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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2024

Assessment of Potential Dose and Environmental Impacts from Proposed Testing at the INL Radiological Response Training Range

This assessment uses screening level models to calculate potential environmental impacts from proposed tests at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) Radiological Response Training Range (RRTR) site. Proposed tests could be conducted using 11 different radioactive material types that include K 2 O, LaBr 3 , KBr, Cu, Zr, F, Ga, Ga 2 O 3 , NaNO 2 , Ga-68, and Tc-99m. The tests could potentially release radioactive material to the atmosphere and radionuclides and other contaminants to the soil, which could leach into the unsaturated zone and migrate to the aquifer. Atmospheric transport of radionuclides to potential human receptors and time-integrated air concentrations were calculated with a Gaussian plume model and three years of hourly meteorological data. Potential surface-soil impacts were calculated with the computer program Mixing-Cell Model (MCM). Groundwater impacts were calculated with the computer programs MCM and GWSCREEN. Radiological doses from potential atmospheric releases were calculated for public receptors off the INL Site and for workers at nearby INL facilities. Results were compared to regulatory dose limits. Maximum potential groundwater concentrations were estimated in the aquifer below the NSTR site and compared to drinking water standards or risk-based screening levels for resident tap water. Soil concentrations were calculated and compared to risk-based screening levels for workers and potential future residents. All impacts were estimated based on the assumption that 12 tests are conducted annually using all 11 material types for a period of 15 years. This document provides the resources to enable a subject matter expert in the field of environmental assessments to replicate the modeling and calculations. The methodology and parameters are presented in the text. All electronic files, including computer code input, output, executable files, batch files, scripts, and spreadsheet files are contained in a zip file that can be accessed by selecting “Additional Information” (select Native File) in the INL Electronic Document Management System (EDMS).

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Review of particle deposition to and removal from clothing, skin, and hair after a radioactive airborne dispersal event

Explosive Radiological Dispersal Devices (RDD) – aka dirty bombs – are seen as a credible method to carry out a radiological terror attack. After exploding a radioactive source, the radionuclide-laden plume will be blown downwind of ground zero, with particles falling out and potentially depositing on people caught in and under the cloud. Some of these people may not show any sign of radiation sickness and therefore not realize they have been contaminated and may take the radioactive particulate with them on their daily activities, thus spreading the radioactive particulate outside the initially contaminated area. This paper reviews the scientific literature to better understand the rate at which particulate deposits on and is removed from the different “surfaces” of a person, i.e., hair, skin, and clothing. Prior research indicates that: 1) particle deposition is usually higher on skin than on hair and clothing; 2) particle deposition is greater for a person with higher skin moisture, 3) stronger wind increases the deposition flux onto a person, and 4) the fraction of particulate deposited on the hair, skin, and clothing respectively depends on the length of the hair, assuming all the hair surface is available for deposition. The studies taken into consideration show that the largest uncertainty in particulate deposition onto a person is due to clothing type because of the different possible weave arrangements and tightness which translate into differences in actual surface area and surface roughness. A factor of 2-to-20 variation in deposition rate was found. Removal of the particulate from the contaminated person may be due to wind, a person's movement, and/or contact transfer, i.e., by touching a different clean surface. Experiments show that the majority of the particulate is resuspended within 2–6 h mostly depending on the intensity of physical activity. The largest uncertainty in particulate removal from skin depends on the skin moisture, transfer rate of single-contact, and how many objects/people a person touches per hour. No data for hair were found for particle removal and resuspension. The studies considered did not utilize radionuclides directly; however, data on adhesion of radioactive vs. their non-radioactive counterpart have shown that the uncertainty due to the radioactivity of the particles is lower than that due to other factors. In conclusion, an idealized scenario involving a single building in the path of the cloud showed the impact of building-influenced flow on the cloud transport path and mixing, which affects the radiological dose the downwind population is exposed to and consequently the health effects.

63 RADIATION, THERMAL, AND OTHER ENVIRON. POLLUTAN↗
DOE OSTI2022

Radiological Considerations Supporting the American Medical Isotope Producer Niowave

This report provides a summary of work performed by Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) during FY22 in support of Niowave, an American Medical Isotope Production (AMIP) facility. SRNL served in a technical support role, funded by NA-231, supporting Niowave in the beginning of non radiological functional testing of their airport facility in FY22. Through this agreement, SRNL provides Niowave access to subject matter experts (SMEs) for questions that may arise during the drafting of engineering plans, facility policies, and/or response procedures. This report summarizes discussions between SRNL and Niowave about guidance concerning issues with the floor of the hot cells, dispersible removable contamination (beta emitting fission product), hot cell operation specifically utilization of cameras or mirrors, and the process for removing contaminated waste from the hot cell. Lessons learned and other various resources provided to Niowave by SRNL during FY22 are referenced in this report. This work was funded through NNSA’s Office of Material Management and Minimization, Conversion Office (NA-231).

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2022

Dosimetry and cancer risk estimations for different radiation protection solutions at decommissioning a contaminated nuclear power plant site

Contaminated sediments originating from dredging activities in a nuclear power plant site were placed in a pond, which has to be taken into consideration during the future decommissioning process. The sediments have to be handled to free release the site. The radionuclides Co-60 and Cs-137 were identified and the activity concentrations (Bq/kg) were quantified in the range of 10–6000 and 5–50 Bq kg -1 , respectively. The absorbed dose rate to individuals of various ages and sex present at the site of the dry pond area was estimated. The radiological impact in terms of lifetime attributable risk (LAR) and effective dose were calculated. For a 30-year-old male exposed during one year without any action regarding the sediments in the dried out pond, the LAR was predicted to be 0.0027, which recalculated to effective dose corresponds to 7.6 mSv year -1 . The calculations show that countermeasures will be needed for the contaminated site.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗
DOE OSTI2025

Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory Annual Site Environmental Report for Calendar Year 2024

This report provides the US Department of Energy (DOE) and the public with information on the level of radioactive and non-radioactive pollutants (if any) that are added to the environment as a result of Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory’s (PPPL) operations. This report fulfills the annual public reporting requirements of DOE Order 231.1B. The results of PPPL’s 2024 environmental surveillance and monitoring program are presented and discussed. The report also summarizes environmental initiatives, assessments, and community involvement programs that were undertaken in 2024. PPPL has engaged in fusion energy research since 1951 and at its current locations since 1958. The Laboratory’s mission is to develop the scientific knowledge and advanced engineering to enable fusion to power the US and the world, and to develop the understanding of plasmas from the nano- to the astrophysical scale. PPPL’s primary experiment, the National Spherical Torus Experiment-Upgrade (NSTX-U) is a collaboration among national laboratories, universities, and national and international research institutions and is a major element in the US Fusion Energy Sciences Program. Its design tests the physics principles of spherical torus (ST) plasmas, playing an important role in the development of smaller, more economical fusion reactors. Due to previous operational issues, NSTX-U did not operate in 2024. PPPL is engaged in a project to replace key NSTX-U components and systems to enable the operation of this international magnetic fusion user facility. In 2024, PPPL’s radiological environmental monitoring program measured tritium in the air at onsite sampling stations. Using highly sensitive air monitors, PPPL is capable of detecting small changes in the ambient levels of tritium. The operation of monitors located on D-site is used to demonstrate compliance with the National Emission Standard for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAPs) regulations. Also included in PPPL’s radiological environmental monitoring program, are water monitoring – ground, surface, and waste waters. PPPL’s radiological monitoring program characterized the background levels of tritium in the environment and those data are presented in this report. Ground water monitoring continued under New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection’s (NJDEP) Site Remediation Program regulations. PPPL monitored for nonradiological contaminants, mainly volatile organic compounds (components of common degreasing solvents). In 2024, PPPL complied with permit limits for surface water and sanitary wastewater discharges. PPPL was honored with an award for EPEAT-certified electronics purchasing from the Global Electronics Council on July 25, 2024.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2022

Perspectives on Response to an Abnormal Radiological Event [Slides]

On May 2, 2019, a sealed radioactive source containing cesium-137 was breached at the University of Washington Harborview Research and Training (HRT) Building in downtown Seattle while attempting to recover the source for the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA’s) Off-site Source Recovery Program (OSRP). The breach of the source resulted in the contamination of personnel, large sections of the building, and a release of material to the local environment.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2022

An Assessment of Potential Dose Impacts from External Contamination on Naval Reactors Facility Waste Canisters (Special Analysis)

This Special Analysis (SA) was performed to address a request by Naval Reactors Facility (NRF) Waste Programs for a permanent exception to limits of removable surface contamination on the exterior of waste canisters shipped to the Remote-Handled Low-Level Waste (RHLLW) Disposal Facility as specified in the waste acceptance criteria (WAC) (PLN-5446). The purpose of this SA is to determine if the NRF-requested levels for removable surface contamination on the exterior of all NRF waste canisters is within the bounds of the current performance assessment (PA). This was done by calculating the groundwater all-pathways dose contribution from surface contamination on the exterior of NRF canisters for the following cases: (1) the exteriors of all NRF waste canisters are contaminated to the 10 CFR 835 Appendix D allowable limits in the current WAC, and (2) the exteriors of all NRF waste canisters are contaminated to the limits requested by NRF Waste Programs. Dose impacts for each case were compared to each other and to the all pathways dose for the PA base case. Dose impacts were also compared to the all pathways dose limit specified in DOE O 435.1. A simple assessment of the potential impacts of the increase in surface contamination using the NRF-requested limits on the biotic, air, and inadvertent intruder pathways was also performed. Based on the results of this SA, the increase in canister exterior contamination limits requested by NRF are well within the bounds of the current PA and will not result in a violation of performance objectives. The results also show the increased limits do not reflect or necessitate a fundamental change to the PA conceptual model, nor a change to the way exterior contamination is not included in PA dose calculations. Therefore, it is recommended the NRF request for an exception to the current limits for external surface contamination be accepted and the revised limits for NRF-generated waste canisters be added to the WAC. The monitoring plan will also be revised to identify external canister contamination as a potential mobile source term that may be detected by monitoring earlier than potential releases from waste. The PA, composite analysis (CA), closure plan, and PA/CA maintenance plan do not require revision. Recommendations are also included for inclusion of NRF procedures used to limit water pool radionuclide variability (and thus canister surface contamination variability) to the waste generator certification process.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2023

Dirty bomb source term characterization and downwind dispersion: Review of experimental evidence

Dirty bombs are considered one of the easiest forms of radiological terrorism, a form of terrorism based on the deliberate use of radiological material to cause adverse effects in a target population. One U.S. Government official has even described a dirty bomb attack as “all but inevitable”. While people in the vicinity of the blast may experience acute radiation effects, people downwind may unknowingly be contaminated by the radioactive airborne particulate and face increased long-term cancer risk. The likelihood of increased cancer risk depends on the radionuclide used and its specific activity, its aerosolization potential, the particle sizes generated in the blast, and where a person is with respect to the detonation. Different studies have reported that plausible radionuclides for dirty bomb include 60 Co, 90 Sr, 137 Cs, 192 Ir, 241 Am based on their availability in commercial sources as well as safeguards, the amount needed for adverse health effects, previous mishandling of radionuclides and malicious uses. In order to have increased long-term cancer risk, the radionuclide would have to deposit inside the body by entering the respiratory tract and then possibly migrate to other organs or bones (ground shine is not considered in this paper because areas affected by the event will likely become inaccessible). This implies that the particles will have to be smaller than 10 μm to be inhaled. Experiments involving the detonation of dirty bombs have shown that particles or droplets smaller than 10 μm are generated, independently from the initial radionuclide or its state (e.g., powder, solution). Atmospheric tests have shown that in unobstructed terrain, the radionuclide laden cloud can travel kilometers downwind even for relatively small amounts of explosives. Furthermore, buildings in the path of the cloud can change the dose rate. For instance, in one experiment with a single building, the dose rate was 1–2 orders of magnitude lower behind the obstacle compared to its front face. For people walking around, the amount of particulate deposited on them and inhaled will depend on their path relative to the cloud, resulting in the counterintuitive result that the closer people may actually not be the ones more at risk because they could simply miss the bulk of the cloud in their wandering. In summary, the long-term cancer risk for people caught in a dirty bomb cloud away from the detonation requires considering where and when the people are, which radionuclide was used, and the layout of the obstacles (e.g., buildings, vegetation) in the path of the cloud.

63 RADIATION, THERMAL, AND OTHER ENVIRON. POLLUTAN↗
DOE OSTI2024

Characterization of C-Reactor (105-C) Moderator Tanks 204 and 205

Area Completion Project (ACP)/Savannah River Nuclear Solutions (SRNS) has requested Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) to perform chemical and radiological analyses on moderator heavy water samples from C-Reactor (105-C) in Moderator Tanks 204 and 205. The heavy water samples have been characterized using SRNL analytical methods. Information generated from the characterization of these heavy water samples provide a basis for determining the residual contamination remaining in the tanks. These analyses are needed in order to update the C-Reactor Contaminant migration groundwater model and report, to help determine a disposition pathway for the moderator water, and to ship samples off-site to the Southwest Research Institute (SWRI). This report presents characterization results for the March 2024 C-Reactor Moderator Tank 204 and 205 heavy water samples. SRNL results are critical to allow ACP to complete this Performance Based Incentive project on time. Based on the characterization data provided in this report, results of these samples meet customer expectations and satisfy the Technical Assistance Request (TAR).

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2023

Assessment of Potential Dose and Environmental Impacts from Proposed Testing at the INL National Security Test Range

This assessment uses screening-level models to calculate potential environmental impacts from proposed tests at two locations at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) National Security Test Range (NSTR) site. Proposed tests could be conducted using 11 different radioactive material types that include K 2 O, LaBr 3 , KBr, Cu, Zr, F, Ga, Ga 2 O 3 , NaNO 2 , Ga-68, and Tc-99m. The tests could potentially release radioactive material to the atmosphere and radionuclides and other contaminants to the soil, which could leach into the unsaturated zone and migrate to the aquifer. Atmospheric transport of radionuclides to potential human receptors and time-integrated air concentrations were calculated with a Gaussian plume model and three years of hourly meteorological data. Potential surface-soil impacts were calculated with the computer program mixing-cell model (MCM). Groundwater impacts were calculated with the computer programs MCM and GWSCREEN. Radiological doses from potential atmospheric releases were calculated for public receptors off the INL Site and for workers at nearby INL facilities. Results were compared to regulatory dose limits. Maximum potential groundwater concentrations were estimated in the aquifer below the NSTR site and compared to drinking water standards or risk-based screening levels for resident tap water. Soil concentrations were calculated and compared to risk-based screening levels for workers and potential future residents. All impacts were estimated based on the assumption that 12 tests are conducted annually using all 11 material types for 15 years. This document provides the resources to enable a subject matter expert in the field of environmental assessments to replicate the modeling and calculations. The methodology and parameters are presented in the text. All electronic files, including computer-code input, output, executable files, batch files, scripts, and spreadsheet files, are contained in a zip file that can be accessed by selecting “Additional Information” (select Native File) in the INL Electronic Document Management System (EDMS). It is highly unlikely the test scenarios evaluated in this ECAR will adversely impact human health based on comparisons of calculated dose and concentration against regulatory standards and risk-based screening levels. Conservative estimates of dose to workers and the public from atmospheric transport of possible radionuclide releases are far below federal radiation protection standards. Conservative estimates of potential contaminant concentrations in groundwater are less than federal drinking water standards or screening levels. Predicted radionuclide concentrations in surface soils are below risk-based screening levels, except for Ge-68 (material Ga-68) for the worker. The Ge-68 soil concentration can be made less than the worker PRG, if the number of annual tests using Ga-68 is reduced from 12 to 6. However, the sum of ratios still exceeds one because of the high K-40 ratio. If the EF of the worker (number of days the worker is in the contaminated testing area) is reduced from 225 days/yr (default value for full time worker) to 112 days/yr, the Ge-68 ratio is less than one and the sum of ratios is less than one. Actual radiation doses and groundwater and surface-soil concentrations are likely to be much less than those calculated because of the conservative assumptions and parameters employed in the modeling. For example, atmospheric-transport calculations assume the entire inventory of each material type is readily released to the atmosphere and no plume deposition, depletion, or radioactive decay occurs during transport. The calculations also assume the same meteorological conditions (e.g., wind velocity, wind direction, stability class) that produce the maximum 95th percentile concentration (i.e., concentration representing the 95th percentile of a distribution of concentrations derived from 3 years of hourly meteorological data) at each receptor location are the same for all 12 tests during the year, and each receptor is assumed to be present during all 12 tests. The surface-soil assessment assumes the entire inventory of each test is deposited in the top 5 cm of soil. No atmospheric dispersal is assumed, and the radionuclides are subject only to leaching and radioactive decay. The groundwater-pathway modeling is conservative in that it is one-dimensional in the unsaturated zone (no lateral spreading/dilution) and assumes the entire inventory of contaminants infiltrates into the ground at the same location for every test. This is especially conservative for particulate radionuclides because they would have to dissolve or corrode first and some would be dispersed into the atmosphere. The groundwater receptor is also assumed to consume water directly from a hypothetical well positioned in the location of maximum concentration. In addition, conservative degradation rates were used, and volatilization was not considered for the nonradradioactive chemicals modeled. And finally, the calculations assume all 12 tests will be performed at the same place at both locations, and all 11 radioactive material types will be used for each test. This is conservative because it is anticipated that no more than two material types will be used per test.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Separation of rare earth element radioisotopes by reverse-phase high-speed counter-current chromatography

Analytical scale purification of rare earth element (REE) radioisotopes is typically accomplished using cation-exchange resins (e.g. AG 50W-X8) and high-performance liquid chromatography (HPLC). Despite the variety of improvements made since the development of this separation process in the 1950s, nearest neighbor separations remain a challenge, as does the issue of irreversible sample adsorption. Herein, we report a study that evaluates the potential of high-speed counter-current chromatography (HSCCC) as an alternative method for purifying REE elements, with specific reference to separations of fission product REE of interest to nuclear forensics. Complementary HSCCC REE separation experiments, one spiked with radiotracer and REE fission product activity, allowed for in depth analysis of resulting fractions from both an elemental (inductively coupled plasma atomic emission spectroscopy, ICP-AES) and radiological (gamma-ray spectrometry, beta counting) purity perspective. The highly reproducible nature of separation profiles generated from HSCCC instruments was leveraged to simplify work-up of samples containing radioisotopes. Subsequent radioanalytical evaluation revealed minimal carryover of Eu into neighboring Sm and Tb fractions (as indicated by presence of 150Eu), and trace contamination of the Tb fraction with Y (as indicated by presence of 91Y). Subtle differences in stationary phase retention across the two columns were reflected in significant variations in decontamination factors of duplicate parallel separations. Furthermore, these differences paired with obtained distribution of radioisotopes provided valuable insights into future improvements. Collectively, this study represents a significant step forward in development of HSCCC technology for task specific REE radioisotope purification.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗
DOE OSTI2023

Allometric-kinetic model predictions of concentration ratios for anthropogenic radionuclides across animal classes and food selection

Protection of the environment from radiation fundamentally relies on dose assessments for non-human biota. These dose assessments use measured or predicted concentrations of radionuclides in soil or water combined with Concentration Ratios (CRs) to estimate tissue concentrations in animals and plants, yet there is a paucity of CR data relative to the vast number of potential taxa and radioactive contaminants in the environment and their taxon-specific ecosystems. Because there are many taxa each having very different behaviors and biology and many possible bioavailable radionuclides, CRs have the potential to vary by orders-of-magnitude, as often seen in published data. Given the diversity of taxa, the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) has categorized non-human biota into 12 representative organisms (ROs), while the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) uses the non-taxon specific categories of terrestrial, riparian, and aquatic animals. The question we examine here is: do these categorizations adequately “represent” the broad diversity of animals? To explore this question, here we analyze an Allometric-Kinetic (A-K) model to calculate radionuclide-specific CRs for common animal classes which are then further subcategorized into herbivores, omnivores, carnivores, and invertebrate detritivores. Comparisons in CRs among animal classes exhibited only small differences, but there was order of magnitude differences between herbivores, carnivores, and especially detritivores, for many radionuclides of interest. These findings suggest that the ICRP ROs and the DOE categories are reasonable, but their accuracy could be improved by including sub-categories related to animal dietary ecology. Finally, comparisons of A-K model predicted CR values to published CRs show order-of-magnitude variations, providing justification for additional studies of assimilation across radionuclides and animal classes.

63 RADIATION, THERMAL, AND OTHER ENVIRON. POLLUTAN↗
DOE OSTI2024

Cutaneous Radiation Injuries: REAC/TS Clinical Experience

Abstract The Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site (REAC/TS) is one of the US Department of Energy (DOE)/National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Nuclear Emergency Response Team (NEST) assets and has been responding to radiological incidents since 1976. REAC/TS is in the Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education (ORISE). A critical part of the REAC/TS mission is to provide emergency response, advice, and consultation on injuries and illnesses caused from ionizing radiation. Fortunately, radiation injuries are not frequent, but when they occur, they are more likely to be cutaneous radiation injuries (CRI) or internal contamination. In this paper, we will review selected cases from the REAC/TS experience in order to illustrate cutaneous patterns of injury and treatment options.

Public, Environmental & Occupational Health↗
DOE OSTI2024

Assessing Effects of Climate Change on Legacy Waste at the Enewetak Atoll

The Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI) is in the central Pacific Ocean ~4,500 km west of Hawaii. The Enewetak Atoll, located in the northwest part of the RMI, was the site for 43 nuclear weapon tests between 1948 and 1958. Fallout and deposition from the tests contaminated the island surfaces, lagoon waters and sediment, and nearby ocean waters at the atoll. In the 1970s, a cleanup effort collected radioactive waste and placed it in the Cactus Crater on Runit Island (also called the Runit Dome). In December 2021, Congress directed the U.S. Department of Energy to study the impacts of climate change on the Runit Dome nuclear waste disposal site. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) assembled a multidisciplinary team of climate scientists, ocean modelers, environmental scientists, and health physicists to assess the likely effects of remaining radionuclides at the Enewetak Atoll. PNNL’s approach focused on effects of tropical cyclones that were postulated to mobilize and transport contaminated lagoon sediments and result in human and biota exposure. PNNL’s study estimated (1) the radionuclide source term, (2) the effects of climate change on severe storms, (3) mobilization and transport of radionuclides, and (4) radiation dose to humans and biota. Radionuclides in the lagoon and/or ocean waters of the Enewetak Atoll were characterized by the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) in 1972, Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution in 2015, and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in 2018. The RMI Nationwide Radiological Study was conducted in the early 1990s for radionuclides remaining in island soils. The 1972 AEC survey remains the most comprehensive source of radionuclide data on lagoon sediments. Climate change modeling at a regional scale in the central Pacific Ocean is limited. PNNL climate scientists simulated severe historical storms postulated to occur both in a recent climate (2015) and in the future (2090) using the Advanced Research Weather Research and Forecasting (WRF-ARW) model, employing a pseudo-global-warming technique. A postulated complete, future failure of the Runit Dome was also considered. PNNL developed a high-resolution regional ocean hydrodynamics model covering the entire RMI extended economic zone using the Finite Volume Coastal Ocean Model (FVCOM). The FVCOM model was run using global reanalysis data for current climate and WRF-ARW simulation for the future climate. PNNL also developed a radionuclide fate and transport model using the FVCOM Integrated Compartment Model (FVCOM-ICM) to simulate the current and future mobilization and transport of radionuclides sorbed to lagoon sediments and the exchange of radionuclides between the water and sediment. FVCOM-ICM-predicted radionuclide concentrations were then used to estimate radiation dose to humans and biota at all islands of the Enewetak Atoll. Under current climate conditions, annual radiation exposures for the southern islands including Enewetak (Fred) and Medren (Elmer) were below the current U.S. standards. Radiation doses were somewhat elevated starting at Runit Island northward and westward to Enjebi Island (Janet). The islands in the northwest quadrant, particularly Bokoluo (Alice) and Bokombako (Belle), remain relatively contaminated. The islands in the southwestern quadrant have low contamination. The highest contribution to radiation doses comes from consumption of locally grown foods. Two radionuclides, 90Sr and 137Cs, contributed the greatest fraction for most terrestrial foods. In current climate conditions, the storms temporarily increased radionuclide concentrations in the lagoon waters, increasing the radiation dose slightly. In future conditions, doses are expected to be smaller, primarily because of the radioactive decay of the shorter-lived radioisotopes of 90Sr and 137Cs. This could make all islands in the far northwest of the atoll – except Bokombako (Belle) and perhaps Bokoluo (Alice) – suitable for residency. For the f

Prasad, Rajiv↗
DOE OSTI2024

Cross-sections for 43 Sc, 44 m Sc, and 44 g Sc from two heavy ion reactions

Two different heavy ion reactions were used to produce 43 Sc (t$_{\frac12}$ = 3.891 h), 44g Sc (t$_{\frac12}$ = 4.042 h), and 44m Sc (t$_{\frac12}$ = 58.61 h) among other stable or long-lived chemically separable products. Production cross sections for 19 F + 27 Al and the reverse kinematic reaction 35 Cl + nat B were measured using an MC-SNICS ion source and the Notre Dame FN Tandem Accelerator. 19 F beams from 35 to 60 MeV were produced with beam currents between 40–80 pnA and 35 Cl beams were produced at six entrance energies with comparable beam currents. This work reports nuclear reaction cross sections 27 Al ( 19 F, x) 43 Sc, 27 Al ( 19 F, pn) 44g Sc, and 27 Al ( 19 F, pn) 44m Sc at six energies between 35 and 60 MeV lab energy. Cross sections within the same energy range were measured for 27 Al ( 19 F, 3pn) 42 K and 27 Al ( 19 F, 3p) 43 K. Comparative measurements were performed for the same compound nucleus produced from nat B( 35 Cl, x) 43 Sc, nat B( 35 Cl, pn) 44g Sc, and nat B( 35 Cl, pn) 44m Sc. The measured thin target cross sections show an overestimation by several statistical models for the scandium radioisotopes. This is corroborated by the measured thick target production rates for both entrance channels. This may be due to angular momentum effects of a heavy ion entrance channel compared to light-ion production, but additional work is required to understand this discrepancy. Finally, these measurements demonstrate that the medically useful 43 Sc, 44g Sc, and 44m Sc radioisotopes can be free of the long-lived contaminant 46 Sc without the use of enriched targets, using heavy ion beams and robust target materials.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗
DOE OSTI2022

MARSAME Radiological Release Report for Metal Items from TA 53, Set 22

EPC-ES has evaluated the survey results for metal items from the Los Alamos Neutron Science Center (LANSCE) and found that the metal items described in Table 1 of this report (identified by RP Tracking Numbers) meet the criteria for unrestricted release under DOE Order458.1 Radiation Protection of the Public and the Environment (DOE 2020) and can be recycled. This conclusion is based on the known history of the metal items and on radiation survey data (see the completed RP-Form-031 LANSCE Metals Clearance Log [LANL 2021a] for each item). None of the items in this report are located within radiological areas. Therefore, the items are considered unencumbered and are not subject to the moratorium suspension on metal recycling from Department of Energy facilities. Additionally, LANL has determined that there is no practical opportunity for internal DOE reuse or recycling of this metal. Process knowledge indicates that these metal items were unlikely to ever bein direct contact with the beam and thus are unlikely to have become activated. Surface contamination measurements (both total and removable) showed either no detectable radioactivity or activity levels within the range of background. All measurements for volumetric contamination were indistinguishable from background based on calculated decision limits. Additionally, all gamma isotopic surveys conducted for defense-in-depth showed no identifiable gamma radiation from beam activation.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
DOE OSTI2022

MARSAME Radiological Release Report for Metal Items from TA 53, Set 20

EPC-ES has evaluated the survey results for metal items from the Los Alamos Neutron Science Center (LANSCE) and found that the metal items described in Table 1 of this report (identified by RP Tracking Numbers) meet the criteria for unrestricted release under DOE Order 458.1 Radiation Protection of the Public and the Environment (DOE 2020) and can be recycled. This conclusion is based on the known history of the metal items and on radiation survey data (see the completed RP-Form-031 LANSCE Metals Clearance Log for each item). None of the items in this report are located within radiological areas. Therefore, the items are considered unencumbered and are not subject to the moratorium suspension on metal recycling from Department of Energy facilities. Additionally, LANL has determined that there is no practical opportunity for internal DOE reuse or recycling of this metal. Process knowledge indicates that these metal items were unlikely to ever be in direct contact with the beam and thus are unlikely to have become activated. Surface contamination measurements (both total and removable) showed either no detectable radioactivity or activity levels within the range of background. All measurements for volumetric contamination were indistinguishable from background based on calculated decision limits. Additionally, all gamma isotopic surveys conducted for defense-in-depth showed no identifiable gamma radiation from beam activation.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2023

MARSAME Radiological Release Report for Metal Items from Technical Area 53, Set 26

Environmental Protection and Compliance, Environmental Stewardship Group (EPC-ES) has evaluated the survey results for metal items from the Los Alamos Neutron Science Center (LANSCE) at Technical Area 53 (TA-53) and found that the metal items described in Table 1 of this report (identified by Radiation Protection [RP] Tracking Numbers) meet the criteria for unrestricted release under Department of Energy (DOE) Order 458.1 Chg 4, Radiation Protection of the Public and the Environment (DOE 2020) and can be recycled. This conclusion is based on the known history of the metal items and radiation survey data. None of the items in this report are located within radiological areas. Therefore, the items are considered unencumbered and are not subject to the moratorium suspension on metal recycling from DOE facilities. Additionally, Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) has determined that there is no practical opportunity for internal DOE reuse of this metal. Process knowledge indicates that these metal items were unlikely to ever be in direct contact with the beam and thus are unlikely to have become activated. Surface contamination measurements (both total and removable) showed either no detectable radioactivity or activity levels within the range of background. All measurements for volumetric contamination were indistinguishable from background based on calculated decision limits. Additionally, all gamma isotopic surveys conducted for defense-in depth showed no identifiable gamma radiation from beam activation.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗