Engineering Papers⌕ Search

SEARCH · Engineering Papers

Results for “nuclear power plants”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 73 records · Page 4

Site Integration and Regulatory Considerations for a Nuclear Power Plant Colocated with Industrial Facilities: Colocation Studies for a Petroleum Refinery, Methanol Plant, and Wood Pulp Plant

This research explores the colocation of nuclear power plants (NPPs) with industrial applications. Three existing industrial sites were considered to demonstrate the siting process and illuminate technological gaps for future work. The three applications demonstrated for colocation here are a petroleum refinery, a methanol production plant, and a pulp and paper plant. This study uses a modified version of the EPRI siting criteria to explore the geological and demographic characteristics of the location of the current industrial site, as well as exploring external hazards from the industrial plant and its surrounding land use. Data was collected from public databases to estimate site characteristics. We then discuss how the site characteristics may impact the ability to colocate an NPP with an industrial application. The application site and 5 additional sites were explored for each application to give a general indication of the siting implications for an NPP in each area. The hazards for each industrial application was also explored to determine how colocation may impact reactor safety. The following gaps have been identified and should be explored in future research on colocation of NPPs with petroleum refineries, methanol plants, and pulp and paper plants: - There is a variety of industrial use, hazards, and pipelines in the surrounding area. A more thorough review of these hazards should be considered for colocation. - In general, the whole region around some applications seems to have softer soil, with implications for large site preparation costs. Further site investigations should prioritize looking into the geotechnical conditions. - Applications along coastlines are susceptible to flooding and hurricanes. The benefits of colocation should be weighed against the potential design implications. - The benefits of natural gas pipeline infrastructure in place should be explored further. If heat supply from the NPP is not required or not feasible due to the distance between the NPP and the application, there may be an opportunity to supply hydrogen to the plant through an existing pipeline. - Because there are several collocated industrial plants in the regions for the refinery and methanol plant, the benefits of sharing resources from the NPP should be explored further. This may open up additional sites for colocation. The following knowledge gaps were identified for the colocation of NPPs with these three industries, and industrial applications in general. These gaps are: - While the STAND tool contains many important characteristics for the reactor siting process, it is not calibrated for the colocation of NPPs with industrial facilities. - There are aspects of both the NPP and industrial application that need to be quantified for a siting analysis. Particularly, we need to understand the water intake requirements for NPPs and each application. - Further work may focus on adapting the STAND site comparison methodology to comparison of sites for co-location. This will involve using the data documented in this report as a starting point and performing a comprehensive and quantitative comparison. - Without spending significant resources, it would be impossible to gather data for each site to evaluate all aspects of siting. One approach to finding data and understanding its implications to siting is looking at FSARs for existing plants. For example, most sites considered in this study have small Vs30 values, indicating soft soil. However, there are NPPs located in the vicinity of most of the sites (e.g., Waterford Steam Electric Station near New Orleans) and reviewing available site characteristics and geotechnical data for these NPPs, might provide further information for siting. - The siting analysis in this study indicates that colocation of the NPP with the industrial site could be difficult based on external hazards, cooling requirements, weather, or population. We need to determine the impact of distance between the two facilities on cost and quality of energy transport. - This study did not touch on socioeconomic impacts for NPP colocation with industrial facilities. The input-output analysis methodology could be applied to the communities referenced in this study to determine the socioeconomic impact of these projects. - Similarly, the impacts of colocation on emergency planning was not explored in this study. The impacts on emergency planning infrastructure are somewhat related to the socioeconomic impacts, and could be explored using a similar methodology. - This study also did not address physical and cybersecurity, which will be important aspects of co-location [ref] . Cybersecurity will be important, regardless of the distance, but physical security will be important if the facilities are located very closely. Physical security might also be important for the steam lines between the plants, unless they are determined to be non-safety significant. - In many site l

08 HYDROGEN↗

AI-Guided Reasoning-Based Operator Support System for the Nuclear Power Plant Management

The Decision-making process in the Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) control room faces some challenges: operator incomplete knowledge, insufficient time for responding to the highly dynamic events, and a large number of indicators to monitor. Because of the complexity of the NPP system, it is hard to pre-plan all the failures/mitigative actions. An intelligent operator support system is vital to mitigate these shortcomings. In this paper, an AI declarative approach (Answer Set Programming (ASP)) is employed to represent our knowledge of the nuclear power plant in the form of logic rules. This represented knowledge is structured to form a reasoning-based operator support system. When an incident occurs, this ASP-based reasoning support system is demonstrated to be capable of fault identification (diagnosis), informing the operator of different scenarios and consequences, and generating the control options (decision making).

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Capability Building Progression of an Insider Threat Mitigation Program at International Nuclear Power Plant

With threats to nuclear facilities continuously evolving, the development and implementation of insider threat mitigation programs is increasingly important. The Office of International Nuclear Security within the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA’s) developed the “Insider Threat Mitigation Program: Facility Implementation Handbook” to assist organizations to be better positioned to minimize the risks posed by malicious insiders. The handbook identified eight elements that contribute to the development and implementation of insider threat mitigation programs. This report outlines the development of a capability building progression of an insider threat mitigation program at international nuclear power plants. This information can be stand-alone or be accompanied by a technical exchange with subject matter experts to support development and implementation of programs with interested international partners.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Demonstration of ACCERT Software for Nuclear Power Plant Techno-Economics

In the past few years, there has been a renewed interest in the deployment of nuclear power for decarbonizing the electricity grid as well as a range of industrial applications. As the demonstrations of advanced nuclear power plants start to begin, there will likely be a further increase in this interest. As nuclear is being considered as a part of the energy mix, understanding the cost of nuclear energy becomes increasingly important for all stakeholders including advanced reactor vendors (for making design decisions and marketing their designs), users of nuclear energy (e.g., to estimate the cost of decarbonization of other industries using nuclear), and government (e.g., in capacity expansion models that are used in framing policy). In this summary, we demonstrate a software tool called ACCERT that is currently being developed with funding from the Systems Analysis and Integration (SA&I) program under the Department of Energy’s Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE NE). ACCERT is a cost estimation and techno-economics tool for nuclear power plant applications that includes a database of (a) cost estimates of various ‘reference’ nuclear power plant designs gathered from existing literature, and (b) algorithms developed from these costs that can be used extrapolate the existing costs and perform a bottom-up cost estimation of other designs. A companion summary describes the software and its design in more detail and this summary presents a demonstration for four different nuclear power plant designs: a pressurized water reactor (PWR), high-temperature gas reactor (HTGR), sodium fast reactor (SFR), and a heat-pipe microreactor. The demonstrations include the reference cost estimates and the cost estimates of a modified design for each reference case.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Automated Waterbox Inspection for Nuclear Power Plants Using Computer Vision - Based Change Detection

Nuclear power plant waterboxes require regular inspection for leaks, missing components, and structural damage during maintenance outages. Traditional manual inspection is time-consuming and poses safety risks from confined space entry. We developed an automated computer vision system for drone-based waterbox inspection in partnership with Florida Light and Power. Our approach uses feature detection and matching to identify critical changes between baseline and current inspection images, automatically flagging additions (leaks/debris), removals (missing plugs), and translations (displaced components) while compensating for drone movement and environmental variations. We systematically evaluated six feature matching methods, from classical approaches (SIFT+BF) to state-of-the-art neural networks (SuperPoint+SuperGlue), using both standard benchmarks (HPatches) and waterbox-specific validation with real-world augmentations. SuperPoint+SuperGlue achieved superior performance with 7.82 pixels RMSE and 100% success rate—2.8x better accuracy than our baseline. While the pre-trained model has commercial licensing restrictions for nuclear deployment, our findings validate this architecture for custom training. We implemented a real-time GUI demonstrating the SIFT+BF approach for immediate deployment, processing drone feeds at 30 FPS with color-coded change visualization. Future work includes training a custom SuperPoint+SuperGlue model on waterbox data and integrating Vision-Language Models for automated reporting and maintenance guidance.

46 - INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AN↗

One Man’s Pirate is Another Man’s . . . Nuclear Terrorist? Evaluating the Act of Piracy Against Floating Nuclear Power Plants on the High Seas

The lack of international consensus about whether a floating nuclear power plant is a facility or vessel presents an ambiguity about a pirate's status if they board a floating nuclear power plant, As piracy continues to be a concern for maritime security, the deployment of floating nuclear power plants (FNPPs) on the high seas raises questions about laws on piracy.

Fialkoff, Marc [Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORN↗

Precursor Analysis Report: SQL Slammer Worm Infection of Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Plant 2003

The SQL Slammer Worm Infection of Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Plant 2003 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about Davis-Besse’s 2003 cyber attack and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed in the attack. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. On 25 January 2003, the SQL Slammer worm infected more than 90% of vulnerable hosts and crashed the internet in 10 to 15 minutes, making it one of the fastest spreading worms in history. SQL Slammer is a fileless, memory-resident worm that remotely exploits a stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability on local hosts to intensively scan and rapidly self-propagate across the internet. The worm infected approximately 300,000 unpatched hosts running Microsoft Structured Query Language (SQL) Server 2000 or Microsoft Desktop Engine (MSDE) 2000 with SQL Server Resolution Service. The SQL Slammer worm indirectly infected FirstEnergy’s Davis-Besse nuclear power plant by first infecting a consultant’s company network server and then propagating through an external misconfigured connection into Davis-Besse’s site network. The infection caused major network congestion, slow performance, data overloads, and the inability of local hosts to communicate with each other, which eventually caused a loss of availability and a loss of view when the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) and Plant Process Computer (PPC) crashed. At the time of the infection, the plant was already offline, the digital monitoring systems had redundant analog backups, and the plant control and safety functions were not affected, so there were no concerns of a safety breach. However, this incident resulted in many lessons learned and spawned important discussions about cybersecurity’s role in nuclear safety and electric power reliability regulation, policy, and guidance. Researchers and analysts identified 10 unique techniques utilized during the attack with a total of 640 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Eight of the identified techniques used during Davis-Besse cyber attack were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 596 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 428 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the 331 days preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Advanced Physics-Based Fluid System Performance Monitoring to Support Nuclear Power Plant Operations. Final CRADA report

This project targeted performance monitoring requirements for nuclear power plants with the goal of improving plant economics. We introduced a new and innovative technology to the industry that can reduce operations staffing levels by automating surveillance and can reduce maintenance staffing levels by providing early detection of degrading equipment. A beta-stage release of the PRO-AID power plant equipment fault diagnostic software ready for deployment in nuclear power plants will be delivered and demonstrated in a utility pilot project. To provide for efficient use of DOE funds the aim is to generate a minimum viable product for which we can prove the value of the product. The end state product will be serviceable for use in either a simulator environment or plant environment. The former provides a means for demonstration of the diagnostic capability for faults unlikely to be encountered in day-to-day operations.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Review of Hazards and Accidentology of an Integrated Energy Systems to Nuclear Power Plant Safety

With the interconnectivity of industrial processes in a nuclear integrated energy system (IES) the primary issue becomes the safety of the nuclear power plant (NPP). The industrial processes being supported are assumed to have been in colocation prior to the addition of an NPP. Do the hazards from each process reach beyond the perimeter of the plant to affect the NPP? This paper reviews hazards and accident statistics from processes in an IES as a first step to answer this question. Hazards and accidentology discussed cover hydrogen, ammonia, syngas, methanol, synthetic fuels, and oil refineries. They include mainly fire, explosion, and toxicity in varying degrees. Historical accident statistics are given whenever available, and accident causes are evaluated and ranked based on their frequencies. Lessons learned from previous accidents are presented. Future work will focus on utilizing the data collected for accidentology of the industrial processes to perform Failure Modes and Effects Analysis and analyze the impacts of additional hazards on the colocated existing nuclear power plant or newly built advanced nuclear reactor. The analysis will provide the frequency and consequence of external events that can affect the NPP.

08 - HYDROGEN↗

Evaluation of ASCE 4-16 and AISC 43-18 (Draft) for use in the Risk-Informed Performance-Based Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Plant Structures, Systems, and Components

This report describes the assessment of ASCE Standards 4-16 and 43-18 (Draft) for use in the Risk-Informed Performance-Based (RIPB) seismic design of structures, systems, and components (SSCs) at nuclear power plants. This work was performed for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of Regulatory Research (RES), to support potential endorsement of these industry standards for the design of nuclear power plants based on the RIPB approach. Currently, the NRC endorses a deterministic design approach for demonstrating the design adequacy of SSCs based on the Standard Review Plan (NUREG-0800) and NRC Regulatory Guides. In the RIPB approach, the design criteria are developed to achieve a target performance goal, which is defined by the annual frequency of occurrence of the design basis earthquake (i.e., Seismic Design Category) and the acceptable level of structural performance (i.e., Limit State) for the SSCs. ASCE 4-16 provides methods for performing a seismic analysis of structures to obtain the seismic response of these structures (e.g., building displacements, accelerations, in-structure response spectra) which are used in the design of the SSCs. It also provides methods for performing seismic analysis of SSCs to determine the seismic demands (e.g. member forces and displacements) needed to design individual SSCs. ASCE 43-18 (Draft) provides the criteria for the seismic design of SSCs using the seismic demands developed in ASCE 4-16. The use of ASCE Standard 43-18 (Draft), along with ASCE 4-16, provides the criteria for the seismic design of the SSCs. ASCE 43-18 (DRAFT) relies on other consensus codes and standards such as ACI 349 for reinforced concrete, AISC/N690 for steel structures, ASME Section III for pressure-retaining mechanical components and Containments, and IEEE-344 for Class 1E equipment. The goal of this technical review was to assess the adequacy of the provisions in these standards for use by the NRC in developing regulatory guidance for design of SSCs in nuclear power plants, based on the RIPB approach. The research reported herein describes the basis for acceptance of the new standards and identifies areas where additional staff guidance is needed for the seismic design of SSCs at nuclear power plants. This technical review has determined that ASCE 4-16 and ASCE 43-18 (Draft) provide an appropriate framework for the seismic design of SSCs at nuclear power plants using a Risk-Informed Performance-Based approach. However, some of the criteria therein warrant exceptions, qualifications, and/or clarifications.

42 ENGINEERING↗

A Dynamic Risk Framework for the Physical Security of Nuclear Power Plants

This paper describes ongoing work within the Light Water Reactor Sustainability pathway at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) to optimize the security and cost of nuclear power plants. It introduces the dynamic risk assessment tool developed at INL, Event Modeling Risk Assessment using Linked Diagrams (EMRALD). EMRALD is leveraged to optimize the security posture of a nuclear power plant by integrating force-on-force (FOF) simulations and operator mitigation actions, including dynamic and flexible coping strategies (FLEX). To illustrate the methodology, four attack scenarios are modeled in a commercially available FOF simulation tool using a hypothetical nuclear power plant facility. The simulation results provide valuable insights into possible attack outcomes, as well as the probabilistic risk of a core damage event given these outcomes. Safety mitigation procedures are modeled in EMRALD dependent on the attack outcomes by considering human operator uncertainties. The results demonstrate that the number of armed responders can be optimized, while still maintaining the same protection level as the initial security posture. The proposed modeling and simulation framework of integrating FLEX equipment with FOF models enables the nuclear power plants to credit FLEX portable equipment in the plant security posture, resulting in an efficient and optimized physical security system.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

A Dynamic Risk Framework for the Optimization of Physical Security Posture of Nuclear Power Plants

This paper describes an ongoing work within the Light Water Reactor Sustainability pathway at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) to optimize security and cost of nuclear power plants. It introduces the dynamic risk assessment tool developed at INL, Event Modeling Risk Assessment using Linked Diagrams (EMRALD). EMRALD was leveraged to optimize the security posture of a nuclear power plant by integrating force-on-force (FOF) simulations and operator mitigation actions including the dynamic and flexible coping strategies (FLEX). To illustrate the methodology, four attack scenarios were modeled in a commercially available FOF simulation tool using a hypothetical nuclear power plant facility. The simulation results provide valuable insights into possible attack outcomes, as well as the probabilistic risk of core damage event given these outcomes. Safety mitigation procedures were modeled in EMRALD dependent on the attack outcomes by considering human operator uncertainties. The results demonstrate that the number of armed responders can be optimized, while still maintaining the same protection level as the initial security posture. The proposed modeling and simulation framework of integrating FLEX equipment with FOF models enables the nuclear power plants to credit FLEX portable equipment in the plant security posture, resulting in an efficient and optimized physical security system.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Dynamic Instructions for Nuclear Power Plant Field Workers

Most tasks conducted at a nuclear power plant are guided by a procedure in one way or another. Some tasks must be conducted by strictly adhering to the prescribed steps, while other tasks use the procedures as a reference guide. Traditionally, the procedure process in the nuclear industry has been paper heavy. In recent years however, the nuclear industry has considered adopting more dynamic solutions to improve the efficiency of their work management process, advance human and system performance, as well as reduce the cost of handling paper copies of documentation. As a first step, many nuclear utilities in the U.S. deployed solutions that electronically route the documents through the review and approval processes and where the worker in the field uses an electronic copy of the instruction or procedure on a handheld device. These electronic copies are very similar to the format of the paper instruction but do have some additional capabilities to capture recorded input and notes.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

Investigating Application of LiDAR for Nuclear Power Plants

Many evaluation, assessment, and modeling tasks at nuclear power plants require spatial in-formation; this often requires physical visits to locations within the facility because the 2D or 3D schematics and current models do not contain enough detail or do not capture as-built and real-world conditions. These visits require extensive manual labor for not only the requesting party, but also support groups, such as security. Light Detection and Ranging (LiDAR) mapping is trying to solve that problem by providing very detailed 3D models for low costs. However, the use of these models can be very limited because either component reference information is missing and too costly to add or there is no way to extract specific spatial data needed for other tools. This report outlines two main efforts. First, to reduce the effort of “Tagging” data in large 3D models, a general Application Programming Interface (API) was developed to import a variety of existing plant database information into a 3D-visualization engine. Filters allow the user to have only zone-specific items listed; then, they can simply click and assign the information to a specific spot or component in the 3D model. The second part of the work is the development of an interface for importing pieces from the3D-LiDAR model into other systems needed for modeling and simulation, outlined around fire modeling. This interface allows for the retrieval of item location and boundaries, enabling the auto generation of models for varying tools.

3D Modelling↗

Mid–height seismic isolation of equipment in nuclear power plants

An innovative seismic isolation solution for designers of safety-class equipment in advanced nuclear power plants is introduced. The test specimen was a tall, slender, carbon steel vessel that could represent a reactor vessel, steam generator, or a heat exchanger in a nuclear power plant: 240 inches tall, outer diameter of 60 inches, and wall thickness of 1 inch. The vessel was supported by three radial mounts at its mid-height, near its center of gravity, on a steel frame. The vessel was subjected to three-component ground motions using a 6DOF earthquake simulator. The specimen was filled with water for testing to indirectly account for the fluid and internal equipment present inside a prototype vessel. Three configurations were tested: non-isolated, isolated using single Friction Pendulum (SFP) bearings, and isolated using triple Friction Pendulum (TFP) bearings. The test results demonstrate that mid-height seismic isolation is practical and enables a significant reduction in horizontal spectral accelerations. Furthermore, these outcomes are not specific to the spherical sliding bearings used in the experiments but are broadly applicable to mid-height, seismically isolated equipment.

42 ENGINEERING↗

AI for Interpreting Nuclear Power Plant Documents for Power Uprates

To reduce the cost and time needed for regulatory compliance, nuclear power plants (NPPs) can utilize artificial intelligence (AI) to assist in interpreting complex and voluminous documents that typically span thousands of pages. Usually, the process of interpreting a plant’s technical specifications (TSs) and associated documents is labor intensive. This study aims to understand what processes state-of-the-art large language models (LLMs) can automate and to identify the pitfalls associated with using LLMs to reduce human labor costs and time. This research uses a recent AI technology called retrieval augmented generation (RAG), which retrieves pages of information from TSs and associated documents to assist with NPP power uprates (cleared to produce more power). LLMs are integral to RAG because they create human-like responses based on the retrieved information, aiding in the interpretation and application processes. A baseline case demonstrates how LLMs can operate successfully for a power uprate application. Then five use cases show five types of potential failures: (1) RAG retrieving the incorrect information, (2) RAG misinterpreting the retrieved information, (3) RAG relying on knowledge not contained in the retrieved information, (4) RAG hallucinating, and (5) RAG refusing to answer. The results of the five use cases suggest that automating the human interpretation of TSs and associated documents with AI should be approached with caution. A subject-matter expert reviewed the AI outputs from the five use cases and concluded that an LLM can produce technical information that is needed to produce power uprate applications in certain instances.

21 - SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLAN↗

Nuclear Power Plant Infrastructure Evaluations for Removal of Spent Nuclear Fuel

This report provides evaluations of the NPP site infrastructure and near-site transportation infrastructure for removing spent nuclear from 16 (NPP) sites. The material to be removed from the NPP sites includes both the spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and the greater-than-Class C low level radioactive waste (GTCC waste) that is stored, or will be stored, at the sites.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Quantitative evaluation of common cause failures in high safety-significant safety-related digital instrumentation and control systems in nuclear power plants

Digital instrumentation and control (DI&C) systems at nuclear power plants (NPPs) have many advantages over analog systems. They are proven to be more reliable, cheaper, and easier to maintain given obsolescence of analog components. However, they also pose new engineering and technical challenges, such as possibility of common cause failures (CCFs) unique to digital systems. Here this paper proposes a Platform for Risk Assessment of DI&C (PRADIC) that is developed by Idaho National Laboratory (INL). A methodology for evaluation of software CCFs in high safety-significant safety-related DI&C systems of NPPs was developed as part of the framework. The framework integrates three stages of a typical risk assessment—qualitative hazard analysis and quantitative reliability and consequence analyses. The quantified risks compared with respective acceptance criteria provide valuable insights for system architecture alternatives allowing design optimization in terms of risk reduction and cost savings. A comprehensive case study performed to demonstrate the framework's capabilities is documented here in this paper. Results show that the PRADIC is a powerful tool capable to identify potential digital-based CCFs, estimate their probabilities, and evaluate their impacts on system and plant safety.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗