Engineering Papers⌕ Search

SEARCH · Engineering Papers

Results for “recommendations”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 73 records · Page 4

Recommendations for an Applicant to Calculate Activity Data for Greenhouse Gases Estimates

In 2009, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) directed the NRC staff to address climate change issues and consider the impacts of the emissions of carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) and other greenhouse gases (GHGs) in its environmental reviews for major licensing actions (NRC 2009b). To implement this direction from the Commission, the staff issued guidance in 2011 and updated guidance in 2014 in Attachment 1 to Interim Staff Guidance COL/ESP-ISG-026 (NRC 2011; NRC 2014). This guidance provides a simpler method than the method described in RG 4.2 Rev. 3, that an applicant can use to meet the plant parameter envelope (PPE) value from the Generic Environmental Impact Statement for Licensing of New Nuclear Reactors (NR GEIS). NRC staff estimated the 97-year lifecycle GHG emissions from a reference 1000 megawatt electrical (MWe) light-water reactor (LWR) for various activities associated with construction, operation (including uranium fuel cycle), and decommissioning of nuclear power plants and presented the results in Appendix H of the NR GEIS. Appendix H of the NR GEIS includes estimates of direct emissions from construction equipment and emergency diesel engines in a nuclear facility and indirect emissions from workforce vehicular traffic, fuel transportation and the uranium fuel cycle. The NR GEIS Section 3.3 extended the estimates in Appendix H for the installation of two 1000 MWe nuclear reactors on the same site. Scaling factors were used to extrapolate the GHG emissions of a reference 1000 MWe reactor to a two-unit nuclear reactor plant (each reactor unit generating 1000 MWe). GHG emission estimates for building, operation, decommissioning and safe storage (SAFSTOR) for a two-unit nuclear reactor plant would be based on the plant’s physical size, and therefore estimates for these source categories were assumed to be twice the value of the reference 1000 MWe reactor. However, GHG emissions from the fuel cycle (including fuel transportation) were scaled upward by a factor of 3, based on plant efficiencies greater than the 80 percent assumption in Appendix H. Table 1 below shows the PPE emissions for two 1000 MWe nuclear reactors as provided in NR GEIS. The total GHG emissions for two 1000 MWe reactors were calculated as 2,534,000 metric tons (MT) of CO 2 equivalent (CO 2 (e)) based on a 97 year GHG life cycle period. The GHG emissions lifetime of 97 years for a reference nuclear reactor includes a 7-year building phase, 40 years of operation, 10 years of active decommissioning, and 40 years of SAFSTOR operations (NRC 2024). Construction equipment and vehicular traffic from workers commute would contribute to the GHG emissions during a 7-year building phase. Uranium fuel cycle, vehicular traffic, fuel and waste transportation, and testing of standby diesel generators would contribute to GHG emissions during the 40-year operations phase. While NRC’s regulations allow up to 60 years of reactor facility decommissioning, Appendix H estimated that most of the GHGs would occur over an estimated 10-year period during which to the licensee would engage in significant demolition and earth-moving activities, as discussed in Supplement 1 to NUREG-0586 (NRC 2002). Vehicular traffic by the workforce during a 40-year SAFSTOR period would additionally contribute GHG emissions. The carbon footprint for a 40-year SAFSTOR period was separately analyzed from the decommissioning activities as provided in Table YYYY-2 of the staff issued guidance in 2011 (NRC 2011).

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Recommended Practice: Seamless Retry for Electric Vehicle Charging

This work introduces the concept of seamless retry in the electric vehicle (EV) charging domain. Its primary aim is to enhance the reliability and user experience of EV charging by reducing the frequency of user-required interventions in EV charging. This is achieved through an automated retry mechanism that activates upon encountering errors during the EV charging process.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Measuring the Energy Consumption and Efficiency of Deep Neural Networks: An Empirical Analysis and Design Recommendations

Addressing the "Red-AI" trend of rising energy consumption by large-scale neural networks, this study investigates the measured energy consumption of training various fully connected neural network architectures. We introduce the BUTTER-E dataset, an augmentation to the BUTTER Empirical Deep Learning dataset, containing energy consumption and performance data from 41,129 individual experimental runs spanning 30,582 distinct configurations: 13 datasets, 20 sizes (trainable parameters), 8 "shapes", and 14 depths on both CPUs and GPUs using node-level watt-meters. This dataset reveals the complex relationship between dataset size, network structure, and energy use. Our analysis uncovers a surprising, hardware-mediated non-linear relationship between energy efficiency and network design, challenging the assumption that reducing the number of parameters or FLOPs is the best way to achieve greater energy efficiency. We propose a straightforward and effective energy model that accounts for network size, computing, and memory hierarchy. Highlighting the need for cache-considerate algorithm development, we suggest a codesign approach to energy efficient network, algorithm, and hardware design. This work contributes to the fields of sustainable computing and Green AI, offering practical guidance for creating more energy-efficient neural networks and promoting sustainable AI.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Advanced Reactor Designs Security Analysis, Risk, and Recommendations: Risks, Consequences, and Possible by-Design Mitigation Approaches Associated with Select Advanced Reactors

Next-generation advanced reactors (ARs) incorporate enhanced safety systems, have smaller source terms, and feature compact modular designs, which should lessen their collective risk profiles. However, to fully evaluate risk, security needs to be a part of the equation. Without taking security into consideration, safety systems and components in the new ARs may be vulnerable to sabotage. These base attributes, coupled with enhanced security features specific to AR design through sound engineering and security-by-design (SeBD), should provide developers and operators with lower inherent security risk profiles. Building security early into the AR design may remove or passively secure potential critical targets from an adversary’s reach , thereby increasing overall safety and security. An integrated approach and diverse design team that includes engineering, operations, and security experts are fundamental to building security into the design without sacrificing fundamental operational efficiencies and principles. The objective of this project was to evaluate the security and safety interfaces for five classes of reactors, identify potential security vulnerabilities of structures, systems, and components (SSC), and underscore the need to consider security alongside safety in the design o f these concepts. The five reactor classes evaluated in this project and presented in this report are molten-salt reactors (MSR), high temperature gas reactors (HTGR), sodium-fast reactors (SFR), advanced light-water reactors (ALWR), and microreactors. These designs were selected because they reflect the concepts that are closest to market deployment and have received significant resource investments from the public and private sector. This project assesses the inherent security risks posed by common classes of ARs, provides a methodology and framework to assess security along with safety, and offers an analysis of potential mitigation strategies that could be incorporated. For each AR technology, the SSCs that relate to radionuclide source safety functions are discussed to understand the SSC contribution to safety and relative importance in the protective strategy for the design. The assumptions that went into evaluating each reactor concept originated from generic publicly available nonproprietary information and should not directly be used to qualify an absolute risk profile nor to rank specific AR designs. Instead, the purpose of the analysis is to understand and compare the generic inherent security risks of different AR technologies.

98 - NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL↗

Testing Recommendations for Thermal Failure Analysis

Minimizing ranges of uncertainty in failure QOIs is vital for making informed engineering decisions. To improve our decision-making ability, it is necessary to have a QOI representation that captures more complex failure modes. Capturing the physics of complex time-dependent temperature failure in explicit detail can be computationally and experimentally expensive. To avoid this blooming of complication and costs, an empirical QOI component-level failure/damage model may be sufficient to help identify component-level failure. In this context, failure and damage are abstractions of more complicated processes that lead to the cessation of normal operating behavior, not a representation of mechanical damage, such as void formation. Such a model requires minimal increases in computational cost and experimental burden. The proposed QOI serves as an indicator that something has likely failed, similar to the previous critical failure temperatures or pressures. This QOI will not replace any existing failure QOIs. It will be calculated alongside them, allowing for preservation of legacy style QOI measurements with new context from the new QOI.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Methods and recommendations for large-scale deflagration testing of battery energy storage system enclosures

UL Solutions produced this report as a summary of a test series executed at Sandia National Laboratories that they funded. This report was approved for release by UL Solutions in October 2025 and released in 2026 on their website at https://www.ul.com/insights/methods-and-recommendations-large-scale-deflagration-testing-battery-energy-storage-system.

Gaudet, Benjamin [UL Solutions] (ORCID:00090006419↗

IBR Digital Supply Chain Gap Analysis and Recommendations

The adoption of clean energy technologies, including solar photovoltaics, continues to introduce non-traditional stakeholders to the operations and planning of the electric system. Stakeholders such as manufacturers, vendors, owners, aggregators, and others are enabling the adoption, integration, and optimum operations of solar technologies at accelerated rates. Inverters form the foundation of many digitally controlled energy sources for clean energy technologies, including Solar, Battery Energy Storage Systems, Hybrid Systems, and Hydrogen Fuel Cells. Their supply chain is complex, a series of microchips, electronic switches and other components making up its primary functions. The complexity of this space and the growing digitization associated with these components can create supply chain cyber risks. One measure to mitigate cybersecurity attacks is proper digital supply chain security. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Solar Energy Technologies Office (SETO), in partnership with the Cybersecurity, Energy, Security, and Emergency Response (CESER) office, is hosting a workshop to bring together solar vendors and services providers to discuss digital supply chain security for solar systems and challenges and opportunities in the transitioning to a fully domestic supply chain for solar energy in the U.S. This workshop will support the Securing Solar for the Grid (S2G) and Energy Cyber Sense program activities. During the workshop, industry experts and researchers from DOE National Laboratories will discuss the current solar supply chain landscape and the transition to domestic manufacturing of solar components in the U.S. Tools and techniques to better manage and secure the digital supply chain of solar devices and systems will be discussed.

cybersecurity↗

The Relationship of Hydrology in the Green River to Colorado Pikeminnow Populations

The Federally listed Colorado Pikeminnow (CP) (Ptychocheilus Lucius) has been declining in the Green River Basin over the last 20 years. Muth et al. (2000) recommended flows and temperatures to benefit endangered fish species downstream of Flaming Gorge Dam on the Green River. The recommendations identified a range of flows during the base flow period (flows that occur after the annual snowmelt runoff period, usually from early summer to the following spring) that were intended to benefit CP. The recommendations indicated that the mean flow for the summer–winter period should be established each year on the basis of anticipated hydrologic conditions, but adjustments could be made if hydrologic conditions change. Flow should gradually decline from peak flow to base flow, with the base flow reached by early to middle summer (depending on hydrologic conditions) and maintained through February. The rate of decline should depend on rates of decline in Yampa River flows and the recommended rates of decline for dam releases. No specific recommendations were made for base flow variation in Reach 1, but variation around the annual mean base flow should be restricted to achieve recommended levels of variation in Reach 2 (middle Green River) (Table 5.5 in Muth et al. 2000). Implementation of the flow and temperature recommendations served as the proposed action for an EIS on Flaming Gorge Dam operations. A Biological Assessment of the impacts on endangered species of implementing the recommendations was prepared and a Biological Opinion that called for development of a study plan to examine the effects of implementation. Projects to address this evaluation were identified in the Green River Study Plan and have been conducted since then. The purpose of the Study Plan was to identify and recommend to the Recovery Program those monitoring or research projects necessary for implementation and evaluation of the flow and temperature recommendations. Those projects included studies to evaluate the anticipated effects of implementing the recommendations (including potential adverse effects identified in the 2006 Biological Opinion) and studies to examine recognized uncertainties of the recommendations. A new recovery program summer base flow study plan was approved in September of 2020 to evaluate stable and elevated summer base flows below Flaming Gorge Dam intended to benefit CP spawning and rearing success. Anecdotal observations suggest CP production may have been higher in years prior to flow restrictions for endangered fish. Based on long-term CP monitoring data in the Green River, Bestgen and Hill (2016) concluded that CP would benefit from higher summer baseflows (1,700-3,000 ft 3 /sec) with flows above or below associated with lower abundance of age-0 CP. Therefore, flexibility in the ROD is currently being utilized to establish higher stable summer base flows in an attempt create more advantageous conditions for spawning and rearing CP. These fish recovery flows are restrictive to WAPA in the summer months, therefore it is necessary to conduct an analysis of historic river data relationships to CP abundance to better understand if the recommended fish flows (elevated and stable base flows) are necessary for fish recovery.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

A Review of the Lawrence Livermore Nuclear Accident Dosimeter 1980s-present

A Nuclear Accident Dosimetry program is a federal requirement for all facilities that have the potential to have a criticality accident. Personnel Nuclear Accident Dosimeter (PNAD) theory and analytical procedures are driven by various scientific needs and interacting regulations. A brief history of the status of USA Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear accident dosimetry regulations, recommendations, and performance testing criteria are given. Then, the history of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) PNAD is explored, including changes in the physical dosimeter and adjustments of the analysis method through the last four decades. Finally, the performance of LLNL’s PNAD at criticality accident intercomparison training exercises since 2009 is explored. In general, reported neutron doses have been within or close to DOE-STD-1098 performance criteria while reported gamma doses have been outside of DOE-STD-1098 performance criteria. Reported total absorbed doses have varied in meeting ANSI/HPS N13.3 and ANSI/HPS N13.3 (R2019) performance criteria. Dosimetry staff retirement and turnover have left historical knowledge gaps, yet provided opportunities within the NAD program at LLNL. This review paper serves as an overview of the history and status of the NAD program. Brief technical, procedural and programmatic recommendations to improve LLNL’s NAD program are given. Technical recommendations include investigating orientation factors through modeling or empirical experimentation, investigating gamma dosimetry methods for high-dose scenarios, and exploring other dosimetric methods for simpler, quicker NAD analysis. Procedural recommendations include better documentation of conversion factor (activity-to-fluence and fluence-to-dose) derivations and spectrum uses, and updated analysis spreadsheets or simple Graphic User Interfaces for dose calculations. In conclusion, programmatic recommendations include formalized training for NAD analysts, and having multiple SMEs trained on the NAD program.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Analysis of US Industrial Assessment Centers (IACs) implementation

Industrial energy assessments are a fundamental action toward developing a decarbonization strategy at any level. They provide an understanding of where energy efficiency opportunities exist and help to make informed business decisions about the costs and benefits of implementing sustainable policies and practices. This paper examines the effectiveness of the Department of Energy's Industrial Assessment Centers Program at providing useful energy-efficiency audits as well as the barriers faced by the program and plans for future growth and improvement. This paper presents an analysis of the program between 1981 and 2022, covering 20,290 industrial assessments and 151,198 recommendations, with $2.6 billion of recommended savings. The analysis includes a breakdown of the IAC recommendations and implemented projects based on both the industrial subsectors according to the Standard Industrial Classification code, energy type, and systems evaluated. The results include a 47 % implementation rate, a gap analysis to understand the missed opportunities, and a discussion about reasons for recommendation rejection. A comparison of the IAC Program with other country-level energy auditing or assessment programs was conducted, and suggestions for improving implementation rates were mentioned.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗

Hydropower Supply Chain Gap Analysis

In 2022, DOE conducted supply chain "deep dives" for renewable energy technologies, including hydropower (Uria-Martinez, Hydropower Industry Supply Chain Deep Dive Assessment 2022). The deep dive identified several challenges in the current hydropower supply chain. In addition, Nguyen et. al (2022) conducted an analogous deep-dive assessment on large (> 100-MW) power transformers (LPTs), a critical component of hydropower installations, and concluded that the LPTs as well as several upstream components and materials also have domestic supply chain challenges. These deep dives were the initial high-level assessments of these supply chains and were focused on identifying the biggest issues. Both recommended further investigation. In the two years since the deep dives were published, the Water Power Technologies Office (WPTO) has focused on improving our understanding of the hydropower supply chain and developing strategies for addressing these challenges. Because the challenges outlined above are most acute for large hydropower systems, most of the report and specifically, this report concentrates on the larger > 100-MW hydropower systems. Early in 2023, DOE's Secretary of Energy asked the Water Power Technologies Office (WPTO) to engage the hydropower community and seek input on strategies to secure and encourage domestic manufacturing. WPTO has established three focus areas for engagement: 1) Define the market for planned rehabilitations and new construction of the domestic fleet, 2) Provide insights for policies, incentives, loan programs, and technology investments to encourage domestic content, and 3) Define the existing and required domestic hydropower manufacturing capabilities and workforce. This report summarizes these efforts and complements the earlier work by further exploring the identified challenges and identifying potential actions to address these challenges. Furthermore, we conducted a detailed gap analysis of the domestic hydropower supply chain, down to the component level. From this analysis, we then make specific, actionable recommendations for closing these gaps. Section 2 of the report summarizes recent (i.e., since 2021) legislation impacting hydropower deployment and/or its supply chain. It then describes the efforts of WPTO to assess and improve the hydropower supply chain since the publication of the deep-dive assessments. In Section 3, the report updates the earlier supply chain and market studies, identifying specific capabilities by company and location. Section 4 outlines the hydropower demand signal for both new builds due to clean energy goals as well as refurbishments and upgrading of the current domestic fleet. Section 5 is a detailed gap analysis while Section 6 provides actionable recommendations for closing the gaps. Section 7 concludes the report by linking the recommendations to the identified gaps and discusses future efforts.

13 HYDRO ENERGY↗

An Architectural Survey of the U12G Tunnel Historic District, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), in conjunction with the National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO), proposes to demolish six buildings and three storage areas located at the U12g Tunnel portal area in Area 12 of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). The buildings are 12-358 (Signal Vault); 12-201800 (Storage Quonset Hut); 12-202555 (Walker Shack); 12-868 (Pipe Assembly); 12-B100933 (Electrical Shop); 12-B100944 (Conference Room); and Storage Area 1; Storage Area 2; and Storage Area 3. The buildings and storage areas were selected for demolition as part of the DOE’s Real Property Efficiency Plan to reduce the footprint of unused and non-operational facilities on the NNSS. They are all vacant and have no proposed uses for current or upcoming NNSS missions. Demolition activities constitute an undertaking subject to review under Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) (54 United States Code [USC] § 306101) and its implementing regulations, 36 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 800. Identification efforts began with resources proposed for demolition in federal Fiscal Year (FY) 23. Four buildings were proposed to be demolished in FY23 (12-358, 12-868, 12-201800, and 12-202555). These buildings and the U12g Tunnel Historic District (SHPO No. D444) were recorded in Identification, Evaluation, and Finding of Adverse Effect for the Proposed Demolition of Five Buildings in Area 12, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada (Menocal et al. 2023). Identification efforts indicated three buildings (12-358, 12-201800, and 12-868) supported nuclear testing in the U12g Tunnel. The fourth building post-dated the use of U12g Tunnel for nuclear testing activities. The report recommended that three of the four buildings (12-358, 12-201800, 12-868) and the U12g Tunnel Historic District may be eligible for the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP). The report also found that the undertaking would have an adverse effect on the three buildings and on the historic district. The Nevada State Historic Preservation Office (SHPO) concurred with the report’s findings (Reed 2023). The U12g Tunnel was determined eligible as a historic district under the Secretary of the Interior’s (SOI) Significance Criterion A, at the local level, in the context of the Cold War as an underground testing environment for the development of nuclear weapons and to assess the effects of a nuclear explosion on materials and equipment with a period of significance from 1959 to 1971. It was also determined eligible under Significance Criterion C for embodying the distinctive characters of a horizontal tunnel complex used for nuclear testing and as a significant and distinguishable entity. The three buildings were determined to be contributing elements of the district. The undertaking was expanded with the addition of two buildings and three storage areas proposed to be demolished and located within U12g Tunnel Historic District in FY24. These five resources (12-B100933, 12-B100944, and Storage Areas 1, 2, and 3) were recorded in Supplemental Identification, Evaluation, and Finding of Effect for Additional Proposed Demolition at U12g Tunnel, Area 12, Nevada national Security Site, Nye County, Nevada (Brannan et al. 2024). Identification efforts indicated that the two buildings and Storage Area 1 supported nuclear testing in the U12g Tunnel. Storage Area 1 and Storage Area 2 post-dated the nuclear testing activities at U12g Tunnel and were not recommended as contributing elements to the district. The report also found that the undertaking would have an adverse effect on the newly identified buildings and one storage area and on the historic district. The SHPO concurred that the expanded undertaking would result in adverse effects to historic properties (Reed 2025). To resolve these adverse effects, NNSA/NFO, in consultation with the SHPO, is following standard mitigation as stipulated in the 2024 Programmatic Agreement DE-GM58-22NA25554 Among the U.S. Department of Energy and the Nevada State Historic Preservation Officer and the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation Concerning the Protection of Historic Properties on the Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada (hereafter referred to as the NNSS PA). The standard mitigation measures are outlined in Appendix D of the NNSS PA. As such, this architectural survey has been prepared in accordance with Appendix D of the NNSS PA and follows the report format outlined in Appendix F. It includes a historic context that describes the district’s origin, history, and support functions, its significance in the context of nuclear testing on the NNSS, and identifies contributing and non-contributing elements within the district. The report is accompanied by Architectural Resource Assessment (ARA) forms for individual resources and a Historic District Resource Assessment (HDRA) for the U12g Tunnel Historic District. In total, this architectural report identified 32 primary resources within the district boundary. Six of the primary resources were previously identified as contributing elements. An additional 17 resources are recommended as contributing elements to the district for a total of 23 contributing elements. The other nine resources identified are recommended as non-contributing elements to the district.

12-201800↗