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At least 73 records · Page 4
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2020

Nuclear Criticality Safety Assessment of Criticality Control Containers without Moderation Control at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) provides for safe, permanent disposal of government-owned transuranic (TRU) and TRU mixed wastes. Receipt and disposal of waste at the WIPP site began in March 1999. The Sandia report, Consideration of Nuclear Criticality When Disposing of Transuranic Waste at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, addressed potential nuclear criticality safety issues based on the projected inventory characteristics known at the time [1]. As designs for inventory, waste forms, and disposal packages have changed, new analyses have been performed, and updates have been made to address any potential effects to the WIPP safety basis. New analyses performed include Saylor 2017 [2] and Brickner 2019 [3], which address certain waste containers with specified loadings under post-closure conditions. Both examined several hypothetical scenarios and included analyses to bound (from a criticality potential standpoint) credible configurations that could occur at WIPP during the repository regulatory post-closure disposal time period for feature, event, and process (FEP) considerations—10,000 years. During this post-closure period at WIPP, the screening of FEPs is governed by the risk-based standards and implementing regulations of the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) (i.e., 40 CFR 191 and 40 CFR 194, respectively) [4,5]. An FEP screening can be based on either a low-consequence or low-probability rationale. A low-probability rationale includes either (a) a qualitative rationale that the FEP is not credible or (b) a quantitative demonstration that the probability is less than 10-4 in 104 years. In this evaluation, a qualitative lowprobability rationale of not credible is used by demonstrating that bounding configurations of the waste are not critical. The demonstration of subcriticality is through quantitative calculations, but a probability of criticality is not evaluated. Rather, the rationale for this evaluation is that bounding configurations with an effective neutron multiplication factor (keff) well below the upper subcriticality limit (USL) make criticality incredible. Reference [2] documented a nuclear criticality assessment of the WIPP repository for disposal of dilute surplus plutonium materials using the Dilute and Dispose Approach and packaging in criticality control overpacks (CCOs). The CCO is the waste disposal container recently designed to allow for up to 380 fissile gram equivalent (FGE) 239 Pu per drum, which is a higher fissile loading than typical waste containers. The CCO consists of a criticality control container (CCC) positioned by upper and lower plywood spacers within a standard 55 gal drum. The CCC is used to establish a geometry control for fissile materials during transportation and WIPP emplacement operations. The current WIPP waste acceptance criteria for CCO payloads limit beryllium to less than or equal to 1% by weight of the waste contents and require the waste form to be non-machine compacted. Reference [2] considered two scenario progressions—room closure from salt creep, hereafter referred to as the reconfigured dry scenario, and flooding with brine, hereafter referred to as the reconfigured wet scenario. The subsequent drying out of the reconfigured wet scenarios was also considered. For all scenarios, subcriticality was maintained when 50 g of B 4 C (acting as a neutron absorber) per CCC was intermixed within the plutonium disposition waste form. The analysis used a waste form description that limits the amount of moderation that could be present within the waste form (i.e., it limits the amount of water and polyethylene that could be present based on planned processing conditions). This analysis to evaluate increased limits on the amount of moderation that could be present was performed as a companion to Reference [2] to address concerns associated with verifying moisture and/or plastic contents of waste materials following packaging of dilute surplus plutonium in the CCO. To that end, this analysis used the models and methods from Reference [2] to evaluate a more generic base waste form consisting of water and polyethylene that is more similar (and nearly identical) to the generic waste forms utilized in other models/analyses supporting the TRU Package Transporter Model II (TRUPACTII) safety analysis [6] (all are without moderation controls). The waste form in this analysis uses a base mixture of 75% water and 25% polyethylene, the total amount of which is varied to determine the optimum moderation to fissile material (H/Pu) ratio. The fissile loading is maintained at up to 380 FGE 239 Pu (modeled as PuO 2 ) per CCO with an additional 545 g of beryllium (to bound the 1% by weight contents restriction) and 50 g of B 4 C intermixed per CCO. The beryllium content (1% by weight) is based on the total allowed waste weight (this does not include packaging and container weights). Figures ES-1 and ES-2 display summary results, showing that with this model including 50 g of B 4 C per CCO, the system keff remains under 0.85 for all moderator amounts and provides a significant margin against post-closure criticality under postulated bounding conditions for compaction. Figure ES-1 compares an infinite model with a room model at the initial emplacement spacing and under full radial compaction. Full radial compaction places each CCC in direct contact and does not credit any anticipated spacing associated with current post-closure geomechanical modeling of the repository [7]. The effects of variations in the H/Pu ratio were evaluated by varying the amount of the water/polyethylene component of the waste model, with fissile loading maintained at 380 239 Pu FGE. Similarly, Figure ES-2 illustrates how various amounts of B 4 C per CCO influence k eff at different radial compactions, all at the H/Pu ratio of 200 (in the room array model). Therefore, while the results from Saylor 2017 [2] modeled more realistic process limits associated with packaging of dilute surplus plutonium, this analysis demonstrates that limits on moderation (plastic and water content) are not necessary to ensure subcriticality in the WIPP repository, provided the requisite B 4 C absorber is present.

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DOE OSTI2020

2020 NEPA Polychlorinated Biphenyl (PCB) Risk Assessment

The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) facility is a U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) operating repository 654 m below the surface in a thick salt formation in southeastern New Mexico. The DOE disposes transuranic (TRU) waste produced from atomic energy defense activities at the WIPP facility. A portion of the waste shipped to the WIPP facility contains TRU radionuclides co-mingled with polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), which fall under U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulations implementing the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA). This report documents the risks of PCBs co-mingled with TRU waste (hereafter designated as PCB/TRU waste) designated for disposal at the WIPP facility. This analysis is input to the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) assessment by the DOE Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO) for the proposed increase of the WIPP facility disposal area to include additional waste panels (but not to increase the legislated WIPP volume). This analysis is not a compliance calculation to support a certification renewal nor does it support a planned change request (PCR) or planned change notice (PCN) to be submitted to the EPA.

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DOE OSTI2020

Summary Report for the NEPA Impact Analysis. Revision 1

The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), located in southeastern New Mexico, has been developed by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) for the geologic (deep underground) disposal of defense-related transuranic (TRU) waste. Containment of TRU waste at the WIPP facility is derived from standards set forth in Title 40 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 191. The DOE assesses compliance with the containment standards according to the Certification Criteria in Title 40 CFR Part 194 by means of Performance Assessment (PA) calculations performed by Sandia National Laboratories (SNL). WIPP PA calculations estimate the probability of radionuclide releases from the repository to the accessible environment for a regulatory period of 10,000 years after facility closure. The DOE Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO) has initiated a National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) action for a proposal to excavate and use additional transuranic (TRU) waste disposal panels at the WIPP facility. This report documents an analysis undertaken as part of an effort to evaluate the potential environmental consequences of the proposed action. Although not explicitly required for a NEPA analysis, evaluations of a dose indicator to hypothetical members of the public after final facility closure are presented in this report. The analysis is carried out in two stages: first, Performance Assessment (PA) calculations quantify the potential releases to the accessible environment over a 10,000-year post-closure period. Second, dose was evaluated for three hypothetical exposure pathways using the conservative radionuclide concentrations assumed to be released to the accessible environment.

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DOE OSTI2020

Shear Behavior of Artificial Clay Seams within Bedded Salt Structures

Bedded salt contains thin layers of clay, also known as clay seams, in-between far thicker layers of salt. These inhomogeneities are thought to have first-order effects on the closure of nearby drifts and potential roof collapses. Despite their importance, characterizations of the peak shear strength and residual shear strength of clay seams in salt are extremely rare in the published literature. A previous paper reported results from laboratory direct shear experiments on clay seam samples from the Permian Basin in New Mexico. These clay seams behaved similar to intact salt, which was attributed to the abundance of salt crystals intersecting the clay seams. None of those specimens contained a distinct ¼" - ½" (6 -12 mm) thick clay seam, as has been observed in drifts at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). Due to the difficulty in obtaining WIPP samples with these types of clay seams, artificial seams of bentonite and brine sandwiched between sections of salt were created and shear tested. Eight 4" diameter samples were created with either a ¼" or ½" a thick seam and then consolidated at 3000 psi prior to shear testing. The direct shear tests on these samples were performed at nominal normal stresses representative of expected WIPP in-situ conditions (500 to 1500 psi). The resulting shear stress vs. shear displacement curves exhibited a peak followed by a gradual decay of shear strength. The shear stress never transitioned to a true residual shear stress plateau, so the final shear strength at the end of each test (0.75" of shear displacement) was analyzed instead. Both the peak shear strength and the final shear strength conformed to Mohr- Coulomb behavior with friction angles and cohesion strengths consistent with a saturated, highly consolidated, clay. These new artificial clay seam results and the previous clay-interspersed-with-salt results likely bound the expected shear behavior of WIPP clay seams.

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DOE OSTI2022

White Paper on Lithium-Ion Battery Safety for use in Safety Planning at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) is an underground facility designed to safely dispose of radioactive waste. The WIPP uses many heavy vehicles to transport materials and equipment underground. Most of these vehicles are powered by traditional internal combustion engines (ICE) with diesel fuel. Recently, electric vehicles (EVs) powered with batteries have been used at the WIPP. EVs have very low operational and maintenance costs, not considering battery replacements, and they have zero emissions during operation. This absence of emissions makes them ideal for underground facilities with limited ventilation. Even if a facility has robust ventilation normally, ventilation systems can break down leading to restrictions in ICE powered operations. Figure 1 shows a rendering of the WIPP.

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DOE OSTI2024

Solidification of SRPPF Aqueous Recovery Liquid: Process Disruptions

Savannah River National Laboratory has identified a magnesium oxysulfate grout formulation to solidify the liquid effluent from the Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility (SRPPF) Aqueous Recovery System (ARS). The formulation uses reactive, light burnt MgO, anhydrous MgSO 4 , and dead burnt MgO and provides good mixability, similar density to the original Portland Cement-based mix, and a leachate pH of 9.39, within the assumed Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) brine pH range. The formulation will solidify the effluent using a solid first, lost paddle design, within a 55-gallon drum. A series of seven different process disruptions, or irregular processing during the expected ARS liquid effluent solidification process, were completed to assess the severity of the impact of the process disruption and how the formulation behaves under these conditions. Seven process disruptions were investigated including: No Mixing, Partial Mixing, Compacted/Stratified, Sealed, Overfilled, Underfilled, and Undermixed. The impact on solidification, leachate pH, Er (a Pu/Am surrogate) distribution, and density of the resulting grout were established. Overall, four of the process disruptions, No Mixing, Partial Mixing, Compacted/Stratified, and Overfilled, resulted in basic, unabsorbed liquid that would require additional solidification to be acceptable for WIPP. Most solids generated in this testing met the expected WIPP leachate pH requirements. Solids from the Compacted/Stratified process disruption test, however, produced a leachate pH slightly above the assumed range in the WIPP performance assessment. The distribution of Er for most of the tests was relatively consistent. The No Mixing process disruption test, however, resulted in non-homogeneous Er distribution, indicating that radioactive material would not be evenly distributed throughout this solid’s matrix. The Overfilled test is the only mix with a density slightly below the acceptable value. The Sealed and Overmixed tests produced a solid closest to the standard mix with no unabsorbed liquid, expected leachate pH levels, consistent Er concentrations, and expected density, indicating these process disruptions do not have a negative impact on the final grout form. Based on the other process disruptions, it is critical to have premixed dry materials and a well-defined mixing process to produce a solid, homogeneous magnesium oxysulfate cement, with no unabsorbed liquid. These process disruption tests show that the lack of adequate mixing is fundamental to creating an improperly solidified material that may require remediation.

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