U.S. DOE. These recommended practices present a framework to systematically assess the induced seismicity risk and quantify the associated uncertainties. These recommendations are based on current research and are sufficiently general to allow for modification and application to a variety of different types of sites. The substance of the recommended practices contained herein includes both technical and non-technical issues, and covers all operational stages of the GCS project lifecycle. They start at the preliminary risk assessment phase, continue through site assessment and characterization, include best practice communication and seismic monitoring plan methodologies, discuss the evaluation and mitigation of seismic hazard and risk, and closes with an exploration of operational management plans, which conclude when the induced seismicity risk abates back to background level. The focus of these recommendations is on actively managing the risks associated with induced seismicity by developing an actionable risk management plan that starts at the project proposal stage and continues through site closure through an iterative assessment and improvement process. The audience of this document is expected to include all interested stakeholders (e.g., operators, project developers, regulators, and the general public) and is expressly written to be accessible to this broad range of partners. This document is intended to disseminate knowledge gained through recent advances in the science of induced seismicity hazard and risk assessments, to provide updates based on recent experience gained by similar corollary injection-induced seismicity cases, and most importantly to establish a uniform framework to carry out a successful induced seismicity risk management plan for carbon storage projects in the future. These recommendations do not directly address any domestic or international regulations or standards. A complementary NRAP report makes recommendations for the assessment and management of environmental subsurface risks associated with unwanted fluid migration at GCS sites (Thomas et al., 2021) and should be referred to in order to address those additional GCS site risks
The US and other nations have a large nuclear and chemical waste remediation task remaining from World War II, the Cold War, and industrial activities. The US Department of Energy (DOE) has the largest task in the U.S., with Hanford (Washington State) being the most contaminated site, with the longest and most costly cleanup program projected to extend to the end of the century. One of the greatest remediation problems at Hanford are the burial waste facilities, some of which are inside the 200 Areas on the Central Plateau, while others are outside the 200 Areas. These areas are associated with waste sites, pipes, and contaminated trenches, posing technical cleanup challenges to meet DoE's remediation goals, including protection of human health and the environment commensurate with Tri- Party Agreement and current regulatory requirements. In this paper we select one of the legacy waste sites (the BC Cribs and Trenches) as a case study to explore how risk to ecological resources varies during and as a consequence of remediation on sites primarily considered legacy waste sites. We used the risk methodology developed by the Consortium for Risk Evaluation with Stakeholder Participation (CRESP) during the Hanford Site-wide Risk Review. The CRESP methodology included evaluating the risk to receptors, including human health, the Columbia River, groundwater, and ecological and cultural resources. The risk evaluation process for ecological receptors included defining the boundaries of each evaluation unit (EU) to be remediated, definition of a suitable buffer area that might be affected, and consideration of the known resource value based on field work. This information, coupled with known remediation options or strategies, allowed us to develop a risk rating for ecological resources. Site risks were evaluated on a scale of 'not discernible' to 'very high' risk. Consideration of the risks at the buried waste sites was complicated by uncertainties in remediation methods and the degree of restoration that would occur as part of the remediation process. We use the BC Cribs and Trenches as a case study to explore why the risks are low currently but increase during remediation. The current 'not discernible to low' risk rating is due to the lack of high quality ecological resources on the BC Cribs and Trenches EU, except for edge areas (with some state-listed species). During remediation the risks increase to 'medium', mainly due to high quality resources on adjacent buffer lands, which could be disrupted during active remediation. Medium and high quality resources on the edge of the site are continuous with higher quality native shrub-steppe habitat on the buffer. Ecological resources on some of the areas surrounding the 200 East and West Areas are some of the highest quality shrub-steppe areas on the Hanford Site, and risk to these resources could be prevented by planning before and during remediation to minimize disruption. For example, lay down areas for the BC Cribs and Trenches can be minimized by careful planning. Heavy truck and other vehicular traffic can be minimized. Spread of the noxious weeds now on some of the site can be prevented, and the spread of invasive species into the site (particularly near undisturbed shrub-steppe habitat) can be reduced. Further, the areas around and between the 200 East and West Areas have been largely undisturbed and can serve as a source of seeds and propagules for any revegetation that occurs as part of the remediation process. (authors)