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At least 73 records · Page 4
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2021

An Experimental Investigation of Human Performance Differences Depending on Simulator Complexity

As a different approach to collect human reliability analysis (HRA) data compared to the full-scope simulator studies, Idaho National Laboratory (INL) has attempted to collect HRA data based on Simplified Human Error Experimental Program (SHEEP), which uses a simplified simulator and student participants. To date, INL has considered the SHEEP approach using simplified simulators such as Rancor Microworld and Compact Nuclear Simulator to complement – not replace – full-scope studies as well as to mainly collect HRA data for estimating nominal/basic human error probabilities (HEPs) needed in the HRA quantification process. This study is a part of the project aiming to suggest how to support full-scope data collection studies based on SHEEP. This paper first introduces major tasks within the SHEEP framework. Then, as one of the major tasks, why and how we have planned to experimentally investigate human performance differences depending on simulator complexity are mainly introduced in this paper.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Rancor Integrated Procedure System (RIPS): A Computer-Based Procedure Platform for Advanced Reactor Research

The Rancor Microworld Simulator is a simplified, pressurized water, small modular reactor simulator that includes a multi-unit plant model server, an advanced digital human-machine control interface, and the Rancor Integrated Procedure System (RIPS). Rancor provides a research and development tool that can be used for collecting operator performance data and for prototyping concepts of operations (ConOps) for advanced reactor development. RIPS is meant as a research tool and includes many unique features: (1) RIPS has a robust procedure authoring system. (2) RIPS has the capability to run any of the three IEEE-Std-1786 computer-based procedure types. (3) RIPS can be configured to take on the look and feel of different vendors’ computer-based procedure systems for the purpose of developing and evaluating different ConOps for plant upgrades or new builds. (4) RIPS includes the capability for logging operator procedure use, including integrating procedure logs with Rancor simulator logs, thereby allowing automated data collection of operator scenario runs. (5) RIPS integrates with the Human Unimodel for Nuclear Technology to Enhance Reliability (HUNTER), a dynamic human reliability analysis environment that creates a digital human twin or virtual operator to mimic reactor operator performance. (6) RIPS includes support for automation of plant monitoring and control functions. While RIPS is explicitly built into Rancor, it may also be used with full-scope training simulators. This functionality allows RIPS to be used for existing plants and advanced reactors under development.

99 - GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2022

The evolution of the Human Systems and Simulation Laboratory in nuclear power research

The events at Three Mile Island in the United States brought about fundamental changes in the ways that simulation would be used in nuclear operations. The need for research simulators was identified to scientifically study human-centered risk and make recommendations for process control system designs. This paper documents the human factors research conducted at the Human Systems and Simulation Laboratory (HSSL) since its inception in 2010 at Idaho National Laboratory. The facility’s primary purposes are to provide support to utilities for system upgrades and to validate modernized control room concepts. In the last decade, however, as nuclear industry needs have evolved, so too have the purposes of the HSSL. Thus, beyond control room modernization, human factors researchers have evaluated the security of nuclear infrastructure from cyber adversaries and evaluated human-in-the-loop simulations for joint operations with an integrated hydrogen generation plant. Lastly, our review presents research using human reliability analysis techniques with data collected from HSSL-based studies and concludes with potential future directions for the HSSL, including severe accident management and advanced control room technologies.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Back to Basics: First Principles of HRA

Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) continues to suffer from a myriad of technical gaps in its foundations. Core issues have been widely discussed but remain largely unaddressed, although the path taken to this point was paved with good intentions. Now, while this characterization may seem dramatic it is not intended to throw doubt onto HRA as a discipline or to diminish the value it has on increasing safety and resilience in nuclear power. Rather, it is intended to communicate that HRA has some serious challenges and is desperately in need of a critical evaluation. To quote Dougherty [1], “the misrepresentations that will undoubtedly arise may serve to provoke the necessary creativity.” What bears noting is that in the last thirty years since Alan Swain declared that “no adequate HRA had ever been done,” there has been little effort to correct the issues he highlighted. Human factors practice is still poorly implemented, many complex systems are fundamentally incompatible with reliable human performance, and there remains poor foundational support for many of the assumptions within HRA. We propose three categories of issues in HRA, philosophical, theoretical, and empirical and potential solutions to these issues.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
NASA NTRS2017

And the Human Saves the Day or Maybe They Ruin It, The Importance of Humans in the Loop

Flying a mission in space requires a massive commitment of resources, and without the talent and commitment of the people involved in this effort we would never leave the atmosphere of Earth as safely as we have. When we use the phrase "humans in the loop", it could apply to almost any endeavor since everything starts with humans developing a concept, completing the design process, building or implementing a product and using the product to achieve a goal or purpose. Narrowing the focus to spaceflight, there are a variety of individuals involved throughout the preparations for flight and the flight itself. All of the humans involved add value and support for program success. The paper discusses the concepts of human involvement in technological programs, how a Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) accounts for the human in the loop for potential missions using a technique called Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) and the tradeoffs between having a human in the loop or not. Human actions can increase or decrease the overall risk via initiating events or mitigating them, thus removing the human from the loop doesn't always lowers the risk.

DeMott, Diana L.↗
NASA NTRS2010

The Importance of HRA in Human Space Flight: Understanding the Risks

Human performance is critical to crew safety during space missions. Humans interact with hardware and software during ground processing, normal flight, and in response to events. Human interactions with hardware and software can cause Loss of Crew and/or Vehicle (LOCV) through improper actions, or may prevent LOCV through recovery and control actions. Humans have the ability to deal with complex situations and system interactions beyond the capability of machines. Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) is a method used to qualitatively and quantitatively assess the occurrence of human failures that affect availability and reliability of complex systems. Modeling human actions with their corresponding failure probabilities in a Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) provides a more complete picture of system risks and risk contributions. A high-quality HRA can provide valuable information on potential areas for improvement, including training, procedures, human interfaces design, and the need for automation. Modeling human error has always been a challenge in part because performance data is not always readily available. For spaceflight, the challenge is amplified not only because of the small number of participants and limited amount of performance data available, but also due to the lack of definition of the unique factors influencing human performance in space. These factors, called performance shaping factors in HRA terminology, are used in HRA techniques to modify basic human error probabilities in order to capture the context of an analyzed task. Many of the human error modeling techniques were developed within the context of nuclear power plants and therefore the methodologies do not address spaceflight factors such as the effects of microgravity and longer duration missions. This presentation will describe the types of human error risks which have shown up as risk drivers in the Shuttle PRA which may be applicable to commercial space flight. As with other large PRAs of complex machines, human error in the Shuttle PRA proved to be an important contributor (~12 percent) to LOCV. An existing HRA technique was adapted for use in the Shuttle PRA, but additional guidance and improvements are needed to make the HRA task in space-related PRAs easier and more accurate. Therefore, this presentation will also outline plans for expanding current HRA methodology to more explicitly cover spaceflight performance shaping factors.

Hamlin, Teri↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Strategies for Quantifying Human Space Flight Performance in the Crew Health and Performance System

The Crew Health and Performance-Probabilistic Risk Assessment (CHP-PRA) team at NASA Glenn Research Center is planning a customized approach to quantify human spaceflight performance changes with respect to changes to the CHP system functions and capabilities. Using the Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAG) initiated by NASA’s Human Systems Risk Board (HSRB) [1], the team is surveying potential candidate models and novel strategies that generate metrics suitable for supporting decision making related to how the CHP system may influence human system performance risk. One such investigation includes classic Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) models. Traditionally, HRA methods estimate the occurrence of human errors and their impact on the success of an activity when designing and operating a system. While humans perceive, interpret, decide on, and carry out a course of action, the factors affecting performance and error likelihood are commonly referred to as performance shaping factors (PSFs). Originally developed to alleviate safety concerns related to nuclear power plant operations, HRA methods such as THERP [2] and CREAM [3] dismantle an activity into tasks, requiring elemental steps to be executed, and assess their failure due to predefined PSFs. In this study, we compare generic HRA methods and those that incorporate some human spaceflight aspects, such as sleep conditions (SCREAM [4]), with respect to how they may be adopted to capture performance with an intention to mitigate detrimental outcomes elucidated by the HSRB DAGs. We suggest strategies to quantify astronaut performance specific to spaceflight activities and illustrate how such concepts may help in optimizing the CHP system capabilities with respect to Artemis missions.

dag↗
NASA NTRS2019

SCREAM: Space-based Cognitive Reliability Error Analysis Method

Given both ground-based performance shaping factors (PSFs) collected by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) and potential space-based PSFs collected by JSC's HH&P, this year's task is to determine how to combine them for future human reliability analysis (HRA) of space missions. All HRA to date for space missions have been based on ground data (i.e. 1-G environment). There is no space-based HRA approach. The target of this project to produce a "first of its kind" HRA approach for space missions. As humans go beyond Earth orbit and missions become longer, human performance and reliability is expected to degrade. The questions become by how much, when, and what, leading to defining the overall effect on crew risk. Knowing this information earlier rather than later will help us mitigate this risk by vehicle design, crew training, and operational workarounds.

Boyer, Roger L.↗
NASA NTRS2016

Human Reliability Assessments: Using the Past (Shuttle) to Predict the Future (Orion)

NASA (National Aeronautics and Space Administration) Johnson Space Center (JSC) Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) uses two human reliability analysis (HRA) methodologies. The first is a simplified method which is based on how much time is available to complete the action, with consideration included for environmental and personal factors that could influence the human's reliability. This method is expected to provide a conservative value or placeholder as a preliminary estimate. This preliminary estimate or screening value is used to determine which placeholder needs a more detailed assessment. The second methodology is used to develop a more detailed human reliability assessment on the performance of critical human actions. This assessment needs to consider more than the time available, this would include factors such as: the importance of the action, the context, environmental factors, potential human stresses, previous experience, training, physical design interfaces, available procedures/checklists and internal human stresses. The more detailed assessment is expected to be more realistic than that based primarily on time available. When performing an HRA on a system or process that has an operational history, we have information specific to the task based on this history and experience. In the case of a Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) that is based on a new design and has no operational history, providing a "reasonable" assessment of potential crew actions becomes more challenging. In order to determine what is expected of future operational parameters, the experience from individuals who had relevant experience and were familiar with the system and process previously implemented by NASA was used to provide the "best" available data. Personnel from Flight Operations, Flight Directors, Launch Test Directors, Control Room Console Operators and Astronauts were all interviewed to provide a comprehensive picture of previous NASA operations. Verification of the assumptions and expectations expressed in the assessments will be needed when the procedures, flight rules and operational requirements are developed and then finalized.

DeMott, Diana↗
NASA NTRS2017

Human Reliability Assessments: Using the Past (Shuttle) to Predict the Future (Orion)

NASA (National Aeronautics and Space Administration) Johnson Space Center (JSC) Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) uses two human reliability analysis (HRA) methodologies. The first is a simplified method which is based on how much time is available to complete the action, with consideration included for environmental and personal factors that could influence the human's reliability. This method is expected to provide a conservative value or placeholder as a preliminary estimate. This preliminary estimate or screening value is used to determine which placeholder needs a more detailed assessment. The second methodology is used to develop a more detailed human reliability assessment on the performance of critical human actions. This assessment needs to consider more than the time available, this would include factors such as: the importance of the action, the context, environmental factors, potential human stresses, previous experience, training, physical design interfaces, available procedures/checklists and internal human stresses. The more detailed assessment is expected to be more realistic than that based primarily on time available. When performing an HRA on a system or process that has an operational history, we have information specific to the task based on this history and experience. In the case of a Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) that is based on a new design and has no operational history, providing a "reasonable" assessment of potential crew actions becomes more challenging. To determine what is expected of future operational parameters, the experience from individuals who had relevant experience and were familiar with the system and process previously implemented by NASA was used to provide the "best" available data. Personnel from Flight Operations, Flight Directors, Launch Test Directors, Control Room Console Operators, and Astronauts were all interviewed to provide a comprehensive picture of previous NASA operations. Verification of the assumptions and expectations expressed in the assessments will be needed when the procedures, flight rules, and operational requirements are developed and then finalized.

DeMott, Diana L.↗
NASA NTRS2004

EVA Performance Prediction

Astronaut physical performance capabilities in micro gravity EV A or on planetary surfaces when encumbered by a life support suit and debilitated by a long exposure to micro gravity will be less than unencumbered pre flight capabilities. The big question addressed by human factors engineers is: what can the astronaut be expected to do on EVA or when we arrive at a planetary surface? A second question is: what aids to performance will be needed to enhance the human physical capability? These questions are important for a number of reasons. First it is necessary to carry out accurate planning of human physical demands to ensure that time and energy critical tasks can be carried out with confidence. Second it is important that the crew members (and their ground or planetary base monitors) have a realistic picture of their own capabilities, as excessive fatigue can lead to catastrophic failure. Third it is important to design appropriate equipment to enhance human sensory capabilities, locomotion, materials handling and manipulation. The evidence from physiological research points to musculoskeletal, cardiovascular and neurovestibular degradation during long duration exposure to micro gravity . The evidence from the biomechanics laboratory (and the Neutral Buoyancy Laboratory) points to a reduction in range of motion, strength and stamina when encumbered by a pressurized suit. The evidence from a long history of EVAs is that crewmembers are indeed restricted in their physical capabilities. There is a wealth of evidence in the literature on the causes and effects of degraded human performance in the laboratory, in sports and athletics, in industry and in other physically demanding jobs. One approach to this challenge is through biomechanical and performance modeling. Such models must be based on thorough task analysis, reliable human performance data from controlled studies, and functional extrapolations validated in analog contexts. The task analyses currently carried out for EVA activities are based more on extensive domain experience than any formal analytic structure. Conversely, physical task analysis for industrial and structured evidence from training and EV A contexts. Again on earth there is considerable evidence of human performance degradation due to encumbrance and fatigue. These industrial models generally take the form of a discounting equation. The development of performance estimates for space operations, such as timeline predictions for EVA is generally based on specific input from training activity, for example in the NBL or KC135. uniformed services tasks on earth are much more formalized. Human performance data in the space context has two sources: first there is the micro analysis of performance in structured tasks by the space physiology community and second there is the less structured evidence from training and EV A contexts.

Peacock, Brian↗
DOE OSTI2022

Auto Procedure Parsing: A Natural Language Processing Approach

Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) operating procedure is “a set of rules that describes how actions on the plant should be made if a certain system goal should be accomplished. U.S. NPPs use paper-based procedures (PBPs). PBPs are difficult to use. Common errors with PBPs are: following the wrong procedure, omit a step etc. Computer based procedures (CPBs) offer great improvement in ensuring plant safety. Some studies rely on experienced operators to understand the procedure content and then reorganize the procedure with digitally executable capabilities. Other studies utilize the procedure format to design rules to extract information from the operating procedures. Existing studies in procedure parsing are manual, laborious and extract limited information. This study aims to automatically extract critical information from operating procedures for generating computer interpretable representation of procedures. Such representation can further be used for automatic dynamic human reliability analysis and CPB design etc.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2023

Identifying human failure events (HFEs) for external hazard probabilistic risk assessment

In recent years, several advancements in nuclear power plant (NPP) probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) have been driven by increased understanding of external hazards, plant response, and uncertainties. However, major sources of uncertainty associated with external hazard PRA remain. One important source is how risk-significant human actions that are carried out to enable plant response and recovery from natural hazards cause the close coupling of physical impacts on plants and overall plant risk during these hazard events. This makes human reliability and human-plant interactions important elements to consider in resolving PRA gaps in external hazards. One of the challenges in considering human response in external hazard probabilistic risk assessment (XHPRA) is that most existing human reliability analysis (HRA) models were not developed for assessing actions outside the control room (termed ex-control room actions) and hazard response. To support this new scope, HRA models will need to be developed or modified to support identification of human activities, causal factors, and uncertainties inherent in external hazard response, thereby providing insights regarding event timing and physical event conditions as they relate to human performance. In this study, there are two main objectives: (1) evaluate the applicability of an existing cognitive-based HRA method, Phoenix, to ex-control room actions, and (2) identify sources of uncertainty to be characterized or reduced in order to make this method suitable for XHPRA. The first step of such work is performed by assessing the suitability of existing HRA methods to support identifying human failure events (HFEs) for human response to flooding hazards. These HFEs are human actions or inactions that are involved in human responses to flooding hazards and could contribute to the loss of a critical function for the plant in the scenario being examined. Here, in this work, decomposition analyses using the cognitive-based Phoenix HRA model are used to identify HFEs. The Phoenix method was found to be suitable for analyzing ex-control room actions as well as identifying specific HFEs and underlying crew failure modes (CFMs). However, the method's suitability for use in ex-control room actions would benefit from expanding the available CFMs to accommodate a larger variety of physical and communication tasks.

42 ENGINEERING↗
NASA NTRS2013

Launch and Assembly Reliability Analysis for Mars Human Space Exploration Missions

NASA s long-range goal is focused upon human exploration of Mars. Missions to Mars will require campaigns of multiple launches to assemble Mars Transfer Vehicles in Earth orbit. Launch campaigns are subject to delays, launch vehicles can fail to place their payloads into the required orbit, and spacecraft may fail during the assembly process or while loitering prior to the Trans-Mars Injection (TMI) burn. Additionally, missions to Mars have constrained departure windows lasting approximately sixty days that repeat approximately every two years. Ensuring high reliability of launching and assembling all required elements in time to support the TMI window will be a key enabler to mission success. This paper describes an integrated methodology for analyzing and improving the reliability of the launch and assembly campaign phase. A discrete event simulation involves several pertinent risk factors including, but not limited to: manufacturing completion; transportation; ground processing; launch countdown; ascent; rendezvous and docking, assembly, and orbital operations leading up to TMI. The model accommodates varying numbers of launches, including the potential for spare launches. Having a spare launch capability provides significant improvement to mission success.

Cates, Grant R.↗
DOE OSTI2021

A Bayesian and HRA-Aided Method for the Novel Reliability Analysis of Software

Technological advancements and nuclear power plant modernization has inspired considerable research in the areas of safety and reliability, yet there remains a lack of consensus for the reliability assessment of digital instrumentation and control (I&C) systems. Motivated by the lack of consensus for reliability analysis methods, this work employs a novel framework that incorporates Bayesian, human reliability, and common-cause failure (CCF) modeling techniques. The novel framework allows the use of state-of-the-art or classical modeling techniques when accounting for human and CCF effects on system reliability. The Bayesian and HRA-Aided Method for the Reliability Analysis of Software (BAHAMAS) is demonstrated by a case study for the quantification of software hazards found in a previous analysis of a digital reactor trip system. The results demonstrate the ability of BAHAMAS to account for human activities during the software development life cycle and their influence on software reliability. BAHAMAS is a flexible tool for extending the coverage of conventional probabilistic risk assessments to include modernized digital I&C systems.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
NASA NTRS2003

Development of an Integrated Human Factors Toolkit

An effective integration of human abilities and limitations is crucial to the success of all NASA missions. The Integrated Human Factors Toolkit facilitates this integration by assisting system designers and analysts to select the human factors tools that are most appropriate for the needs of each project. The HF Toolkit contains information about a broad variety of human factors tools addressing human requirements in the physical, information processing and human reliability domains. Analysis of each tool includes consideration of the most appropriate design stage, the amount of expertise in human factors that is required, the amount of experience with the tool and the target job tasks that are needed, and other factors that are critical for successful use of the tool. The benefits of the Toolkit include improved safety, reliability and effectiveness of NASA systems throughout the agency. This report outlines the initial stages of development for the Integrated Human Factors Toolkit.

Resnick, Marc L.↗
DOE OSTI2023

Comparison of Error Rate Depending on Operator Expertise and Simulator Complexity

This paper analyzes operator's error rate from experiments, depending on the expertise and simulator complexity. This study uses the Rancor Microworld, a simplified simulator developed by INL, and the Compact Nuclear Simulator (CNS), a less simplified simulator developed by the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI). The error rates were measured from simulation data of a total of 72 participants, and the collected error rate data were analyzed using analysis of variance (ANOVA) test.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Analysis of human performance differences between students and operators when using the Rancor Microworld simulator

Here, from within the umbrella of the Simplified Human Error Experimental Program (SHEEP) framework, this paper analyzes human performance differences between professional and student operators when using a simplified simulator (i.e., Rancor Microworld). This paper represents a crucial step in understanding the fidelity of the simplified simulators and student operators within the SHEEP study. This paper explores a randomized factorial experimental design that features two independent variables: participant type and event class. Six human performance measurements are considered in the experiment. The experiment is conducted using 20 professional reactor operators employed at actual nuclear power plants (NPPs), along with 20 trained students. The experimental data are analyzed via statistical analysis methods. Finally, this paper examines the differences in human performance between actual operators and students when using Rancor Microworld.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗