Aluminum cladding oxidation of prefilmed in-pile fueled experiments
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This report addresses previously identified technical knowledge and technology gaps and presents the key findings of the multiyear, EMTD-funded research efforts with the goal of evaluating whether ASNF can be safely stored dry for many decades and whether changes to existing ASNF management practices are appropriate. The findings formulate the technical basis for the extended dry storage of ASNF, leading to the main conclusion: All completed work to close the identified knowledge gaps on extended (>50 years) ASNF dry storage supports the conclusion that extended ASNF dry storage is both safe and viable.
As the second step towards modeling three-dimensional (3D) multi-physics computational fluid dynamics (CFD) of the unsealed containers in the IFSF facility, the previous methodology used for developing the sealed DOE standard canister model was utilized here. This 3D CFD model considers unsealed canister with small mass exchange with surrounding air as time evolves in the simulation and contains a larger network of chemical reactions to consider due to several of the side reactions occurring in the presence of water vapor, nitrogen, oxygen and carbon dioxide rather than a helium backfilled canister. Similar to the sealed system, the set of full radiolytic chemical reactions of bulk moist air were established, and then reduced to a more manageable set of equations for the computational efficiency of the 3D CFD simulation. Due to the similar size of the unsealed canisters to the sealed DOE canisters, it is assumed that the chemical and thermal response times to changes in the conditions remains similar such that the same time-stepping algorithm can be utilized. This report documents the theory of the model, workflow to establish radiolysis reaction network, and initial simulations of the evolutions of thermal fields, hydrogen gas and nitric acid concentrations within unsealed canisters in conditions relevant to INL INTEC CPP-603 over a long period of time.
As the first step toward developing three-dimensional (3D) multi-physics computational fluid dynamics (CFD) model for unsealed and vented canister storage system, a 3D CFD model coupled with bulk gas radiolysis reactions was developed first for sealed DOE standard canisters filled with inert gas and trace amount of air and water. The workflow for constructing canister-scale 3D CFD models and coupling with gas phase radiolysis reactions were established, which can be readily extended to unsealed, vented canister storage system. This interim milestone report documents the theory of the model, workflow to establish radiolysis reaction network, and initial simulations of the evolutions of thermal fields and hydrogen gas concentrations within sealed DOE standard canisters over long period of time. In addition, a mesh refinement test was done to show that increasing the models mesh refinement had negligible impact upon the temperature profiles.
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According to one aspect of the invention, a method for separating and recovering uranium from a nuclear fuel element. The method includes immersing a nuclear fuel element containing nuclear fuel and cladding in a molten metal. The nuclear fuel includes uranium. The cladding is selectively dissolved from the nuclear fuel element when immersed in the molten metal. The nuclear fuel is separated from the cladding. The method then includes loading the nuclear fuel into a permeable basket that is electrically configured as an anode of an electrolytic cell. There are also a molten salt electrolyte and a cathode in the electrolytic cell. Then, the method includes applying an electric charge across the electrolytic cell. The molten salt electrolyte selectively transfers uranium from the anode to the cathode.
The U.S. Department of Energy decisions for the ultimate disposition of its inventory of used nuclear fuel presently in, and to be received and stored in, the L Basin at the Savannah River Site, and schedule for project execution have not been established. A logical decision timeframe for the DOE is following the review of the overall options for fuel management and disposition by the Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future (BRC). The focus of the BRC review is commercial fuel; however, the BRC has included the DOE fuel inventory in their review. Even though the final report by the BRC to the U.S. Department of Energy is expected in January 2012, no timetable has been established for decisions by the U.S. Department of Energy on alternatives selection. Furthermore, with the imminent lay-up and potential closure of H-canyon, no ready path for fuel disposition would be available, and new technologies and/or facilities would need to be established. The fuel inventory in wet storage in the 3.375 million gallon L Basin is primarily aluminum-clad, aluminum-based fuel of the Materials Test Reactor equivalent design. An inventory of non-aluminum-clad fuel of various designs is also stored in L Basin. Safe storage of fuel in wet storage mandates several high-level 'safety functions' that would be provided by the Structures, Systems, and Components (SSCs) of the storage system. A large inventory of aluminum-clad, aluminum-based spent nuclear fuel, and other nonaluminum fuel owned by the U.S. Department of Energy is in wet storage in L Basin at the Savannah River Site. An evaluation of the present condition of the fuel, and the Structures, Systems, or Components (SSCs) necessary for its wet storage, and the present programs and storage practices for fuel management have been performed. Activities necessary to validate the technical bases for, and verify the condition of the fuel and the SSCs under long-term wet storage have also been identified. The overall conclusion is that the fuel can be stored in L Basin, meeting general safety functions for fuel storage, for an additional 50 years and possibly beyond contingent upon continuation of existing fuel management activities and several augmented program activities. It is concluded that the technical bases and well-founded technologies have been established to store spent nuclear fuel in the L Basin. Methodologies to evaluate the fuel condition and characteristics, and systems to prepare fuel, isolate damaged fuel, and maintain water quality storage conditions have been established. Basin structural analyses have been performed against present NPH criteria. The aluminum fuel storage experience to date, supported by the understanding of the effects of environmental variables on materials performance, demonstrates that storage systems that minimize degradation and provide full retrievability of the fuel up to and greater than 50 additional years will require maintaining the present management programs, and with the recommended augmented/additional activities in this report.
Aluminum clad spent nuclear fuel (SNF) not destined to be reprocessed at Savannah River's H Canyon will eventually be moved from existing wet and dry storage facilities into standardized dry storage systems (e.g., Universal Canisters), ideally suited for disposal. With the current lack of disposal capacity in the U.S., placement of this SNF into dry storage requires plans for demonstrating to the regulator the safety of both the extended storage and the subsequent transportation to a future disposal facility of this SNF. For commercial SNF, concerns related to extended dry storage and subsequent transportation have been, and continue to be, addressed through several demonstration projects including, but not limited to, one for the lower burnup SNF at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) and one for the higher burnup SNF at Dominion's North Anna Power Station. Lessons learned from the more recent Orano led higher burnup demonstration project (HBU Demo Project) provides relevant information for advancing the concept of a 'smart cask' system for dry interim storage, which will allow for collection of data to support the safety demonstration for extended dry storage and subsequent transportation of the aluminum clad SNF. This 'smart cask' would eliminate the need for multiple demonstration projects that may have to be performed for different types of aluminum clad SNF designs and/or for potentially age distinguishing parameters, such as burnup or initial enrichment. This 'smart cask' would be developed and deployed by leveraging the HBU Demo Project's experience associated with modifying and deploying a TN-32B bolted carbon steel vertical storage cask system to monitor key parameters related to the criticality, structural, confinement, and thermal safety of the SNF and the canister system containing this SNF. This paper will focus on how the extensive design, licensing, and fabrication experience accumulated by the HBU Demo Project's cask system can be leveraged to support the design, licensing, and fabrication of a 'smart cask' system intended to support/confirm the interim dry storage, potential extended storage, and subsequent transportation of aluminum clad SNF, such as the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) SNF. (authors)
Casting of aluminum alloy three layers of clad strip was tried using the two sets of twin roll casters, and effects of the casting parameters on the cladding conditions were investigated. One twin roll caster was mounted on the other twin roll caster. Base strip was 8079 aluminum alloy and overlay strips were 6022 aluminum alloy. Effects of roll-load of upper and lower casters and melt temperature of the lower caster were investigated. When the roll-load of the upper and lower caster was large enough, the overlay strip could be solidified and be connected. The overlay strip could be connected when the melt of the overlay strip cast by the lower caster was low enough. Sound three layers of clad strip could be cast by proper conditions.
Approximately 27 MTHM of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) owned and managed by the U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Environmental Management is stored in the L Basin at the Savannah River Site (SRS). This 'DOE SNF' is comprised of approximately 12,000 aluminum-clad, aluminum-based fuel assemblies (∼7 MTHM), and approximately 2000 non-aluminum fuel assemblies (∼20 MTHM). A program is in progress to perform Non-Destructive Examination (NDE) of the fuel and their storage containers to characterize the materials' condition, and to evaluate the effects of service to enable continued safe wet storage of the SNF. The Augmented Monitoring and Condition Assessment Program (AMCAP), a two-part program to develop and implement remote underwater Non-Destructive Examination of the aluminum SNF, and of the containers of the non-aluminum SNF, respectively, is aimed at the characterization and evaluation of corrosion degradation of aluminum fuel and container materials. The predominant design of the aluminum SNF (ASNF) stored in L Basin is the Materials Test Reactor (MTR) equivalent design, a plate fuel design. These SNF are stored in 5'' diameter tubes or 5'' x 5'' squares (called bundles) that are nominally 12' or up to 14' long. The SNF is de-bundled and inspected using a custom-designed MTR Fuel Inspection Table. The inspection table provides for indexed fuel positioning for a video camera examination with controlled lighting. A total of 10 of the SNF originating from foreign research and test reactors were selected for examination based on burnup, enrichment, and prior damage caused by service/storage history. A special inspection campaign of these 10 assemblies is in progress. The observed corrosion damage included minor to moderate attack from general corrosion, pitting, crevice, end grain and galvanic corrosion. Example results from the completed inspections are shown and discussed. The focus is a comparison of the as-received condition versus the as-found current storage condition that will serve to validate Water Chemistry and Corrosion Monitoring Programs. The non-aluminum SNF (NASNF) stored in L Basin are of diverse design that includes various geometries with claddings of stainless steel, Zircaloy, and Hastelloy. The fuel core materials include uranium alloys, oxides/mixed oxides, and carbides. These SNF materials, originating from early experimental and test reactors, are in various physical forms including single fuel elements and cut pieces. The fuel is stored in L Basin in various configurations including in direct bundled storage in aluminum tubes and in isolation cans that are in the bundles or in a larger over-size storage container (OSC). Concern with inside-out corrosion and the potential loss of configuration control and ability to handle the storage containers prompted the development of remote NDE methods that include visual and UT technologies to assess the condition of the containers. Candidate stored materials were selected for a special inspection campaign; the development of the NDE methods for the inspection for galvanic, crevice and sediment-induced corrosion (inside-out) are discussed. A summary of the SNF storage in L Basin at the SRS, and an overview of the AMCAP to enable continued safe storage of DOE SNF are described. (authors)
The welding of aluminum-clad fuel plates into aluminum alloy 6061 side plate tubing is a unique design feature of the High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) fuel assemblies as 101 full-penetration circumferential gas metal arc welds (GMAW) are required in the fabrication of each assembly. In a HFIR fuel assembly, 540 aluminum-clad fuel plates are assembled into two nested annular fuel elements 610 mm (24-inches) long. The welding process for the HFIR fuel elements was developed in the early 1960 s and about 450 HFIR fuel assemblies have been successfully welded using the GMAW process qualified in the 1960 s. In recent years because of the degradation of the electronic and mechanical components in the old HFIR welding system, reportable defects in plate attachment or adapter welds have been present in almost all completed fuel assemblies. In October 2008, a contract was awarded to AMET, Inc., of Rexburg, Idaho, to replace the old welding equipment with standard commercially available welding components to the maximum extent possible while maintaining the qualified HFIR welding process. The upgraded HFIR welding system represents a major improvement in the welding system used in welding HFIR fuel elements for the previous 40 years. In this upgrade, the new inner GMAW torch is a significant advancement over the original inner GMAW torch previously used. The innovative breakthrough in the new inner welding torch design is the way the direction of the cast in the 0.762 mm (0.030-inch) diameter aluminum weld wire is changed so that the weld wire emerging from the contact tip is straight in the plane perpendicular to the welding direction without creating any significant drag resistance in the feeding of the weld wire.
The AMCAP MTR Fuel Inspection Program, a special inspection program comprised of four inspection campaigns, examined a total of ten (10) pre-selected aluminum-clad, aluminum-based fuel core spent nuclear fuel assemblies (ASNF) stored in the L Area Disassembly Basin (L Basin) at the Savannah River Site. A full description of the inspections and the results are reported. The fuel had been stored in bundled-tube storage (Vertical Tube Storage) for periods of 18 to 21 years. The prior service experience of the individual 10 assemblies varies, but all included irradiation followed by wet storage at international research reactor sites prior to shipment to the US and storage in L Basin. The 10 assemblies were expected to be among the “worst"’ in terms of prior corrosion damage of the entire inventory of the direct-bundle-stored ASNF in L Basin. The inventory of MTR ASNF in L Basin will continue to be stored in the bundled-tube configuration or in slug-storage buckets with inserts pending retrieval for ultimate disposition. The MTR fuel inspections focused on collecting information for characterization of the material condition of the ASNF considering various types of aluminum fuel corrosion degradation of its assembled materials in water storage. A custom-designed Fuel Inspection Table was used to stage the fuel for remote, enhanced visual examination (close-up video imaging & recording) with controlled lighting and positioning that enables reproducibility of imaging conditions. The inspections were conducted by fuel subject matter expert staff from Spent Fuel Project Engineering (SFPE) and the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL). Stills captured from the video records were used to compare the corrosion evolution from previous records, as available. This evaluation of the inspection results including the comparison to the previous inspection results demonstrate that the water quality and the storage configuration of ASNF in L Basin do not cause aggressive corrosion degradation of the fuel; mitigation of the prior corrosion degradation of the fuel also appears to have been achieved with the good water quality conditions of L Basin. Recommendations are made for future inspection of the fuel to trend corrosion degradation and demonstrate continued safe wet storage of the ASNF in L Basin. The next fuel examination is recommended to be performed in 5 years.
Following discharge from research reactors, spent nuclear fuel may be stored 'wet' in water pools or basins, or it may be stored 'dry' in various configurations including non-sealed or sealed containers until retrieved for ultimate disposition. Interim safe storage practices are based on avoiding degradation to the fuel that would impact functions related to safety. Recommended practices including environmental controls with technical bases, are outlined for wet storage and dry storage of aluminum-clad, aluminum-based research reactor fuel. For wet storage, water quality must be maintained to minimize corrosion degradation of aluminum fuel. For dry storage, vented canister storage of aluminum fuel readily provides a safe storage configuration. For sealed dry storage, drying must be performed so as to minimize water that would cause additional corrosion and hydrogen generation. Consideration must also be given to the potential for radiolytically-generated hydrogen from the bound water in the attendant oxyhydroxides on aluminum fuel from reactor operation for dry storage systems.
An engineering effort is underway to re-establish capability to produce 238Pu oxide at the kilogram scale in the United States. A multi-step batch process is being developed to produce this important material. Recently, a portion of this process was studied using discrete-event simulation tools to determine whether the conceptual process might achieve its yearly production goal. The study showed the conceptual process can meet the yearly production goal under some circumstances, but process improvements would be needed to ensure greater likelihood of success. This study extends the work performed previously by examining the effects of changing the reactor target design on the yearly process output. Two new reactor target configurations are considered an aluminum-clad reactor target containing 50% greater 237Np oxide content than the original target, and a zirconium alloy-clad target using no aluminum. The results indicate that use of the new aluminum-clad target configuration may allow the process to achieve the same yearly production goal in less time using fewer targets. If the zirconium alloy-clad target is used, then even fewer targets would be needed to reach the production goal, but some process changes would be required to handle the zirconium cladding. The number of days needed to process a target batch to completion, and the steady state 238Pu oxide production rate, for each configuration are compared to the results from the initial simulation study.
The United States government currently manages nearly 13 metric tons of aluminum-clad spent nuclear fuel (SNF) without a long-term storage solution, so a fundamental understanding of corrosion processes occurring on aluminum alloy surfaces is of utmost importance to plan for extended (>50 years) interim dry storage of aluminum-clad SNF. While thermal and chemical corrosion processes are well characterized for aluminum, radiation effects are not. To help understand the impacts of radiation on aluminum-clad SNF, here the radiation-induced molecular hydrogen gas (H 2 ) generation from pristine and pre-corroded aluminum alloy 1100 (Al-1100) coupons have been studied. Corrosion of coupons was achieved by submerging coupons in water at 95 °C for 29 days, yielding a ~5 μm boehmite/bayerite oxide film. Pre-corroded coupons were exposed to cobalt-60 gamma radiation to absorbed doses of up to 1.0 MGy under a variety of conditions: cover-gas composition (argon, nitrogen, or air), relative humidity (0, 50, and 100%), and temperature (ambient, 100, and 200 °C). Post-irradiation measurements demonstrated that the yield of H 2 was directly attributable to the presence of the Al-1100 coupons and their physisorbed water with dependence on absorbed gamma dose, relative humidity, and cover-gas composition. No H 2 was quantified in the presence of air, while both nitrogen and argon environments afforded higher H 2 yields with increasing relative humidities. This was attributed to the greater availability of adsorbed water for radiolytic processes. Irradiation of pre-corroded Al-1100 coupons at different temperatures under 0% relative humidity argon conditions yielded statistically equivalent H 2 yields for ambient temperatures and 100 °C. However, irradiation at 200 °C promoted a 3 to 4-fold increase in the yield of H 2 , possibly due to the transformation of bayerite to boehmite and/or improved efficiency of H • and H 2 release from oxide surfaces.
The reactivity initiated accident (RIA) is a postulated accident in light water reactors initiated by a rapid increase in reactivity which causes an increase in fission rate and fuel temperature. One potential mode of fuel system failure during RIA is pellet cladding mechanical interaction (PCMI) due to the rapid thermal expansion of the fuel pellet. Simulated PCMI experiments were performed by rapidly pressurizing iron-chromium-aluminum (FeCrAl) cladding tube samples using a hydraulic modified burst test system, causing the specimens to burst under a biaxial loading path. Deformation and rupture of the specimens were tracked with a telecentric lens and high-speed camera system. Outer surface strains were calculated using digital image correlation (DIC) on speckle patterns painted on the specimens’ outer surfaces. Experiments were conducted at approximately 275 °C, representative of hot zero power RIA conditions. The failure hoop strain was DIC-calculated between approximately 1.8–3.4%, corresponding to quasi-static energy depositions of approximately 110–260 calories per gram UO 2 assuming initial pellet-cladding contact. These conditions are very similar to the proposed energy deposition limit of 150 calories per gram UO 2 for unirradiated zirconium-based cladding in US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Draft Regulatory Guide 1327. A very small strain rate dependence was observed in the data, with the magnitude of the failure hoop strain decreasing slightly with increasing strain rate. This observed dependence may be relevant because the FeCrAl cladding strain rate will be approximately 20% higher than in zirconium-based cladding due to the harder neutron spectrum and resultant shorter neutron generation time.