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This document provides guidelines for the accomplishment of Failure Mode, Effects, and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) on the Apollo program. It is a procedure for analysis of hardware items to determine those items contributing most to system unreliability and crew safety problems.
A finite-element analysis was conducted to evaluate the stress distributions within mode I and mode II failure specimens, assuming both isotropic and orthotropic elastic material properties. The effects of anisotropy on both the magnitude and the location of the highest stress concentration at the vicinity of the crack tip are significant. The results from modeling realistic blunt crack tip geometry and resin-rich zones imply that local variations in the microstructure strongly influence the stress state near the crack tip and therefore the measured fracture properties. In addition, the features of a viscoelastic model for thermoplastic matrices are described. This model will be used in future investigations of matrix-dominated failure phenomena.
The implementation of the HST system safety program is detailed. Numerous safety analyses are conducted through various phases of design, test, and fabrication, and results are presented to NASA management for discussion during dedicated safety reviews. Attention is given to the system safety assessment and risk analysis methodologies used, i.e., hazard analysis, fault tree analysis, and failure modes and effects analysis, and to how they are coupled with engineering and test analysis for a 'synergistic picture' of the system. Some preliminary safety analysis results, showing the relationship between hazard identification, control or abatement, and finally control verification, are presented as examples of this safety process.
A view of the facility and operational requirements involved in performing a manned thermal vacuum test is presented. The requirements fall into two major categories. The first category deals with placing the suited crewmen in a hazardous environment and assuring their safety. The second category deals with the constraints and special requirements involved with a suited crewman operating flight hardware in a 1-G environment. Design areas that deal with man rating a chamber, including fire suppression, emergency repress, emergency power, backups, reliable instrumentation and data systems, communications, television monitoring, biomedical monitoring, material compatibilities, and equipment supporting the Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) are discussed. The operational issues that are peculiar to manned testing such as test rules, test procedures, test protocol, emergency drills, availability of hyperbaric facilities, test team training and certification engineering concerns for a safe mechanical and instrumentation buildup, hazard analysis, and Failure Modes and Effects Analysis are discussed. The constraints and special requirements involved with a suited crewman operating flight hardware in a 1-G environment are addressed.
This paper will detail how the Hubble Space Telescope (HST) system safety program is conducted. Numerous safety analyses are conducted through the various phases of design, test, and fabrication, and results are presented to NASA management for discussion during dedicated safety reviews. This paper will then address the system safety assessment and risk analysis methodologies used (i.e. hazard analysis, fault tree analysis, and failure modes and effects analysis), and how they are coupled with enginering and test analyses for a 'synergistic picture' of the system. Some preliminary safety analysis results, showing the relationship between hazard identification, control or abatement, and finally control verification, will be presented as examples of this safety process.
Four high-pressure gas tanks, the basis of this study, were especially made by a private contractor and tested before being delivered to NASA Kennedy Space Center. In order to insure 100% reliability of each individual tank the staff at KSC decided to again submit the four tanks under more rigorous tests. These tests were conducted during a period from April 10 through May 8 at KSC. This application further validates the predictive safety model for accident prevention and system failure in the testing of four high-pressure gas tanks at Kennedy Space Center, called Continuous Hazard Tracking and Failure Prediction Methodology (CHTFPM). It is apparent from the variety of barriers available for a hazard control that some barriers will be more successful than others in providing protection. In order to complete the Barrier Analysis of the system, a Task Analysis and a Biomechanical Study were performed to establish the relationship between the degree of biomechanical non-conformities and the anomalies found within the system on particular joints of the body. This relationship was possible to obtain by conducting a Regression Analysis to the previously generated data. From the information derived the body segment with the lowest percentage of non-conformities was the neck flexion with 46.7%. Intense analysis of the system was conducted including Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA), Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA), and Barrier Analysis. These analyses resulted in the identification of occurrences of conditions, which may be becoming hazardous in the given system. These conditions, known as dendritics, may become hazards and could result in an accident, system malfunction, or unacceptable risk conditions. A total of 56 possible dendritics were identified. Work sampling was performed to observe the occurrence each dendritic. The out of control points generated from a Weighted c control chart along with a Pareto analysis indicate that the dendritics "Personnel not Wearing Proper Protective and Hose/tubing located in high-traffic area" which account for 59.18% of total dendritic frequency need to be addressed to reduce the chance of a hazard from occurring. However, the occurrences of some dendritics are more important than others. As a result immediate, from a Weighted c perspective, corrective action should be taken to ameliorate the cause of the Class A dendritic "Personnel located under suspended or moving loads" rather than just the most commonly occurring dendritics. In any case the vast majority of data obtained indicates that testing operations possess a relatively high degree of safety.
No abstract available
One inherent characteristic of requrements engineering is a lack of certainty during this early phase of a project. Nevertheless, decisions about requirements must be made in spite of this uncertainty. Here we describe the context in which we are exploring this, and some initial work to support elicitation of uncertain requirements, and to deal with the combination of such information from multiple stakeholders.
Strength analysis for composite bolted joints involves the mating of a stress analysis with an appropriate mode specific failure criterion for each of the primary failure modes. The stress analysis and failure criteria are independent of each other and can be manipulated separately in order to optimize the strength analysis package formed by their coupling. Material properties tests were conducted on rubber toughened graphite-epoxy material to measure the basic strength and stiffness in the warp and fill directions and in shear. Test matrices are summarized for investigations of laminate configuration, stacking sequence, fastener diameter, edge distance, fastener half spacing, laminate thickness, and fastener torque. A three dimensional finite element analysis computer program was written and failure criteria for net tension, shearout, and bearing were determined.
Current progressive damage and failure analysis (PDFA) methods were developed around thermoset material systems and their physical behavior. However, the applicability of these analysis methods has not been evaluated for use in modeling thermoplastic material systems. As part of the Hi-Rate Composite Aircraft Manufacturing (HiCAM) Project sponsored by NASA, intralaminar failure characterization was completed on a thermoplastic material system, AS4D/PEKK-FC, with off-axis tension (OAT) and off-axis compression (OAC) testing. The experiments were able to capture matrix non-linear shear behavior and the failure envelope of the material system. Two PDFA methods, LS-DYNA MAT299 and NASA’s CompDam-DGD, were then employed to simulate individual coupon behavior and simulation results were compared to published verification and validation guidelines from the CMH-17 crashworthiness working group. The results found that the two modeling methods provided suitable representation of material behavior of thermoplastics.
Current progressive damage and failure analysis (PDFA) methods were developed around thermoset material systems and their physical behavior. However, the applicability of these analysis methods has not been evaluated for use in modeling thermoplastic material systems. As part of the Hi-Rate Composite Aircraft Manufacturing (HiCAM) Project sponsored by NASA, intralaminar failure characterization was completed on a thermoplastic material system, AS4D/PEKK-FC, with off-axis tension (OAT) and off-axis compression (OAC) testing. The experiments were able to capture matrix non-linear shear behavior and the failure envelope of the material system. Two PDFA methods, LS-DYNA MAT299 and NASA’s CompDam-DGD, were then employed to simulate individual coupon behavior and simulation results were compared to published verification and validation guidelines from the CMH-17 crashworthiness working group. The results found that the two modeling methods provided suitable representation of material behavior of thermoplastics.
For purposes of the study, the propulsion system was considered as consisting of the following: (1) main engine system, (2) auxiliary propulsion system, (3) pneumatic system, (4) hydrogen feed, fill, drain and vent system, (5) oxygen feed, fill, drain and vent system, and (6) helium reentry purge system. Each component was critically examined to identify possible failure modes and the subsequent effect on mission success. Each space tug mission consists of three phases: launch to separation from shuttle, separation to redocking, and redocking to landing. The analysis considered the results of failure of a component during each phase of the mission. After the failure modes of each component were tabulated, those components whose failure would result in possible or certain loss of mission or inability to return the Tug to ground were identified as critical components and a criticality number determined for each. The criticality number of a component denotes the number of mission failures in one million missions due to the loss of that component. A total of 68 components were identified as critical with criticality numbers ranging from 1 to 2990.
A semi-empirical shearout strength model has been formulated for the analysis of composite bolted joints with allowance for the effects of joint geometry. The model employs a polynomial stress function in conjunction with a point stress failure criterion to predict strength as a function of fastener size, edge distance, and half spacing. The stress function is obtained by two-dimensional plane-stress finite element analysis using quadrilateral elements with orthotropic material properties. Comparison of experimentally determined shearout strength data with model predicted failures has substantiated the accuracy of the model.
During 1997, a team from Hernandez Engineering, MSFC, Rocketdyne, Thiokol, Pratt & Whitney, and USBI completed the first phase of a two year Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) of the Space Shuttle. The models for the Shuttle systems were entered and analyzed by a new QRA software package. This system, termed the Quantitative Risk Assessment System(QRAS), was designed by NASA and programmed by the University of Maryland. The software is a groundbreaking PC-based risk assessment package that allows the user to model complex systems in a hierarchical fashion. Features of the software include the ability to easily select quantifications of failure modes, draw Event Sequence Diagrams(ESDs) interactively, perform uncertainty and sensitivity analysis, and document the modeling. This paper illustrates both the approach used in modeling and the particular features of the software package. The software is general and can be used in a QRA of any complex engineered system. The author is the project lead for the modeling of the Space Shuttle Main Engines (SSMEs), and this paper focuses on the modeling completed for the SSMEs during 1997. In particular, the groundrules for the study, the databases used, the way in which ESDs were used to model catastrophic failure of the SSMES, the methods used to quantify the failure rates, and how QRAS was used in the modeling effort are discussed. Groundrules were necessary to limit the scope of such a complex study, especially with regard to a liquid rocket engine such as the SSME, which can be shut down after ignition either on the pad or in flight. The SSME was divided into its constituent components and subsystems. These were ranked on the basis of the possibility of being upgraded and risk of catastrophic failure. Once this was done the Shuttle program Hazard Analysis and Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) were used to create a list of potential failure modes to be modeled. The groundrules and other criteria were used to screen out the many failure modes that did not contribute significantly to the catastrophic risk. The Hazard Analysis and FMEA for the SSME were also used to build ESDs that show the chain of events leading from the failure mode occurence to one of the following end states: catastrophic failure, engine shutdown, or siccessful operation( successful with respect to the failure mode under consideration).
As the design of Micro-Electro-Mechanical System (MEMS) devices matures and their application extends to critical areas, the issues of reliability and long-term survivability become increasingly important. This paper reviews some general approaches to addressing the reliability and qualification of MEMS devices for space applications.
I have performed a reliability & maintainability analysis for the Amine Swingbed payload system. The Amine Swingbed is a carbon dioxide removal technology that has gone through 2,400 hours of International Space Station on-orbit use between 2013 and 2016. While the Amine Swingbed is currently an experimental payload system, the Amine Swingbed may be converted to system hardware. If the Amine Swingbed becomes system hardware, it will supplement the Carbon Dioxide Removal Assembly (CDRA) as the primary CO2 removal technology on the International Space Station. NASA is also considering using the Amine Swingbed as the primary carbon dioxide removal technology for future extravehicular mobility units and for the Orion, which will be used for the Asteroid Redirect and Journey to Mars missions. The qualitative component of the reliability and maintainability analysis is a Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA). In the FMEA, I have investigated how individual components in the Amine Swingbed may fail, and what the worst case scenario is should a failure occur. The significant failure effects are the loss of ability to remove carbon dioxide, the formation of ammonia due to chemical degradation of the amine, and loss of atmosphere because the Amine Swingbed uses the vacuum of space to regenerate the Amine Swingbed. In the quantitative component of the reliability and maintainability analysis, I have assumed a constant failure rate for both electronic and nonelectronic parts. Using this data, I have created a Poisson distribution to predict the failure rate of the Amine Swingbed as a whole. I have determined a mean time to failure for the Amine Swingbed to be approximately 1,400 hours. The observed mean time to failure for the system is between 600 and 1,200 hours. This range includes initial testing of the Amine Swingbed, as well as software faults that are understood to be non-critical. If many of the commercial parts were switched to military-grade parts, the expected mean time to failure would be 2,300 hours. Both calculated mean times to failure for the Amine Swingbed use conservative failure rate models. The observed mean time to failure for CDRA is 2,500 hours. Working on this project and for NASA in general has helped me gain insight into current aeronautics missions, reliability engineering, circuit analysis, and different cultures. Prior my internship, I did not have a lot knowledge about the work being performed at NASA. As a chemical engineer, I had not really considered working for NASA as a career path. By engaging in interactions with civil servants, contractors, and other interns, I have learned a great deal about modern challenges that NASA is addressing. My work has helped me develop a knowledge base in safety and reliability that would be difficult to find elsewhere. Prior to this internship, I had not thought about reliability engineering. Now, I have gained a skillset in performing reliability analyses, and understanding the inner workings of a large mechanical system. I have also gained experience in understanding how electrical systems work while I was analyzing the electrical components of the Amine Swingbed. I did not expect to be exposed to as many different cultures as I have while working at NASA. I am referring to both within NASA and the Houston area. NASA employs individuals with a broad range of backgrounds. It has been great to learn from individuals who have highly diverse experiences and outlooks on the world. In the Houston area, I have come across individuals from different parts of the world. Interacting with such a high number of individuals with significantly different backgrounds has helped me to grow as a person in ways that I did not expect. My time at NASA has opened a window into the field of aeronautics. After earning a bachelor's degree in chemical engineering, I plan to go to graduate school for a PhD in engineering. Prior to coming to NASA, I was not aware of the graduate Pathways program. I intend to apply for the graduate Pathways program as positions are opened up. I would like to pursue future opportunities with NASA, especially as my engineering career progresses.
Our work to date in connecting risk tools hs had successes, but also has revealed there to be significant impediments to information exchange between them. These impediments stem from the well-known phenomenon of 'semantic dissonance' - mismatch between conceptual assumptions made by the separately developed tools. This issue represents a fundamental challenge that arises regardless of the mechanism of information exchange. This paper explains the issue and illustrates it with reference to our experiences to date connecting several risk tools. We motivate this work, present and discuss the solutions we have adopted to surmount these impediments, and the implications this work has for future efforts to integrate risk tools.