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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2022

Defensive Islanding to Enhance the Resilience of Distribution Systems Against Cyber-Induced Failures

The extensive integration of communication, computation, and control technologies into cyber-physical power systems (CPPSs) has increased the vulnerabilities of CPPSs to cyberattacks. This calls for developing solutions that assess and reduce the impacts of cyber-induced failures on CPPSs. This paper proposes a defensive islanding strategy to isolate impacted parts of the CPPS and form self-sufficient islanded grids with an objective of minimum load curtailment. The defensive islanding aims to split a power system into smaller grids to improve its resilience against a potential extreme event. A clustering approach that leverages the hierarchical spectral clustering method is utilized for the optimal defensive islanding. The proposed approach captures the fragility behavior and loading conditions of power system components due to cyber-induced failures. A graphical-based coupling framework is used to map the impacts of cyber failures into operation of power system components. The proposed method is demonstrated on a modified 33-node distribution feeder system integrated with distributed energy resources. The amount of load curtailment and radiality constraints have been used to evaluate the performance of the proposed clustering strategies. The results show the capability of the proposed algorithm to create islands considering the cyber-induced failures for enhanced resilience.

cyber-induced failures↗
DOE OSTI2023

Autonomous System Inference, Trojan, and Adversarial Reprogramming Attack and Defense (Final)

In the world of ever-advancing technology, Autonomous Systems (AS) find extensive application, bolstering functionalities of critical infrastructures such as nuclear power plants. These systems, however, are increasingly becoming a target for nefarious activities, namely through inference attacks, trojan attacks, and adversarial reprogramming. This paper delves into a comprehensive exploration of machine learning (ML)-driven autonomous control systems within advanced nuclear reactor designs, revealing the vulnerabilities and proposing strategies for defense against potential cyber-attacks. Advanced cyber-attacks against critical infrastructure and the energy sector are becoming more common. With the invention of autonomous control systems (ACS) within advanced nuclear reactor designs, system designers, reactor operators, and regulators must consider cybersecurity during the design and operational phases. This article provides a cyber threat assessment of machine learning (ML)- based digital twinning (DT) technologies in the context of advanced reactor ACS. A cyber-physical testbed was created to emulate nuclear reactor digital instrumentation and controls (I&C) and act as a basis for the ACS. The ACS was designed as two plant-level DTs predicting reactor malfunctions and determining control actions and two component-level DTs responsible for classifying component states and forecasting component inputs and outputs (I/O). Two duplicate ACS designs– one using a traditional ML framework and one using an automated ML (AutoML) framework– were created and tested against cyber-attacks on training data, real-time process data, and ML model architectures to determine their respective qualitative cyber-risk in terms of likelihood and impact. Both frameworks showed similar cyber-resilience against training, real-time, and ML architecture attacks, proving that neither is inherently more secure. Recommended safeguard and security measures are posed to system designers, reactor operators, and regulators to maintain the cybersecurity of ML-based DT technologies such as ACS, prompting a holistic view of shared responsibility for maintaining cyber-secure ML-based systems. As global reliance on generation III reactors begins to be critically assessed, the evolution towards advanced reactor systems utilizing digital instrumentation and controls (I&C) becomes not merely preferable, but essential. The integration of semi and fully autonomous control systems (ACS), powered by digital I&C and machine learning (ML)-based digital twinning (DT) technologies, emerges as a potent strategy to mitigate operations and maintenance costs, thereby enhancing the economic feasibility of novel reactor designs. However, with a staggering 500% and 380% increase in cyber-attacks reported against the energy sector by the United States Department of Energy (DoE) and the European Union respectively, a surge in cyber vulnerabilities specifically targeting the nuclear industry has been 2 markedly observed. Notable incidents, such as the W32.Ramnit spyware infiltration at the Gundremmingen nuclear power plant in Germany and the Dtrack spyware intrusion at the Kudankulam nuclear power plant in India, while not directly compromising core industrial control systems (ICS), underscore a compelling necessity to fortify cybersecurity protocols in safeguarding reactor systems against increasingly adept digital adversaries. In light of this, our investigation extends beyond conventional cybersecurity parameters, diving into the intricate web of potential vulnerabilities woven into ML-based DTs and ACS in advanced reactor systems. A crafted cyber-physical testbed and preliminary ACS were devised to act as a mirror, reflecting potential configurations of advanced reactor control designs. Moreover, this study is intertwined with a scrutinization of ML models, developed either through conventional, manually tuned methodologies or via automated means through AutoML, probing into their cyber-risk profiles within operational technology (OT) environments. Expanding on this, two distinct ACS blueprints were forged – one navigating through the corridors of traditional ML and the other traversing the path of AutoML – in an effort to holistically encapsulate the considerations pivotal to ML-based DT control system design. Employing the SANS Institute Industrial Control System (ICS) Kill Chain and the MITRE ATT&CK Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) framework, a structured analysis was conducted, launching three targeted attacks against the training dataset, real-time dataset, and ML models, therein dissecting the potential cyber-attack implications against both ML frameworks within an ACS milieu. It is essential to note that three distinct categories of attacks were conducted against both ACS configurations, each encompassing three distinct ML-based DTs, cumulating in a total of 18 varied attacks. This exploration extends into the realms of Autonomous System Inference, Trojan, and Adversarial Reprogramming Attack and Defense, unraveling vulnerabilities, and opportunities for fortified defenses against such intrusions, particularly where ML-driven technologies, and by extension, ACS, are deployed. Final recommendations, articulated through a lens of security, safeguard, and implementation considerations, are presented for both traditional and AutoML models, anchoring upon the existing knowledge landscape and ML-based DT modeling for ACS, and are offered as a beacon to guide the nuclear industry through the intricate cybersecurity challenges that lie ahead.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2021

Return of the Lemnaceae: duckweed as a model plant system in the genomics and postgenomics era

Abstract The aquatic Lemnaceae family, commonly called duckweed, comprises some of the smallest and fastest growing angiosperms known on Earth. Their tiny size, rapid growth by clonal propagation, and facile uptake of labeled compounds from the media were attractive features that made them a well-known model for plant biology from 1950 to 1990. Interest in duckweed has steadily regained momentum over the past decade, driven in part by the growing need to identify alternative plants from traditional agricultural crops that can help tackle urgent societal challenges, such as climate change and rapid population expansion. Propelled by rapid advances in genomic technologies, recent studies with duckweed again highlight the potential of these small plants to enable discoveries in diverse fields from ecology to chronobiology. Building on established community resources, duckweed is reemerging as a platform to study plant processes at the systems level and to translate knowledge gained for field deployment to address some of society’s pressing needs. This review details the anatomy, development, physiology, and molecular characteristics of the Lemnaceae to introduce them to the broader plant research community. We highlight recent research enabled by Lemnaceae to demonstrate how these plants can be used for quantitative studies of complex processes and for revealing potentially novel strategies in plant defense and genome maintenance.

Biochemistry & Molecular Biology↗
DOE OSTI2024

Achieving Cyber-Resilience for Power Systems using a Learning, Model-Assisted Blockchain Framework

The secure integration and management of distributed energy resources (DER) and power aggregators in the electric grid requires secure communications and a physics-aware Command and Control (C2) strategy. A Blockchain (BC)-based overlay network was developed to provide a security layer for the existing power grid network that mitigates risks in current and legacy network and C2 protocols. By integrating a Model-Assisted Machine Learning (MAML) framework with a Secure Blockchain Overlay Network (SBON) a defense-in-depth strategy was achieved. In our approach, the MAML framework leveraged a smart contract framework to gather network data and learn the dynamics of DER to develop detection strategies for attacks targeting sensors and actuators used by DER. The MAML framework learned dynamical systems models for individual DERs to detect sensor attacks. For DER we utilized a Digital Twin (DT) to accelerate the learning process for a model resistant to stealthy attacks. The project created DT for PV inverters and BESS. The DTs were coupled with a model-assisted, data-driven learning of DER behavior. Specifically, we evaluated architectures for model-based learning with model-free fine-tuning. Additionally, differential privacy techniques were used to obfuscate data, while still allowing the computation of attack detection results based on obfuscated data. The SBON developed leverages a private permissioned blockchain network orchestrated with the Hyperledger Fabric framework. To connect the cyber world, which orchestrates the blockchain fabric, and the physical world where the power network resides, we developed a system implementation to enable the secure interaction of the physical world and the abstracted blockchain.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2022

A Cybersecurity Threat Profile for a Connected Lighting System

In anticipation of improved energy performance and cost savings, cities and building owners are increasingly considering “smart lighting initiatives” that aim to convert their collection of simple luminaires (i.e., lighting fixtures) into an intelligent connected lighting system (CLS) capable of remotely monitoring energy consumption and fault conditions, and possibly implementing adaptive lighting schemes. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has set an national goal of tripling the energy efficiency and demand flexibility of the buildings sector by 2030, relative to 2020 levels 1. It is forecast that connected lighting systems can contribute to that goal by delivering 125 TWh of annual energy savings by 2035 2, equivalent to the annual output of 50 typical (500 MW) power plants. However, these energy savings and the DOE goal are put at significant risk if connected technologies are not adopted due to real or perceived cybersecurity concerns. Connected IoT devices such as these have historically been rife with vulnerabilities which sometimes put security considerations secondary to functionality and operability. What are the cybersecurity threats that will impact these systems, as formerly banal luminaires transition into intelligent connected devices that collect information about themselves, their surrounding environment, and possibly us? In this paper we analyze a threat profile performed on a fault-detection use case for streetlights. A threat profile establishes security requirements, justifies security measures, yields actionable controls, and effectively communicates risk to stakeholders. This effort provides critical information for making threat-based decisions to increase security at a reasonable cost, and can effectively be used by development teams, software architects, and managers to make cybersecurity a part of their ongoing culture of awareness, training, and prevention. This leads to more secure systems and better-understood security. On-premise, cloud, and hybrid architectures with different authentication mechanisms were modeled and later categorized using the Microsoft STRIDE framework. An analysis of the recommended controls for each threat was performed to determine which controls could and should be put in place by manufacturers or third-party suppliers, and which controls need to be left up the end-user to implement. Fifty-seven threats were identified. Among our key findings: (1) 65% (37/57) of the threats did not involve the luminaires, but rather the other components needed to communicate with and manage them; (2) 63% (36/57) of the threats could have been mitigated through manufacturer-implemented defensive techniques or “controls”; and (3) 23% (13/57) of the threats were dependent on the network configuration. Recommendations based on the results of this work are made to key stakeholder groups. Notably, lighting technology developers are advised to address all threats that can be reasonably controlled with baked-in technology solutions (e.g., encryption or authentication controls), and employ some form of secure supply chain management and tracking where other parts (e.g., sensors, microprocessors) of a luminaire must also be built and manufactured with the proper security controls in place. Developers should also review threats involving assets not developed in-house to understand how connectivity with other devices will affect their product during system operation and determine if a compensating control for a defense-in-depth strategy will be needed. Finally, those interested in deploying CLS should compare the differences between cloud and on-premise models to determine which is more suitable for their needs and the abilities of their security team.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗
DOE OSTI2024

ChatGPT and Other Large Language Models for Cybersecurity of Smart Grid Applications

Cybersecurity breaches targeting electrical substations constitute a significant threat to the integrity of the power grid, necessitating comprehensive defense and mitigation strategies. Any anomaly in information and communication technology (ICT) should be detected for secure communications between devices in digital substations. This paper proposes large language models (LLMs), e.g., ChatGPT, for the cybersecurity of IEC 61850-based communications. Multi-cast messages such as generic object oriented system events (GOOSE) and sampled values (SV) are used for case studies. The proposed LLM-based cybersecurity framework includes, for the first time, data pre-processing of communication systems and human-in-the-loop (HITL) training (considering the cybersecurity guidelines recommended by humans). The results show a comparative analysis of detected anomaly data carried out based on the performance evaluation metrics for different LLMs. A hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) testbed is used to generate and extract a dataset of IEC 61850 communications.

ChatGPT↗
DOE OSTI2021

Review of internal cyber attacks in nuclear facilities and an artificial neural network model for implementing internal cyberforensics

Deployment of digital technologies within a modern shift in cyber defense systems is essential for protecting the energy production units. One of the important components of defense is cyberforensics: once an attack has been detected to locate its origin. In this paper, a review of well-known cyberattacks in nuclear facilities is provided, with the lessons learned leading to the development of a machine learning approach implementing identification of internal at- tacks in the facility's data networks. Our approach may be seen as one of the layers in a defense-in-depth strategy that identifies if the attack comes from inside, which may result in identifying faster the attacker's origin. The presented model exploits network packet examination to cast accurate predictions on detailing the origin of malicious network connections. The approach fuses multiple mathematical functions within an artificial neural network to provide a response in the form of 0/1, i. e., whether the attack is identified as internal or not. The utilization of a variety of test cases is developed to explore the relevance and validity of the predictive approach. The proposed implementation is examined with network data packet variance, and the results obtained exhibit a highly accurate detection rate.

Nuclear Science & Technology↗
DOE OSTI2025

Internship Presentation: Integrating Safety and Cybersecurity: Security-by-Design with SOWT Analysis for Reactor Testing

This study covers leveraging reactor testing facilities that are primarily designed with a focus on safety to enhance cybersecurity testing. By incorporating reactor security-by-design with reactor safety-by-design principles and adopting defense-in-depth strategies that emphasize both safety and security, the research evaluates applicable cyber tools, models, and solutions. This includes simulating specific cyber-attack scenarios using reactor simulators and performing SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats) analysis to improve the cybersecurity of reactor systems.

21 - SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLAN↗
DOE OSTI2021

Grid Cyber-Security Strategy in an Attacker-Defender Model

The progression of cyber-attacks on the cyber-physical system is analyzed by the Probabilistic, Learning Attacker, and Dynamic Defender (PLADD) model. Although our research does apply to all cyber-physical systems, we focus on power grid infrastructure. The PLADD model evaluates the effectiveness of moving target defense (MTD) techniques. We consider the power grid attack scenarios in the AND configurations and OR configurations. In addition, we consider, for the first time ever, power grid attack scenarios involving both AND configurations and OR configurations simultaneously. Cyber-security managers can use the strategy introduced in this manuscript to optimize their defense strategies. Specifically, our research provides insight into when to reset access controls (such as passwords, internet protocol addresses, and session keys), to minimize the probability of a successful attack. Our mathematical proof for the OR configuration of multiple PLADD games shows that it is best if all access controls are reset simultaneously. For the AND configuration, our mathematical proof shows that it is best (in terms of minimizing the attacker's average probability of success) that the resets are equally spaced apart. We introduce a novel concept called hierarchical parallel PLADD system to cover additional attack scenarios that require combinations of AND and OR configurations.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2024

OASIS: Offsetting Active Reconstruction Attacks in Federated Learning

Federated Learning (FL) has garnered significant attention for its potential to protect user privacy while enhancing model training efficiency. For that reason, FL has found its use in various domains, from health care to industrial engineering, especially where data cannot be easily exchanged due to sensitive information or privacy laws. However, recent research has demonstrated that FL protocols can be easily compromised by active reconstruction attacks executed by dishonest servers. These attacks involve the malicious modification of global model parameters, allowing the server to obtain a verbatim copy of users' private data by inverting their gradient updates. Tackling this class of attack remains a crucial challenge due to the strong threat model. In this paper, we propose a defense mechanism, namely OASIS, based on image augmentation that effectively counteracts active reconstruction attacks while preserving model performance. We first uncover the core principle of gradient inversion that enables these attacks and theoretically identify the main conditions by which the defense can be robust regardless of the attack strategies. We then construct our defense with image augmentation showing that it can undermine the attack principle. Comprehensive evaluations demonstrate the efficacy of the defense mechanism highlighting its feasibility as a solution.

deep neural networks↗
DOE OSTI2022

ASK: Adversarial Soft k-Nearest Neighbor Attack and Defense

K-Nearest Neighbor (kNN)-based deep learning methods have been applied to many applications due to their simplicity and geometric interpretability. However, the robustness of kNN-based deep classification models has not been thoroughly explored and kNN attack strategies are underdeveloped. In this paper, we first propose an Adversarial Soft kNN (ASK) loss for developing more effective kNN-based deep neural network attack strategies and designing better defense methods against them. Our ASK loss provides a differentiable surrogate of the expected kNN classification error. It is also interpretable as it preserves the mutual information between the perturbed input and the in-class-reference data. We use the ASK loss to design a novel attack method called the ASK-Attack (ASK-Atk), which shows superior attack efficiency and accuracy degradation relative to previous kNN attacks on hidden layers. We then derive an ASK-Defense (ASK-Def) method that optimizes the worst-case ASK training loss. Experiments on CIFAR-10 (ImageNet) show that (i) ASK-Atk achieves ≥13% (≥ 13% ) improvement in attack success rate over previous kNN attacks, and (ii) ASK-Def outperforms the conventional adversarial training method by ≥ 6.9% (≥ 3.5% ) in terms of robustness improvement. Relevant codes are available at https://github.com/wangren09/ASK .

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2022

Characterizing the Defense Hierarchy of Populus trichocarpa

The U.S. Departments of Energy and Agriculture are developing bioenergy crops as a sustainable alternative to traditional fossil fuels. Plant disease threatens this effort by inhibiting the efficient production of plant feedstocks for bioenergy. In particular, biotrophic Melampsora leaf rust pathogens can increase morbidity in Populus trichocarpa and its hybrids (aka poplars), the primary woody feedstocks for bioenergy. Controlling rust disease in plantations is thus critical to the success of the poplar bioenergy program. Current efforts to control rust disease focus on plant genetic resistance. However, with novel pathogenic variation generated by the global movement of pathogens and their hybridization, it is increasingly clear that controlling rust disease in a long-lived plant like Populus depends on our ability to understand and manage not only genes for rust resistance, but also short-lived plant microorganisms that contribute to defense against rust (aka “defense mutualists”). Our proposed research thus seeks to develop an integrative, hierarchical model of P. trichocarpa defense that integrates genetic resistance and defense mutualists. Our overarching hypothesis is that defense against Melampsora rust is biologically degenerate, with major and minor plant resistance genes, plant defense compounds, and defense mutualists within the microbiome each contributing to rust resistance under different circumstances. The specific aims of our study will test the placement of each of these factors in the defense hierarchy. Ultimately, it is our hope that disease management strategies harnessing both resistance genes and naturally occurring defense mutualists of P. trichocarpa, and an appreciation of the ecological circumstances in which each is effective, will maximize plant resistance and productivity while minimizing impacts on the surrounding ecological landscape.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2020

Market Opportunities for Deployable Wind Systems for Defense and Disaster Response

This report is the first public deliverable from the Defense and Disaster Deployable Turbine project, funded through the distributed wind portfolio of the U.S. Department of Energy Wind Energy Technologies Office. The objective of the project is to explore the opportunity for deployable turbine technologies to meet the operational energy needs of the U.S. military and global disaster response efforts. This report provides a market assessment that was conducted over a year using public reports, presentations at topical conferences, and direct stakeholder engagement interviews with both military and industry representatives. It begins with the high- level operational energy strategy of the Department of Defense that provides the context for alternatives to diesel fuel to meet energy needs. The report then provides an estimate of the energy use of the military in missions where a deployable turbine could potentially serve as an alternative to the baseline use of diesel fuel in generators to provide electricity in remote locations. An overview of domestic and international disaster response is provided with a focus on the role of the military in providing energy to those events. Finally, the report summarizes the technical considerations that would enable a deployable turbine to meet military and disaster response energy needs including the global wind resource, the technical design of the turbine, and the operational constraints of various military missions.

17 WIND ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2023

A critical review of cyber-physical security for building automation systems

Modern Building Automation Systems (BASs), as the brain that enable the smartness of a smart building, often require increased connectivity both among system components as well as with outside entities, such as the cloud, to enable low-cost remote management, optimized automation via outsourced cloud analytics, and increased building-grid integrations. As smart buildings move towards open communication technologies, providing access to BASs through the building's intranet, or even remotely through the Internet, has become a common practice. However, increased connectivity and accessibility come with increased cyber security threats. BASs were historically developed as closed environments with limited cyber-security considerations. As a result, BASs in many buildings are vulnerable to cyber-attacks that may cause adverse consequences, such as occupant discomfort, excessive energy usage, and unexpected equipment downtime. Therefore, there is a strong need to advance the state-of-the-art in cyber-physical security for BASs and provide practical solutions for attack mitigation in buildings. However, an inclusive and systematic review of BAS vulnerabilities, potential cyber-attacks with impact assessment, detection & defense approaches, and cyber resilient control strategies is currently lacking in the literature. This review paper fills the gap by providing a comprehensive up-to-date review of cyber-physical security for BASs at three levels in commercial buildings: management level, automation level, and field level. The general BASs vulnerabilities and protocol-specific vulnerabilities for the four dominant BAS protocols (i.e., BACnet, KNX, LonWorks, and Modbus) are reviewed, followed by a discussion on four attack targets and seven potential attack scenarios. Furthermore, the impact of cyber-attacks on BASs is summarized as signal corruption, signal delaying, and signal blocking. The typical cyber-attack detection and defense approaches are identified at the three levels. Cyber resilient control strategies for BASs under attack are categorized into passive and active resilient control schemes. Open challenges and future opportunities are finally discussed.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
NASA NTRS2010

An Overview of the NASA Aeronautics Test Program Strategic Plan

U.S. leadership in aeronautics depends on ready access to technologically advanced, efficient, and affordable aeronautics test capabilities. These systems include major wind tunnels and propulsion test facilities and flight test capabilities. The federal government owns the majority of the major aeronautics test capabilities in the United States, primarily through the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the Department of Defense (DoD), however an overarching strategy for management of these national assets was needed. Therefore, in Fiscal Year (FY) 2006 NASA established the Aeronautics Test Program (ATP) as a two-pronged strategic initiative to: (1) retain and invest in NASA aeronautics test capabilities considered strategically important to the agency and the nation, and (2) establish a strong, high level partnership with the DoD Test Resources Management Center (TRMC), stewards of the DoD test and evaluation infrastructure. Since then, approximately seventy percent of the ATP budget has been directed to underpin fixed and variable costs of facility operations within its portfolio and the balance towards strategic investments in its test facilities, including maintenance and capability upgrades. Also, a strong guiding coalition was established through the National Partnership for Aeronautics Testing (NPAT), with governance by the senior leadership of NASA s Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate (ARMD) and the DoD's TRMC. As part of its strategic planning, ATP has performed or participated in many studies and analyses, including assessments of major NASA and DoD aeronautics test capabilities, test facility condition evaluations and market research. The ATP strategy has also benefitted from unpublished RAND research and analysis by Ant n et al. (2009). Together, these various studies, reports and assessments serve as a foundation for a new, five year strategic plan that will guide ATP through FY 2014. Our vision for the future is a balanced portfolio of aeronautics ground and flight test capabilities that advance U.S. leadership in aeronautics in the short and long term. Key to the ATP vision is the concept of availability, not necessarily ownership; that is, NASA does not have to own and operate all facilities that are envisioned for future aeronautics testing. However, ATP will enable access to capabilities which are needed but not owned by NASA through strategic partnerships and reliance agreements. This paper will outline the major aspects of the ATP strategic plan for achieving its mission.

Marshall, Timothy J.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Near-Earth Object Workshops to Assess Reconnaissance for Planetary Defense (NEO WARP)

Based on the third goal of the United States National Preparedness Strategy and Action Plan for Near-Earth Object Hazards and Planetary Defense to “develop technologies for NEO reconnaissance, deflection, and disruption missions” and specifically includes actions aimed at technology development for rapid-response NEO reconnaissance missions.

Planetary Defense↗
DOE OSTI2023

Briefing Book: Office of Experimental Sciences

Key to OES science is the advancement of experimental capabilities and vibrant partnerships with other elements of NNSA’s Defense Programs. OES fosters an experimental portfolio that spans the space from small scale studies utilizing tabletop instruments through complex and dynamic high energy density; hydrodynamic; and subcritical experiments on flagship national facilities like Los Alamos Neutron Science Center (LANSCE), National Ignition Facility (NIF), Z machine at Sandia National Laboratories, Dual Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test (DARHT), and the U1a Complex in Nevada. Essential to meeting the deterrence challenges that drive OES is a functional strategy for integration of OES with Defense Programs pursuits in modeling and simulation, engineering and technology maturation, and stockpile and production modernization.

42 ENGINEERING↗