Knowledge representation to support EMDAP implementation in advanced reactor licensing applications
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This report summarizes the activities carried out as part of Terrestrial Energy USA's Regulatory Assistance Grant project (Award #:DE-NE0008842) for the Integral Molten Salt Reactor (IMSR®).
Sabotage of nuclear plants and theft of special nuclear material are different from many other issues potentially affecting public health and safety, and some of those differences drive the content of the present report. A high-level indication of these differences is provided in the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s Safety Goal Policy. Promulgated in the mid-1980’s, when it had become reasonably clear that risk analysis had improved to the point where it was possible to understand the risks associated with plant operation, the Safety Goal Policy articulates qualitative safety goals and quantitative health objectives that are meant to guide regulatory and risk management activities, with the following key exceptions noted in the original policy statement: The possible effects of sabotage or diversion of nuclear material are also not presently included in the safety goals. At present there is no basis on which to provide a measure of risk on these matters. It is the Commission’s intention that everything that is needed will be done to keep these types of risks at their present very low level; and it is the Commission’s expectation that efforts on this point will continue to be successful. With these exceptions, it is the Commission’s intent that the risks from all the various initiating mechanisms be considered to the best of the capability of current evaluation techniques. The present report discusses extensions of classical risk management to address some of the special issues that arise in the context of security. Although the present emphasis is on physical security, some attention will be paid to cyber security. A particular focus of the report is on quantitative framework to manage and address uncertainties. This framework is demonstrated via a couple of hypothetical examples.
Factory fueling and assembly, multi-site operation, and the associated transportation of advanced nuclear systems present both new opportunities and challenges for microreactor deployment. These areas have not been demonstrated under Nuclear Regulatory Commission rules and regulations. A goal of the Systems Integration and Analysis technical area under the US Department of Energy Microreactor Program for the current fiscal year is to articulate these challenges and provide industry recommendations. This mid-year progress report describes the progress and some of the contributions to this effort by the Advanced Reactor Engineering and Development section at Oak Ridge National Laboratory. The content provided here is preliminary and may change before being incorporated into a later report, which is expected to be completed in September 2022.
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The Columbia Basin Consulting Group (CBCG) is developing an advanced reactor cooled by Lead-Bismuth (Pb-Bi). The design is being developed for a high level of passive safety. It has the advantages of the classical liquid metal (sodium) reactor, i.e. small size and passive safety, while having the additional advantage of chemically inert coolant.
For presentation at the FECM / NETL Carbon Management Research Project Review Meeting, Pittsburgh, PA, August 28-September 1, 2023.
This milestone report details the progress in the constitutive surrogate modeling framework for Zircaloy’s mechanical behavior under extreme conditions, within the NEAMS program throughout the U.S. fiscal year 2024 (FY24). The presented work expands on the spectral based mechanical solver and the mechanistic material model for Zircaloy, which were introduced in the NEAMS program during FY22 and detailed in the previous fiscal year (FY23). As part of the NEAMS program, the current effort described in this report focused on the development of a novel viscplastic (creep) surrogate for the mechanistic, polycrystal-based model. To this end, the work was subdivided into two interdependent components related to the necessary improvements to the LApx constitutive model and algorithm and, to the development and use of a surrogate model.
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Small modular reactors (SMR) offer a novel approach to the construction and operation of nuclear power plants. The NuScale VOYGR™ plant uses a simplified SMR design that is based on proven light-water reactor technology with substantial improvements in nuclear safety. It consists of a 250 MWt reactor core housed with other primary system components in an integral reactor pressure vessel surrounded by a steel containment vessel, all of which is immersed in a large pool of water that also serves as the ultimate heat sink. At the core of the NuScale safety case are three primary safety systems: the decay heat removal system, the emergency core cooling system, and the containment. The ability of the NuScale Power Module (NPM) passive safety systems to remove core decay heat for an unlimited duration is demonstrated through analysis of a beyond-design-basis extended loss of AC power with no replenishment of water to the ultimate heat sink or operator actions. The NuScale methodology to evaluate an indefinite loss of AC power uses the proprietary NRELAP5 systems analysis computer code. Analysis results show that the reactor coolant system liquid level above the core is maintained and that containment pressure remains below the vessel design pressure. Once full passive air cooling is established, containment pressure and temperature will decrease over time with decreasing core decay heat. NuScale received standard design approval in September 2020 and design certification in January 2023 for its 50 MWe NPM configured as a 12 module plant. NuScale is currently seeking standard design approval to increase its core power to 250 MWt, nominally 77 MWe per module, in a 6-module plant (VOYGR™-6) configuration. The high-level safety of NuScale’s SMR technology is foundational to a new standard of nuclear power plant resilience.
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Slides for a DOE GAIN meeting for the Advanced Reactor Safeguards Project meeting with advanced reactor designers in April 2021.
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The recent resurgence in advance (non-light water) reactor development has been paralleled by the development of risk-informed performance-based (RIPB) licensing pathways. Specifically, the creation of the RIPB Licensing Modernization Project (LMP) approach and subsequent endorsement by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) now provides advanced reactor vendors with a defined RIPB method to develop an affirmative safety case for licensing. In addition, the Technology Inclusive Content of Applications Project (TICAP) has published guidance on developing a license application based on the LMP approach. To support the utilization of risk information as part of advanced reactor design and licensing efforts, the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME)/American Nuclear Society (ANS) Joint Committee on Nuclear Risk Management (JCNRM) has developed a probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) standard for advanced reactors. The standard, which was formerly approved by the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) in 2021 and recently endorsed by the NRC in trial use Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.247, is an integral standard, covering from initiating events to offsite consequence. A major feature of the standard is that it permits the inclusion of any source of radioactivity material at the site within the plant PRA. Therefore, non-core sources of radioactivity, such as fuel storage, fuel processing, and purification systems, can be included within a single comprehensive plant PRA. For those advanced reactor vendors utilizing a RIPB licensing approach, there is an opportunity to include the non-core sources of radioactivity within the RIPB framework for licensing decision-making, such as the categorization of events, classification of structures, systems, and components (SSCs), and evaluation of the adequacy of defense-in-depth (DID). For advanced reactor designs that contain multiple non-core sources of radioactivity, or for monolithic plant sites that include associated fuel facilities, this approach could potentially simplify licensing applications through the use of a single, uniform, and consistent decision-making framework across all radioactive sources at the site. In addition, a RIPB approach could provide additional insights regarding plant behavior, flexibility regarding licensing decision-making, and potentially allow the use of risk information as part of the plant oversight process. Risk-informing these aspects of advanced reactor licensing would also be consistent with the NRC’s risk policy statement. However, there is diverse regulation and guidance regarding the licensing of non-core sources of radioactivity and generally limited experience using RIPB approaches for the evaluation as part of licensing.