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At least 73 records · Page 4
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2003

Aircraft signal definition for flight safety system monitoring system

A system and method compares combinations of vehicle variable values against known combinations of potentially dangerous vehicle input signal values. Alarms and error messages are selectively generated based on such comparisons. An aircraft signal definition is provided to enable definition and monitoring of sets of aircraft input signals to customize such signals for different aircraft. The input signals are compared against known combinations of potentially dangerous values by operational software and hardware of a monitoring function. The aircraft signal definition is created using a text editor or custom application. A compiler receives the aircraft signal definition to generate a binary file that comprises the definition of all the input signals used by the monitoring function. The binary file also contains logic that specifies how the inputs are to be interpreted. The file is then loaded into the monitor function, where it is validated and used to continuously monitor the condition of the aircraft.

Gibbs, Michael↗
NASA NTRS2021

Modernizing NASA’s Space Flight Safety and Mission Success (S&MS) Assurance Framework In Line With Evolving Acquisition Strategies and Systems Engineering Practices

This paper presents the objectives-driven, case-based safety and mission success (S&MS) assurance framework being developed by the NASA Office of Safety and Mission Assurance (OSMA), including its motivations and its implementation via a S&MS Assurance Standard that is under development, supplemented by supporting standards including an S&MS Analysis Management Standard that is also under development. A need to evolve NASA’s S&MS assurance framework has emerged in recent years, resulting from the need to accommodate new acquisition models; the need to accommodate evolving systems engineering (SE) practices; the need to stipulate acceptable levels of S&MS risk; the need for improved integration of S&MS into SE; and the need for clearer risk acceptance accountability. The objectives-driven, case-based S&MS assurance framework proposed here is responsive to that need. Its key features include: • The establishment, by NASA Acquirers, of fundamental S&MS performance objectives that define limits of acceptability for the likelihoods that mission technical objectives will be accomplished and that people, assets, and environments put at risk by the mission will not be adversely affected; • The development and approval of Providers’ S&MS plans for meeting Acquirers’ S&MS performance objectives, including commitments to support Acquirer audit, investigation, and reporting needs; • The development, by Providers, of S&MS assurance cases that argue, supported by evidence, that the Provider has met, or is on track to meeting, the fundamental S&MS objectives; • The evaluation, throughout the program/project life cycle, of Provider S&MS assurance cases as the primary S&MS-related technical basis for Acquirer risk acceptance and the granting to the Provider of authority to proceed through the program/project life cycle. This proposed S&MS assurance framework is notable for its lack of prescription of traditional S&MS requirements and strategies such as defined failure tolerances, margins, or analysis requirements. Instead, Providers are given latitude to propose their own strategies for meeting the fundamental S&MS performance objectives, subject to independent review and Acquirer approval. The result is a framework for S&MS assurance that is at once both rigorous and flexible.

Assurance Case↗
NASA NTRS1967

Safety in flight operations.

Manned space flight safety, discussing system design, operations planning, staffing, training and simulation

OPERATIONS RESEARCH↗
NASA NTRS2010

International and NASA SSA and Safety of Flight Issues

This presentation reviews the international and NASA interests in Space Situational Awareness (SSA) and space debris as it affects space flight safety. The international interesrt has increased since the collision of the Iridium and Cosmos satellites in 2009. The United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UN COPUOS) has commenced a multi-year effort to review the long-term sustainability of outer space activities.

Johnson, Nicholas K,↗
NASA NTRS1991

The 1991 International Aerospace and Ground Conference on Lightning and Static Electricity, volume 1

The proceedings of the 1991 International Aerospace and Ground Conference on Lightning and Static Electricity are reported. Some of the topics covered include: lightning, lightning suppression, aerospace vehicles, aircraft safety, flight safety, aviation meteorology, thunderstorms, atmospheric electricity, warning systems, weather forecasting, electromagnetic coupling, electrical measurement, electrostatics, aircraft hazards, flight hazards, meteorological parameters, cloud (meteorology), ground effect, electric currents, lightning equipment, electric fields, measuring instruments, electrical grounding, and aircraft instruments.

William Jafferis↗
NASA NTRS1987

Full-scale Transport Controlled Impact Demonstration Program

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and NASA conducted a full-scale air-to-surface impact-survivable impact demonstration with a remotely piloted transport aircraft on 1 December 1984, at Edwards Air Force Base, California. The test article consisted of experiments, special equipment, and supporting systems, such as antimisting kerosene (AMK), crashworthiness structural/restraint, analytical modeling, cabin fire safety, flight data recorders, post-impact investigation, instrumentation/data acquisition systems, remotely piloted vehicle/flight control systems, range and flight safety provisions, etc. This report describes the aircraft, experiments, systems, activities, and events which lead up to the Controlled Impact Demonstration (CID). An overview of the final unmanned remote control flight and sequence of impact events are delineated. Preliminary post CID observations are presented.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS1976

Flight experience with a digital integrated propulsion control system on an F-111E airplane

A digital integrated propulsion control system (IPCS) installed in the left side of an F-111 E aircraft was tested in flight. The F-111 aircraft was selected for the IPCS program because it incorporated a variable geometry inlet and an afterburning turbofan engine and had two engines, one of which could remain in the normal configuration to ensure flight safety. Flight data were compared with results of tests run in an altitude test chamber. The digital system was found to be capable of duplicating the standard engine and inlet control systems. Instabilities such as inlet buzz and afterburner rumble were detected and controlled. The usefulness of an altitude chamber for developing a software and testing hardware was proven. The flexibility of IPCS was demonstrated when an autothrottle, an in-flight thrust calculation, and a coannular noise study capability were added at the end of the flight tests.

Burcham, F. W., Jr.↗
NASA NTRS1986

Space Shuttle redesign status

NASA has conducted an extensive redesign effort for the Space Shutle in the aftermath of the STS 51-L Challenger accident, encompassing not only Shuttle vehicle and booster design but also such system-wide factors as organizational structure, management procedures, flight safety, flight operations, sustainable flight rate, and maintenance safeguards. Attention is presently given to Solid Rocket Booster redesign features, the Shuttle Main Engine's redesigned high pressure fuel and oxidizer turbopumps, the Shuttle Orbiter's braking and rollout (landing gear) system, the entry control mode of the flight control system, a 'split-S' abort maneuver for the Orbiter, and crew escape capsule proposals.

Brand, Vance D.↗
NASA NTRS1997

Evaluation of Flight Attendant Technical Knowledge

Accident and incident reports have indicated that flight attendants have numerous opportunities to provide the flight-deck crew with operational information that may prevent or lessen the severity of a potential problem. Additionally, as carrier fleets transition from three person to two person flight-deck crews, the reliance upon the cabin crew for the transfer of this information may increase further. Recent research indicates that flight attendants do not feel confident in their ability to describe mechanical parts or malfunctions of the aircraft, and the lack of flight attendant technical training has been referenced in a number of recent reports. Chute and Wiener describe five factors which may produce communication barriers between cockpit and cabin crews: the historical background of aviation, the physical separation of the two crews, psychosocial issues, regulatory factors, and organizational factors. By examining these areas of division we can identify possible bridges and address the implications of deficient cockpit/cabin communication on flight safety. Flight attendant operational knowledge may provide some mitigation of these barriers. The present study explored both flight attendant technical knowledge and flight attendant and pilot expectations of flight attendant technical knowledge. To assess the technical knowledge of cabin crewmembers, 177 current flight attendants from two U.S. carriers voluntarily completed a 13-item technical quiz. To investigate expectations of flight attendant technical knowledge, 181 pilots and a second sample of 96 flight attendants, from the same two airlines, completed surveys designed to capture each group's expectations of operational knowledge required of flight attendants. Analyses revealed several discrepancies between the present level of flight attendant operational knowledge and pilots' and flight attendants' expected and desired levels of technical knowledge. Implications for training will be discussed.

Dunbar, Melisa G.↗
NASA NTRS2002

Control Oriented Modeling and Validation of Aeroservoelastic Systems

Lightweight aircraft design emphasizes the reduction of structural weight to maximize aircraft efficiency and agility at the cost of increasing the likelihood of structural dynamic instabilities. To ensure flight safety, extensive flight testing and active structural servo control strategies are required to explore and expand the boundary of the flight envelope. Aeroservoelastic (ASE) models can provide online flight monitoring of dynamic instabilities to reduce flight time testing and increase flight safety. The success of ASE models is determined by the ability to take into account varying flight conditions and the possibility to perform flight monitoring under the presence of active structural servo control strategies. In this continued study, these aspects are addressed by developing specific methodologies and algorithms for control relevant robust identification and model validation of aeroservoelastic structures. The closed-loop model robust identification and model validation are based on a fractional model approach where the model uncertainties are characterized in a closed-loop relevant way.

Crowder, Marianne↗
NASA NTRS1975

HOME - An application of fault-tolerant techniques and system self-testing

Hard Over Monitoring Equipment (HOME) has been designed to complement and enhance the flight safety of a flight research helicopter. HOME is an independent, highly reliable, and fail-safe special purpose computer that monitors the flight control commands issued by the flight control computer of the helicopter. In particular, HOME detects the issuance of a hazardous hard-over command for any of the four flight control axes and transfers the control of the helicopter to the flight safety pilot. The design of HOME incorporates certain reliability and fail-safe enhancement design features, such as triple modular redundancy, majority logic voting, fail-safe dual circuits, independent status monitors, in-flight self-test, and a built-in preflight exerciser. The HOME design and operation is described with special emphasis on the reliability and fail-safe aspects of the design.

Holden, D. G.↗
NASA NTRS2007

NASA Range Safety Annual Report 2007

As always, Range Safety has been involved in a number of exciting and challenging activities and events. Throughout the year, we have strived to meet our goal of protecting the public, the workforce, and property during range operations. During the past year, Range Safety was involved in the development, implementation, and support of range safety policy. Range Safety training curriculum development was completed this year and several courses were presented. Tailoring exercises concerning the Constellation Program were undertaken with representatives from the Constellation Program, the 45th Space Wing, and the Launch Constellation Range Safety Panel. Range Safety actively supported the Range Commanders Council and it subgroups and remained involved in updating policy related to flight safety systems and flight safety analysis. In addition, Range Safety supported the Space Shuttle Range Safety Panel and addressed policy concerning unmanned aircraft systems. Launch operations at Kennedy Space Center, the Eastern and Western ranges, Dryden Flight Research Center, and Wallops Flight Facility were addressed. Range Safety was also involved in the evaluation of a number of research and development efforts, including the space-based range (formerly STARS), the autonomous flight safety system, the enhanced flight termination system, and the joint advanced range safety system. Flight safety system challenges were evaluated. Range Safety's role in the Space Florida Customer Assistance Service Program for the Eastern Range was covered along with our support for the Space Florida Educational Balloon Release Program. We hope you have found the web-based format both accessible and easy to use. Anyone having questions or wishing to have an article included in the 2008 Range Safety Annual Report should contact Alan Dumont, the NASA Range Safety Program Manager located at the Kennedy Space Center, or Michael Dook at NASA Headquarters.

Dumont, Alan G.↗
NASA NTRS1995

A New Approach to Measuring Safety with Flight Data

For over two decades, safety has been measured by screening flight data for deviations from prescribed operations. NASA and the FAA are developing a prototype system with a new approach, to complement these event-measurement systems. The premise is that, in addition to these events, much can be gained by analyzing all the flight data on a routine basis. The statistical analyses of this system enable the evaluation of normal as well as extreme operations. The trend analyses make it possible to foresee the potential occurrence of an unsafe operation and intervene before it occurs.

Chappell, Sheryl L.↗
NASA NTRS2007

An Online Resource for Flight Test Safety Planning

A viewgraph presentation describing an online database for flight test safety techniques is shown. The topics include: 1) Goal; 2) Test Hazard Analyses; 3) Online Database Background; 4) Data Gathering; 5) NTPS Role; 6) Organizations; 7) Hazard Titles; 8) FAR Paragraphs; 9) Maneuver Name; 10) Identified Hazard; 11) Matured Hazard Titles; 12) Loss of Control Causes; 13) Mitigations; 14) Database Now Open to the Public; 15) FAR Reference Search; 16) Record Field Search; 17) Keyword Search; and 18) Results of FAR Reference Search.

Lewis, Greg↗
NASA NTRS2010

Loosely Coupled GPS-Aided Inertial Navigation System for Range Safety

The Autonomous Flight Safety System (AFSS) aims to replace the human element of range safety operations, as well as reduce reliance on expensive, downrange assets for launches of expendable launch vehicles (ELVs). The system consists of multiple navigation sensors and flight computers that provide a highly reliable platform. It is designed to ensure that single-event failures in a flight computer or sensor will not bring down the whole system. The flight computer uses a rules-based structure derived from range safety requirements to make decisions whether or not to destroy the rocket.

Heatwole, Scott↗